Practical Ethics and Profound Emptiness

by Jampa Tegchok

  On the other hand, the existence of the snake can be disproved. First, it isn’t commonly accepted in the world for a rope to be a snake. Second, people with unimpaired senses in a brightly lit room do not see a snake there; they see a rope. Third, a probing awareness cannot establish a snake there.

  In short, the verse from the Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning explains that although phenomena are not truly existent, true-grasping ignorance motivates the creation of karma, and due to this, the environment and the beings in it come into being. Although they come into being due to true-grasping, they are not truly existent; they exist by mere conceptual designation.

  The stanza from the Four Hundred explains that true duhkha and true origins exist by being merely fabricated by thought. Apart from being merely designated by conceptuality, true duhkha and true origins cannot be found. Therefore, the wise do not grasp them as inherently existent, nor do the wise deny that they are merely conceptually designated. All phenomena exist by being merely designated or fabricated by conception; the example of a snake being designated on a coiled, striped rope illustrates this.

  As we know, identifying the object of negation is the first step in realizing emptiness according to the Prasangika view. One sutra states that all the attractive and unattractive things in the world are posited by conception. Anything more than what is merely designated by conception is the object of negation.

  The above verses by Nagarjuna and Aryadeva highlight two key points for understanding emptiness according to the Prasangikas’ view: the reasons why phenomena do not exist inherently and the faults of believing them to exist in that way, and the meaning of mere designation by conception and why phenomena exist in this way.

  Verse 80 explains that the basis of designation of the person is the six constituents: earth, water, fire, air, space, and consciousness. Although it is usually said that the five aggregates are the basis of designation of the person, saying the six constituents are the person’s basis of designation is also correct. Five of the constituents — earth, water, fire, air, and space — comprise the first aggregate, the body. The body’s solidity is the earth element, its cohesiveness is the water element, its heat is the fire element, and its motility is the air element. The space inside bodily cavities — for example, in the stomach and intestines — is the space element. The consciousness constituent comprises the four mental aggregates.

  When meditating on emptiness, we do not look for an inherently existent person. Rather, we search to see if the person inherently exists. If a person existed inherently, it would have to have certain characteristics. We then investigate to see if the person is like that or not. We examine whether the person who comes and goes, who reads and eats, who experiences happiness and pain, and so forth exists in the constituents individually or in the collection of constituents, or if it exists separately from them.

  Although an inherently existent person is an object of negation in the meditation on emptiness, and the first step in meditating on emptiness is to identify the object of negation, we can’t realize an inherently existent person with a reliable cognizer because it doesn’t exist. Rather, we think of what such a person would be like if it did exist and hold a conceptual appearance of an inherently existent person in our mind. An inherently existent person would be totally independent of causes and conditions, parts, or any other factors, including name and conceptuality. Then we investigate whether the person actually exists like that or not. The person isn’t any one of these constituents and it is not the collection of all of them. Separate from these six things that constitute the basis of designation of the person, we cannot find a person. What person is there other than these? These few lines have tremendous meaning; understanding them requires deep contemplation.

  81.Just as the person is not real

  due to being a composite of six constituents,

  so each constituent also is not real

  due to being a composite.

  Anything that exists inherently should be findable either in its basis of designation or separate from it. As established in the previous verse, the person is not any of the six constituents and cannot be found in the collection of constituents. The person also cannot be found separate from the constituents.

  However, this does not mean the person is totally nonexistent, because it depends on the composite of six constituents. It also depends on being merely designated by conception in dependence on the collection of the six constituents. Something that exists by being merely designated by conception cannot exist inherently, because inherently existent things would have their own independent essence. We can state this in the form of a syllogism as follows: consider a person; it does not inherently exist because it is merely designated in dependence on the collection of the six constituents that are its basis of designation.

  Having refuted the inherent existence of the person, lest we then think that its constituent parts exist inherently, Nagarjuna refutes that as well. Using the same reason — being merely designated in dependence on the collection of its parts — Nagarjuna shows that each of the six constituents doesn’t exist inherently. Just as the person exists by being merely designated in dependence on its basis of designation, the six constituents, so too does each constituent exist by being merely designated by conception in dependence on the collection of its parts.

  For example, the earth element doesn’t inherently exist, because it arises depending on the collection of its parts. The earth element cannot be found in any of its parts individually, in the collection of its parts as a whole, or in the continuity of its parts. Nor is it separate from its basis of designation. What other earth element could there be? We investigate the other constituents in a similar way. None of them can be found independent of their basis of designation and the mind that conceives and designates them.

  This reasoning — of not being identical with or totally separate from its parts — can be used for any phenomenon. Once we understand it clearly in relation to one object, we can apply it to any phenomenon. Similarly, the reasoning we use to show that the person is merely designated by conception can be used for all phenomena.

  82.The aggregates are not the self, nor do they exist in the [self];

  nor is the [self] in the [aggregates]; but without them, the [self] cannot exist.

  And the self and aggregates are not mixed like fire and fuel.

  Therefore, how could the self exist?

  The Selflessness of Person

  This verse explores the relationship of the self and its basis of designation, the aggregates. If the person existed inherently, it should exist in one of the five ways mentioned in this verse. Nagarjuna also discusses this in chapter 22 of Treatise on the Middle Way, where he examines the existence of the Tathagata.20

  Before we examine these five, it’s important to understand that there are two selves: a self that exists and a self that is negated. The self that exists is the person who creates karma and experiences the pleasurable, painful, and neutral results. This is the mere I that exists by being merely designated by conception. This self is the focal object of self-grasping as well as the focal object of a conventional reliable cognizer apprehending I.

  The self that is negated is the conceived object and the apprehended object of self-grasping. It doesn’t exist. Here self means inherent existence, true existence, existence from its own side, and objective existence of both persons and phenomena. This is the self that is negated by reasoning, the self that is refuted when we realize selflessness.

  If the person existed inherently, it would have to exist in one of these five ways in relation to the aggregates that are its basis of designation. We’ll examine each point to see if the self exists inherently.

  (1) The aggregates are not the self. The person and the aggregates are the same entity or nature, but they are not inherently one entity. If they were inherently the same entity, they would have to be identical: the I and the aggregates would be inseparably one, exactly the same in every way.
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  Generally speaking, when something is the same entity or same nature as another thing, the two things don’t have to be inseparably one without any difference at all. But if we talk about two things being inherently one entity, they have to be inseparably one and totally identical. If the aggregates and the person were inherently one entity, several faults would ensue. First, just as there are five aggregates, there would have to be five selves, or just as there is one self, there would have to be one aggregate. Both of these are impossible.

  Someone might say, “There are many persons because there is the person of the past life, the person of the present life, the person of the future life, the person experiencing happiness, the person experiencing suffering, and so on.” That is true; however, here we are speaking about the person that exists at any given instant of time. Are there five persons at that moment just as there are five aggregates? Is there one person who is just the body, another person who is the feelings, and so on? Of course not. Similarly, we can’t say that since there is one person, there is only one aggregate.

  In addition, if the self and the aggregates were inherently one, asserting a self would be useless because it would be identical to the aggregates. If the self were the body, for example, every time we used the word I we could substitute the word body. Thus instead of saying, “I got a job,” we would say, “the body got a job.” The body would also think and do everything else that the I does.

  If the self and the aggregates were inherently one, we wouldn’t be able to remember events from the past. In addition, karma we created in the past would get lost, and we could experience the results of karma we didn’t create. Why would these unwanted results come about if the person and the aggregates were inherently one? Just as the aggregates arise and cease inherently, the person would arise and cease inherently.21 Something that arises and ceases inherently is not part of a continuum. When it ceases, it is gone forever. In that case, each moment of a person would be a separate person that was unrelated to the previous and subsequent moments of the person. If the person of each moment of our continuum were inherently separate from all the other moments, we could not remember what we did in the past, because an entirely different person existed in the past. In addition, any karmic seed the person of one moment created would not be passed on in the continuum of that person. If that were the case, either the result of the karma a person created in this life would not be experienced by the continuum of that person in the next life, or if it were, then the person in the next life would experience results of actions created by a totally different person. In that case, that person could experience the results of karma created by anyone in the universe because everyone else would equally be a totally separate person.

  Furthermore, if the I were one with the body, since the person of this life came from the previous life, the body of our previous life would also exist in this life. Or since the body of this life came from the sperm and egg of our parents, we’d have to say the I came from the sperm and egg of our parents. So many foolish consequences would arise if the I and the aggregates were identical.

  Additionally, (2) the aggregates are not in the self and (3) the self is not in the aggregates. In general, the aggregates and the person have the relationship of “basis and dependent” or “support and supported.” The I is the dependent, the supported, and the aggregates are the basis or the support. However, they are not inherently basis and dependent. The aggregates are not in the I — that is to say, the aggregates don’t depend on the I. For example, if there is a bowl of yogurt, the bowl is the basis and the yogurt fills it and depends on it. In this case, the I would be like the bowl and the aggregates like the yogurt. There would be a person and the aggregates would fill it up and depend on it. But the relationship between the I and the aggregates isn’t like this. Thus the aggregates are not in the I. Alternatively, the I is not in the aggregates — it does not inherently depend on the aggregates. Here the aggregates would be like a house and the person would be a separate entity living in it and depending on it. Again, this is not the relationship between the I and the aggregates.

  These two kinds of dependence could occur only if the I and the aggregates were inherently different. In general, the I and the aggregates are different. They have different names and meanings. While things that are different conventionally don’t have to be totally unrelated, things that are inherently different must be totally separate with no relationship to each other at all. For example, cause and effect are different and they are different entities but they are related in that one produces the other. The wood that forms the table and the table are different, but they are related because they are one nature.

  In both of these examples, if the two things were inherently existent, they would have to be totally unrelated, which is not the case at all. It is the same with the person and the aggregates: they are different but related. The person is designated in dependence on the aggregates.

  If the aggregates and the person were inherently different and unrelated, the aggregates would not be the basis of designation of the self. They would be distinct like flowers in a vase. The flowers depend on the vase but are different from it. But the person and the aggregates aren’t separate like this, even though they are basis and dependent. They are one entity; we don’t observe them separate from each other in the way that we observe the flowers and the vase as two different things.

  The verse goes on to say (4) without them, the self cannot exist. Without the aggregates, there wouldn’t be a person. It is impossible to identify a person without the presence of the aggregates. The person cannot exist on its own, independent of the aggregates.

  If the I and the aggregates were inherently different, they would be totally different and unrelated. In that case, if the aggregates were eliminated one by one, the person could still remain there. In addition, the aggregates could be in one place and the person in another.

  Lastly, (5) the self and aggregates are not mixed like fire and fuel. Some people believe the person and the aggregates have an inexpressible relationship that is neither one nor different. They believe the person and aggregates are mixed in an ineffable, inexpressible fashion like wood and the fire burning it. When wood is burning, the fire is inseparable from it. In fact, the fuel becomes the fire. However, the self and the aggregates aren’t mixed in that way, and one does not become the other. This option is not acceptable because in an inherently existent world, things must be either completely identical or totally unrelated.

  These five possible relationships can be condensed into two: the person and aggregates are either inherently one or inherently different. To say they are mixed like fire and fuel is similar to saying they are inherently one. Thinking they are inherently basis and dependent is thinking they are inherently different.

  In place of the fifth point above, in Treatise on the Middle Way Nagarjuna says that the person does not inherently possess the aggregates. Generally speaking, the person does possess the aggregates — we say, “This is my body, this is my mind.” But the person doesn’t inherently possess them. There are two ways to inherently possess something: either (1) the person possesses the aggregates the way we own a house — a case of them being different entities, or (2) the person possesses the aggregates in the way Joe possesses his ear — they are one nature. The relationship of possession is not inherent, however. If it were, then in the first case the faults of the person and the aggregates being inherently different would accrue, and in the second case the faults of their being inherently one would obtain.

  If the self does not exist in any of these five ways in relation to the aggregates, how could it inherently exist? So many undesirable consequences arise when we examine if the self and aggregates have some sort of inherently existent relationship. The only viable conclusion to reach after this analysis is that an inherently existent person does not exist.

  In the Supplement, Chandrakirti adds two more points: (6) the self is not the collection of the aggregates,
and (7) the self is not the arrangement of the aggregates. Together with the above five, this forms the well-known sevenfold analysis. The two latter points can be subsumed into the self and aggregates not being inherently one or inherently different.

  Because the five or seven points can be condensed into the self and aggregates not being inherently one or inherently different, the lamrim and thought-training literature speak of four essential points to use when meditating on the emptiness of the person: (1) identifying the object to be refuted, the inherently existent person, (2) ascertaining the pervasion that if the person existed inherently it would be either inherently one or inherently different from the aggregates (there is no other option), (3) determining that they cannot be inherently identical, and (4) determining that they cannot be inherently different or separate. From this analysis, we then conclude that the person does not inherently exist and thus is empty of inherent existence.

  When we go into the proof of non-true existence more elaborately, five principal reasonings can be used for analysis: (1) the reasoning of being free of one and different, which analyzes the entity of phenomena; (2) the diamond splinters reasoning that analyzes the cause; (3) the reasoning that refutes production from the existent and nonexistent, which analyzes the effect; (4) the reasoning that refutes production from the four extremes, which analyzes both cause and effect; and (5) dependent arising, the monarch of reasonings.22 All of these are precious tools for us to use to discover the nature of reality.

  83.The [other] three elements are not earth, nor are they in earth;

  nor is the [earth] in them, but without them, the [earth element] cannot exist.