Peace

by Jeff Nesbit

  Ulanov appeared in the room an instant later. As both made their way to the table, the loud buzz in the room began to quiet. As they all took their seats, idle conversation in the room ceased.

  Ulanov wasted no time. Within minutes of being recognized by the president of the Security Council—who, that month, happened to be from one of the new members, Herzegovina—the Russian ambassador promptly stood up from the table and circulated his first set of findings to the other members.

  King barely glanced at the documents as they were delivered to his seat. They were, in fact, the same documents that had been presented to the 1540 Committee earlier that morning: a presentation of satellite and other evidence of the damage done to Iran’s nuclear facilities near Shiraz.

  “It is unmistakable evidence, Mr. President, of what Israel has done,” Ulanov said. “They have deployed, and used, a nuclear weapon. It is a first use of nuclear weapons—something which this body must take action against at the highest possible level.”

  “Ambassador Ulanov, are you also prepared to show evidence of Iran’s use of nuclear weapons, just twenty-four hours later?” King asked quickly. “The world watched as Iran launched what can only be described as a weapon of mass destruction toward Israel. Had that missile struck home—which it did not—we can only imagine the repercussions. Surely you don’t condone that?”

  “Of course not, though we will never know for certain if it carried a nuclear payload,” Ulanov responded. “But that is not the issue here. Iran was provoked by a clear, irrefutable first use of nuclear weapons by Israel.”

  “There is an immense difference,” King responded. As usual, King felt compelled to defend Israel, which had never been allowed to argue its case on the Security Council. The U.S. and the United Kingdom had argued Israel’s cause since the end of the Second World War. “If it is proven that Israel did, in fact, use a nuclear weapon, it was clearly contained, and tactical. What Iran launched was a weapon of mass destruction, aimed at killing untold millions of civilians.”

  “Perhaps,” Ulanov mused. “But only if there was, in fact, a working nuclear warhead attached to the missile Iran launched. That is still not proven, by any means.”

  “I am certain those facts will come to light soon enough,” King said. “But the intention is clear. Iran meant to fulfill its intended, announced mission, which is to wipe Israel off the face of the map.”

  Ulanov laughed. “Now, now, my American friend, not so quickly. Iran was merely responding to an unprovoked attack by Israel. I, for one, might argue that Iran was within its rights to retaliate.”

  “So will you argue that position?” King asked. “Or will you, in fact, see Iran’s response as a serious and extraordinarily dangerous escalation of the situation—one that threatens others in the region beyond Israel and Iran?”

  “We shall see,” Ulanov said, smiling. “The U.S. position on the use of nuclear weapons in the region, especially, is likely to be tested with the next piece of my presentation.”

  Aides to Ulanov quickly passed out a second set of documents. King spent more time studying these. He’d not expected this.

  The documents were from multiple intelligence sources, but King was fairly certain that he’d seen some of this from the Mossad before. It was clear evidence that a nuclear weapon had detonated aboard the Abraham Lincoln. There were further schematics that showed the weapon had most likely been engineered by North Korean scientists to work with a Yugo sub, built for Iran by North Korea.

  King took a deep breath. The game had changed.

  “So as the United States already knows,” Ulanov said once the documents had been delivered to the Security Council members, “there has clearly been another use of nuclear weapons in the region. These documents show, with absolute clarity, that a Yugo submarine built for Iran by North Korea exploded a nuclear device—also provided by North Korea—in the vicinity of the American Nimitz-class supercarrier in its 5th Fleet. That the Abraham Lincoln is still floating—given this nuclear attack—is quite surprising. So my question for the United States is: what do you intend to do about this, now that North Korea and Iran have used nuclear weapons against an American ship?”

  All eyes turned toward Dr. Zhao, the Chinese ambassador. China consistently defended North Korea and would again. But, for now, Dr. Zhao remained silent, so King decided he had no other choice but to enter the fray. The White House had only just begun to formulate a diplomatic response to the nuclear attack against the Abe by North Korea and Iran. But King could not walk away. He would simply have to ask for forgiveness later. He pulled his prepared statement from his suit coat and placed it in front of him. Given the evidence now on the table, he would need to modify his statement.

  “Mr. Ulanov, I would have this to say,” King said slowly. He glanced down at his prepared statement and began to read. “First, and importantly, the United States would like to go on record as condemning in the strongest possible terms the unilateral actions taken by Israel to use tactical nuclear weapons to attack a facility in southern Iran. There is no excuse for Israel’s decision to use a tactical nuclear weapon against an adversary, and the United States will support strong, measurable UN Security Council actions against Israel as a direct result of its decision there.”

  There was an audible, collective gasp in the room. The United States had never agreed to even modest UN sanctions against Israel. That it was now willing to condemn its longest, closest ally in the Middle East had taken many in the room by surprise.

  King looked up from his prepared text and spoke without notes.

  “But, secondly, I must also add that the United States is currently assessing the truth of the attack in the Strait of Hormuz.”

  “I can assure you that what I’ve circulated is clear and verifiable,” Ulanov said quickly.

  King paused, scanned the room, and forged ahead. He would worry later about the consequences of the words. “While I cannot confirm that the attack against the Abraham Lincoln did, in fact, involve the use of nuclear weapons, I will say this.” King’s voice was steady, unwavering. “If it is shown that Iran and North Korea conspired to use nuclear weapons against a U.S. ship, we will take immediate—and appropriate—action in return. Everyone in this room can be certain of that.”

  40

  BEIT LAHIA, GAZA

  The flatbed truck was as nondescript as any other rumbling through the streets in the early dawn in Gaza. It had no markings. Its drivers joked with pedestrians as it wound its way north through side streets in Gaza toward an abandoned warehouse area north of Beit Lahia.

  The back of the flatbed truck was covered with rough canvas and held in place with rope on all sides. Various things jutted up and off to the side. But it was largely ignored as it rumbled along. The drivers even took time to stop at a local café for a quick cup of coffee. It was, by all appearances, just another trip in Gaza.

  But the pieces inside the truck had been carefully assembled over the previous months. The leaders of Hamas would never make the same mistakes they’d made in 2006, when their cache of rockets had been seized in a brutal month-long war with the IDF that had inflicted serious damage to Hamas’ leadership.

  Never again, they’d vowed. Since 2006, they’d forged a close working relationship with the Hezbollah leadership in southern Lebanon. They were learning to love and trust Sa’id Nouradeen, the only Arab to defeat Israel on the battlefield. They wanted to learn what Nouradeen knew and had chosen to drift within Hezbollah’s—and Iran’s—orbit.

  Hamas’ leadership still held press conferences with their faces covered. They still kept their actions hidden, from both the people of Gaza and the world. But they’d learned from their mistakes of 2006. They didn’t keep their cache of weapons in central places.

  They didn’t ship just through the Mediterranean—they’d figured out routes through the pirates off the Somalia coast. They didn’t bribe in small amounts at the Egyptian border—they’d established bigger bribes and more permanent u
nderground tunnel routes from Egypt into Gaza.

  Hamas had managed to send engineers to train with Hezbollah engineers in Lebanon. From there, they’d managed to learn how to break apart, ship, and then reassemble rocket parts and warheads. Pieces of rockets and warheads now came in through multiple sources—the Mediterranean, underground tunnels at the Egyptian border, even the Suez Canal.

  Hamas had also learned that it made no sense to identify any single person as the leader. No imam or political leader publicly claimed responsibility for directing Hamas or its actions. It was easier that way, they’d learned. There would be time, at some point, for a single leader to emerge. But not yet.

  As the truck left the cobbled streets of Gaza, several of the inhabitants sitting under the canvas in the back of the truck stopped playing cards long enough to check to make sure the truck’s contents were secure. They needn’t have worried. The Hezbollah and Iranian engineers who’d trained them had done a good job. The truck’s contents were just fine. The various parts had been reassembled correctly and were secure.

  There was actual joy on this particular truck. This would be an important day for the Hamas soldiers and engineers. They were better prepared, properly trained, and ready to see the fruits of their years of patience. Today would be a good test.

  They’d chosen a cloudy, rainy day. It would be almost impossible for Israel’s radar and satellites to detect them. But, in truth, the Hamas leadership was growing less concerned by Israel’s ability to detect them. Let them see! They should know what we are capable of achieving.

  The truck pulled into the barren parking lot beside an abandoned warehouse. They had an unobstructed view of the Mediterranean from this location, less than a mile from the coastline. It was a perfect spot. The truck’s inhabitants scrambled and pulled the canvas down.

  Acting quickly, the team assembled the parts they needed for the test. A half hour later, a satellite looking down would have seen a perfectly assembled Fajr-4 rocket recently acquired through Hezbollah from Iran, then re-engineered with a smaller warhead design.

  The team locked the missile in place and, without preamble, fired it out toward the Mediterranean Sea. The missile flew and flew, and the team cheered loudly. Several checkpoint boats monitored the missile flight and reported back. The modified Fajr-4 rocket had easily flown more than fifty miles before disappearing into the sea.

  The team quickly reported their findings back to others waiting for word on the test in Gaza. The success of the test flight cheered them all. They’d worked for three years to engineer and assemble just such a missile. For the first time, several of Israel’s major cities—Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Ashdod—were within reach of their missiles. The terms of the conflict, at long last, had finally changed for Hamas.

  Minutes later, classified communiqués and transcripts began to fly forward to capitals in and around the Middle East. Hamas’ successful test-firing of a modified Fajr-4 rocket capable of delivering warheads into populated areas in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv—as well as sensitive military and nuclear facilities in Israel—quickly sent shock-waves through various quarters.

  Israel had been severely condemned for its brutal 2006 war against Hamas. It would be much more difficult to contain them this time, the IDF leadership wrote in confidential, strategic memos for Navon and the Knesset. Any misstep by Israel could lead the United Nations to propose European peacekeeping forces in Gaza—permanently locking in Hamas’ ability to do as they pleased in Gaza.

  UN peacekeeping forces south of the Litani River in southern Lebanon had done nothing to stop Hezbollah from positioning rockets capable of reaching deep into Israel, and peacekeeping forces in Gaza would create an almost identical scenario for Israel.

  If Israel was not careful, and strategic, they could soon have enemies capable of launching armed, short-range missiles from the south, north, and northeast at major population centers. They were deploying a laser-driven missile shield designed to deal with short-range missiles as quickly as they could, but the IDF had long ago concluded that such a shield could not possibly protect their major population centers from a barrage of missiles fired from both the north and south.

  No, the IDF had concluded that Israel needed to reduce the number of fronts on which they were fighting. One front was fine. Three fronts was an impossible military task.

  So, the communiqués concluded, the Hamas test of a missile that could fly farther than fifty miles was a watershed moment. Every major city, military facility, and nuclear center in Israel was now within reach of Iran’s proxies in both the south and north. Some solution—political or military—to Israel’s problem with Hamas in Gaza was needed—and soon.

  41

  SOUTH OF BURMA

  THE INDIAN OCEAN

  The old, creaking cargo ship made its way slowly out of port at Burma, where it had refueled and picked up some additional freight. The captain of Kang Nam 5 knew that, within hours, he would be forced to make a choice.

  The American destroyer, the USS John McCain, had shadowed the North Korean cargo freighter from the East China Sea, down the coastline of China, and past Vietnam and Thailand before the North Korean ship had made its way into port at Burma.

  This particular Kang Nam was one of five such cargo ships that regularly made the passage from the Nampo port on North Korea’s western coastline around the China coast to Burma—and destinations beyond. The U.S. Navy had shadowed all five of them for months but had yet to invoke the UN Resolution that allowed it to request to board the cargo ship to look for illegal nuclear weapons parts.

  North Korea’s military leaders had made it very clear that they had no intention of allowing anyone to board and search its ships. They had no use for the UN Resolution sanctioning a request to hail and search any North Korean ship at sea. What’s more, they’d said that any move by an American ship to board one of the North Korean freighters would be considered an act of war.

  Should the U.S. try to board a North Korean freighter, they’d vowed retaliation with nuclear weapons. It was not an idle threat.

  American ships had come close to halting one of the five Kang Nams on two occasions. In both cases, however, the freighters had returned home to the port at Nampo rather than risk a confrontation at sea or a possible search-and-seizure in an unfriendly port.

  While it did not give an American ship the right to search a North Korean cargo ship with force, the UN Resolution did give an American destroyer the right to shadow a North Korean ship into port, where it could ask the port’s government to grant access.

  North Korea’s leaders had quickly come to realize that, if it wanted to continue to ship illegal nuclear materials aboard the Kang Nams, then they’d need a friendly port in which to dock and refuel. Burma had gladly obliged, and the two countries now enjoyed an alliance built out of necessity.

  North Korea’s five Kang Nams now regularly refueled at port in Burma and then headed out again. The Kang Nams had been able to regularly make the trip from Nampo to Bandar Abbas in Iran with just one stop at Burma. The U.S. ships could do nothing about it—unless they wanted to risk a confrontation at sea. And, to date, American military leaders had chosen not to confront a North Korea ship.

  In the past ten months, all five of the Kang Nams had made more than two dozen trips around the China coastline to Iran. None of them had been stopped. All of them had refueled at Burma before making their way again to the port at Bandar Abbas.

  The U.S. suspected that all of the Kang Nam cargo ships contained illegal nuclear materials and other weapons parts for Iran. But there was very little the U.S. could do beyond shadowing the ships—as long as Burma was unwilling to allow a search-and-seizure in their own port.

  Today, though, would be different. Russia’s revelations before the UN Security Council had forced the United States into action. The very public news that North Korea was ultimately responsible for the first-ever nuclear attack against an American military facility had placed the American government i
n a no-win situation.

  President Camara had consulted with the joint chiefs and the Group of Eight in Congress. In fact, he’d made three separate trips to the Capitol in just the past forty-eight hours to consult with Congress. All of them had come to one unmistakable conclusion: they had to confront North Korea, in some fashion.

  The joint chiefs had decided, ultimately, that it was time to test the UN Resolution. It had sent five destroyers to shadow all of the Kang Nams. Three of them were still at Nampo, and a fourth had been in the Bandar Abbas port since the beginning of the confrontation with the 5th Fleet in the Strait of Hormuz.

  But Kang Nam 5 was out at sea, and North Korea had decided that it, too, had no choice but to test the UN Resolution. Pak Jong Il himself had personally phoned the ship’s captain and ordered him to leave Burma and make his way to Bandar Abbas. He was also told, in no uncertain terms, to resist any attempt by the Americans to board his ship.

  North Korea’s military leaders had decided to hedge their bets somewhat and had ordered the ship’s captain to offload some of the questionable nuclear material cargo destined for Iran in Burma. It could always pick it up at a later date, when tensions had eased. But, for now, it made no sense to test fate more than it already was by sailing straight from Burma to Iran.

  As the Kang Nam made its way into international waters, the USS John McCain made no attempt to hide its intentions. It steamed close and pulled alongside the North Korean freighter. The American destroyer had its guns trained on the North Korean freighter in the event that it opened fire on the incoming U.S. ship.

  But the North Korean captain made no move. He didn’t respond to ship-to-ship communications, and he didn’t present even a token show of force. No guns were raised aboard the Kang Nam.