A History of the Roman World

by Scullard, H. H.

  2. CARTHAGE

  The felicity of the Carthaginian Empire depended largely on the unusual stability of her constitution, which attracted the interest of Greek political thinkers such as Aristotle (Politics, ii, 1). The Phoenicians of the west probably did not model their new cities on the monarchical pattern of the mother country: to have set up new kings (melakim) would have smacked of disloyalty. Instead, at the head of the state we find two annually appointed judges or Suffetes (Shophetim; cf. the judges of early Israel) whom the Greeks and Romans probably misnamed βασιλε îς and reges. In original function these magistrates were judges rather than generals: the early aims of Carthage were commercial, not military. The real conduct of state affairs rested with a Council of (perhaps) Thirty, which included the Suffetes, and with a Senate of Three Hundred, of which the Thirty were a subcommittee. Matters carefully prepared by these bodies, or questions on which the higher powers could not agree, might be brought before a popular assembly of citizens; but where agreement was reached, the assembly would not usually be consulted. In the assembly, however, there was great freedom of speech, and it was the people who, with certain restrictions, elected the Suffetes, the members of both councils, and the generals. Common commercial and economic interests helped to preserve the balance of power between the governing class and the people. Stability was further increased by vesting judicial power, not in the people, but in a Council of One Hundred and Four, chosen from the larger Senate. This court of judges, which was first established to check the tyrannical tendencies of the house of Mago, supervised the administration of the magistrates. Yet as these judges were elected, not by the people, but by a group of magistrates whom Aristotle called Pentarchies or Boards of Five, the state gradually succumbed to the domination of a close and corrupt oligarchy of judges and pentarchs, until the day when Hannibal cleansed the administration.

  The effective government was thus in the hands of an oligarchy of nobles. But it is uncertain how far they formed an aristocracy of birth or of wealth, how far they closed their ranks against other aspirants to office, and how far their interests were commercial or agricultural. The original settlers may have formed an aristocracy of birth, but being merchants and manufacturers they would gradually become an aristocracy of wealth. This in turn may have been somewhat exclusive: the leaders of the nation known to history came from surprisingly few families, and their names, repeated constantly in the same and different generations, form a very small proportion of the names known from Punic inscriptions. But it can scarcely be doubted that the ranks of the nobles were often increased from the aspiring nouveaux riches; indeed, the great house of Barca, which appeared in the mid-third century, seems to have been a new family.

  Many of these nobles continued to derive their wealth from commerce and industry, but others, in answer to the needs of the growing population for food, gradually turned to agriculture and became landowners. Big estates were cultivated with cheap slave labour, and the success achieved by the landed gentry in scientific farming may be gauged by the fact that after the fall of Carthage the Roman Senate had Mago’s thirty-two books on agriculture translated into Latin for the benefit of Roman colonists. It has been suggested that from the fourth century the nobility became so immersed in their estates that they left the profits of commerce to others; and that politically their interests were represented by the Suffetes and the Senate of Three Hundred, those of the commercial aristocracy by the Hundred and Four and the pentarchs. Such a rigid cleavage, however, is not very probable, though at times a clash of interest may have occurred between the landowners and merchants. And it is not necessary to suppose that all who turned to agriculture automatically lost their interest in trade.4

  To support her empire Carthage needed money, men and ships. The first she derived from tribute and customs dues, but our evidence is insufficient to allow a reliable estimate of the amount.5 Her army, originally formed of citizens, did not suffice for her great wars abroad, so that she began to conscript her subjects – Africans, Sardinians and Iberians – and to employ mercenaries. By the third century her citizens no longer served in her armies, except as officers, or in wars fought in Africa itself. This development had many obvious advantages for a people whose interests lay in commerce rather than in war, but it brought its peculiar dangers. Outstanding generals might aspire to military dictatorship, particularly when after the First Punic War armies of mercenaries became a permanent feature; but the oligarchical institutions of the city were devised to check the too-successful general, while crucifixion was the punishment for failure. Further, when the subject Africans found themselves serving no longer with citizens but merely with allies, mercenaries, or other subjects, they acquired a dangerous estimate of their own importance; the Numidians also realized their own value when Carthage made increasing use of their cavalry. The army was thus always a potential source of danger. Although often a motley crew with little or no national feeling, when disciplined and organized by a general of genius it developed into a first-class fighting machine.

  The navy also was maintained from the tribute of the subjects, who were relieved of the duty of self-protection. The skill of the seamen and navigators of Carthage was well known and the maintenance of a large fleet offered a good excuse for exacting tribute. But it is unlikely that she normally found it necessary to keep her whole navy afloat in order to safeguard her commerce and to protect or threaten her subjects. Many vessels would be laid up in the great arsenals and dockyards at Carthage, and the crews called up only in time of need. The praise accorded to the Punic navy by patriotic Roman writers arose partly from sincere admiration, but partly from a desire to exaggerate the achievements of their own victorious fellow-countrymen.

  The civilization of Carthage has left little mark on world history, and our knowledge of it derives mainly from biased Greek and Roman writers and from the results of recent archaeological investigation. But when every allowance has been made the resultant picture is not attractive. Carthage tapped the caravan routes of Egypt and Africa, her merchants sailed to Britain and Senegal, and she became one of the richest states of the world, but she was rather a carrier than a productive state; and curiously, she did not issue coins until early in the fourth century and at first only to pay her troops in Sicily rather than for commercial reasons. Her industry aimed at mass-production and cheapness rather than beauty. Her art was unoriginal and owed much to Egypt and Greece. Her nobles might acquire a taste for Greek art, but this was met by importing foreign artists and works of art or by the imitation of Greek models. Even the equipment of the tombs, which in early days were richly adorned, became increasingly cheaper. We hear of Carthaginian books and libraries, but there is no evidence to suggest that she was gifted with any real literary inspiration. The Punic language, however, which belongs to the North Semitic group and is akin to Hebrew, was more virile, as is shown by its persistence and by the numerous inscriptions which have come to light. Carthaginian religion and cult were cruel, gloomy and licentious. The Canaanitish deities, Ba’al Hammon, Tanit, Melkart, Eshmun and Astarte inspired in their worshippers a fanatical devotion, which did not shrink from self-immolation or human sacrifice. Contact with the civilized world may have mitigated the barbarity to an extent, but the fires of the sacrifice called Moloch continued to receive their tribute of infants from noble families at hours of crisis in the city’s history.6

  Carthage thus gave the world little of value. Even the spirit of the great house of Barca came rather to destroy than to build. To the end the Carthaginian remained Oriental and was only superficially tinged with Greek culture; and he was not popular in the western world. ‘Bearded Orientals in loose robes, covered with gaudy trinkets, often with great rings of gold hanging from their nostrils, dripping with perfumes, cringing and salaaming, the Carthaginians inspired disgust as much by their personal appearance as by their sensual appetites, their treacherous cruelty, their blood-stained religion. To the end they remained hucksters, intent on personal g
ain, careless or incapable of winning the goodwill of their subjects.’7 They may have been thus conceived by some Greeks and Romans, but it is well to recall that a Carthaginian named Hasdrubal and renamed Cleitomachus became head of the Academy at Athens in 129, and to balance the picture with the words of Cicero: ‘Carthage would not have held an empire for six hundred years had it not been governed with wisdom and statecraft.’ (de rep., i, frg. 3.)

  3. THE CAUSES OF THE WAR

  The early treaties between Rome and Carthage were treaties of friendship and for trade, formed to limit their spheres of influence. But in 306 the two Republics may have formed a closer political agreement which debarred the Carthaginians from interfering in Italy, and the Romans in Sicily (p. 124). Carthage again negotiated with Rome in 279; no defensive alliance was struck, but an emergency measure was designed, chiefly to keep Pyrrhus in Italy (p. 130). During the war Carthage neither received nor asked for help, not wishing to bring Romans into Sicily; Rome also kept to herself.

  In 272 a puzzling incident occurred. When the Romans were besieging Tarentum, which was still held by Pyrrhus’ lieutenant Milo, a Carthaginian fleet suddenly appeared in the harbour, but quickly sailed off again. Had it come in reply to an appeal from Milo or on its own initiative; to help the Romans or to capture Tarentum? Later Roman writers accused Carthage of having tried to seize Tarentum, alleging that the action was a breach of treaty rights; but the Carthaginians had not tried to land. Indeed, far from acting contrary to the agreements, the Punic admiral may have sailed up in accordance with Mago’s treaty to see whether he could help the Romans. It is perhaps most likely that the Carthaginians were reconnoitring on the offchance of turning the situation to their advantage, but when this seemed impossible they sailed away, while the home government disavowed the admiral’s action and Rome accepted the apology, as recorded by Orosius. But whether Rome suspected treachery or merely rebuffed a friendly gesture, the result would hardly improve relations between the two Republics.8

  When Pyrrhus left the shores of Sicily he is reported to have remarked: ‘What a cockpit we are now leaving for Carthaginian and Roman to fight in.’ The recent history of the island justified this prophecy. The Punic expansion had been checked during the reign of Agathocles as King of Syracuse (304–289), but after his death the Carthaginians again advanced their standards, until driven back by Pyrrhus. When he retired to Italy they defeated the Syracusan fleet, recovered their lost possessions and captured the Greek cities of central Sicily. Thus by 275 Syracuse’s influence was confined to eastern Sicily, and even there she met with rivals. Certain of Agathocles’ discharged Italian mercenaries on their return home had treacherously seized the town of Messana (c. 288). Styling themselves Mamertines, after the Sabellian war god Mamers, they settled there and proceeded to plunder the surrounding districts, Carthaginian and Greek alike. Defeated but not exterminated by Pyrrhus, they were later defeated by the Syracusans under Hiero who now, if not earlier, assumed the title of king (265–264) and then undertook the siege of Messana. At this point the Carthaginians intervened, refusing to look on while Syracuse won control of the Sicilian straits by capturing Messana. Their admiral threw a Punic garrison into the town with the consent of the Mamertines, and Hiero was obliged to return to Syracuse, disregarding the complimentary exhortations of the poet Theocritus to continue fighting. But the Mamertines did not wish to keep their new garrison indefinitely: some advocated reaching an agreement with Carthage by which their autonomy would be respected, others preferred to seek alliance with a less alien people, the Romans. The latter party prevailed and Rome was suddenly faced with a request for alliance and help. What was she to do?

  Rome and Carthage were thus brought abruptly face to face. By ejecting from Rhegium the Campanians who had tried to play at pirates like the Mamertines in Sicily the Romans had won control of the Straits (270). But now a Carthaginian garrison at Messana faced them from the opposite shore: it barred their access to Sicily, and constituted a point d’appui from which, following the example set by Dionysius and Agathocles, the Carthaginians could sail against the towns of the Italian coast, once they had taken eastern Sicily. There could be no doubt that they would extend to Sicily the monopoly which they exercised throughout the western Mediterranean. That might not be of direct concern to the Romans, who were little interested in foreign trade, but it would be a severe blow to their allies in southern Italy. And there was the further danger that if Rome neglected her new Greek allies, they might turn to Carthage for protection in a desperate effort to preserve their Sicilian trade. It did indeed seem that Rome would have to listen to the appeal of the Mamertines, even though this might involve crossing swords with Carthage and possibly a deadly duel.

  But the swords which the Mamertines virtually thrust into the rivals’ hands could scarcely have been kept permanently sheathed. Rome and Carthage had little in common. Different in race, culture and religion, with divergent moral and material interests, they would gravitate towards conflict when once the minor states between them had been eliminated or assimilated. In the Hellenistic east a common culture held the three great monarchies in a precarious balance of powers. When Rome had absorbed something of that culture, she adapted her policy in order to try to maintain the balance. But in the west rivalry would lead to war: compromise was difficult, if not impossible.

  The immediate question before the Roman Senate was the appeal of the Mamertines, not war with Carthage, though the more far-sighted must have seen that this would probably follow the granting of the request. When the Senate failed to reach a decision the question was referred (by Appius Claudius?) to the people, who voted to send help to the Mamertines. Polybius, who here follows Fabius Pictor and thus gives at least a pro-Roman account, if not a tendentious justification, explains that the Senate hesitated, in spite of a full recognition of the danger of the advance of Carthage, because it felt unable to ally itself to a robber-state, especially as it had recently executed the brigands at Rhegium. But the weight of this moralistic argument has been questioned, since the seizure of Messana by the Mamertines had occurred twenty-five years earlier and the new state was now standing on its own feet and had been recognized by Carthage and several Greek cities; it was presumably autonomous and therefore Rome would not break her fetial law by granting alliance. Further, the parallel with Rhegium is weak, for there Rome interfered on behalf of her own allies, whereas she had had no dealings with Messana. But even if conscientious scruples were among the motives of the Senate’s hesitation, others also must be found in the fear of war with a great sea power, and in the aversion of the conservative element in the Senate to an expansionist policy which increased the power of the people and of the popular leaders whom a new war might bring into prominence. A further reason was probably that Roman interference in Sicily would involve a definite breach of the treaty of 306. The popular leaders who wanted war might argue that the Carthaginians had themselves annulled this agreement by their action at Tarentum, and by their general attitude which was, according to Polybius (i, 7), one motive that had stimulated Rhegium to ask Rome for protection (c. 280). But the Senate perhaps hesitated to disregard formal obligations.9

  The people had accepted the Mamertine alliance because of the advantages which their leaders said would attend it. These suggested benefits would not be land, tribute, or even booty, but the checking of the advance of Carthage and the increase of allies with the consequent decrease of effort by the citizen army. The personal advantages to the popular leaders from success in war was an aspect which they would hardly emphasize, but of which such families as the Otacilii of Beneventum and the Campanian Atilii would be fully conscious. But the main motive which led Rome to accept the alliance of the Mamertines was to secure an outpost which was necessary to the safety of Italy. The two rivals may both have rushed to secure this key position, but their motives were different; defensive imperialism dominated Rome’s policy, an exploiting commercial imperialism actuated Carthage.

 
4. ROME’S NAVAL OFFENSIVE

  In 264 the consul Appius Claudius Caudex was sent with two legions to announce Rome’s acceptance of Messana’s request for alliance and to garrison the town. His advance guard under his relative C. Claudius forced the Straits with little opposition: after a slight skirmish the Carthaginian admiral merely returned some ships, which he had captured, with the threat that he would not let the Romans so much as wash their hands in the sea. The attitude of the Punic commander in Messana was equally cautious. On the arrival of C. Claudius and under pressure from the Mamertines he evacuated the citadel, only to be crucified later for his lack of initiative and pour encourager les autres. The scrupulous behaviour of these Punic generals who, wishing to avoid any openly hostile acts, refused either to contest the passage of the Straits or to hold Messana, contrasts strongly with the decisive vigour of the Roman leaders.

  The Roman occupation of Messana stung the Carthaginian government to action. War had not yet been formally declared, but the time was ripe. Further, Hiero of Syracuse was willing to forget the age-long hostility of Carthage to the Sicilian Greeks and to co-operate with the erstwhile enemy. This unnatural alliance was brought about mainly because both parties saw their common interests threatened by the rising power of Rome. Punic troops were sent to Sicily under Hanno, son of Hannibal, who garrisoned Agrigentum and encamped at Messana. Hiero also arrived there and camped further south of the town, while the Punic fleet anchored to the north. Seeing Messana thus blockaded, Appius Claudius succeeded in transporting his troops across the Straits by night. Then, or possibly before crossing to Sicily, he sent an embassy to the Carthaginians and Hiero, ordering them to raise the siege of a town which was allied to Rome. On their refusal he formally declared war and the First Punic War had officially started.10