US-China Relations (3rd Ed)
Page 50
regional concerns shifted to worry that US budget difficulties and political
gridlock in Washington would undermine the ability of the United States to
sustain support for regional responsibilities. Overall, the Obama govern-
ment’s “rebalance” policy and recent US practice meshed well with the inter-
ests of the majority of Asia-Pacific governments that seek legitimacy through
development and nation building in an interdependent world economic order
and an uncertain security environment caused notably by Chinese assertive-
ness. However, major questions remained on whether the rebalance was
sufficient to deal with China’s recent challenges and whether it would be
continued by the new US administration.
The basic determinants of US strength and influence in the Asia-Pacific
region involve five factors, starting with security. In most of Asia, govern-
ments are viable and make the decisions that determine direction in foreign
affairs. Popular, elite, media, and other opinion may influence government
officials in policy toward the United States and other countries, but in the end the officials make decisions on the basis of their own calculus. In general, the officials see their governments’ legitimacy and success resting on nation
building and economic development, which require a stable and secure inter-
national environment. Unfortunately, Asia is not particularly stable, and most
regional governments are privately wary of, and tend not to trust, each other.
As a result, they look to the United States to provide the security that they
need to pursue goals of development and nation building in an appropriate
environment. They recognize that the US security role is very expensive and
involves great risk, including large-scale casualties if necessary, for the sake of preserving Asian security. They also recognize that neither rising China,
nor any other Asian power or coalition of powers, is able or willing to
undertake even a small part of these risks, costs, and responsibilities.
Second, the nation-building priority of most Asian governments depends
greatly on export-oriented growth. As noted above, much of Chinese and
Asian trade depends heavily on exports to developed countries, notably the
United States. America has run a massive trade deficit with China, and a total
annual trade deficit with Asia valued at more than US $400 billion. Asian
government officials recognize that China, which consistently runs an overall
trade surplus, and other trading partners in Asia are unwilling and unable to
bear even a fraction of the cost of such large trade deficits, which, nonethe-
less, are very important for Asian governments.
Third, the George W. Bush administration was generally effective in
interaction with Asia’s powers. The Obama administration built on these
strengths. The Obama government’s broad rebalancing with regional govern-
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ments and multilateral organizations had a scope ranging from India to the
Pacific island states to Korea and Japan. Its emphasis on consultation and
inclusion of international stakeholders before coming to policy decisions on
issues of importance to Asia and the Pacific also was broadly welcomed and
stood in contrast with the previously perceived unilateralism of the Bush
administration. Meanwhile, the US Pacific Command and other US military
commands and security and intelligence organizations have been at the edge
of wide-ranging and growing US efforts to build and strengthen webs of
military and related intelligence and security relationships throughout the
region.
Fourth, the United States for decades, reaching back to past centuries, has
engaged the Asia-Pacific region through business, religious, educational, me-
dia, and other interchange. Such active nongovernment interaction puts the
United States in a unique position and reinforces overall American influence.
Meanwhile, more than fifty years of generally color-blind US immigration
policy, since the ending of discriminatory American restrictions on Asian
immigration in 1965, has resulted in the influx of millions of Asia-Pacific
migrants who call America home and who interact with their countries of
origin in ways that underpin and reflect well on the US position in the region.
Fifth, part of the reason for the success of US efforts to build webs of
security-related and other relationships with Asia-Pacific countries has to do
with active contingency planning by many Asia-Pacific governments. As
power relations change in the region, notably on account of China’s rise,
regional governments generally seek to work positively and pragmatically
with rising China on the one hand, but they seek the reassurance of close
security, intelligence, and other ties with the United States, on the other hand, in case rising China shifts from its current avowed benign approach to one of
greater assertiveness or dominance.
Against the background of recent Chinese demands, coercion, and intimi-
dation, the Asia-Pacific governments’ interest in closer ties with the United
States meshed well with the Obama administration’s engagement with re-
gional governments and multilateral organizations. The US concern to main-
tain stability while fostering economic growth overlapped constructively
with the priorities of the majority of regional governments as they pursued
their respective nation-building agendas.
Under President Trump, the positive role of the Pacific Command, legal
immigration, and nongovernment American engagement in Asia has contin-
ued. The president’s campaign rhetoric raised questions about support for
alliances, but they have subsided with high-level US reassurance. America’s
role as economic partner was in doubt with the scrapping of the TPP, but the
US market has remained open to regional imports.
President Trump ended the rebalance and TPP. Employing unpredictable
unilateral actions, he cast doubt on past US commitment to positive regional
Outlook
281
relations. He also junked related policy transparency; carefully measured
responses; and avoidance of dramatic action, linkage, or spillover among
competing interests. Early in his presidency, his record in the region showed
episodic engagement featuring intense pressure to prevent North Korea’s
nuclear weapons development and overall drift in dealing with most other
issues. President Trump’s strong defense posture and pragmatism on human
rights issues were welcomed by many regional governments, but they failed
to overshadow a muddled picture of a poorly staffed administration with
conflicting impulses and many preoccupations leading to flawed engagement
in the Asia-Pacific.
In sum, readers are advised to monitor this set of indicators for evidence
of greater regional acceptance of China’s rise as a benign and positive force
in regional affairs. Such a change would presumably reduce regional interest
in sustaining close ties with the United States as a potential counter to pos-
sible Chinese intimidation and coercion. Also, readers should monitor this set
of indicators for signs that regional governments may come to judge the
Unite
d States as unable or unwilling to strike a proper balance that allows
regional governments to remain secure in the face of China’s rise without
causing friction between China and the United States that destabilizes the
regional environment.
CONCLUSION
The discussion above leads to the following four conclusions of use to read-
ers interested in tracking developments and assessing the importance of Chi-
na’s rise in Asian and world affairs and the future course of Sino-American
relations:
1. China’s recent relationships in Asia can be measured accurately.
2. Salient strengths and limitations of China’s rising influence in Asia
can be measured accurately.
3. Significant strengths and limitations of the United States in the Asia-
Pacific region can be measured accurately.
4. The contingency planning of Asia-Pacific governments can be mea-
sured accurately.
Taken together these conclusions show continued Chinese advance in
importance and influence. But the United States remains the region’s leading
power, and other governments are wary of implications of China’s rise as
they seek mutual benefit in greater economic and other interaction with Chi-
na. Asia is the international area where China has always exerted greatest
influence and where it devotes the lion’s share of Chinese foreign policy
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Chapter 12
attention, but that does not mean that China will come to dominate the
region. Prevailing conditions, even including the mediocre record of the
Trump administration as of mid-2017, make it hard to foresee how China
could emerge in a dominant position in Asia for some time.
As a result, the reported danger of confrontation and/or conflict or the
need for dramatic US accommodation or appeasement of China, which has
been predicted to emerge in Sino-American relations amid projections of
China rising to challenge the leading position of the United States in Asian
and world affairs, appear to be reduced. Moreover, if China is not in a
position to challenge the United States in nearby Asia, it will be less able to do so in other areas farther from China’s scope of influence and farther from
China’s scope of concern. Indeed, it appears more likely that Chinese policy
makers and strategists will continue incremental efforts and adjustments in
order to overcome existing and future obstacles as they seek to improve
Chinese influence, interests, and status. This difficult and protracted task
adds to China’s long array of domestic challenges and other preoccupations.
It argues for continued reserve in broader Chinese foreign policies and prac-
tices as Chinese leaders take account of the sustained but substantial limits of Chinese international power and influence.
Variables that could upset the above forecast include how well China’s
leaders manage such a moderate approach to world affairs. As noted here and
in chapter 7, a major challenge comes from Chinese elite and public opinion
that reflect unawareness of the negative legacies China has as a result of past behavior in nearby areas. And the acute sense of righteousness of these
Chinese groups is accompanied by prickly patriotic inclinations that are
quick to find fault with the United States and some of China’s neighbors.
Popular and elite frustrations can grow and spill over to impact Chinese
leaders and the policies they follow toward China’s neighbors and the United
States.
Other variables that could change the forecast obviously include US poli-
cy. Should the United States reverse policy and withdraw from security
commitments to the Asia-Pacific or close American markets to regional ex-
porters, the prevailing order in the Asia-Pacific would change significantly,
with the future order possibly very much in doubt. The United States also
could craft its reengagement in Asia as balancing against and attempting to
exclude China, thereby forcing Asian governments to choose between Bei-
jing and Washington.
Meanwhile, abrupt and provocative actions by the always unpredictable
North Korean government, by claimants in territorial disputes along China’s
rim, and by the bold leaders in power in Washington and Beijing could
escalate tensions. Under extreme circumstances, they could possibly lead to
military conflict that if not well managed could see China and the United
States in a disastrous war.
Notes
1. INTRODUCTION
1. Wang Jisi, “Trends in the Development of U.S.-China Relations and Deep-Seated Reasons,” Danddai Yatai (Beijing), June 20, 2009, 4–20; Yan Xuetong, “The Instability of China-U.S. Relations,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 3, no. 3 (2010): 1–30; Aaron Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York: W. W. Norton, 2011); Michael Swaine, America’s Challenge: Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011); Jeffrey Bader, Obama and China’s Rise (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2012); David Shambaugh, ed., Tangled Titans: The United States and China (Lanham, MD: Rowman
& Littlefield, 2012).
2. Bader, Obama and China’s Rise; Kenneth Lieberthal, “The China-U.S. Relationship Goes Global,” Current History 108, no. 719 (September 2009): 243–46; “China-U.S. Dialogue Successful—Vice Premier,” China Daily, July 29, 2009, 1; Hillary Clinton and Timothy Geithner, “A New Strategic and Economic Dialogue with China,” Wall Street Journal, July 27, 2009, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204886304574308753825396372 (accessed September 7, 2009).
3. Prominent Americans identified with this view include Zbigniew Brzezinski and C. Fred Bergsten. For critical response, see Elizabeth Economy and Adam Segal, “The G-2 Mirage,”
Foreign Affairs 88, no. 3 (May–June 2009): 56–72.
4. Jeffrey Bader, “U.S.-China Challenges: Time for China to Step Up,” Brookings, January 12, 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/research/u-s-china-challenges-time-for-china-to-step-up.
5. Robert Sutter and Satu Limaye, America’s 2016 Election Debate on Asia Policy & Asian Reactions (Honolulu: East-West Center, 2016). That report used campaign statements and other materials made available in “2016 Presidential Candidates on Asia,” Asia Matters for America, http://www.asiamattersforamerica.org/asia/2016-presidential-candidates-on-asia.
6. Bader, “U.S.-China Challenges”; Harry Harding, “Has U.S. China Policy Failed?”
Washington Quarterly 38, no. 3 (2015): 95–122; Robert Blackwill and Ashley Tellis, Council Special Report: Revising U.S. Grand Strategy toward China (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, April 2015); Orville Schell and Susan Shirk, Chairs, U.S. Policy toward China: Recommendations for a New Administration, Task Force Report (New York: Asia Society, 2017).
7. Interviews with Chinese officials and specialists, Beijing 2016, reviewed in Sutter and Limaye, America’s 2016 Election Debate, 21–28.
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Notes
8. Bonnie Glaser and Alexandra Viers, “China Prepares for Rocky Relations in 2017,”
Comparative Connections 18, no. 3 (January 2017): 21–22.
9. Shi Jiangtao, “Tempest Trump: China and U.S. Urged to Make Plans for ‘Major Storm’
in Bilateral Relationship,” South China Morning Post, January 30, 2017.
10. The above developments are reviewed in Bonnie Glaser and Alexandra Viers, “Trump and Xi Break the Ice at Mar-a-La
go,” Comparative Connections 19, no. 1 (May 2017): 21–32.
11. Dave Majumbar, “New Report Details Why a War between China and America Would Be Catastrophic,” National Interest (blog), August 1, 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/new-report-details-why-war-between-china-america-would-be-17210.
12. On Chinese perspectives see Nina Hachigian, ed., Debating China (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). See also contrasting US views of various differences in China-US
relations in Michael Swaine, Creating a Stable Asia: An Agenda for a U.S.-China Balance of Power (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016); Bader, “U.S.-
China Challenges”; Harding, “Has U.S. China Policy Failed?”; Blackwill and Tellis, Council Special Report; Schell and Shirk, U.S. Policy toward China; Shambaugh, Tangled Titans; Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy; and Swaine, America’s Challenge. Earlier contrasting perspectives are seen in David M. Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008); Bates Gill, Rising Star: China’s New Security Diplomacy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2007); and Susan Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford, 2007).
13. Susan Lawrence and David MacDonald, U.S.-China Relations: Policy Issues, Report RL41108 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, August 2, 2012); Schell and Shirk, U.S. Policy toward China.
2. PATTERNS OF US-CHINA RELATIONS
PRIOR TO WORLD WAR II
1. John K. Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842–1854 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953); Li Changjiu and Shi Lujia, Zhongmei guanxi liangbainian [Two hundred years of Sino-American relations] (Peking: Xinhua Publishing House, 1984).
2. Warren Cohen, America’s Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 8–28; Michael Hunt, The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and China to 1914 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).
3. Daniel Bays, ed., Christianity in China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996).
4. Michael Hunt, Frontier Defense and the Open Door: Manchuria in Chinese-American Relations, 1895–1911 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973); Michael Schaller, The United States and China: Into the Twenty-First Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 26–48.