The Battle of Peach Tree Creek

by Earl J. Hess

  The view of Maney’s assault from the Union position was impressive. Kimball’s men had barely started to construct breastworks when the Tennessee skirmishers made their appearance. Indiana born, a schoolteacher and medical doctor before the war, Kimball had gained considerable experience as a regimental, brigade, and division commander in the Eastern and Western theaters before the Atlanta campaign. He could see that Maney was deployed in two lines and that the Rebels were “charging with great confidence with a rapidity and an absence of confusion I have never seen equaled.”38

  The echelon formation of Hood’s army allowed the Federals to deal with each division in turn. By the time Maney’s troops settled in the ravine, it was possible for other Union brigade commanders to send help to Kimball. Blake dispatched the 28th Kentucky and 97th Ohio from his left flank to Kimball’s line, and Bradley sent the 51st Illinois to the location of the 88th Illinois. Kimball’s men delivered a steady fire at Maney’s troops. Day Elmore of the 36th Illinois told his parents that “I gave them 75 rounds for Chickamauga.” The slight shelter of the ravine enabled Maney to stay put for the rest of the evening. Capt. James I. Hall’s Company C, 9thTennessee lay down on the second line in Walker’s Brigade until a pine tree directly in front was almost cut in two by a Federal artillery round. As the top part of the trunk hung down, attached to the rest only by a splinter, he worried that it would fall on his men. Within a couple of minutes after moving the company back twenty paces, another round plowed the ground his troops had just vacated. “The warning given by the broken tree top saved the lives of many if not all the company,” Hall later concluded. It was indeed “a remarkable Providence.” Maney held his division in place until 10 P.M. then retired to the starting point of his advance.39

  Hardee’s artillery tried to support the infantry that afternoon but with scant success. Capt. Cuthbert H. Slocomb’s Fifth Company, Washington Artillery of New Orleans, took position along the Buck Head and Atlanta Road near a tobacco barn, where it fought an unequal duel with Union artillery pieces. The Federal guns nearly decimated Slocomb’s command, and the unit was ready to retire from its exposed position when Oscar Legare called on his comrades to fire a parting shot. While readying the piece, a Parrot shell exploded in the middle of the crew. The blast shredded the upper bodies of Legare and another man behind him. “The two boys were torn to pieces from the waist up,” recalled Philip Daingerfield Stephenson. “We found long strips of flesh high up on the trees behind them.” The two were carried to the rear suffering terribly and died soon after.40

  When Slocomb pulled his guns back, Stephenson noticed sights that demoralized him. “Evidences of strife were all about us, dead and wounded men and horses, upturned limber chests, etc. One sight caught my eye—an artillery horse jammed head foremost against a tree, the head twisted far under the neck and the body squatting. Stone dead—as though, having torn back, frantic from wounds and blind with pain and fear from the front and run all tilt against the tree.”41

  Hardee’s command suffered all the trials of heavy combat without experiencing the thrill of success. Newton estimated that the initial assault of Hardee’s Corps lasted only thirty minutes. In short, within a half hour, Bate, Walker, and Maney had stalled in their attempt to fulfill Hood’s battle plan. Newton asserted that from this point on the Confederates “made frequent attacks on my line, though none so severe as the first, and a constant fire had to be kept up along my lines until dark.” It is true that Confederate sources confirm the keeping up of steady fire until dusk on some parts of the line, especially Maney’s Division. But there is no evidence from the Rebel side that any more attempts to attack took place beyond the repulse of the first advance. Newton was guilty of some exaggeration when he reported to corps headquarters the next day that the enemy assaults were “so rapid that I could not keep account of them.” It is possible Newton counted each individual brigade’s advance as a separate Confederate assault for they came on within a few minutes of the previous advance. Maney’s Division maintained its position at high tide longer than any other of Hardee’s units. The firefight west of the Buck Head and Atlanta Road therefore lasted several hours. In fact, it lasted so long that some of Kimball’s men continued to fire even after the Rebels retired because of the pent-up excitement of the day.42

  Hardee began to make plans to renew his assault with the only reserve available. Cleburne had positioned his troops so their formation straddled the Buck Head and Atlanta Road. Brig. Gen. James A. Smith’s Brigade of Texas regiments was on the first line and west of the road, while Brig. Gen. Mark P. Lowrey’s Brigade of Alabama and Mississippi units held the first line east of the road. Brig. Gen. Lucius E. Polk’s Brigade of Alabama, Mississippi, and Confederate units anchored the second line west of the road, while Brig. Gen. Daniel C. Govan’s Brigade of Arkansas troops held the second line east of it.43

  Cleburne was positioned close enough to receive much long-range artillery fire. At one point in the engagement Hardee, Cleburne, and their staff members rode north along the Buck Head and Atlanta Road as a battery targeted the group, killing a member of Cleburne’s escort who rode very near the division leader. The Union pieces delivered a disconcerting amount of fire on Cleburne’s formation. Lieut. Robert M. Collins of the 15th Texas Cavalry (dismounted) thought it made “a fellow feel like he was very small game to be shot at with such guns.”44

  The fire took effect. Complaining after the war that they “were catching all the cannon balls,” Charles A. Leuschner of the 6th Texas Infantry watched as an artillery round flew within three feet of his body, killed four comrades, and cut off another man’s leg. There was such a spray of blood that Leuschner and four other men were splattered with it. Hardee was close enough to witness the incident and expressed a good deal of concern about the exposure of his troops. Regimental losses in Smith’s Brigade at Peach Tree Creek ranged from two in the consolidated 17th and 18th Texas Cavalry (dismounted) to seventeen in the consolidated 6th and 15th Texas Cavalry (dismounted).45

  Lieutenant Collins suffered a serious wound from this fire. A shell exploded directly in front of him, injuring several men and lodging “an ounce ball” in his left thigh. Collins remembered grabbing the wound to stop the bleeding “and thereby hold on to life long enough to give our past history a hasty going over and to repeat all the prayers we knew.” As four men with a litter transported him to the rear, the group had to run a gauntlet of artillery fire. When Collins asked one of the men if he was still bleeding, the man replied in a thick Irish accent, “Not a drap of the rudy current to be seen, Lieutenant.” This report so encouraged Collins that he thought about not only surviving the wound but enjoying a leave of absence based on it. He was even further encouraged by a surgeon who quickly examined the injury. The doctor proclaimed “it an ugly one, but not necessarily fatal. We thanked him from the bottom of our heart for these words.”46

  As Collins was taken to the rear, Lowrey held his command to the rear of Walker’s troops and saw that Stevens’s Brigade failed to close in on the enemy position. When what was left of Stevens’s men fell back under Nisbet’s control, the two officers met each other. Nisbet recalled feeling that Lowrey’s presence had been wasted. “If they had come up sooner, we could have held our captured works” on the Union skirmish line. Nisbet briefly filled Lowrey in on the situation, but the latter did not believe there were obstacles in the way. “‘Colonel, you must be mistaken about the enemy being fortified,’ Lowrey told him. ‘General Hood informed me that they had just crossed the creek.’” Nisbet offered to prove it by sending one of his regiments forward just enough to allow Lowrey a view of the position. After his personal examination, Lowrey admitted that it would be a useless sacrifice of life to launch another assault. Even so, Lowrey reported losing forty-five men of his brigade to Union artillery fire that day.47

  The officers in Cleburne’s second line had far less opportunity to see what was happening on the battlefield. “Did not engage the enemy,” reported Capt. Aar
on A. Cox of the 5th Confederate in Polk’s Brigade. “Enemy’s force not known; did not see him.”48

  By about 6 P.M., Hardee not only planned to use Cleburne but made efforts to get Bate’s Division more fruitfully involved in the fight. Col. W. D. Pickett of his staff rode about to locate Bate and, when he found him, discovered that the division commander was searching for the Union left flank. “He is now moving slowly onward,” Pickett reported to Hardee, “but it is necessarily slow, as the undergrowth is in places dense. I fear he will not be able to strike the enemy’s flank much before dark.” In fact, Bate never found much less struck that flank even after dusk descended on the battlefield.49

  Cheatham’s Corps played a very small role in Bate’s attack. Brig. Gen. Randall L. Gibson’s Brigade, the leftmost unit in Clayton’s Division, held the Confederate line east of Bate’s position. The entire brigade moved forward when Bate began his assault. Gibson did not go very far, even though he inadvertently faced the two-mile gap in Sherman’s position. Gibson, Clayton, and Cheatham had no idea such a gap existed and made no attempt to exploit it.50

  Not hearing the sound of small-arms fire from Bate, Hardee issued orders for Maney to resume his advance and for Cleburne to go into action and support him. The decision was supported by a message from Stewart, whose command had also tried and failed in its first attack by this time. Loring had assured Stewart that if Hardee could renew the assault he would make a second try as well.51

  Hardee had established his headquarters in a grove of trees near the Buck Head and Atlanta Road and just to the rear of Cleburne’s second line. There Cleburne reported his division ready to go in and received Hardee’s order to attack. According to staff members who were present, the two generals talked for only “a few seconds” before Cleburne rode off to get his men started. Cleburne selected staff members to go to each brigade commander with the necessary instructions. But before they left, a staff officer from Hardee’s headquarters galloped up with orders to cancel the attack. Hood had just instructed Hardee to send a division to help Wheeler contend with Schofield and McPherson, and Cleburne’s Division was the only choice for this assignment. “Five minutes more would have been too late, and would have found this command heavily engaged,” Irving A. Buck reported after the war.52

  In fact, Smith’s Brigade had already begun to prepare for a forward move by the time the recall was sounded. It moved forward to a point just behind Maney’s two lines to be ready to support them. Capt. Thomas J. Key personally scouted forward to see if he could advance the guns of his Arkansas battery between the lines and fire at close range to support the infantry attack. According to Irving A. Buck, the combined forces of Maney and Cleburne had only to cross a relatively narrow space of ground before engaging Kimball’s and Blake’s commands in close-range fighting. If pressed vigorously, it might have been too much for Newton’s lone division.53

  It is possible that McPherson’s approach saved Newton that day, although the Fourth Corps troops had many advantages that also could have spelled success for the Federals even in the face of a concentrated attack by a force twice as large as Newton’s command. By the early afternoon, Wheeler fell back so much that he caused alarm at Army of Tennessee headquarters. By late afternoon, that alarm had grown so far as to cause Hood to divert troops from the battle taking place north of Atlanta. The order reached Hardee’s headquarters probably about 7 P.M., arriving “at a critical moment” in Jacob Cox’s words. Hood’s order was “imperative,” in Hardee’s estimation, and the quick departure of Cleburne’s Division spelled the end of his efforts that day. Bate was not in position to help much; Maney and Walker alone could not be counted on for success in the renewal of an action in which they had already failed to produce results. Besides, dusk was fast approaching. It is questionable, as Albert Castel has pointed out, whether Cleburne could have exploited any success he may have achieved given the late hour at which the attack would have started.54

  The troops of Cleburne’s Division left their reserve position immediately upon receiving the order from Hardee’s headquarters. They marched south along the Buck Head and Atlanta Road past the Peach Tree Creek Line and to the Atlanta City Line defenses, arriving well past dusk. Bivouacking there for the night, the division wound up not supporting Wheeler at all until the next morning. Ironically, one of the best divisions at Hood’s disposal neither contributed to the effort at Peach Tree Creek nor helped Wheeler hold back McPherson on July 20, providing another example of the limited sense of good timing, foresight, and planning at Hood’s headquarters.55

  Rumors of fighting at Peach Tree Creek circulated among the rank and file in the Army of Tennessee before day’s end. The fact that Walker and Maney captured the Union skirmish line highlighted verbal reports and gave the impression that the Confederates had won a significant victory. When word arrived that the main Union line held firm, the news of Hood’s order for the diversion of Cleburne seemed to be a handy excuse for the failure. By 10 P.M. Andrew Jackson Neal of Capt. Thomas J. Perry’s Florida Battery more accurately told his father what had happened. “I had heard of some success but most places we failed to accomplish anything.”56

  Neal pinpointed the essential truth. Despite the fact that he outnumbered Newton five to one, Hardee had utterly failed to bring his strength against the enemy. Peach Tree Creek witnessed the most dismal battlefield performance of Hardee’s career. Col. Charles H. Olmstead of the 1st Georgia (Volunteer) in Mercer’s Brigade evaluated the result accurately. Hardee’s attack “was delivered in a half-hearted, hap-hazard dis-jointed way,” he wrote after the war. “It lacked resolution and likewise proper dispositions for the mutual support of the Divisions and Brigades engaged.” Hardee’s biographer has argued that Hardee should not have shifted so far to the right before the attack, as timing was essential for success.57

  As noted earlier, the timing of the shift was not really the key failure, for the Federals were as ready in the late afternoon as they were in the early part of the day. More importantly, Hardee handled his corps as if he was brand new to that command level rather than the most experienced corps leader in the Army of Tennessee. Hood’s insistence on an advance in echelon also contributed to failure; Newton’s troops therefore could deal with each Confederate division in turn rather than as an overwhelming whole. Given the situation, much depended on the initiative and determination of brigade and division commanders and it has to be admitted that none of them exhibited much energy or grit on July 20. Bate, Walker, and Maney failed to deliver results at Peach Tree Creek, and it is not easy to explain these failures. For example, no one in Maney’s Division spelled out why the troops simply stopped short of the Union position rather than continue their advance. Bate never explained why he floundered through the thickets all afternoon, and Walker, noted as a fiery Southern patriot, remained silent on why his division could not do more than capture the Union skirmish line. The entire corps shared responsibility for Hardee’s dismal performance.

  At Hood’s headquarters, an idea already was germinating to explain that dismal performance. Thomas B. Mackall, who acted as an aide for his uncle, the army’s chief of staff, noted in his journal that “Hardee does not think proper to attck eny’s strong works.” Hardee’s biographer discounts the idea that the general failed to push his attack. But soon after the battle, Hood came to believe that a fear of charging Union earthworks (a breakdown in morale) was the chief reason Hardee failed to exploit his advantages on July 20.58

  Howard understandably was overjoyed by the success of Newton’s embattled command at Peach Tree Creek. “The division made a gallant fight and deserves unqualified praise,” he reported to Thomas’s headquarters the next day. “The position held was vital,” Howard argued, “securing, as it did, the Buck Head and Atlanta Road, and constituting the left of our right wing, while the army was divided.” Howard also accepted Newton’s exaggerated report that the Confederates launched several assaults, and Thomas even stated in a circular that Newton repelled
a total of seven attacks on his position. A newspaper correspondent saw how the defensive victory affected the division commander. “‘Wasn’t it dusty,’ exclaimed Gen. Newton, as he came riding back, his face aglow with triumph, and his horse laboring for breath.” One can forgive Newton for exaggerating the number of attacks his men repulsed, for continually pointing out the importance of the position he defended, and for making sure everyone understood that his troops stopped cold an elite corps of Hood’s army.59

  Newton’s fight was largely on open and high ground within sight of thousands of Union and Confederate soldiers. The Federals often emphasized that their works were so immature that it was almost like an open field fight as well. Maj. Frederick Atwater wrote of his men in the 42nd Illinois that “at no time had they any works to fight behind with the exception of an occasional tree that had been felled for the purpose of building works.” Unlike many previous confrontations in the Atlanta campaign, there were no trenches, abatis, chevaux-de-frise, or traverses to offer maximum protection. The slight rail and log barricades served a purpose, in the view of most observers, but they were limited in scope, calling on the grit and determination of all Union troops behind them to repel the enemy.60