The Battle of Peach Tree Creek
Page 14
The Federals also marveled at the relatively light casualties Newton suffered on July 20, despite the slim protection of their works. Luther Bradley thought success carried a “cheap” price. Newton reported only 102 casualties in his division and attributed it to “the partial protection of the rail barricades, and the fine natural position.” He could also have noted that Hardee failed to bring to bear his artillery in an important way to pound that position, for the slim rail works would have offered little protection against such fire. The fact that no Confederate unit closed in on Newton’s line also must account for the light casualties in Federal ranks. Kimball reported losing only 34 men out of a total of 1,400 engaged in his brigade. The 24th Wisconsin in Kimball’s command suffered two casualties. Bradley’s brigade lost twenty-four men while the 42nd Illinois in that brigade counted only two men wounded that afternoon.61
Hardee never estimated the losses in his corps, nor did any of his subordinates report their casualties. No doubt on the basis of reports fed him by officers in Newton’s division, Howard estimated that Hardee suffered losses of 1,500 men. This probably is about right considering that total Confederate casualties in Hardee’s and Stewart’s commands are estimated at 2,500 men.62
As the day waned, and Maney’s and Walker’s troops remained relatively close to the scene of action, a number of Confederates who were isolated between the lines worked their way toward the enemy. They had gotten into positions of danger and hid behind trees or undulations of the ground until drumming up enough courage to show themselves. When this happened the Federals on that part of the field stopped firing and yelled, “Come on Johnny, you shan’t be hurt.” As John Wesley Marshall of the 97th Ohio reported, a given Confederate often would begin to come into Union lines, but some other Federal a short distance away “would yell at him to come there, thus completely bewildering him.” As Marshall put it, every Yankee wanted “to have the fun of taking him in.”63
In this way the Federals of Newton’s division celebrated and enjoyed their surprising defensive victory of the day. In this way, some bewildered Confederates put an end to Hardee’s surprising and dismal failure.
6: Featherston versus Ward
I waited till they came close enough, & then without any orders from any one, I ordered my Brigade to charge.
—Benjamin Harrison
A victory snatched from the trembling balance of battle.
—John Coburn
Unlike Hardee, Stewart prepared energetically to lead his Army of Mississippi into battle on July 20. He disseminated detailed information about the attack plan, gave inspirational talks to the troops, and injected an air of optimism and opportunity for his command. He would face far tougher odds than Hardee. Returns dated July 10 indicate Stewart had 13,354 men present for duty, but historians have estimated his troop strength as significantly lower ten days later. Thomas Robson Hay believes Stewart led 11,000 men on July 20, while the four Union divisions opposing his sector mustered 16,682 troops. Confederate dispositions had inadvertently massed too many men on one sector and not enough on another; better planning could have evened out this differential if Hood had more time and experience to plan the battle.1
The contest between Stewart and Hooker played out on a rugged battlefield along the high ground just south of Peach Tree Creek. Geary’s division and the skirmish lines of Ward’s division and Williams’s division ran along the second ridge south of the creek, the highest ground in the area. Collier Road also ran along that ridge connecting to the Buck Head and Atlanta Road on the east, near the right flank of Newton’s division, and to Howell’s Mill Road on the west, at the location of Hiram H. Embry’s plantation. Collier Road had once been a section of the old Montgomery Ferry Road that linked Decatur with the Chattahoochee River. Andrew J. Collier’s gristmill was situated on a stream that drained northward into Peach Tree Creek about halfway between the Buck Head and Atlanta Road and Howell’s Mill Road. It was variously called Shoal Creek, or Early Creek, or Tanyard Branch.2
Williams’s division, after crossing Peach Tree Creek early on July 20, had moved along a small country road toward the southwest before stopping part way up the high ground at a collection of buildings. If Williams had continued, he would have reached Embry’s plantation and the junction of Collier Road with Howell’s Mill Road. Ward had also crossed Peach Tree Creek early on July 20 and, like Williams, had been told by Hooker to rest his men near the creek. Due to Hooker’s nonchalance that morning, there were two gaps in his corps line to either side of Geary, covered only by skirmishers.3
The key to Hooker’s position was the second rise of ground that his skirmishers and Geary held. On Ward’s sector, the left of the Twentieth Corps position, the ground rose as one moved southward from the Peach Tree Creek bottomland until reaching the first rise, which had a covering of small pine trees. Then the landscape descended into a ravine that drained westward into Shoal Creek. Collier’s Mill was located at the junction of these two streams. The ground once again ascended to the second rise, which was a bit higher than the first and largely clear of trees. Here Collier Road was sunk in places and had rail fences on both sides of the roadway—a pretty good defensive position. The ground was largely open in front of Ward’s division with patches of timber especially within the ravine, which lay about 350 yards from Ward’s resting troops. The ravine at its deepest had slopes some thirty feet high. It was another 200 yards at least from the ravine to Collier Road. John Coburn estimated that the ground rose some seventy feet in 400 yards as one walked south from the Peach Tree Creek bottomland.4
Lieut. Col. Edward Bloodgood’s 22nd Wisconsin skirmished forward to the second ridge on Ward’s sector. After establishing his men along Collier Road, Bloodgood saw a thick belt of timber half a mile across the open ground in front. Within that timber signs of Confederate activity could be detected; the enemy appeared to be “massing preparatory to a charge.”5
The Confederates were indeed preparing to attack. After taking command of the Army of Mississippi on July 7, Stewart had yet to lead it into battle, and he was determined to do all he could to make the charge a success. Loring’s Division held the right, Walthall’s Division the center, and French’s Division the left of the Army of Mississippi line. Each division had detached a brigade to hold Hood’s left flank near the Western and Atlantic Railroad and the Chattahoochee River; therefore, each division commander could use only two remaining brigades against their opponents.6
Alexander P. Stewart, fighting his new command, the Army of Mississippi, for the first time on July 20. (Library of Congress, LC-DIG-ppmsca-20282)
On Loring’s sector, Brig. Gen. Winfield Scott Featherston’s Brigade of Mississippi troops held the right connecting with Maney’s Division of Hardee’s Corps. Featherston had only 1,230 men available for the assault. He had left 200 of his troops on picket duty along the sector his brigade held before the grand shift to the right earlier that day. Born in Tennessee, “Old Swet,” as Featherston was called, had served in the United States Congress and worked as a lawyer in Holly Springs, Mississippi. Featherston commanded the 17th Mississippi in Virginia before transfer to the West and elevation to a brigade command.7
“The plan of the battle was fully explained to me by Genl Loring,” Featherston told Hood after the war. He understood that an interval of 300 yards was required in the echelon formation and that all units were “to oblique to the left, and sweep down the creek.” Perhaps more importantly, Loring imparted an air of urgency to the operation. “My orders were to fix bayonets and charge their works when we reached them, to stop for no obstacle, however formidable, but to make the attack a desperate one.” Featherston imparted these instructions accurately to his regimental officers. Loring told Featherston that only part of Thomas’s army was yet across Peach Tree Creek and was vulnerable to a vigorous, determined assault.8
In order to reach a point where such an assault could be delivered, Featherston had to worm his command through a thick belt of timbe
r that fronted the Peach Tree Creek Line. His men moved forward by the right flank by companies, the easiest way to deal with a forest. The regiments resumed their normal line upon reaching the Confederate skirmish position at the northern edge of this timber. The brigade assembled there with the 40th Mississippi on the left, then the 31st, 22nd, 3rd, and 33rd Mississippi in succession to the right. The 1st Mississippi Battalion of Sharpshooters acted as skirmishers for the brigade, supported by a company each from the 22nd and 40th Mississippi. Some 600 to 700 yards north, across open ground, lay Collier Road and the Union skirmish line held by Bloodgood’s Wisconsin regiment.9
Featherston was ready by about 3 P.M. according to his watch, but he had to wait at least ten minutes for Maney’s Division to move forward 300 yards. Then he gave the order for his Mississippians to move out. “I was struck with surprise at the time we moved to the front,” Featherston told Hood after the war, “that no guns, either artillery or small arms were heard on our right save a feeble skirmish.” Featherston assumed this meant that Maney found no Union troops in his front. He could not imagine, given the sense of urgency imparted by Stewart and Loring, that Hardee’s men would have failed to find and drive any blue-coated opponents before them.10
Featherston versus Ward
Featherston’s men advanced “with eagerness and rapidity” at the double-quick. “Troops never marched into the field of conflict with more determination, coolness & courage than my command did on this occasion,” he told Loring. “The charge was made in gallant style.” Some parts of the brigade moved through patches of woods, and the entire line came upon a marshy swale 300 yards from Collier Road. Several regiments once again moved by the right of companies to negotiate this obstacle. Maj. Martin A. Oatis’s 22nd Mississippi endured “a murderous enfilade fire” from Union guns located in the left wing of Geary’s division while crossing the swale. Massing his men to move through the footpaths civilians had made through the swale increased his casualties to this fire. “In effecting the passage of this marsh I lost many of my bravest and best officers and men,” Oatis sadly admitted. Once across the swale, Featherston’s men endured direct fire from Bloodgood’s 22nd Wisconsin. The Federals had no hope of holding off an entire brigade, so they retired as the enemy closed in. The Union fortifications were slight and temporary, Featherston noted, and he also discovered that there was no sign of Maney’s Division to the right. His flank was in the air.11
Featherston gloated that the Federal skirmishers were “thrown into confusion and driven back,” but Bloodgood actually kept a good hand on his men. As soon as the Mississippi brigade emerged into view, approaching “with the true rebel yell,” he sent a message to Coburn for assistance. Bloodgood waited until the enemy was only thirty feet from the road before ordering the 22nd Wisconsin to retire. The regiment fell back into the ravine between the first and second ridges. Just then, Coburn’s brigade came rushing up to the first ridge to help, and Featherston’s Brigade crowded on top of the second ridge almost simultaneously. It looked to many Federal observers located farther north on this open battlefield as if Bloodgood’s lone regiment had held off an entire brigade and was now hotly pursued.12
Featherston’s men stopped at Collier Road, seeing it as a good defensive position, and fired a short while. Then parts of the brigade continued to move forward. Capt. Moses Jackson’s 33rd Mississippi on the far right of the brigade advanced beyond the captured Union skirmish line and down the slope of the ravine that lay between it and the first ridge. Part of Oatis’s 22nd Mississippi in the center of the brigade line pursued Bloodgood’s retreating men for about forty or fifty yards until stopping at the military crest of the ridge, if one looked north. The fortified Union skirmish line, of course, looked south and found more advantageous ground where Collier Road was located on the natural crest of the ridge top. In short, unlike the men of the 33rd Mississippi, some of the 22nd Mississippi troops did not go down into the ravine between the two ridges. All of Capt. Charles A. Huddleston’s 40th Mississippi on the far left of the brigade advanced forty yards beyond the captured Union skirmish line and stopped. It received a great deal of Federal artillery fire from Geary’s division to the left. This fire “decimated the ranks to a very considerable extent,” reported Huddleston. Col. Thomas A. Mellon’s 3rd Mississippi also remained on the crest of the ridge rather than advance into the ravine.13
No one in Featherston’s Brigade clearly explained why only part of the command advanced beyond the captured Union skirmish line. On the basis of Confederate reports, the 31st and 33rd Mississippi moved down into the ravine separating the two ridges. Part of the 22nd Mississippi also moved into the ravine, and the 1st Mississippi Battalion of Sharpshooters apparently was in a position to contribute to the Confederate forward movement. The 3rd and 40th Mississippi remained on the second ridge near Collier Road. At best, it can be said that four of the six units in Featherston’s Brigade moved beyond the second ridge and toward the hole in Hooker’s position. The entire brigade took 1,230 men into action, which means that at most 820 of them advanced while 410 remained on the crest of the second ridge near the captured Federal skirmish works. There is no indication that Featherston personally advanced beyond those captured works as well; apparently, he remained near Collier Road.14
Those 820 Confederates thrust themselves toward Ward’s division of the Twentieth Corps, some 4,000 men strong. Featherston’s situation mirrored Hardee’s in reverse; his troops were outnumbered more than four to one as they tried to extend the brigade’s advance down the ridge and into the ravine.15
Their opponent was less than a stellar battlefield leader. Like Thomas a Virginian by birth, Ward grew up in Kentucky, fought in the Mexican War, and served in the state legislature as well as the United States House of Representatives. His Civil War career consisted mostly of garrison duty until called on to lead a brigade in the Third Division of the Twentieth Corps that was composed mostly of western regiments. He took command of the division when Daniel Butterfield went on sick leave part way through the Atlanta campaign. Ward had handled the division poorly on July 3 during the follow up to Johnston’s evacuation of the Kennesaw Mountain Line, exposing Coburn’s brigade by pushing it too far forward from its supporting units. “Hooker gave it to Ward for being so rash as to lead one brigade alone into such a place,” reported John H. Roberts of the 22nd Wisconsin.16
Fortunately, Ward’s division received early warning of the Confederate advance from an unlikely source. Pvt. Henry Crist of Company I, 33rd Indiana had wandered southward past the Union skirmish line looking for blackberries. As he stopped in a ravine, the glint of sunlight on burnished steel caught his attention, and he saw Featherston’s Brigade preparing to advance. Rushing back, he not only told the Federal skirmishers but raced to John Coburn with the news. Coburn took the report seriously. He immediately ordered his brigade to fall in and then told Benjamin Harrison of the report, suggesting that their two brigades form and move south at least to the first ridge to meet the enemy. Harrison agreed to the plan, as Coburn rushed off to get Ward’s approval. The division commander hesitated. Hooker had not authorized a move south, and there was yet no confirmation of a Rebel advance. But Ward was willing to act if Coburn could ride forward and see for himself that action was justified.17
Coburn’s Brigade
Coburn wasted no time in riding up the slope to the Union skirmish line. From there he watched as the Confederates emerged from the timber and began their advance across open ground. Coburn galloped his horse back to the bottomland, shouting “Harrison they are coming” as he rode by on the way to his own men. “I never shall forget Colonel Coburn’s voice as it rang out ‘forward 2nd Brigade,’” recalled Jefferson E. Brant of the 85th Indiana. Learning the news, Ward finally issued orders for all three of his brigades to push forward. “The division moved at once in splendid order,” he reported.18
Coburn’s brigade occupied the center position of Ward’s division, with the 33rd Indiana on the left, t
he 85th Indiana on the right, and the 19th Michigan to the rear as a reserve. It took 1,315 men into action that afternoon. Just before reaching the crest of the first ridge, Coburn’s men encountered the Union skirmishers retiring from their fortified position near Collier Road. Bloodgood brought his 22nd Wisconsin through the ranks of Coburn’s troops and reformed the regiment in rear of Ward’s division.19
Maj. Levin T. Miller’s 33rd Indiana encountered some difficulty working through a dense patch of pine and oak trees on the slope of the first ridge before it stopped on the crest. Here Coburn ordered his line forward into the ravine between the first and second ridges. He first told Miller to go forward, and the 33rd Indiana found that the tree cover extended down into the ravine in front of the left wing, which crossed the small stream in the bottom of the ravine before the right wing got close enough to cross. Miller reformed his ranks at the foot of the opposite slope and waited for orders.20
To the right, Lieut. Col. Alexander B. Crane stopped the 85th Indiana on the crest of the first ravine. Then he saw Coburn’s assistant adjutant general, Lieut. Francis C. Crawford, motioning to him to continue moving forward into it. Because he knew Crawford was positioned to see what the 33rd Indiana was doing, he trusted his judgment and ordered the men forward. Just as the 85th Indiana reached the stream at the bottom of the ravine, Crane could see Oatis’s 22nd Mississippi of Featherston’s Brigade begin marching down the opposite slope into the ravine as well.21
As his men were moving down into the ravine, Coburn realized that the Confederates were threatening to flank his left as well as approaching his front. Wood’s brigade had lagged behind his own in forming and moving forward, and the way was clear for Featherston’s Confederates to advance south in that sector. Coburn rode fast to Wood’s brigade and urged its commander to hurry forward before he returned to his own command in time for the confrontation with the 22nd Mississippi. Harrison’s brigade to the right was a bit behind Coburn’s pace also, but it soon came forward and began to advance beyond his position, engaging the enemy at about the same time as Coburn’s brigade.22