The Battle of Borodino: Napoleon Against Kutuzov

by Alexander Mikaberidze

  Indeed, Nansouty’s lancers proved no match for the heavily armed Russian cuirassiers and sought cover behind their own cuirassiers, who opened intervals to let them through the line and then closed ranks to repel the Russians.

  In the meantime, the Polish infantry (fourteen companies of voltigeurs and the 15th Polish Line), led by General Rybinski and supported by cavalry, occupied the hill south of the Shevardino Redoubt and threatened the left wing of the Russian forces Andreyev recalled that almost his entire regiment (50th Jägers) acted in skirmisher order and suffered heavy losses.

  The confused nocturnal fight finally died down around 10.30pm when Kutuzov was informed of French reinforcements reaching the battleield and the Poles flanking the Russian position from the left. It was already too late in the evening and there was no point in defending the destroyed redoubt any longer. So Kutuzov recalled the troops and abandoned the redoubt to the French. Virtually all Russian sources consulted asserted that the redoubt was in the Russian hands by then and it was abandoned to the French. Naturally, the French memoirs reveal claims to the contrary.

  Bagration received the order around 11pm and immediately instructed Gorchakov to withdraw his exhausted troops under cover of darkness. The Russian cavalry regiments took position in two lines behind the redoubt and a line of skirmishers was deployed between the Utitsa woods and the left flank, while the Jägers moved to the north-western edge of the wood. The remaining troops retreated towards the Semeyonovskoye brook, which now became the new Russian left lank. The redoubt was occupied by the French, who also controlled the villages of Aleksinka, Fomkino, Doronino and Shevardino.

  The Russian withdrawal from Shevardino is noteworthy for an interesting, albeit often overlooked, incident. As Gorchakov’s men were falling back, the French cavalry moved around the redoubt in order to charge their right lank in an attempt to cut off some units. As Gorchakov noted, he heard

  the loud tramping of enemy horses. The night was already dark enough that it was impossible to make out the numbers, though from the sound alone it was clear that the enemy was cavalry and that they were coming on in fairly powerful columns.

  Gorchakov quickly issued orders for the Cuirassier Division to attack, but ‘with all the haste, it would have still taken some time for it to engage the enemy’. Therefore, to gain time and confuse the enemy, Gorchakov exploited the darkness that concealed the strength of his troops near Shevardino, and ordered a mere battalion of the Odessa Infantry Regiment to thunder on its drums and shout ‘Hurrah!’ as loud as possible, in order to simulate the arrival of reinforcements (the battalion was strictly prohibited from firing, so as not to reveal its location and strength). The ruse apparently worked since, as Gorchakov described, ‘the enemy movement was halted’ and the Cuirassier Division arrived in time to charge and route the French. Gorchakov even claimed that the Cuirassier Division seized four guns, but ‘the capture of these pieces was not mentioned anywhere and they were later counted instead of the pieces we lost during the battle of [the following day]’.111

  The Battle of Shevardino was now finally over. Bagration submitted a glowing report of his troops: ‘although the enemy forces gradually increased and [constantly] reinforcing its columns, endeavoured to overwhelm our troops, they were vanquished everywhere by the courage of the Russian troops …’ Kutuzov acknowledged in a letter to his wife that ‘yesterday we had an infernal battle on the left flank’.112

  The Shevardino Redoubt was almost completely destroyed and the area around it was strewn with the corpses of men and horses. Gourgaud says the French found ‘every living thing […] destroyed’ inside the redoubt, while Brandt saw it ‘covered in corpses’. The villages of Doronino and Shevardino were largely destroyed. As night descended over the battleield, occasional gunire disrupted the gloomy silence, since the advance elements of both armies were only ‘at a distance of a pistol shot’.113 Dutheillet de Lamothe, of the 6th Battalion, 57th Regiment, spent a grisly night inside the redoubt, which was full of dead and dying men, whose moans kept him awake all night. However, exhaustion – both physical and psychological – soon took over and, according to Labaume, the soldiers ‘lay down amidst bushes and slept profoundly, despite the vehement wind and an excessively cold rain’.

  The French wounded were more fortunate than their Russian counterparts, since Larrey’s flying ambulances spent the night removing them to the nearby infirmaries (although, according to Griois, the French medics picked up some Russian wounded as well). Larrey’s subordinates worked tirelessly, and in the morning the results of their labours could be seen in ‘a grass covered ravine near the road that was full of [amputated] hands and limbs as well as corpses’.114

  Marauders were also busy that night, searching the dead for food, alcohol and valuables – in that order. The French did find some low-quality alcohol and barely edible biscuits on the Russian corpses. Hubert Charles Biot, aide-de-camp to General Pajol, accompanied his general to the redoubt late on the night of the 6th and found it ‘cluttered with dead and wounded’. Meanwhile, French infantrymen

  were busy ‘stripping’ the Russian corpses of the bad brandy which they had in their water bottles; short of everything, they did not despise this frightful drink. I too wanted to taste it, but the pepper and vitriol burnt one’s mouth.

  That night, as usual, Russian officers gathered in small groups to spend the night. Most were sitting around the campfires but some fortunates lodged in a few remaining huts. Sergei Mayevsky, Bagration’s adjutant, recalled that: ‘since my title of duty officer worked magic in war and peace’, he was able to secure one of the two remaining houses at Semeyonovskoye, where ‘everyone, except for first-class generals, gathered and the leftovers of my tea tasted as a heavenly nectar to them’.115

  Both Army commanders observed the Battle of Shevardino from afar. Kutuzov stayed at his headquarters, north-east of Shevardino, and briefly travelled along the Russian lines. Second Lieutenant Nikolai Mitarevsky, of the 12th Light Company, recalled seeing the aged field marshal approaching with his escort and setting up an observation post between the 7th and 24th Divisions, from where he was able to observe the New Smolensk Road and the action at Shevardino:

  I had never seen Kutuzov before and now we all had a chance to observe him to the full, although we could not dare to approach him too close. With his head bowed, he sat in his frock-coat without epaulettes, with a forage cap on his head and a Cossack whip [nagaika] across his shoulder. Generals and staff officers of his suite stood around him, while messengers and Cossacks were behind him. Some of his young adjutants and messengers soon sat in a circle, took out cards and began to play a Schtoss [a popular card game among Russian officers].116

  Kutuzov was often briefed by arriving officers and remained ‘serious but calm’ throughout the action. As the battle at Shevardino progressed, Bennigsen travelled south to meet Bagration, who shared his opinion that Napoleon would attack the left lank:

  He foresaw what would happen if our Army remained in [its] current position and that the left flank would be driven back with casualties. I promised him to convey his concerns about the dangers facing this part of the Army to the Commander-in-Chief. Returning, I delivered a detailed report to Kutuzov and suggested, as I did the day before, to shorten our left flank. Yet, [Kutuzov made no decision] and everything was left intact.117

  On the French side, Napoleon spent most of the day in his tent near Valuyevo, surrounded by his Imperial Guard. One participant saw him ‘walking to and fro on the edge of the ravine, his hands behind his back, now and then observing what was going on through his spy glass’. His health was already weakened by the campaign and his personal physician, Baron Yvan, noted that the Emperor ‘was eminently nervous’. 118 Furthermore, due to winds, rain, and continual horse riding, Napoleon suffered from a severe cold and high temperature, which only worsened his condition, causing nervous coughing and difficulty in urinating. Summoning another physician, Dr Mestivier, Napoleon complained, ‘I am growing old,
my legs swell, I urinate with difficulty, doubtless it is the humidity of these bivouacs.’ After a quick check up, the doctor noted that the Emperor had ‘a continual dry cough, breathing difficult and spasmodic, urine only coming out drop by drop and with pain [containing] sediment. The lower part of the legs and feet extremely oedematose, the pulse feverish …’ Both doctors were greatly concerned about Napoleon’s health and had the Emperor’s pharmacist prepare a special medicine for him, while General Lauriston helped to apply cataplasms on his stomach.

  The Battle of Shevardino proved to be costly for both sides. Most Russian studies acknowledge that the Russians lost approximately 6,000 casualties and several guns. Neverovsky’s memoirs revealed the scale of losses suffered by some Russian units, when he noted that:

  in this battle I lost almost all my brigade chefs, staff and junior officers […] I received 4,000 recruits to reinforce my Division before the battle, and had some 6,000 in the front during the battle; I left the battle with only three [thousand].

  Vorontsov, who brought four battalions of his Grenadier Division, also acknowledged that the battle claimed ‘rather many lives’. There were virtually no Russian prisoners taken, and when General Caulaincourt reported this to the Emperor, Napoleon ‘was astonished [and] questioned him over and over. “Didn’t my cavalry charge in time? […] Are those Russians determined to win or die?’”119

  French losses are usually estimated at between 4,000–5,000 men and some French regiments were particularly hard-hit. The 57th Line lost approximately 500 men, though Dutheillet de Lamothe estimated its loss at 600. According to later studies of officer casualties by Martinien, the 57th lost three officers dead, three mortally wounded and six wounded, while in the 25th Line, one officer died of wounds and one was wounded. One more officer was killed in the 2nd Company of the 6th Horse Artillery, which was attached to Compans’ division. Based on regimental reports, the 111th lost eighty-six killed (including four officers), 555 wounded (fifteen officers), thirty-three captured and another 138 missing. The combined voltigeur companies had twenty-five killed and 220 wounded (including six officers), the 30th Line (of Morand’s Division) lost twenty-four killed and forty-two wounded. Meanwhile, the Polish troops suffered about 550 casualties. Among the French casualties was also Colonel Méda of the 1st Chasseurs, who shot Maximilian Robespierre during the Thermidorean coup in July 1794.120

  The 61st Line, which distinguished itself in the assault on the Shevardino Redoubt, lost thirty killed, 238 wounded and seventeen captured. When, on the following day, Napoleon was surprised to see the much-reduced regiment and asked a colonel of the whereabouts of his battalion, the colonel supposedly replied: ‘Sire, it is [lying dead] in the redoubt.’ Among the men of the 61st who distinguished themselves that day was the 27-year-old Augustin Sommeillier, General Guyardet’s aide-de-camp, who ‘demonstrated sang froid and calmness as he delivered various orders to the troops engaged in the action.’ Among other troops, Fusilier Bovard was singled out for killing two Russian gunners, while Voltigeur Kaiser slew two others as they tried to remove an artillery piece. In the midst of the fighting, Adjutant-Major Fourgeau ‘rallied a peloton of tirailleurs to repel a cavalry charge’, and was helped by Captain Labroux, replacing the Major, who ‘led a company to halt a cavalry charge and always demonstrated his courage’. Ricot, commander of the regimental artillery of the 61st, was commended for his skilful command of the battery.121

  Meanwhile, Robert Guillemard recalled meeting a sergeant of the 57th Line, who told him: ‘The Emperor came to our bivouac this morning at daybreak, and was able to convince himself, by the appearance of the ground round the redoubt, strewed with green-coated corpses that the enemy’s loss was infinitely greater than ours.’

  Some Russian officers criticized Kutuzov’s decision to defend Shevardino, and Yermolov remarked that the construction of the Bagration Flèches had made the Shevardino Redoubt superfluous, ‘because it stood out of our artillery range; consequently, there was no point in defending and maintaining it’. This opinion was shared by Norov, who lamented that the ‘redoubt was defended longer than it was needed’. The opinion of many rank-and-file seems to have been expressed by a soldier of the 27th Division, who remarked many years after the war:

  There was no order at Shevardino […] Before the cuirassiers arrived, we were badly mauled and our battalion head, in a fit of anger, grumbled, ‘What a sham! First they [Russian command] cannot properly make any arrangements and then give us this nonsense!122

  Barclay de Tolly was enraged by the whole affair, since he had previously requested the redoubt to be abandoned. He blamed Bennigsen for this failure, since ‘[he] had chosen the position and did not want to lose his face. Consequently, Bennigsen sacriiced six or seven thousand valiant soldiers and three cannon on 5 September’.

  Barclay de Tolly probably was overly critical in his assessment. The defence of Shevardino allowed the Russian troops (of the 2nd Western Army) to move to new positions around Semeyonovskoye. This redeployment certainly should have been done earlier, but it was not, and in given circumstances, Bagration and Gorchakov had little choice but to fight. Kutuzov later acknowledged that the battle gave the Russians time to continue the construction of fortifications at Borodino and determine the direction of Napoleon’s main attack. Indeed, the loss of Shevardino should have convinced Kutuzov that Bagration and Barclay de Tolly were right in asserting that the left lank could not be adequately defended and should have induced him to make appropriate changes. As we will see, this was not the case and Kutuzov’s reluctance to make changes in his battle formation would have important consequences …

  Armies and Leaders

  The strength of both armies varies depending on the source. The Russians tallied approximately 120,000 men at Smolensk and suffered up to 20,000 casualties over the following two weeks. The heaviest losses (about 16,000 men killed and wounded) were sustained at the battles of Smolensk and Lubino, the rest were lost during the fighting retreat to Borodino. Tsar Alexander’s letter of 5 September indicates that Kutuzov reported 95,734 men in cavalry and infantry in late August. Alexander calculated that with the arrival of some 2,000 stragglers and Miloradovich’s reinforcements of 15,589 men, the Russian Army would amount to 113,323 men; and in view of additional detached units rejoining the Army, he estimated over 120,000 men.123 Army roll-calls, gathered in early September, provide further details. On 4 September, the 1st Western Army numbered 53,587 soldiers and 6,338 officers, while its artillery consisted of 132 position, 212 light and 52 horse guns. On 6 September, after receiving reinforcements, it showed 67,391 men and 7,982 officers with 420 guns.124 In late August, Prince Bagration’s army comprised 1,210 officers, 2,182 non-commissioned officers, 31,533 soldiers, with 53 heavy, 72 light and 48 Horse Artillery guns.125

  Despite these reports, both participants and historians produced contrasting assessment of the Russian strength. Toll referred to 103,800 regular troops, Buturlin and Wolzogen estimated 115,000 regular troops and 17,000 Cossacks and Opolchenye. Duke Eugène of Württemberg was more specific, naming 96,000 men in infantry, 18,300 in regular cavalry, 5,000 Cossacks and 15,000 Opolchenye. Russian historians Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky and Bogdanovich calculated 128,000 men. The Soviet estimates of Kutuzov’s army at Borodino varied from 120,000 (Zhilin) to 126,000 (Beskrovny) and sought to highlight the French numerical superiority, which was usually stated as 133,000 men. However, in 1987, S. Shvedov’s research demonstrated that these estimates were flawed and Kutuzov, in fact, had some 157,000 soldiers, including 10,000 Cossacks and 33,000 Opolchenye. This study was largely ignored by Soviet scholars but was utilized by a new generation of Russian historians. Thus, in the mid-1990s, Aleksey Vasiliev and Andrei Eliseyev produced slightly lower estimate of 155,200 men. Accepting these numbers, it is clear that Kutuzov enjoyed the overall numerical superiority over the French but had about 20,000 less regular troops than Napoleon.

  The Russian Opolchenye included 21,694 troops of the Moscow Opolc
henye and 12,500 from the Smolensk Opolchenye. Of the latter, a couple of thousand militiamen were assigned to Major General Levitsky, the commandant of Mozhaisk, to maintain garrison duty: so the effective strength of the Smolensk Opolchenye was close to 10,000. These forces differed in their organization and combat readiness. The Moscow Opolchenye was organized into three divisions, which included three jäger units armed with muskets and ive dismounted Cossack regiments armed with lances. The Smolensk Opolchenye, however, consisted of eleven uezd (district) Opolchenyes, each divided into 500 (pyatisotnya), 100 (sotnya) and 50 (polusotnya) units. The weaponry was distributed unevenly and the militiamen from the Belsk, Gzhatsk and Krasnyi uezds had no firearms at all. The best-armed Opolchenye was that of the Sychov district, since its 1,336 men had 1,284 muskets, 6 carbines, 400 pistols and 1,309 pikes.126 The battle value of the Opolchenye and other reinforcements had been long debated. In his letter to Tsar Alexander, Kutuzov himself complained that: ‘although the newly arriving troops were dressed and equipped, they were composed largely of recruits and lacked staff, junior and non-commissioned officers.’127 Neverovsky, whose division was reinforced by some of the newly arrived troops, reported that:

  Troop Estimates for the Battle of Borodino

  the rank-and-file of the 5th Regiment from [Miloradovich’s] corps are well trained, properly dressed and given all necessary primary guidance. However, the troops of the 1st jäger [Opolchenye] Regiment fail these requirements and had not received necessary drill during their training.128

  Still, the Opolchenye forces should not be dismissed completely, since they performed many auxiliary functions that freed up regular troops for combat, and some militiamen helped defend the Russian extreme left flank. Yet some Russian officers left less than flattering accounts of the Opolchenye. Nikolai Andreyev of the 50th jägers noted that some militiamen, tasked with removing the wounded, robbed their charges.