Eisenhower in War and Peace

by Jean Edward Smith

  When the conference ended on December 2, 1943, FDR still had not reached a decision. He recognized Marshall was entitled to the post, and understood his obligation to the chief of staff. But he had increasingly come to believe that Eisenhower might be a better choice, and he was truly reluctant to lose Marshall from Washington. What did Marshall want? Back in Cairo, Roosevelt delegated Hopkins to find out. When Hopkins called on Marshall, the chief of staff declined to state his opinion. “I will wholeheartedly accept whatever decision the President makes,” said Marshall.86

  The following day, Sunday, December 5, FDR sent for Marshall shortly before lunch. “I was determined,” Marshall said later, “that I should not embarrass the President one way or the other—that he must be able to deal in this matter with a perfectly free hand in whatever he felt was the best interest of the country.”87

  After a few brief formalities, Roosevelt asked Marshall directly what he wanted to do. “Evidently it was left up to me,” Marshall recalled. “I repeated again in as convincing language as I could that I wanted him to feel free to act in whatever way he felt was to the best interest of the country and to his satisfaction and not in any way to consider my feelings.”88

  “Then it will be Eisenhower,” said Roosevelt. “I don’t think I could sleep at night with you out of the country.”89 n

  * * *

  a Bedell Smith was initially concerned that Alexander had too few Americans on his staff at Fifteenth Army Group. Harold Macmillan told Smith that the quality of the American officers previously provided was poor and “quite frankly that he must supply some better American officers if they were to be taken seriously.” Smith got the message and dispatched Lyman Lemnitzer to be Alexander’s deputy. (Lemnitzer served as chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1960 to 1962.) Harold Macmillan, The Blast of War: 1939–1945 304 (New York: Harper and Row, 1968).

  b After conceding Eisenhower’s executive ability, Monty wrote Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, chief of the imperial general staff, that Ike “knows nothing whatever about how to make war or fight battles; he should be kept away from all that business if we want to win this war.” Montgomery to Brooke, April 4, 1943, Montgomery Papers, Imperial War Museum, London.

  c “It was a crashing blow to hear from him [Churchill] that he was now handing over this appointment to the Americans,” Brooke recorded in his diary entry of August 15, 1943. “Not for one moment did he realize what this meant to me. He offered no sympathy, no regrets at having had to change his mind and dealt with the matter as if it were one of minor importance.” Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, War Diaries, 1939–1945 441–42, Alex Danchev and Daniel Todman, eds. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001). When Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke was elevated to the peerage, he adopted the name Alanbrooke.

  d Montgomery’s orders instructed him “to secure a bridgehead on the toe of Italy, to enable our naval forces to operate through the Straits of Messina.” No effort was made to coordinate his efforts with the Fifth Army, and it was not anticipated that the Eighth Army would move north beyond the neck of Catanzaro, the ankle of the Italian boot. Alexander to Montgomery, August 20, 1943, Montgomery Papers, Imperial War Museum, London. Also see The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein 173 (Cleveland: World Publishing, 1958); Nigel Hamilton, Master of the Battlefield: Monty’s War Years, 1942–1944 386–87 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983).

  e In addition to having been first captain of the corps of cadets (USMA, 1922), Taylor was a gifted linguist who had taught French and Spanish at the academy.

  f “When the time comes that I must meet my Maker,” wrote Ridgway in his memoirs, “the source of most humble pride to me will not be accomplishments in battle, but the fact that I was guided to make the decision to oppose this thing [GIANT II]. I deeply and sincerely believe that by taking the stand I took we saved the lives of thousands of brave men.

  “The hard decisions,” Ridgway added, “are not the ones you make in the heat of battle. Far harder to make are those involved in speaking your mind about some hare-brained scheme, which proposes to commit troops to action under conditions where failure is almost certain, and the only results will be the needless sacrifice of priceless lives.” Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway, as Told to Harold H. Martin 82–83 (New York: Harper, 1956).

  g Could Eighth Army have reached Salerno more quickly? The U.S. Army’s official history of the Salerno campaign, written by the distinguished military historian Martin Blumenson, states that the “unequivocal answer is impossible.” After describing the difficulties Eighth Army surmounted, Blumenson quotes Mark Clark’s note to Montgomery while the battle was still in progress: “Please accept my deep appreciation for assistance your Eighth Army has provided Fifth Army by your skillful and rapid advance.” Clark to Montgomery, September 15, 1943, in Martin Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino 140–41 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1969).

  h On October 30, 1943, FDR cabled Churchill that it was important for a commander of OVERLORD to be appointed quickly, but, “as you know I cannot make Marshall available immediately.” The president asked Churchill if he could appoint a British deputy supreme commander “who in receipt of precisely the same measure of support as will eventually be accorded Marshall could well carry the work forward.”

  Churchill replied the following day. “Can you give me a firm date when Marshall will be available, as I see great difficulties in the various stop gap arrangements proposed?” Warren F. Kimball, ed. 2 Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence 571, 573 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984). Also see Winston S. Churchill, Closing the Ring 304–6 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951).

  i The dinner guests, in addition to FDR and Kay Summersby, included Eisenhower, Admiral Leahy, General Spaatz, Air Chief Marshal Tedder, Elliott Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt, Jr., and Miss Nancy Gatch, a Red Cross worker who was Butcher’s latest girlfriend. Lieutenant Junior Grade William Rigdon, who kept the president’s logbook, decorously listed Summersby and Gatch as the guests of Franklin, Jr., and Elliott. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943 287 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961).

  j In the course of the conversation, FDR asked Summersby whether she would like to join the Women’s Army Corps (WACs). Kay replied she would like nothing better, but she wasn’t an American citizen and therefore was not eligible. “Well, who knows?” Roosevelt replied. “Stranger things have happened.”

  By order of the president, Kay Summersby was commissioned a second lieutenant in the WACs in October 1944. Korda, Ike 422.

  k Marshall, although he consistently refused to express any opinion on the appointment, evidently assumed he would be named to the post. Mrs. Marshall had begun moving the family’s personal belongings out of Quarters 1 at Fort Myer to their home in Leesburg, Virginia, and Marshall had had his desk, the behemoth used by General Pershing (and now used by the secretary of defense), crated for shipment to London. Katherine Tupper Marshall, Together: Annals of an Army Wife 156–57 (New York: Tupper and Love, 1946); David Eisenhower, Eisenhower at War, 1943–1945 42–43 (New York: Random House, 1986).

  l FDR’s memory failed him, or perhaps the wish was father to the thought, as sometimes happened with the president. MacArthur was awarded the Medal of Honor in March 1942 after his escape from the Philippines. At that time Eisenhower headed the War Plans Division in the War Department and certainly would not have been recommended for the Medal of Honor. Eisenhower had opposed the award of the medal to MacArthur, which FDR may have remembered. Manchester, American Caesar 275–76.

  m In a lengthy letter to her husband postmarked December 19, 1943, Anna described FDR’s return to the White House. “LL [Little Lady, Eleanor Roosevelt] is now in N.Y., so OM [Old Man, FDR] and I are having the Norwegians [Princess Martha] for tea, and then OM, the big kids and I will swim.… OM and I had a good t
alk about Elliott. During the discussion, you’ll be amused to know that he suspects that the man you first wrote to about going into the Army [Eisenhower], is sleeping with his attractive driver!” Anna Roosevelt Boettiger to John Boettiger, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park.

  n The British were delighted that Roosevelt chose Eisenhower rather than Marshall. After leaving Teheran, FDR told Elliott, “It’s absolutely clear that Winston will refuse absolutely to let Marshall take over. It’s not that [Marshall] argued too often with the P.M. on military matters, it’s just that he’s won too often.”

  In his memoirs, Churchill insisted it was the president’s decision, but when informed by Roosevelt that it would be Eisenhower, he replied that he had the “warmest regard for General Eisenhower, and would trust our fortunes to his direction with hearty good will.”

  General Sir Alan Brooke, who was often critical of Eisenhower, called the decision “a good one. Eisenhower had now a certain amount of experience as a Commander and was beginning to find his feet. The combination of Eisenhower and Bedell Smith had much to be said for it. On the other hand Marshall had never commanded anything in war except, I believe, a company in the First World War.”

  Elliott Roosevelt, As He Saw It 209 (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1946); Winston S. Churchill, Closing the Ring 418; Lord Alanbrooke, War Diaries 491.

  THIRTEEN

  D-Day

  You will enter the continent of Europe, and undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces.

  —COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF TO EISENHOWER,

  February 12, 1944

  “Well, Ike, you’d better start packing,” said FDR when he landed in Tunis on his return to Washington. “You are going to command OVERLORD.”1 Roosevelt said the official announcement would be made later in December, but the matter was settled and that Eisenhower should wind up his affairs in North Africa and be in London by the beginning of January.

  “The General was so happy I thought he would burst,” Kay Summersby recalled. “That grin never left his face.”2

  Roosevelt was scheduled to remain in Tunis only one day. But his plane developed hydraulic trouble and he again stayed for two. FDR said that if a legitimate reason for the delay had not been found, he would have invented one because he wanted to spend more time with Ike. When Eisenhower expressed surprise that the president could not determine his own travel schedule, Roosevelt replied, “You haven’t had to argue with the Secret Service.”3

  According to Butcher, “The President discussed all sorts of problems, ideas, and ambitions with Ike. These were not confined to military subjects [and] Ike felt complimented by the President’s frankness and indications of complete confidence in him.”4

  Because Eisenhower would command OVERLORD, it was understood that his successor in the Mediterranean would be British, and Churchill, at the recommendation of Brooke, chose General Sir Henry Maitland “Jumbo” Wilson. Wilson was then Allied commander in chief in the Middle East and had a proven track record dealing with explosive situations in Palestine, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq. Churchill also wanted Bedell Smith to remain in Algiers as chief of staff to Wilson, but Eisenhower insisted that Smith accompany him to London. Ike also wanted Alexander as his deputy and ground commander, but the British said no. Churchill, who continued to believe the war might be won in Italy, wanted Alexander to remain there, and Brooke, who did not share the prime minister’s high regard for Alexander, thought him entirely too pliable for OVERLORD. “Ike knew he could handle Alex,” wrote Brooke, but “I would have had little confidence in Alex running that show.”5

  The obvious choice to direct the landings in France was Montgomery. As Churchill saw it, Monty was a national hero in Britain “and will give confidence among our people.”6 For Brooke, it was a matter of competence. No one could argue that Montgomery was not qualified. He might be difficult, and Ike was not fond of him, but in Brooke’s opinion Montgomery would add the necessary battlefield experience to the command structure. Eisenhower accepted the inevitable. In his memoirs, Ike conceded that no one was better at winning the affection of the enlisted men serving with him than Montgomery, and when it came to fighting set-piece battles, Monty had no peer.7 Eisenhower was tickled pink to be named supreme commander, and if Churchill and the British war cabinet wanted Montgomery to be the ground commander for OVERLORD, he would make it work.

  But he did not want Montgomery as his deputy. Instead, Eisenhower secured the Combined Chiefs’ approval to take Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder to London. Ike and Tedder worked well together, and were equally committed to the principle of “allied”—rather than national—command.8 Tedder was an advocate of close air-ground support, and the term “Tedder’s carpet” derived from a bombing technique he devised to clear a path for ground troops through enemy defenses.a

  Eisenhower intended that Tedder wear two hats: one as his deputy and a second as commander of the air force for OVERLORD. But the Combined Chiefs decided otherwise. Without consulting Ike, Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, who led RAF Fighter Command, was assigned to head the air arm. Eisenhower did not know Leigh-Mallory, had never worked with him, and was not pleased. “I understand Mallory is a fighter commander of the very highest quality,” Ike wrote Marshall, “but this tendency to freeze organization so that a commander may not use trusted and superior subordinates [that is, Tedder] in their proper spheres disturbs me very much indeed.”9

  Ike’s reservations were well founded. Tedder’s talents were wasted in a position whose duties were never defined, and Leigh-Mallory, who did not work well with others, became a source of friction between Ike and the strategic air commanders. He grew excessively pessimistic as D-Day approached, was eased out of his position in October 1944, and died in a plane crash the following month.

  To command the naval forces for OVERLORD, Eisenhower would have preferred Andrew Cunningham, but in October, Cunningham had been recalled to London to succeed Sir Dudley Pound as first sea lord. (Pound had been fatally stricken with cancer.) Instead, he selected Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, who had been Cunningham’s deputy. Ramsay, born in 1883, had retired in 1938, but was recalled when war began and had almost single-handedly put together the fleet of small ships that evacuated the British Expeditionary Force from Dunkirk. Because Ramsay was on the retired list and only temporarily on active duty, the Admiralty had given the Mediterranean fleet to Cunningham and made Ramsay his deputy. The arrangement had worked well, and despite his age, Ramsay was indefatigable. He also liked Americans. “All of us knew him to be helpful and companionable,” wrote Eisenhower, “even though we sometimes laughed among ourselves at the care with which he guarded the ‘senior service’ position of the British Navy.”10

  An additional appointment, one that Eisenhower insisted upon from the beginning, was that of John C. H. Lee to head the logistics effort. Despite his grandiose manner, indeed, perhaps because of it, Lee had no equal in amassing the supplies that an army needed to move forward—and crossing the Channel would pose an unprecedented logistical challenge. Eisenhower installed Lee as deputy theater commander and commanding general of Army Service Forces.11 b “I hope that General Lee is big enough for this job,” Ike cabled Marshall, “but I assure you it is one that takes a world of ability, not only in technical matters, but in coordinating and cooperating with Allies.”12

  With the exception of Bedell Smith as his chief of staff, and Lee in charge of logistics, all of Eisenhower’s principal deputies were once again British. When they were in place, Ike turned to the American component of OVERLORD. The British side would be Monty’s responsibility. On December 17, Ike suggested to Marshall that he would like Bradley as his senior army group commander, and Tooey Spaatz to command the strategic air force. He also said he wanted Patton to command one of the American armies.13 Marshall was in Australia visiting MacArthur, and a brief period of confusion followed. Exactly when Marshall received Eisenhower’s cable is unclear, but on Decemb
er 21 the chief of staff informed Ike that he thought General Leslie McNair, who was commanding Army Ground Forces, should be his senior ground commander, and that the armies should be commanded by Jacob Devers (who had taken Ike’s place in London) and Bradley, or Bradley and Courtney Hodges, who was then commanding Third Army at Fort Sam Houston. “Hodges is exactly the same class of man as Bradley in practically every respect,” said Marshall. “Wonderful shot, great hunter, quiet, self-effacing, thorough understanding of ground fighting, DSC [Distinguished Service Cross], etc.” No mention was made of Patton, and instead of Spaatz, Marshall thought Ira Eaker should command the air force. Both Devers and Eaker were already in England, and Marshall gently chided Ike for wanting to strip the Mediterranean of its senior officers.14

  Marshall’s cable created considerable consternation at AFHQ, but Eisenhower stuck to his guns. He wanted commanders with recent battle experience, he told Marshall, and since McNair and Devers had none, that meant Bradley and Patton. Hodges would be acceptable, said Ike, but Devers should be assigned to command American forces in the Mediterranean, and Eaker should replace Spaatz there. “I regret that you found anything disturbing in the recommendations I made but, frankly, they are the best I could evolve considering the jobs to be filled.”15 As delicately as he could, Eisenhower was reminding Marshall that OVERLORD was now his responsibility and he wanted to choose his own subordinates.