Eisenhower in War and Peace

by Jean Edward Smith

  Marshall returned to Washington shortly after Christmas and quickly set matters straight. “It appears that we have gotten into complete confusion regarding future assignments,” he cabled Eisenhower. Marshall said he had been “following a confused trail in the Pacific” and was just now able to digest what Ike was recommending. One of the chief of staff’s greatest strengths was his ability to delegate. It was, of course, Eisenhower’s responsibility, said Marshall, and whoever he wanted would be approved. “I think the foregoing should clarify things and leave you free to proceed.”16

  As Butcher recorded, “Marshall’s message was like the sun breaking through the fog. When Ike received the good news … his whole demeanor changed.”17 In effect, Marshall had given Eisenhower carte blanche: The supreme commander would be the supreme commander.

  With his team in place, Eisenhower turned to the plan for OVERLORD. At the Casablanca conference in January 1943, the Combined Chiefs had established a planning group (COSSAC) under Major General Sir Frederick Morgan to put together the framework for the cross-Channel attack. “Well, there it is,” Brooke told Morgan when he was assigned the task. “It won’t work, but you must bloody well make it.”18

  The planners got some things right. The Allies would land in Normandy, not the Pas-de-Calais, the closest point across the Channel from Britain, where the Germans were ready and waiting. The beaches were selected, the times fixed, and the tides were right. But because of the shortage of landing craft, COSSAC planned for only three divisions in the initial assault. The landings would be limited to a narrow front; troops from Britain, Canada, and the United States would be intermingled; and the follow-on forces would funnel through a single beachhead. When Eisenhower examined the plan he was struck by the similarity to Salerno. “Not enough wallop in the initial attack,” he told Butcher.19

  Montgomery, who was shown a copy of the plan by Churchill, was absolutely appalled. Monty was one of the few British leaders who believed in OVERLORD, but he told Churchill the plan developed by COSSAC “would never do.” For the prime minister’s benefit, Montgomery spelled out the changes he thought necessary.

  The initial landings must be made on the widest possible front.

  Each corps must have a separate beach, and other corps must not land through those beaches.

  Because of differences in organization and equipment, the British and American landing areas must be kept separate.

  After landing, the first order of business must be to secure a good port through which supplies can be unloaded.

  Above all, said Montgomery, “the air battle must be won before the operation is launched. We must then aim at success in the land battle by the speed and violence of our operations.”20

  From the beginning, Eisenhower and Montgomery were on the same page. COSSAC’s plan was a useful starting point, but drastic revisions were required. The basic problem, said Monty, was that the plan had been drawn up as an intellectual exercise by staff officers with little battlefield experience. Churchill needed no convincing. Always skeptical of a cross-Channel attack, he was won over by Montgomery’s enthusiasm. “Grip the show,” he encouraged Monty. “Grip the show.” Afterward, Churchill wrote, “I felt a strong reassurance that all would be well.”21

  Before Eisenhower could leave for London, the politics of North Africa erupted. On December 21, 1943, the French Committee of National Liberation accelerated its purge of former Darlan officials and ordered the arrest of the three most prominent Vichyites who had assisted the Allies.c Ike was blindsided, Churchill was shocked, and FDR was livid. “Please inform the French Committee as follows,” he instructed Eisenhower: “In view of assistance given to the Allied Armies during the campaign in Africa by Boisson, Peyrouton and Flandin, you are directed to take no action against these individuals at the present time.”22

  FDR then vented his dislike for de Gaulle to Churchill. “It seems to me that this is the proper time effectively to eliminate the Jeanne d’Arc complex and to return to realism,” he cabled the prime minister. “I too am shocked by the high handed arrests at this time.”23

  Roosevelt had overreacted. Contrary to the president’s assumption, North Africa was not occupied territory, and there was no way the United States could issue a peremptory order to the French. Eisenhower was caught in the middle. If he delivered the message as the president instructed, the FCNL would regard it as an ultimatum, and Ike had no doubt that de Gaulle would reject it. That, in turn, would be a direct slap at the president that the United States could not accept, and matters would escalate from there. French rearmament would be halted, the use of French troops would be thrown into question, and the all-important support of the Resistance in France would be rendered doubtful.

  Rather than deliver the message, AFHQ sat on the president’s cable. Bedell Smith went to see Churchill, who was convalescing in Morocco, and explained the problem. Churchill cabled FDR suggesting that Eisenhower inform de Gaulle of their concern orally,24 and Roosevelt, having blown off steam, acquiesced. On December 26 he instructed Eisenhower to pursue the matter informally. Instead of “directing” the FCNL, Ike was merely to inform de Gaulle that the United States “views with alarm” the arrest of the former Vichyites.25 d

  Roosevelt’s change of heart coincided with Eisenhower’s desire to secure de Gaulle’s support for OVERLORD. Having spent more than a year dealing with the political problems of North Africa, Ike was convinced that de Gaulle was the only person who could rally the French against Hitler.26 In keeping with de Gaulle’s position as provisional president of France (whether the United States recognized it or not), Eisenhower requested an appointment and called on the French leader.

  “You were originally described to me in an unfavorable sense,” said Ike. “Today, I realize that judgment was in error. For the coming battle, I shall need not only the co-operation of your forces, but still more the assistance of your officials and the moral support of the French people. I must have your assistance, and I have come to ask for it.”

  “Splendid,” de Gaulle replied. “You are a man! For you know how to say, ‘I was wrong.’ ”27

  Ike told Butcher that from that point on the meeting became “a love fest.”28 De Gaulle was concerned that the liberation of Paris be done by French troops. Eisenhower said he would try to arrange it. Ike was concerned about the fate of Boisson, Peyrouton, and Flandin. De Gaulle promised to delay their trial until after France was liberated and a properly constituted national assembly could determine their fate. In the interim they would be housed in comfortable quarters in Algiers.29 When Eisenhower took his leave, he told de Gaulle that he did not know what “theoretical position” Washington would take, but “I will not recognize any other authority in France than yours.”30 From that point on, Ike became de Gaulle’s best friend in the Allied camp, and de Gaulle, for his part, spared Eisenhower the necessity of having to govern a liberated France.

  Eisenhower had intended to go from Algiers directly to London, but on December 28 Marshall suggested he first report to Washington to consult the War Department, “see your family, and get at least a bit of rest” before assuming his position as supreme commander.31 Ike declined. “With regard to my visit home,” he told Marshall, “I feel that for the moment it is an impossibility. I truly hope that February or early March will afford me such an opportunity.”32

  Marshall would have none of it. He might delegate to Eisenhower the choice of American generals for OVERLORD, but rest and attention to family were not negotiable. “You will be under terrific strain from now on,” he told Ike. “I am interested that you are fully prepared to bear the strain and I am not interested in the usual rejoinder that you can take it. It is of vast importance that you be fresh mentally and you certainly will not be if you go straight from one great problem to another. Now come on home and see your wife and trust somebody else for 20 minutes in England.”33

  Eisenhower recognized that Marshall was not joking. “I will be on my way within twenty-four hours,”
he cabled on December 30. “I earnestly request that you keep this visit as secret as possible.”34

  “Delighted,” said Marshall. “Will arrange for any trip or travel you desire and will make tentative preparations on basis of complete secrecy.”35

  Shortly after noon on New Year’s Eve, Summersby drove Ike to the airport in Algiers. “Two weeks seems like a long time,” she said. “Especially when you are going to be so far away.”

  “Twelve days,” Ike replied. “You’ll be with me all the time.” At the airport a small crowd had gathered. Eisenhower shook hands with his staff, and Summersby was last. He retrieved a slip of paper from his pocket and passed it to her. “Kay, can you take care of this for me?” he asked.

  “Certainly, General. Have a safe trip.” Ike boarded the plane, the cabin door closed, and Kay read the note. Think of me, Ike had written. You know what I will be thinking.36 e

  Eisenhower, Churchill, and General Maitland “Jumbo” Wilson in Marrakesh, French Morocco, January 1944, with Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder (second row left); Admiral Andrew Cunningham (second row, second from left); General Sir Harold Alexander (second row, center); and General Walter Bedell Smith (second row, right). (illustration credit 13.1)

  Eisenhower’s plane took off for Marrakesh, in French Morocco, where Churchill was still recuperating from a nasty bout of pneumonia. Ike wanted to pay his respects to the prime minister before heading to Washington, as well as lay the groundwork for the handover of authority in the Mediterranean to Jumbo Wilson. By chance, Montgomery had also stopped off in Marrakesh on his way to London, and in a brief meeting he and Ike compared notes on OVERLORD. Both agreed on the major revisions that were required, and Eisenhower deputized Monty to go to London and work them out. “I was to analyze and revise the plan and have it ready for him on his arrival in England about the middle of January,” Montgomery recorded in his diary.37

  From Marrakesh Ike flew to the Azores, then to Bermuda, and arrived in Washington in the early morning hours of January 2, 1944. The flight, including the visit to Churchill and lengthy refueling stops in the Azores and Bermuda, had taken a day and a half.

  It was after one in the morning when Ike and Butcher drove up in an unmarked car to the Wardman Park. Marshall had alerted Mamie of Eisenhower’s return, and she waited up. But the reunion was less than rapturous. Ike and Butcher had brought two puppies, the offspring of Telek and his “American wife,” as gifts for Ruth Butcher and Mamie. After being released from the crate in which they had been confined, the puppies proceeded to relieve themselves on the Eisenhowers’ carpet, and then repeated the performance at the Butchers’. Neither Mamie nor Ruth was amused. The puppies were reminders of the life Ike and Butcher led overseas, and were quickly dispatched to foster homes.

  At a more substantive level, Ike and Mamie had changed, and the divide between them was greater than ever. They had not seen each other for eighteen months. Eisenhower had grown in stature and was accustomed to command. He had become the confidant of Churchill and Roosevelt, moved easily in the highest circles of government, and held the fate of armies in his hands. He spoke abruptly, rationed his time, and had little patience for small talk. Above all, he had come to Washington under duress and was eager to return to his command.

  Mamie’s position had changed as well. No segment of society is more rank-conscious than Army wives, and Mamie was now First Lady of the coven of military dependents living in northwest Washington. She, too, was accustomed to being deferred to, and her concerns were everyday matters that confronted women whose husbands were abroad. A quintessential Army wife, Mamie’s perspective was limited to family matters, wartime shortages, and military gossip. “How difficult it was for men to come home and live in a home, and how hard it was for us to have a man around the house,” Mamie recalled years later.38

  At 6 a.m. Eisenhower was cooking his own bacon and eggs in the kitchen, and then was off to the War Department for a day of conferences with Marshall, Stimson, King, and Somervell. Mamie, as was her habit, rose later. The War Department had moved from the cramped temporary quarters it had occupied on the Washington Mall since World War I, and was now installed in the Pentagon, the world’s largest office building, located on the south shore of the Potomac on the former grounds of old Fort Hunt and Hoover Airport.f Eisenhower expressed his concern to Marshall that the strategic bombers based in Britain be placed under his command, and Marshall pledged his support.39 Ike was less successful with Admiral King, who declined to transfer landing craft from the Pacific theater to Europe.

  The next day Eisenhower went to the White House to see the president. Roosevelt, like Churchill, was suffering from a respiratory infection and was propped up in bed, supported by a pile of pillows. Eisenhower sought to soften FDR’s hostility to de Gaulle, but found the president intransigent. Roosevelt insisted the French people would never submit to the authority of the FCNL, and that any attempt to impose de Gaulle could lead to civil war. As best he could, Eisenhower tried to suggest the president’s position was unrealistic, but FDR was adamant—another example of the Dutch stubbornness that sometimes got the better of him. Eisenhower said later that the difficulties imposed by Washington’s desire to ignore de Gaulle caused him one of the “most acutely annoying problems” he had to face before D-Day.40

  On the third day Ike and Mamie boarded the chief of staff’s private Pullman car for a rendezvous with their son John at West Point. They stayed for lunch and dinner, and John noticed his father was preoccupied and appeared “impatient to get on with his new job of planning the invasion.” When Mamie complained of her husband’s abrupt manner, Ike responded, “Hell, I’m going back to my theater where I can do what I want.” Eisenhower grinned, but his words were harsh.41

  Back in Washington the next day, January 5, 1944, Eisenhower again called on the president, who showed him a cable from Churchill suggesting that Jumbo Wilson assume command in the Mediterranean on January 8—three days away. Eisenhower quickly agreed, and fired off a cable to Bedell Smith saying he would go from Washington directly to London. “However, I would like to come back to [Algiers] purely as a visitor within a week or ten days merely to say goodbye.”42 Smith suggested otherwise. “It is not repeat not pleasant to be the guest where you have been the master.”43 Eisenhower followed Bedell’s advice.

  From Washington, Ike and Mamie went on Marshall’s orders to the Greenbrier in White Sulphur Springs—acidly described by biographer Geoffrey Perret as “a stuffy resort in West Virginia favored by the haute bourgeoisie.”44 The Army had taken over the Greenbrier to use as a hospital and convalescent facility, and the cottages on the grounds were set aside for family visits. The enforced sojourn suited neither Ike nor Mamie, and after two days Eisenhower flew to Fort Riley, Kansas, for a family reunion. (“I kept calling her Kay,” Ike told Summersby afterward. “Every time I opened my mouth to say something to Mamie, I’d call her Kay. She was furious.”)45

  From Fort Riley, Ike was driven to his brother Milton’s home in Manhattan—Milton was now president of Kansas State University—where he was joined by his older brother Arthur, his mother, Ida, now eighty-one, and the Douds, who drove in from Denver. “Why it’s Dwight,” exclaimed Ida, as she embraced him. Ida did not believe Ike had changed, but his brothers were impressed by his confidence and self-control. “Though he seemed as friendly as ever, he never let himself go ‘all out’—as though he was keeping a good deal of himself in reserve for emergency use.”46

  Eisenhower flew back to the Greenbrier for an additional two days, and then he and Mamie returned to Washington, where Ike met with Marshall and had a final session on Wednesday evening, January 12, with the president. “I was so provoked to think that Mr. Roosevelt, knowing that I hadn’t seen this man in so long, would demand that he come to the White House and spend the whole evening, when I thought the time belonged to me,” Mamie said later.47

  Eisenhower again tried to talk to Roosevelt about de Gaulle, but the president was already
focused on postwar Germany and the zones of occupation. FDR had taken to calling Eisenhower “Ike,” and Mrs. Roosevelt came in briefly to be introduced. The president wanted to know how Ike liked his new title “supreme commander.” Eisenhower agreed it had a ring of importance. “Something like Sultan.”48

  As the meeting concluded, well after 10 p.m., FDR asked Ike about Kay. He said he remembered their picnic at Carthage, and had promised her a photograph. “Give her my very best wishes,” Roosevelt said, as he inscribed a photo of himself for Eisenhower to take back.49

  Eisenhower left for London the following evening, having spent the day at the Pentagon. “If my personal staff [which had been in Algiers] has reached London before my arrival,” he cabled Omar Bradley, “please tell Colonel [“Tex”] Lee to make proper arrangements for my driver to meet me at the station.”50

  Meanwhile, Montgomery had hit London with the intensity of “Christ cleansing the temple,” in the words of one military historian.51 Montgomery was commander in chief of the ground forces for OVERLORD. Armed with written authorization as Ike’s surrogate, with Bedell Smith at his side and Churchill at his back, Montgomery sent COSSAC planners back to their drawing boards. Instead of three divisions in the initial assault, Monty wanted five. Instead of five follow-on divisions, it should be nine. Instead of one landing site, Montgomery wanted five—three British and two American—spanning a front of sixty miles. And the landing sites should be protected by the simultaneous drop of three airborne divisions behind German lines to isolate the battlefield. Montgomery’s decisiveness was like a breath of fresh air, said one American planner.52 “Now that the great Montgomery was in command, I think we all experienced a kind of relief,” said another. “At least we no longer carried our dreadful burden of responsibility.”53

  As it finally evolved, the plan for the D-Day landing (NEPTUNE) reflected Montgomery’s wishes. The American First Army, commanded by Omar Bradley, would land on the two westernmost beaches, Utah and Omaha. The British Second Army, commanded by General Sir Miles “Bimbo” Dempsey, would send troops ashore at Gold, Juno, and Sword beaches. Each beach would constitute a corps area. The U.S. VII Corps under J. Lawton “Lightning Joe” Collins would land at Utah beach; the U.S. V Corps, under Ike’s old friend Gee Gerow, would land at Omaha. The 82nd and 101st Airborne divisions would drop inland on the right flank of VII Corps. The British 6th Airborne Division would land on the left flank of the British I Corps.