The Battle of Borodino: Napoleon Against Kutuzov

by Alexander Mikaberidze

  Meantime, suffering from the Russian fire, the 108th and 85th Line slowly withdrew towards the woods. However, Dessaix was wounded in process after grapeshot shattered his right forearm.294 The command of the 4th Division now passed to Friederichs, who wisely kept his men in the woods to protect from the canister. The casualties, however, continued to mount. When Girod de l’Ain, who accompanied Dessaix to an ambulance, returned to the line, Colonel Anchard of the 108th Line, already wounded several times, pointed towards a handful of men grouped around a regimental eagle, telling him: ‘That is all that is left of my regiment.’ Behind the 4th Division, Compans’ troops (25th, 57th, 61st and 111th Line) continued to lose men and, as Vossen testiies, ‘the enemy deployed guns and howitzers on the edge of the woods and opened ire against our lines. Generals and staff officers appeared at the front and we could hear them yelling, “Advance intrepidly, comrades! Soldiers, forward!”‘ The 61st and 57th Line moved into the woods but were still unable to avoid the Russian skirmishers. Nearby, at the edge of the woods, the 111th Line fought off the Russian cavalry while simultaneously trading shots with Jägers, still harassing them from behind the trees.

  The fighting around the flèches was chaotic and the precise course of events in this section remains difficult to ascertain. Thus, Russian/Soviet and Western historians differ on the number of attacks on the flèches. The latter usually acknowledge three major assaults by the French divisions, while some Soviet scholars – in an attempt to embellish Russian exploits – refer to eight epic assaults on Bagration’s positions. The honour of capturing the flèches was later bitterly disputed by the troops of Davout and Ney. Some participants, especially from the regiments engaged in this combat, argued that the southern flèche was seized during the initial attack and retained for the rest of the day. Thus, Colonel Charrière of the 57th Line claimed that his regiment seized and remained inside the southern lèche for hours, despite repeated Russian attacks. He did, however, acknowledge that he had appealed for help to General Ledru, because the 57th Line was running out of ammunition and could not retain the lèche unless reinforcements were received at once.295 Murat and Rapp recalled seeing flèches captured and then ‘two of them relinquished’ by the Russians but it is unclear which two and when. Suckow believed that the redoubt changed hands many times before being captured by his comrades from the 25th Division. Scheler’s report claims the honour of seizing the flèches belonged to his Württemberg troops. Pelet and Chambray described how the French succeeded in seizing the flèches only to be driven back by the Russians. In his report, Ney described the capture of the flèches as follows:

  A Cantinière at Borodino

  During the bloody combat around the flèches, voltigeur corporal Dumont of the 61st Line, wounded in the upper arm, struggled to conceal his injury, in order to lead his soldiers. But the pain soon forced him to seek an ambulance.

  As he quit the battle, he saw Florencia, a Spanish cantinière of his regiment, who ‘was in tears [since] some men had told her that nearly all the regiment’s drummers were killed or wounded’. Despite his anguish, Dumont agreed to help her find these unfortunate men. And so under canister and musket hail, ‘we were walking amidst wounded men. Some moved painfully and only with difficulty, while others were being carried on litters […] When she caught sight of all the drums of the regiment strewn on the ground [Florencia] became like a madwoman. ‘Here, my friend, here!’ she yelled, ‘They are all here!’ And so they were, lying with broken limbs, their bodies torn by grapeshot. Mad with grief, she went from one to the other, speaking softly to them. But none of them heard her. Some, however, still gave signs of life, among them one drum-major she called her father. Stopping by him and falling on her knees she raised his head and poured a few drops of brandy between his lips.’

  As she mourned her comrades, Florencia was suddenly struck by a musket ball in her left hand, which ‘crushed her thumb and entered the shoulder of the dying man she was holding’. Dumount tried to carry the unconscious Florencia to the ambulance but, with his agonizing wound, it was more than he could do. Fortunately, a French cavalryman came by and ‘without much ado he lifted up the young Spaniard and carried her like a child’ to the Guard artillery ambulance, where Larrey himself operated on her, amputating her finger.

  The 10th Division, driving back the enemy skirmishers and advance elements, approached the left redoubt with great valour. This redoubt was then attacked by the troops of the I Corps, and the 24th Light and the 57th Line entered inside it, getting mixed up in the process. The enemy, having recovered from the first blow, returned to reclaim the redoubt but the 25th Division arrived in time to support the 10th Division and the enemy was repelled.296

  According to General Marchand, ‘the fortifications, which were abandoned by the 57th and 72nd Line, were reclaimed by the Württemberg soldiers’.297

  Meanwhile, the reports and memoirs of Bagration, Vorontsov, Löwenstern, Eugène of Württemberg, Konovnitsyn and Saint Priest, show that the flèches were repeatedly recaptured and lost for several hours, although the precise timing of events remains uncertain.

  Marshal Murat recalled arriving at the flèches just as ‘our light troops entered the second redoubt, from which they were then repulsed. Some Russian cuirassiers were charging our light infantry …’298 Seeing these charges, Murat then personally led the two Württemberg Chevau-léger regiments: a fact borne out by the Russian oficer, Fedor Glinka, who testiied that: ‘a horseman in gaudy uniform led the attack followed by a stream of cavalry. It seemed as if knights from the Medieval Age were attacking! The mighty cavalrymen, in yellow and silver armour, merged into a single column […] and followed Murat.’299 The French charge, which was led by the 2nd Württemberg Chevau-léger, recovered the guns that the Russians had captured moments before. Murat reported that the Württemberg charge ‘was made with great success upon the Russian infantry that was marching at the first redoubt and was entirely sabred. Then I ordered a charge at the second Redoubt which was definitely taken.’300

  But Murat’s men then got carried away in the heat of action and were showered by Russian canister ire. Isolated and without support, the pursuers, in a moment, became the pursued, as Russian cuirassiers, supported by the 2nd Grenadier Division, counter-attacked. The Russians soon reached the southern lèche, where the French infantry, already wavering under canister fire, abandoned the flèche, which was then occupied by the 2nd Württemberg Battalion, supported by the 3rd Battalion deployed outside the walls. So, as the Württemberg chevau-léger – pursued by the Russian cuirassiers -approached the southern flèche, they were protected by their compatriots. According to Suckow, the Württembergers initially withheld their fire since they mistook the Russian uniform for the Saxon. But they confusion was quickly resolved after the Russian colonel shouted his order in German (!?), ‘Kill these German dogs!’ In response, he received a salvo from the Württembergers.

  Murat – barely escaping Russian attempts to capture him – sheltered inside the lèche, where he was able to rally the troops and fight off the Russian cavalry.301 In order to encourage the Württembergers, Murat, ‘knowing little or no German, cried out, “Ah brav Jäger, brav Jäger, scheuss, scheuss, Jäger!’’ He meant to encourage the troops but the effect was merely comical.’302 Still, the Württemberg soldiers managed to repel the Russian charges and protect the Marshal. Faber du Faur, the Württemberg artist who produced a memorable engraving of this incident, noted that:

  A vigorous fire from our light infantry, and from the line infantry in their support, soon repulsed the enemy’s cavalry and assured the safety of the King [i.e. of Naples, meaning Murat]. He, Murat, threw himself upon the retreating foe with the cavalry of Bruyère and Nansouty and, after a number of attacks, forced them back off the heights.

  In the centre of this cauldron, Bagration – dressed in his parade uniform adorned with his favourite Order of St George (2nd class) – remained calm, since, as Glinka recalled, ‘he always drew inspiration at such mom
ents of despair. It seemed that the lames of the battle awakened something deep inside his soul […] His eyes were full of sparkle.’ With the units of General Konovnitsyn’s 3rd Division approaching and the Life Guard Izmailovskii and Litovskii Regiments already near Semeyonovskoye, Bagration decided to counter-attack with available forces to gain ground and time. The precise moment of this counter-attack – and Bagration’s subsequent injury -remains a matter of debate, largely due to the many attempts at embellishing Russian exploits. Uncertainty surrounds not only the timing of the attack but its place in the overall sequence of events during the battle. Some participants (Yermolov, Glinka, Grabbe) and scholars (Zhilin, Beskrovny, Garnich, Troitsky, Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Neyelov, Mikhnevich) have asserted that Bagration was wounded around noon, after the first French attack on Rayevsky’s Redoubt (discussed in the next section). Others, among them Jomini, Bogdanovich and Skugarevsky, have argued that Bagration was wounded around 11.30am, before the French attack on the Grand Redoubt. Finally, some participants (Eugène von Württemberg, Vistitsky, Saint Priest, Clausewitz) and the new generation of Russian historians (Vasiliev, Zemtsov, Popov, Ivchenko etc.) have suggested that Bagration was injured prior to the arrival of II Corps: that is, between 9 and 9.30 am. This latter interpretation is supported by French memoirs and, to this author, it seems closer to reality, considering the overall course of events.

  Recent research by Russian scholars reveals that Colonel Toll, the Quartermaster General and Kutuzov’s right-hand man, can be held responsible for the confusion outlined above.303 In the decades after the battle, Toll tried to cover up some of the miscalculations and errors the Russian command (i.e. Kutuzov and Toll himself) made in the initial deployment at Borodino, as well as later battle decisions. Toll was well aware of the scathing criticism voiced in the memoirs of Barclay de Tolly, Bennigsen, and other participants, which placed a hefty slice of responsibility on his shoulders. In response, Toll, taking advantage of his reputation and connections at the imperial court, published his Opisaniye, an account of the battle, which justified his actions and revised the sequence of events on the left flank and centre. Thus, in the official reports – complied immediately after the battle -Toll wrote that the flèches were defended from 7am to 10am, which placed Bagration’s counter-attack and injury around 9am. But a decade later, as he completed his Opisaniye, Toll added a line claiming that Russian grenadiers drove the French out the flèches after 10am, pursuing their foes as far as the Utitsa woods.304 By this device, Toll extended the fighting at the flèches until noon, when, by his account, the fortifications finally fell to the French and Bagration received his wound. Toll’s sleight of hand allowed other historians – especially Soviet – to claim eight major assaults on the flèches, which, they claimed, remained embattled until the afternoon. This was the version espoused in Russian studies of the battle until well into 1990s.

  Around 9am-9.30 am Bagration issued orders for all his immediate forces to launch a counter-attack and, after directing the artillery ire of his batteries towards the flèches, he personally led the charge of the 2nd Grenadier Division and the 1st Combined Grenadier Brigade. The vigorous Russian offensive seized two flèches, while the French stubbornly held out in the third, southern, flèche. According to a witness:

  Observing the menacing movement of the French forces and grasping their intentions, Prince Bagration conceived a great design. Under his orders, the entire left wing in all its length moved quickly forward with fixed bayonets! Thousands became split into single beings, each of whom whirled around, acted and fought! This was a personal, private struggle of a man against man, of a warrior against warrior, and the Russians refused to surrender even an inch of their soil.305

  Buturlin described the Russian attack thus:

  [the] entire line of the left flank suddenly moved in a bayonet attack. The assault was dreadful […] a desperate and savage fighting followed at which both sides demonstrated marvellous and superhuman courage.

  Meanwhile, Dushenkevich looked on as

  the Grenadiers, whose units were preceded by the priests holding the crosses, marched instilling fear in their enemies – they moved heroically and [the] eyes of each of them sparkled with tears of pure faith, while their faces showed the willingness to die fighting […] This was not a battle but a true slaughter. A previously lat valley now resembled a ploughed field due to [the] cross ricochet fire from batteries; clusters of cannon-balls, grenades and canister pierced our columns or ploughed [the] ground in front of us.

  According to another officer:

  [We made a bayonet attack], and the French ran around like mad. The Frenchmen [were] courageous, as they remained firm under [our] artillery ire […] [and] even made a stand against the cavalry, and no one could best them as skirmishers. But they could not resist [our] bayonet [attacks].306

  Murat admitted that the French had to abandon one of the flèches, while, according to Rapp and Pelet, the Russians were able to carry two of the flèches. Ségur described the attack as ‘violent, impetuous, with infantry, artillery and cavalry all joining in one great effort. Ney and Murat, whose concern now was not to complete the victory, but just to hold what they had gained, braced themselves against this onslaught.’307 Pelet, who was with his 48th Line, witnessed this Russian attack:

  As Bagration’s supporting troops arrived, they were fed into the action, boldly advancing over the bodies of the fallen to retake the lost redoubts. The Russian columns moved in accurate response to the orders from their commanders and were, themselves, living bastions. As soon as they emerged into the open terrain, our canister knocked them down, but these brave warriors let nothing bother them and continued to come at us as before.

  The attack brought a temporary relief and gained precious time for the Russian reinforcements to arrive, but it was bought at a terrible price. Hundreds of soldiers were killed or wounded and the officer corps was decimated.

  On the Russian side, Colonel Kantakuzen managed to recover several Russian guns before being mortally wounded, while Buxhowden, commander of the Astrakhanskii Grenadier Regiment, was wounded three times but continued commanding his men before receiving his final, mortal, injury. Not far from him, Colonel Monakhtin tried to inspire his men by yelling: ‘Lads! This is Russia so defend her with your warrior chests!’ but a moment later the French canister ripped through his own ribcage.308 Generals Borozdin, Gorchakov, Mecklenburg, Saint Priest and Colonel Shatilov were all wounded. The French lost Generals Marion and Komper dead and Gengoult wounded.

  The greatest casualty, however, was Prince Bagration himself. As the attack developed, a shell splinter struck Bagration’s left leg, smashing his shinbone. For a few minutes he made a valiant effort to conceal his wound, in order to prevent panic or discouragement among his troops. Yet he bled profusely and began to slip from the saddle. His adjutants bore him away, but the thing Bagration most feared soon occurred. A mistaken report of his death spread through the 2nd Army and, as Yermolov recalled, ‘in an instant the rumour spread that he was dead […] it was impossible to check the confusion of the troops […] There was one common feeling – despair.’ Barclay de Tolly later noted that after Bagration’s injury, ‘The 2nd Army was in a state of utter confusion’, and his sentiments were echoed by Mayevsky: ‘Prince [Bagration] was taken behind the line and his retinue accompanied him. The fighting now was waged in such confusion that I did not know whom and how I should join.’ Meanwhile, Butenev saw ‘the troops shocked [by Bagration’s injury]; they believed he was invulnerable because he was never wounded, despite participating in numerous battles over a quarter of century’.309 Another participant described how, following Bagration’s wound, ‘the soul of courage and defiance itself had departed from the entire left wing’.

  Soon a remarkable frenzy to avenge their commander spread among Bagration’s soldiers. As he was carried away, Bagration’s adjutant, Adrianov, ran towards his stretcher: ‘Your Excellency, you are being taken away and I am no longer of use to you!�
� Then, as a witnesses recalled: ‘Adrianov, in the sight of thousands, moved like an arrow, cutting his way through the enemy, dealing blows at many before dropping dead.’310

  In the midst of the battle, Bagration was carried to the surgeons at a nearby station. Muravyev saw him ‘with heartbreaking appearance and constantly looking around, taking [with] lively interest in the bloody carnage [around him] …’ Glinka recalled seeing Bagration, surrounded by his adjutant and physicians

  his linen and garments soaked in blood, his uniform unbuttoned, one leg bare, and his head spattered with blood. A large wound was obvious above his knee. His face, covered with dark patches of gunpowder was pale but calm. Despite his agonizing pain, Bagration gazed silently into the distance, listening to the rumble and din of the battle.

  Bagration soon saw Barclay’s adjutant Löwenstern approaching him and, despite pain, told him: ‘Tell General Barclay that the fate and salvation of the Army depends on him. So far everything has been going well, but now Barclay ought to come to my Army in person.’ Seeing that Löwenstern was himself wounded, Bagration told him, ‘Get yourself bandaged.’ A few minutes later, Norov of the Guard Artillery, saw

  a small group [of officers] who half-carried a general, whose one leg barely touched the ground […] Who was he? He was the man who until now held the entire left flank with some supernatural power – Bagration! […] It is difficult to express the sorrow that seized us at that moment …311