Practical Ethics and Profound Emptiness

by Jampa Tegchok

  Such is also the case for each [of the other elements].

  Therefore, as with the self, the elements are unreal.

  Refuting Inherently Existent Phenomena

  In the previous section, Nagarjuna examined the person and instructed us how to meditate on the selflessness of persons. In this section, he focuses on the selflessness of phenomena, which include impermanent things such as the five aggregates and permanent phenomena such as space. Here, too, the analysis centers on determining if things are inherently identical or inherently different.

  Nagarjuna begins with investigating impermanent things — the five aggregates — using the fivefold reasoning found in the previous verse, without the option of possession. First among the aggregates is form. While the definition of form is vague — it is “whatever is suitable to be form” — it principally refers to material objects, which may be gross or subtle. The definition of gross form is “that which is composed of a group of the eight atomic substances.”23 Examples are the body, the table, a leaf, the planet Neptune, and so on. The eight atomic substances are the four tiny particles — the elements of earth, water, fire, and wind — and the four elemental derivatives — visual form, smell, taste, and tangibles. While atom is not a perfect translation for a tiny particle as conceived in this ancient system of physics, we will use it for convenience. First we examine the four elements that are the bases of the form aggregate to see if they exist inherently, then we do the same for the form derivatives. Having done that, we can conclude that the form aggregate, the four elements, and the elemental derivatives do not exist inherently.

  The four elements are parts of a collection that is the basis of designation of a larger material object. These elements do not inherently exist because they exist in relation to and reliant on each other. Just as the person and the aggregates — as the designated object and as its basis of designation — are mutually reliant on each other, so too are the four elements mutually reliant on each other. For this reason, the mode of analysis to see if they inherently exist is the same: we examine if they are inherently identical or inherently separate.

  This examination leads us to four conclusions: first, the other three elements are not earth. Air, water, and fire are not inherently one with the earth element. If they were, they would have to be inseparably one, and then earth would be the defining characteristic of all the other elements. In that case earth would be hot and burning (the defining characteristic of fire), light and moving (wind), and wet and cohesive (water). Clearly the earth doesn’t have those characteristics. In this way, the claim that earth is one with the other three elements is refuted through direct perception.

  Conventionally, the four elements that compose the form aggregate are mutually the basis of each other. However, they are not inherently one or different. The earth element, for example, has all of the other elements complete with it, but it is not inherently one with them. It possesses the other three elements, but not inherently.

  The line nor are they in earth; nor is the earth in them expresses the next two conclusions. The other three elements are not inherently dependent on earth, and earth is not inherently dependent on them; such a relationship would have to be the case if they were inherently different. Fourth, without them, the earth element cannot exist; that is, the earth element cannot stand alone on its own without the other three elements. They exist in mutual dependence on each other.

  This same reasoning is used to show that water, fire, and wind do not exist inherently. For example, water is not inherently one with the other three elements, nor is it inherently the basis of the other three. The other three elements aren’t inherently based on or dependent on water. Also, the water element cannot exist by itself without the other elements. Therefore, as with the self, the elements are unreal; they do not inherently exist.

  To review, Nagarjuna first showed that there was no inherently, existent person. Then he analyzed the components of the body, the four elements. In the same way, these elements, which are part of the basis of designation of the person, do not exist inherently because they do not exist in any of the four ways. Thus, like the person, the four elements are not real, and the mind that grasps them as inherently existent is erroneous.

  84.Earth, water, fire, and wind

  are each not inherently existent,

  since each one does not exist without the [other] three,

  and the other three do not exist without each one.

  85.If each one does not exist without [the other] three,

  and [the other] three do not exist without each one,

  then individually they do not essentially exist,

  so how could they arise as a compound?

  Mutual Reliance Precludes Inherent Existence

  Individually, earth, water, fire, and wind are not inherently existent since each one does not exist without the other three. If we removed three of the four elements, the fourth one would no longer be present. Similarly, if one element were removed, the other three would not be there. For example, in a collection of elements, if the fire element were missing, the other three elements would also not be present. Since they are dependent and reliant in this way, the four elements cannot exist inherently by themselves. Even conventionally they have to exist as a group.

  All four elements exist within the collection of elements and derivatives that makes up a given material object. In this composite, the components rely on each other. While they exist in a mutually reliant manner, the four elements are not mixed with each other in the sense of being indistinguishable from the others. Instead, each still retains its own properties and characteristics.

  Inherent existence is the same as independent existence; independent existence and dependent existence are contradictory. Therefore, anything that arises dependently cannot exist independently and thus is not inherently existent.

  86.If each [element] existed on its own,

  why wouldn’t fire occur without fuel?

  Likewise, why wouldn’t there be water, wind, and earth

  without coherence, motility, and hardness?

  Someone says, “Each of the four elements exists inherently, and when they come together, they form an inherently existent composite.” This cannot be. Since each element does not inherently exist, a form that is a composite of them cannot inherently exist.

  In the context of inherent existence, two or more things cannot rely on each other; they must be totally unrelated, independent, and separate. If each element existed inherently, there could be fire without firewood because fire would be completely different and not reliant in any way on the other three elements. In that case, fire would not need to depend on fuel.

  87.If you claim that [only] fire is well known [to depend on fuel],

  then according to you, how could the other three be independent?

  It does not make sense for those three to be incompatible

  with what is interdependently arisen.

  Dispelling Further Arguments through the Reasoning of Dependent Arising

  In these debates with philosophers from other traditions, we see that after Nagarjuna responds to their claim, they listen and change their assertion. If the new assertion is also incorrect, Nagarjuna refutes it as well. In response to Nagarjuna’s previous refutation, now someone says, “Everyone knows you can’t have fire without fuel. But the other three elements are different. If one is not there, the other three can be, so they exist inherently.”

  Nagarjuna meets this head on, saying, “If you claim that only fire is well known to depend on fuel, how could the other three be independent?” Fire needs fuel to exist and fuel is composed of the other three elements, so fire cannot exist without relying on the other three. Following this logic, none of the other three elements can be posited without relying on fire.

  If this were not the case, then without earth (hardness) being in a composite of elements, water (cohesion), fire (ripening), and wind (motility) could still be present. The property of coh
esion could exist inherently and independently, without there being anything to adhere together. Motility could exist by itself without anything that moves. Fire could exist by itself without anything to heat.

  Nagarjuna goes on, “It does not make sense for those three to be incompatible with what is interdependently arisen.” In other words, each of the other three elements arises dependent and related to the others, so they are not inherently existent. If each of them existed inherently, it would not rely on causes and conditions and would not be mutually dependent on the others. If the wind element, for example, did not exist in reliance upon causes and conditions, it would either always exist everywhere or it would exist nowhere. It could arise without a cause and cease without its cause having ceased. Causes and conditions could have no effect on it at all.

  The four elements in any collection cannot be separated. They cannot exist on their own, totally apart from the others. Each one exists dependent on the others and vice versa. Something that is reliant cannot exist independently or inherently.

  The four elements are the basis for a gross material object, and the gross object arises dependent on those elements. The above argument refutes the inherent existence of the elements that are the basis for a material object. After refuting this, it is easy to prove that the derivatives and the material object itself do not exist inherently.

  88.[If] those [elements] each exist on their own,

  how could they exist mutually?

  And [if they] do not each exist on their own,

  how could they exist mutually?

  Now someone says, “Although the elements rely on each other, the entity of each one exists inherently.” Nagarjuna responds by giving an unwanted consequence, “If what you say is true, then the elements can’t be mutually reliant because inherent existence and mutual reliance are contradictory.” Since the lower systems cannot accept that the four elements are not mutually reliant, they must give up their assertion that they inherently exist.

  Furthermore, if things exist with their own inherent essence, they cannot arise from causes because inherently existent things cannot be affected by any other factors. Svatantrikas and below think that dependent things such as cause and effect both rely on other factors and exist inherently. They are not able to understand how to use dependent arising as a reason to prove emptiness, whereas Prasangikas use dependent arising and mutual reliance as reasons to prove that phenomena lack existence from their own side. Because things depend on other factors, they cannot exist under their own power, with their own inherent essence.

  On the other hand, if the elements did not each exist on their own, they would be mixed and could not be distinguished individually. In that case, they could not be mutually reliant. They must be conventionally distinct — but not inherently different — in order to depend on each other.

  89.If each does not exist on its own,

  but whenever there is one, the remaining [three are present],

  then [if] not mixed, they cannot be present in one locus,

  and [if] mixed, they cannot each exist on their own.

  Someone says, “When one element is present in a place, the remaining three come with it. All of them exist from their own side because when there is one element, the defining characteristics of each element come together with it.” Nagarjuna asks, “If the remaining three elements are also present wherever there is one element, are their natures mixed or unmixed?” If they are not mixed, they cannot be present in one locus, because the four cannot abide together unmixed on one object. If their natures are mixed, they cannot each exist on their own. In this case, the nature of each element can’t exist inherently because it’s been mixed with the natures of the others. In short, it is not correct to think that although the four elements do not inherently exist individually on their own, they exist inherently as mutually reliant.

  90.How can elements that do not exist on their own have inherent characteristics?

  [When mixed, one element] cannot predominate

  [since it] does not exist on its own.

  [Hence, their] characteristics are stated conventionally.

  We define or identify the four elements depending on their individual, specific characteristics. Abhidharma literature states the defining characteristics of each element. Earth is hard and solid; fire is hot and burning; water is wet and moistening; wind is light and moving. These characteristics do not exist inherently because the elements don’t exist individually on their own.

  Someone asks, “If the characteristics of the four elements are mixed, we couldn’t distinguish one from the other, and since they exist inherently we should be able to. When elements join to form a collection and their natures are mixed, their specific characteristics still exist inherently because there are differences in the extent to which they dominate the mixture. We can distinguish each element according to its preponderance in the mixture.”

  Nagarjuna answers, “We aren’t contradicting Abhidharma; we agree that each element has its own specific defining characteristics. However, when the four elements exist together, although there is a difference in the degree of preponderance of each one’s specific characteristics, none of them exist inherently. The characteristics of hard, hot, wet, and moving depend on each other.”

  This person has confused having specific characteristics with existing by its own characteristics. Existing by its own characteristics is synonymous with inherent existence. Each element has its own specific characteristics conventionally, but these characteristics do not exist inherently; they exist by relying on each other. In brief, specific characteristics do not exist by their own characteristics or inherently.

  In his Supplement, Chandrakirti uses the reason that material objects have parts to prove that the form aggregate does not inherently exist. These parts are the tiny particles of the four elements that come together to form a collection. These tiny particles, in turn, have parts, and are therefore dependent arisings and lack inherent existence. By first proving that the individual elements lack inherent existence, it is easy to show that a collection of them gathered together also lacks inherent existence. Anything that depends on parts does not exist independently and therefore does not exist inherently.

  The reasoning in Precious Garland is slightly different. Here Nagarjuna emphasizes the fact that the elements rely on each other. We usually speak about impermanent things being dependent on their causes and conditions, but here dependence is illustrated by analyzing the tiny particles and showing that the eight particles that make up a collection rely on each other.

  91.This approach also applies to colors,

  odors, tastes, and tactile [objects].

  Such is also the case with the eye [faculty], consciousness, and [visible] forms;

  ignorance, karma, and birth,

  92.Agent, object, and action, number,

  conjunction, cause and effect, and time,

  long and short, and so on —

  designation and designated as well.

  Refuting the Inherent Existence of Elemental Derivatives and Applying This to Other Phenomena

  To prove the non-inherent existence of the elemental derivatives, Nagarjuna instructs us to use the same reasoning that proved the four elements are not inherently existent. Just as the four elements exist in reliance upon each other, so too do colors, odors, tastes, and tactile objects. Where one is, the others are also; when one is missing, the other three also are not present. Thus, because they exist dependent on one another, the derivatives do not inherently exist.

  Nagarjuna now extends the analysis to many different kinds of phenomena. The eye faculty, consciousness, and visible forms compose a set of three dependent factors, as do the sense faculty, consciousness, and object of each of the other senses. The eye sense faculty helps to connect the object (a visible form) to the consciousness (the visual consciousness that perceives that form). These three are also mutually dependent in that the sense faculty and its object cannot be causes unless th
ere is an effect — the visual consciousness that perceives that form.

  Ignorance, karma, and birth are another set of causally related factors. Ignorance refers to the first of the twelve links and other afflictions. Karma denotes the virtuous, nonvirtuous, and neutral actions created under its influence. Birth refers to the fortunate and unfortunate births in cyclic existence that result from the various karmas. These, too, are mutually related in that something cannot be a cause without there being an effect or the possibility of an effect.

  Agent, object, and action form a set of dependently related factors present whenever any activity occurs. Number means one and many, all the different numbers. Conjunction refers to the meeting of two or more phenomena. It also refers to an object, such as a person born in cyclic existence, possessing the attributes of impermanence, unsatisfactory nature, emptiness, and selflessness. Cause and effect are another related set. Something is an effect because it arises from a cause; something is a cause because it has the potential to produce an effect. Time refers to the past, present, and future as well as to different lengths of time such as months, years, and so forth. Short and long are distinguished in relation to each other; and so on refers to various other shapes such as round and square and other sets of dependent phenomena. Designation and designated refers to phenomena and their definitions. For example, “thing” is a designation, and “that which is able to perform a function” — the definition of “thing” — is the designated. Just as the elements and their derivatives are not inherently existent, all of these phenomena similarly lack inherent existence because they exist dependent on other factors that are not themselves.

  As well has the sense of “like that.” Initially the non-inherent existence of the person was explained. Just like that, the non-inherent existence of the four elements was established; and like that the emptiness of the elemental derivatives and all these other phenomena is established. The mind to which these things appear inherently existent and that grasps them as inherently existent is mistaken. The person appears to be inherently existent to the self-grasping of the person, and self-grasping apprehends the person as inherently existent. Similarly, all the other minds to which inherent existence appears or that grasp inherent existence are mistaken. Their objects are false; they don’t exist as they appear.