The Battle of Borodino: Napoleon Against Kutuzov

by Alexander Mikaberidze

  As for artillery, most memoirs and studies cite 640 guns present at Borodino. In reality, the Russian Army had 624 guns on the battlefield and 12 guns in Mozhaisk, bringing the total to 636.129 The 1st Western Army had 438 guns and the 2nd Army had 186 pieces (for a detailed discussion, readers should visit the book’s companion website at www.napoleon-series.org).

  The Russian Army at Borodino(Based on the 1997 study by Vasiliev and Eliseyev)

  Strength on 5 September 1812

  1st Western Army

  II Corps 11,450

  III Corps 10,800

  IV Corps 12,000

  V Corps 17,255

  VI Corps 12,500

  I Reserve Cavalry Corps 3,470

  II and III Reserve Cavalry Corps 6,700

  Cossacks 5,600

  Total 79,775 men (excluding HQ escort and auxiliary) 82,400 (all forces)

  2nd Western Army

  VII Corps 12,500

  VIII Corps 17,000

  2nd Cuirassier Division 2,800

  IV Reserve Cavalry Corps 4,300

  Cossacks 3,016

  Total 39,616 (excluding HQ escort & auxiliary) 41,100 (all forces)

  Moscow Opolchenye 21,700

  Smolensk Opolchenye 10,000

  Grand Total 155,200

  At the time, Russian headquarters estimated the French strength at 165,000 men with up to 1,000 guns, though Tsar Alexander and Kutuzov found this estimate ‘somewhat exaggerated’ and Bagration argued Napoleon could not have had more than 150,000 men.130 Discussing the French Army, most scholars utilize estimates provided by Chambray, Fain and Pelet, based on roll-calls of 2 September. Fain showed 120,000 men in the French Army, including 40,000 on the left flank, 70,000 in the centre and 10,000 on the right flank. Pelet estimated 84,000 infantry, 27,000 cavalry, 15,000 artillerymen, for a total of 126,000 men and 563 guns. George Chambray is the most detailed of them and he showed the following numbers:131

  The French Army at Borodino

  (Based on figures quoted by George Chambray)

  Thus, Chambray’s table shows the total strength of the French Army as 133,819 men, of which 103,076 were infantry and 30,743 cavalry; artillerymen are certainly included in these numbers.

  This is in stark contrast to the powerful Grand Army of some 450,000 men that crossed the Nieman in June, or to the estimated 182,000 men Napoleon had at Smolensk, a mere twenty days prior to the roll-call of 2 September. Still, these numbers, which are usually cited in most studies of the 1812 campaign, are somewhat misleading, since they do not seem to take into account the arrival of some French units and fail to mention additional troops assigned to the État Major (i.e. General Staff). Furthermore, they do not relect losses that the French Army suffered during the five days subsequent to the roll-call on 2 September. At Shevardino alone, the French lost over 4,000 men, while a couple thousand stragglers are estimated during the French advance from Gzhatsk. Taking these factors into account, one might argue that at Borodino Napoleon’s effective force probably amounted to between 126,000 and 128,000 men supported by 587 guns.

  In fact, many French regiments were depleted, sick and weary from the constant marches, malnutrition and fighting. More importantly, the French cavalry was in poor condition after losing thousands of horses due to excessive heat, lack of forage and bloody encounters in the first months of the campaign. And as events will show, the Imperial Guard – some 19,000 élite French troops – remained idle during the entire battle, so the number of Allied troops that actually fought at Borodino was closer to 110,000.

  The French Army

  Despite fatigue and losses, the French Army standing at the walls of Moscow represented by far the best fighting machine of its age. Inspired by Revolutionary ideology and led by one of the greatest military captains in history, French troops had dominated the Continent since 1805.

  While the French Revolution saw the famous levée en masse in 1793, the recruitment system was later modified by a series of conscription laws. These laws required that all men between the ages of eighteen and forty register with the authorities, and those between eighteen and twenty-five (later thirty) years of age were called upon for service. Depending on strategic circumstances, an annual ‘class’ (the year in which men reached the age of eighteen) could be called up early.

  The Revolution opened the officer ranks to non-nobles, making all citizens of the new French Republic admissible to every rank and appointment. This was a far cry from the military establishment of the Ancien Régime, which was dominated by the nobility. Naturally, many old officers – almost two-thirds in the Army and even more in the Navy – were dissatisfied with the loss of privileged status and left France to join the émigré forces in Austria and Russia. Despite its tremendous effect on the French Army in 1791-92, the mass departure of oficers also had a positive consequence, allowing talented commoners to rise through the ranks.

  Innovations resulting in the development of permanent divisions, and later corps, were already in place during the Revolution and Napoleon took full advantage of this to develop his concept of mobile warfare. In 1804 he reined a system that combined infantry and cavalry divisions, supported by artillery, into permanent army corps. These units became self-sufficient mini-armies – key elements of the French military machine. Divisions, however, remained as the major tactical unit that could be entrusted with a specific mission. Each division usually consisted of two or three infantry brigades (each with two to five battalions in one or more regiments) and an artillery brigade (with one or more batteries of four to six field guns and two howitzers).

  The infantry was the main branch of the French Army and included both ‘line’ and ‘light’ units. After 1808, regiments had one depot battalion of four companies (training replacements and reinforcements) and four active battalions (bataillons de guerre), each consisting of six companies: four of fusiliers, one of grenadiers and one of voltigeurs. Regiments usually consisted of about 100 officers and some 3,800 rank-and-file.

  French cavalry was categorized as heavy (employed in the charge) or light (used for reconnaissance and skirmishing). The cavalry included a number of different types, including: cuirassiers equipped with breastplates (cuirasses); carabiniers, who were armed with a carbine; dragoons, carrying the sabre and a musket with a bayonet; hussars, elaborately dressed light cavalry generally used for scouting and pursuit; chasseurs à cheval, light cavalrymen who operated as mounted Jägers; and chevaux-léger, light cavalrymen armed with lances. In addition, Napoleon’s cavalry included various foreign units, including the famous Polish Lancers, the Croatian Hussars, Württemberg chevau-léger, etc.

  The Imperial Guard was the élite organization within the Grand Army. In the decade since it was established, the Guard participated in all Napoleon’s campaigns and earned a fearsome reputation. Its membership was by strict selection, since it entailed many privileges, including higher pay and better provisions. As a result, the Guard was both envied and resented by the line units. By 1812, it was an army within an army, with its own infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineers and marines. This imperial corps was organized into the Old Guard (the élite within the élite), the Middle Guard (created in 1806), and the newly established Young Guard. Attached to them were the Polish Vistula Legion and the Hessian Guards.

  Having graduated as an artillery officer from L’École Militaire, Napoleon knew well the potential of this arm. The French artillery, after a lacklustre performance during the Seven Years War (1756-63), quickly developed and improved under the guidance of a series of capable officers. Jean Baptiste de Gribeuval was instrumental in modernizing the French artillery by simplifying and standardizing French guns. Gun barrels were shortened and lightened and accuracy was improved by means of elevating mechanisms and scale sights. Napoleon incorporated this Gribeuval system into his military concepts and employed artillery on an unprecedented scale. He often deployed a grand battery to soften the enemy position and provide massive artillery support for his main attack effort.
By 1812, the ratio of guns to men rose from two guns per thousand to five guns per thousand. The artillery of the Grand Army was organized into regimental (i.e. attached to each regiment), divisional (i.e. assigned to infantry and cavalry divisions), army corps (i.e. an artillery reserve attached to a corps) and army reserve (i.e. organized into the army’s main artillery park). A foot artillery regiment was comprised of several artillery companies (batteries), each with six guns and two howitzers; a horse artillery company included four guns and two howitzers.

  The Grand Army, resting on the fields of Borodino, was an amalgamation of troops from almost every nation of Éurope. The ethnic French made up only a part of this enormous army, while the rest included Prussians, Bavarians, Westphalians, Saxons, Dutch, Swiss, Italians, Austrians and others. The largest non-French contingent was provided by the Poles, who fielded an entire corps led by Józef Poniatowski. Time and again they would prove themselves excellent warriors, who would remain loyal to Napoleon to the very last. The Italians provided the second largest body of non-French troops, led by Prince Eugène, Napoleon’s stepson and Viceroy of Italy. After so many centuries of division, Italians of different stock and regions were now united into a single force and some of the Italian officers even began to dream of the Roman legions and the sense of national pride they once instilled.132 The Germanic troops came from a plethora of minor states that Napoleon placed under his sway over the previous decade. Among them were Bavarians (Napoleon’s most reliable German allies), Saxons (whose ruler would eventually pay a dear price for his pro-French policy), Westphalians (whose King Jérôme Bonaparte was sent back home earlier in the campaign), and the reluctant Prussians (who were represented by a few regiments at Borodino, but whose entire corps was ighting in north-western Russia).

  With such diverse group of nationalities, each with their own worldview and goals, it was naturally difficult to maintain cohesion and esprit de corps. Lieutenant Wedel of the 9th Polish Lancers confirms this in his memoirs: ‘Three-quarters of the nations that were about to take part in the struggle had interests diametrically opposed to those, which had decided the opening of hostilities. There were many who in their hearts wished the Russians success.’ However, the existing sense of union and purpose was cantered on Napoleon, whose legendary sway over his troops has been discussed in numerous books. This is why, according to Wedel:

  Whatever their personal feelings towards the Emperor may have been, there was nobody who did not see in him the greatest and the ablest of all generals, and who did not experience a feeling of confidence in his talents and the value of his judgement […] thus, at the moment of danger, all fought as though they had been defending their own homes.

  His view is echoed in the testimony of Lieutenant Calosso of the 24th Chasseurs a Cheval, who had a rare opportunity to meet Napoleon in person, an incident that seemingly changed his life:

  Before that I admired Napoleon as the whole army admired him. But from that day on I devoted my life to him with a fanaticism which time has not weakened. I only had one regret, which was that I only had one life to offer in his service.

  Even his enemies had to acknowledge the effect Napoleon had on the battlefield. Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington, famously proclaimed that the presence of Napoleon on a battlefield was itself worth 40,000 men, while a Russian officer, and future distinguished historian, remarked: ‘Anyone who was not alive at the time of Napoleon simply cannot imagine the extent of the moral ascendancy he exerted over the minds of his contemporaries.’133

  Average Length of Service (in years) of French Officers (by ranks)

  Rank Infantry Cavalry

  Sous-lieutenant 11.4 10.7

  Lieutenant 13 13.2

  Captain 18 18.5

  Chef de Bataillon/Chef d’Escadron 19.7 19.7

  Colonel 21.9 20.9

  The French officers were products of the Revolution, which introduced principles of merit, talent and elections in the military. With the privileges of nobility abolished and many noble officers emigrating, the officer ranks were open to citizen-soldiers, who advanced according to their merits and talents. The mass departure of nobles and the influx of commoners produced a new amalgamation of strata. According to Oleg Sokolov’s research, about half of the French officers serving in 1812 came from the bourgeoisie (30 per cent) and landowners (20 per cent), while nobles constituted only 5 per cent. Studying company grade officers serving in 1814, Jean Paul Bertaud found that 40.3 per cent were the sons of landowners, followed by those of farmers (34.8 per cent), merchants and tradesmen (20.3 per cent), artisans (18.1 per cent), rentiers (17.6 per cent), military men (14.4 per cent), lawyers (9.8 per cent), professors, teachers and engineers (8.3 per cent), commercial businessmen (8.3 per cent) and manufacturers (7.8 per cent). The government employees supplied 8.2 per cent of officers and nobles comprised almost 5 per cent.134 Among 149 generals sampled for the present study, fifty-seven began service under the Ancien Régime, while the rest joined during the Revolution, with forty-five volunteering in the first three years of the Revolution (1789-91) and twenty-seven responding to the call, ‘la patrie en danger’, in 1792.

  Napoleon inherited the military developed during the Revolutionary Wars and perfected it. He placed the Army at the centre of imperial society and lavished it with attention and honours. One-quarter of 300 prefects of the Empire were from a military background, and officers were in charge of major cities throughout the country. Between 1808 and 1814, 59 per cent of the 3,263 men who received noble titles were military men, and besides the marshals – who all had noble titles – the majority of generals were counts or barons, while colonels received a barony and company-grade officers were rewarded with the title of ‘chevalier’. In addition to titles, Napoleon also provided substantial material privileges to his officer corps. Besides increased pay, the imperial government also provided free education or grants for officers’ children, exempted garrison officers from certain taxes and granted retired officers priority in recruitment for certain government posts.

  With troops from almost every corner of Europe, one might have expected a similarly diverse officer corps. Yet, while company grade officers were mostly of ethnic origin, general officers were largely French. Thus, out of 166 generals considered, 130 were French (plus one Corsican). Among the rest were seventeen Poles, four Westphalians, four Württembergers, two Italians, two Hessians, two Dutch, one Bavarian, one Portuguese, one Swiss and one Saxon. The average length of service of these officers (based on 149 cases) was 24.4 years, with General Ornano and Berthemy’s thirteen years of service and Alexander Berthier’s forty-six years setting the records for the shortest and longest careers, respectively.

  Of the twenty-six marshals Napoleon created during the Empire, thirteen current and future marshals participated in the Russian campaign, nine of them (seven current and two future marshals) being present at Borodino. Two of Napoleon’s ablest marshals – André Masséna and Jean Lannes – did not participate in the campaign since the former was in semi-retirement in France, while the latter had died in 1809. Pierre François Augereau was in Prussia, while Jean Baptiste Bernadotte, already in alliance with Russia, was in Sweden, after being elected Crown Prince in 1810. Four other marshals – Jean Baptiste Jourdan, the hero of Flerus; Nicholas Jean Soult of Austerlitz fame; Louis Gabriel Suchet, the conqueror of Catalonia; and Auguste Frederic Marmont, Napoleon’s close friend and a future turncoat – were all tied down in Spain. Claude-Victor Perrin, Laurent Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Etienne-Jacques-Joseph-Alexandre Macdonald and Nicolas-Charles Oudinot were in Russia but commanded corps on other fronts.

  The Russian Army

  The Russian Army of 1812 was, in many respects, quite different from the one Napoleon faced in 1805 and 1807. The lessons of Austerlitz, Eylau and Friedland led the Russian government to realize the need for change and to pursue a modernization through military reforms. It was a lengthy process, since Russia was at war for virtually the entire period between 1789 and 1812, fighting thre
e campaigns against France, two wars against the Ottomans, two wars with Sweden, one war against Persia and participating in the partitions of Poland and annexations of the Caucasian principalities.

  Able to draw on a population of almost 40 million by the late 18th century, Russian sovereigns drafted conscripts from the servile population that included serfs, state and Church peasants and townspeople. During the Napoleonic Wars, Russia raised levies every year except in 1814, raising some 1,100,000 men. In times of emergency, Russian sovereigns often ordered heavier levies or resorted to militia mobilizations. The heaviest levies were held in 1812, when three emergency levies were initiated within a six-month timeframe, calling for over 400,000 men.

  The Russian officer corps primarily consisted of nobles. Over 86 per cent of the 2,000 officers present at Borodino belonged to the nobility, as did 96 per cent (728 out of 758) of senior officers. Nobles received preferential treatment on enlisting and also in subsequent promotions, while non-nobles were required to serve as non-commissioned officers for extended periods before further advancement. On paper, nobles were required to serve in the lower ranks, but naturally sought to circumvent regulations. The most prominent and powerful families often exploited a loophole in the system by enlisting their children in infancy: consequently, by the time these infants grew up, they already had extensive ‘records of service’, making them eligible for officer status without any real experience or training.

  Of course, patronage and nepotism was of paramount importance in this practice, as well as subsequent career development. Obviously, non-nobles had a lesser chance of obtaining quick career advancement and usually had to wait between five and seven years to become officers. NCOs from the soldier ranks were in the worst position because they, on average, served up to a decade before reaching the officer ranks, but there were exceptions. At Borodino, sixty-four NCOs had already served between ten and twenty-five years, while three others had remained NCOs for an incredible twenty-four to twenty-seven years.