A History of the Roman World

by Scullard, H. H.

  Claudius acted quickly. Taking advantage of the distance between the two enemy camps, he assailed first Hiero’s and then Hanno’s. The result of these engagements is not certain; both sides according to their own historians claimed them as victories. But Hiero, who was displeased with his allies for allowing the Romans to cross to Sicily so easily, fell back on Syracuse soon afterwards (or perhaps not until the following year). Hanno also withdrew to garrison and protect the Carthaginian cities in Sicily.11 The next year both consuls, M’. Valerius and M’. Otacuius, were sent to Sicily with about 40,000 men. Though the retreat of Hiero and Hanno freed Messana, Rome must advance further in Sicily, not to conquer the island, but to force her enemies to recognize her Messanian alliance. When Valerius marched southwards many towns around Aetna submitted to him, yet he could have had little hope of taking Syracuse itself without control of the sea. Hiero, however, who could look for little support from his allies after abandoning them at Messana, began to make friendly overtures, to which the Romans readily responded. He was granted an alliance (renewed in 248) and the control of some thirty miles of territory around Syracuse in return for an indemnity of 100 talents (Diodorus’ reference to an annual tribute of 25 talents may be due only to a misunderstanding of a first instalment of the indemnity); he remained Rome’s loyal ally till his death in 215. His most immediate service was to help the Romans with supplies.

  In March 262, Valerius celebrated a triumph over the Carthaginians and Hiero, and decorated a wall of the Curia Hostilia with a painting of his success. The Senate proposed to send out only two legions this year, but learning that the Carthaginians were recruiting in Spain, Liguria and Gaul, they despatched instead both consuls. These won the support of Segesta in the Punic province in Sicily, and advanced against the Carthaginian headquarters at the Greek city of Agrigentum, which lay on a hill whose steep sides made attack possible only from the south. Here they pitched two camps, joined by a double line of trenches, and besieged the city for five months. Before starvation forced the Punic commander Hannibal to capitulate, strong reinforcements arrived under Hanno who, ensconced on a neighbouring hill, cut off the Roman supplies, which the loyal Hiero supplemented with great difficulty. After two months Hanno gave battle in a desperate attempt to relieve the city. Though he was defeated, the Roman losses were so heavy that Hannibal and his garrison were enabled to escape from the doomed city. The next day Agrigentum was sacked and its inhabitants were sold into slavery; an act of clemency, which might have won over the Sicilians, would have proved a better investment for the future than this barbarity. As the fall of Agrigentum did not bring Carthage to her knees and the consuls of 261 achieved little in Sicily, the Senate realized that peace could only be attained by conquering the whole island and driving out the Carthaginians. This could never be done while the Punic fleet threatened the seaboard towns of Sicily and even ravaged the coast of Italy. So Rome had to face the task of challenging the naval supremacy of her enemy.

  The success with which the land-lubbers of Rome created a navy and defeated the Queen of the western Mediterranean naturally led later ages to embellish with legendary adornments what was undeniably a magnificent achievement. It was said that having no fleet of their own the Romans took a wrecked Punic vessel as a model and built 120 ships within sixty days from the hewing of the timber; meanwhile crews were taught to row on great wooden stages erected on land. The speed of this achievement has often been regarded with some scepticism, but the recent discovery of a Punic warship off Marsala shows methods of prefabrication and mass-production which the Romans may well have imitated. Although since 311 BC duoviri navales had commanded a squadron of 20 ships (for example, in 282, a duovir with 10 ships had been attacked by the Tarentines), such squadrons were probably only fitted out when required and were then laid up; thus Appius Claudius had to cross to Sicily in ships from allied Italian towns, because there was no Roman squadron ready equipped. Further, after the Pyrrhic War various southern Italian towns were perhaps liable by treaty to furnish ships, but these would not number more than 25 vessels all told. When Rome determined to challenge Carthage at sea, she built 20 triremes and 100 quinqueremes. The former represented the old type of duumviral squadron, the latter were built on a new model like the Punic vessels. More difficult than the construction was the manning of the new fleet. Many men could be drawn from the socii navales of the seafaring towns of southern Italy; but others would have to be trained to handle an oar instead of a plough, men who had no experience of the sea. To counteract their lack of skill the Romans determined to turn sea battles into land battles by avoiding the manoeuvring and ramming tactics of the enemy, and by adopting boarding tactics. This was achieved by the use of some kind of device which Polybius describes as a complicated boarding-bridge, known to the soldiers colloquially as a ‘crow’ (corvus) because its ‘beak’ was an iron spike which grappled the enemy’s deck. Thus the Romans intended to thwart their enemy’s superior naval skill, while they made doubly sure by outbuilding the Carthaginians. In all they probably raised 160 vessels, while the enemy had only 130 at sea. Rome was then ready to contest the sea, and when every allowance has been made for patriotic exaggeration in the traditional account, the plain fact is a magnificent tribute to her adaptability and resolve.12

  While the new fleet was mustering at Messana the commander Cn. Cornelius Scipio sailed off with seventeen vessels to negotiate for the surrender of Lipara, but he was surprised and captured by a Punic squadron; this exploit gained for him the suitable cognomen, Asina. Thereupon the other consul of 260, C. Duilius, took over the command and relieved Segesta, which was besieged by Hamilcar, Hanno’s successor. But Duilius had greater claim to fame. Encountering the Punic fleet off Mylae near the north-east corner of Sicily he overcame the enemy’s tactical skill by grappling their vessels with his ‘crows’, so that his men soon swept the decks clear. With their superior numbers (perhaps 140 against 130) the Romans accounted for some 50 vessels, including the admiral’s flagship. Thus Rome in her first venture on the sea defeated a nation whose seafaring traditions were centuries old. Well might Duilius celebrate the first naval triumph in Rome and be honoured by the erection in the Forum of a column ornamented with the bronze rams of the vessels he had captured.13

  The Punic fleet had been defeated, but not destroyed; and Rome did not attempt to blockade by sea the Carthaginian strongholds of Panormus or Lilybaeum, still less to attack her enemy in Africa. Instead, one consul of 259, L. Cornelius Scipio, led an expedition against Sardinia and Corsica. This could have little effect on the main issues of the war, but it trained the Romans in the idea of sending expeditionary forces abroad and reduced the possibility of Punic or piratical raids on the Italian coast. Scipio captured Aleria in Corsica and won the island, but he failed to take the Punic fortress of Olbia in northern Sardinia. The appearance of Hannibal with reinforcements terminated his activity, but the next year his successor, C. Sulpicius, defeated the enemy’s fleet off Sulci in Rome’s second naval victory.

  Meanwhile Hamilcar had made good progress against the one consular army operating in Sicily. After a successful engagement near Thermae he advanced as far as Enna and Camarina and fortified Drepana. To make good these losses the Romans prolonged Aquillius’ command as proconsul through the winter and sent out another consular army to join him in 258. Together the Roman generals advanced towards Panormus, where Hamilcar declined battle, and then by capturing Camarina and Enna they confined the enemy once more to the western end of the island. In 257 all effort in Sardinia was abandoned and little was achieved in Sicily, except that the consul. C. Atilius Regulus, after raiding Melita (Malta) fell in with the Punic fleet off Tyndaris and sank 18 vessels (Rome’s third naval victory).

  5. ROME’S OFFENSIVE IN AFRICA

  Only two ways seemed open to Rome to terminate the struggle: to take the offensive more actively against the Punic province in Sicily, or to strike at Africa. As the former plan offered no prospect of a speedy conclusion, the
latter was adopted. Rome braced herself for the effort. The fleet was raised to 250 battleships and 80 transport ships, while perhaps 100,000 men were required for the crews. The Carthaginian navy was also increased, to a figure perhaps a little less than the Roman. In the summer of 256 the Roman fleet, under the command of L. Manlius Vulso and M. Atilius Regulus, sailed round the eastern coast of Sicily and encountered the enemy off Cape Ecnomus. The Romans advanced in four squadrons on a narrow front, the Carthaginians sailed in order of battle in one long line abreast with the intention of outflanking their enemy. But the Roman first two squadrons, led by the two flagships, broke through the Punic centre and thanks to the corvus were soon victorious. Meanwhile the Roman third squadron had been forced inshore by the Carthaginian left wing, while the fourth Roman squadron was faring badly at the hands of the Carthaginian right. But part of the victorious Roman squadron returned in time to save their fourth line by driving off the Carthaginian right wing, and then the combined victorious squadrons converged against the enemy’s left wing near the shore; here they captured 50 vessels, having sunk 30 others. The Roman losses were only 24. It was a great victory, the fourth that Rome had won at sea; the passage to Africa was now secure.14

  After refitting their ships the Romans sailed to Africa and disembarked at Clupea (Aspis) on Cape Bon, the promontory to the east of Carthage, as Agathocles had done before. Here they were in good communication with Sicily, and could threaten Carthage from the rear, while cutting her off from many of her rich subject cities. After capturing Clupea and ravaging the district, unopposed by Carthage, the Roman generals reported their success to the Senate, who recalled one consul with the fleet and left Regulus with a small squadron and two legions. This force, which was inadequate to attack Carthage, could have maintained the Roman position and have seriously embarrassed Carthage if Regulus had supplemented it by winning the support of the Numidian princes who were ready to revolt; Agathocles had already shown what a small army could achieve. But Regulus was no Agathocles; though brave and confident, he lacked the Greek’s ability.

  When the Carthaginians realized that the Romans intended to continue the campaign, they raised forces and recalled others from Sicily. Then, advancing against Regulus who was besieging Adys (Uthina), they suffered defeat on hilly ground which crippled their cavalry and elephants. Regulus could now advance to Tunis, where he confidently encamped for the winter. Thinking that the Carthaginians were hard pressed, especially as the Numidians were restive, he offered terms of peace (possibly after overtures from Carthage), but these were far too severe to be accepted. Apart from his folly in trying to negotiate on unreasonable terms, it is unlikely that a peace could have been arranged, for Rome would probably have insisted on the complete evacuation of Sicily, while Carthage, though ready to make concessions in order to rid herself of the African war, could hardly have sacrificed the western end of the island.

  In the spring of 255 the Carthaginians were again ready to try conclusions, for during the winter their army had been drilled and trained on Greek lines by a Spartan mercenary officer named Xanthippus. Before Regulus had bestirred himself Xanthippus led out the Punic army; instead of waiting for reinforcements from Italy Regulus advanced and gave battle in a plain on ground chosen by the enemy. Xanthippus formed his main troops into a phalanx with a hundred elephants in front and the cavalry on the wings. In vain the Romans strengthened their centre; they were only trampled to death more easily. The battle was decided by the Punic cavalry who outflanked and surrounded the Romans; a small division on the Roman left routed the Punic mercenaries, but retreated with heavy losses after the general defeat. Regulus and 500 others were captured; only 2,000 Romans escaped to Clupea. The African expedition had failed.15

  Meanwhile the Romans had prepared a fleet, intending to blockade Carthage by sea while Regulus attacked by land. This scheme was now wrecked, but nevertheless the fleet of about 210 vessels, commanded by the two consuls, sailed to Africa to face the Punic navy and to rescue the survivors at Clupea. Off the Hermaean Promontory they met and defeated the fleet of perhaps 200 ships with which the Carthaginians, encouraged by their victory over Regulus, were contesting the right of way. After capturing many vessels by jamming them against the shore, and having won the fifth naval victory of the war, the consuls rescued the survivors at Clupea and sailed for home. But fresh tragedy awaited them. In taking to the sea the Romans had minimized their inexperience by adopting grappling tactics, but they could not compensate for their admirals’ lack of skill and experience in navigation. Natural forces, rather than the Punic fleet, threatened them. On returning from Africa they encountered a terrific storm between Camarina and Cape Pachynus, and only 80 vessels survived.16 However, the two consuls were voted triumphs for their previous victory and a columna rostrata was erected to commemorate it.

  6. STALEMATE AND CHECKMATE

  Rome did not despair or slacken her efforts. In the winter of 255–254 taxes were raised to build a new fleet. By the spring she had at least 220 ships and could be confident that Carthage was not in a position to challenge her at sea. As further activity in Africa was impracticable, four legions were sent to storm western Sicily. Cn. Cornelius Scipio, who had regained his freedom and reputation, led an attack by land and sea on the Punic base at Panormus (Palermo), which was divided into two settlements. The Old City lay between two streams which ran into the harbour (the modern Cala) and was thus strongly protected. The Romans first stormed and captured the New City with the help of Greek engineers and then turned to the Old City, which capitulated. Thirteen thousand citizens who could not raise the requisite ransom were sold into slavery. Other towns, such as Tyndaris and Solus, were soon captured. Little resistance had been offered by the Carthaginians because they were busy suppressing a rising of Numidians in Africa, and because since the recall of Hamilcar they had not enough forces in Sicily to offer battle. Their general, Carthalo, made one counter-attack by storming Agrigentum; but fearing that he was not strong enough to hold it, he burnt the city to the ground. The Carthaginians now only held a few towns in Sicily: Drepana, Lilybaeum, Selinus, Heraclea Minoa, and the isolated Thermae, together with the Lipari and Aegates Islands.

  After a vain attempt upon Lilybaeum the consuls of 253 raided Tripolis, an unwise dispersal of effort; they got into difficulties on the shallows of the Syrtes. In returning to Italy the fleet encountered a storm off Cape Palinurus and suffered considerable damage (150 ships lost, according to Polybius). This fresh disaster caused some discouragement at Rome: clearly the fleet, which had achieved such unexpected success in war, could not face the elements. The Carthaginians too were tired; they had to deal with the Numidians, and though their communications with Sicily were now safer and they sent over an army and many elephants under Hasdrubal (probably in 253 or even 251 rather than 255–254), they made no attempt to regain their lost ground. The next two years passed uneventfully, except that in 252 the Romans captured Thermae and the Lipari Islands.

  This lull in hostilities was followed by a period of renewed effort lasting for two years (250–249). The Romans built 50 new ships which they intended to send under the two consuls of 250 BC against Lilybaeum, while Caecilius Metellus advanced against the town by land from Panormus. But before they moved Hasdrubal took the offensive by marching against Panormus and ravaging the surrounding plain, the Conca d’Oro. Metellus lay low and thus enticed the enemy over the Oreto up to the trenches which he had dug near the city wall. Here the Punic elephants were met with a shower of weapons and stampeded back on their own lines. A sally on Hasdrubal’s flank completed the confusion, and his army was nearly destroyed. His dreaded elephants were all captured, while he himself fled to Lilybaeum, whence he was recalled to face death at Carthage.17

  After this victory the Romans could blockade Lilybaeum by land and sea. The city, which was strongly fortified, lay on a promontory; its harbour, facing northwards, was small but difficult of access. Within the city were the expatriated inhabitants of Selinus,
and a garrison of 10,000 mercenaries. The consuls of 250 BC advanced with (probably) 120 ships and four legions and laid siege to the town, cutting it off from the mainland by a wall and trench which connected their two camps. By sea Hannibal ran the blockade and landed reinforcements; he then sailed out again in safety to join the main Punic fleet under Adherbal at Drepana. Thanks to the occasional success of another blockade-runner, Hannibal the Rhodian, to the loyalty of the garrison, and to a successful attempt to burn the Roman siege works, Lilybaeum withstood the blockade; the Roman supplies were threatened by Punic cavalry from Drepana and only Rome’s determination and the loyal help of Hiero secured the continuance of the siege. Lilybaeum did not fall till eight years later.

  P. Claudius Pulcher, consul of 249, realizing the inefficiency of the naval blockade at Lilybaeum, resolved to attack the Punic fleet which was stationed at Drepana, some sixteen miles to the north. Trusting in his superior numbers and in the fact that Adherbal was as yet unaware that the Roman losses of the previous year had been made up by the arrival of 10,000 socii navales, Claudius hoped to surprise the enemy with success. But his tactical skill did not support his strategic plan. Drepana was situated on a sharp spit of land, with the harbour on the south side protected by the islet of Colombaia. Hither Claudius sailed with 123 vessels. But while his leading ships were entering the harbour, Adherbal succeeded in manning his fleet (about 100 vessels), and by sailing round the island he fell on the flank of the Roman line. Claudius quickly ordered a retreat, which led to much confusion, and when the enemy attacked he was driven inshore with the loss of 93 vessels, though a large part of the crews swam to land and ultimately reached Lilybaeum. This was the first and only defeat which Rome suffered at sea during the war. Claudius was recalled and condemned to pay a heavy fine. The pious attributed his defeat to his insistence on fighting when the omens were unfavourable: learning that the sacred chickens would not eat, it is said, he contemptuously dropped them overboard, remarking ‘Well, let them drink’. But his plan was not ill-conceived, had his naval skill been greater; while the fact that he probably knew that Adherbal was about to receive a reinforcement of 70 ships explains his haste and his impatience with the chickens.