The Battle of Borodino: Napoleon Against Kutuzov

by Alexander Mikaberidze

  So, between 9.30am and 10am, the Russian counter-attack was repelled and the flèches were lost once again. The loss of so many officers, and especially of Bagration, spread confusion among the Russian troops and the left lank appeared to be on the verge of collapse. The French counter-attack sought to pierce the Russian defences and seize Semeyonovskoye, and it might have succeeded if not for the arrival of Russian reinforcements. The 3rd Infantry Division, which Bagration requested from Tuchkov at the start of the battle, finally appeared and

  the Chernigovskii, Muromskii, Revelskii and Selenginskii Regiments […] despite the devastating enemy fire, made a bayonet attack shouting ‘hurrah,’ overwhelmed the superior enemy, spreading confusion into his columns and occupying the position that was bitterly contested from the start of the battle.312

  According to Konovnitsyn, ‘after this fairly successful attack I was informed that Bagration and his chief of staff Saint Priest were wounded […] and Bagration left me in charge as the senior ranking officer’. Konovnitsyn defended the flèches for some time before the French seized the fortifications again. However, he counter-attacked with his 3rd Division, which was supported by the Kievskii, Astrakhanskii, Sibirskii and Moskovskii Grenadiers. The Russian success, however, proved fleeting, since they were driven out of the flèches. Colonel Toll, accompanied by Sherbinin, was examining troops near Semeyonovskoye when he witnessed the attack of the Muromskii and Revelskii Regiments: ‘Cannon-balls were raining upon Semeyonovskoye, trees were falling all around and houses were destroyed as if theatrical production sets. The air itself howled constantly and the earth trembled.’313

  Sherbinin and Glinka saw the charge of Major General Alexander Tuchkov IV with the Revelskii Infantry Regiment and the death of this gallant oficer near the rear lèche. According to Glinka:

  under a terrible artillery fire, Tuchkov shouted to his troops, ‘Lads, follow me forward!’ His soldiers, whose faces were lashed by a storm of lead, hesitated. ‘So you are going to stand here? Then, I will attack alone!’ [Tuchkov yelled] and, grasping the regimental lag, he rushed forward. A moment later, a canister shot shattered his chest […] [and] numerous cannon balls and shells, resembling a boiling cloud, fell on the very place where the dead General lay and ploughed the earth burying the General’s corpse.

  Tuchkov’s body was never found. As Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky observed:

  Three kin [Tuchkov] brothers, all of general’s rank, ended their lives this fateful campaign: one, wounded, was captured near Smolensk, while two others had fallen at Borodino. Their mother lost vision from her tears while the youthful wife of one of the fallen brothers later established a cloister on the Borodino battlefield and left the secular life.314

  The Westphalian troops of Napoleon’s VIII Corps, meantime, were moving southwards to support the Poles and lank the Russian positions. As Borke and Lossberg described, the Westphalians initially followed Ney’s III Corps but then turned right towards the Utitsa woods. Lieutenant Colonel Conrady recalled moving along the ravine that protected them, but barely did his troops emerge on the plain above the ravine when they came under devastating artillery fire. Captain Zakharov’s 1st Life Guard Horse Company was especially effective, as it opened a canister ire at the approaching enemy masses. As one Russian officer recalled: ‘the head of the enemy column was literally mowed down’. Zakharov continued commanding his battery until he suffered a mortal wound. His last words, reputedly, were: ‘I envy your fortune, my friends, since you still can fight for the motherland.’ Zakharov’s company was reinforced by eleven guns collected from various companies, which halted the Westphalian advance, allowing the Russians to bring up cavalry. Amidst smoke, noise and confusion, as Conrady, Lossberg, Morgenstern and Boedicker acknowledged, the Westphalians initially mistook the Russian cuirassiers for the Saxons, who wore similar uniforms, but quickly realized their mistakes and organized squares from the 2nd Line, 3rd Light and the 6th Line. The Russians called off their charge but the Westphalians suffered from an artillery fire that caused havoc amidst their tight formations. Suckow’s memoirs complained about an enemy battery of twenty guns bombarding his men, while, according to Scheler, ‘defending the flèches required immense determination and courage because the enemy showered them with grenades, cannon-balls and canister ..Planat de la Fay observed that the

  General Alexander Tuchkov and the Borodino Saviour Monastery

  The death of General Alexander Tuchkov shattered the life of his wife, Margarita Mikhailovna Tuchkova, née Naryshkina. Even more devastating was the fact that the General’s body was never found, precluding a proper burial. Tuchkova spent years trying to preserve the memory of her husband on the battlefield and, in 1818, she was finally able to lay the foundation of a church with the help of Emperor Alexander, who donated 10,000 roubles for the construction.

  The Church of the Saviour (‘Spasa Nerukotvornogo’), built on the spot where General Konovnitsyn believed Tuchkov to be killed, became the first monument constructed on the battlefield and laid the foundation for the eventual memorial. Tuchkova barely recovered from her husband’s death when she experienced two more tragic events, as her only son died in 1826 and her brother was exiled for his involvement in the Decembrist Uprising.

  Abandoning the secular life, she organized a recluse for women at the Church of Saviour, living in a small house, which was destroyed by the German Army in 1942 but reconstructed as a memorial exhibition in 1994.

  The Church of Saviour was eventually turned into the Borodino Saviour Monastery (‘Spaso-Borodinskii Monastyr’) in 1838, with Tuchkova as its first mother superior. It was surrounded by a brick wall and four towers and gates in 1837-39. Over the next decades it came to include a bell tower (1840), the Cathedral of the Vladimir Icon of the Mother of the God (1851-59) and the Church of John the Baptist (1874). Its Pilgrim’s House became famous after novelist Leo Tolstoy lived there while studying the battlefield for his masterpiece War and Peace.

  In 1912, on the centennial of the battle, Emperor Nicolas II and his family visited the monastery and attended the unveiling of the monument to the 3rd Division. In 1929 (following the October Revolution of 1917) the monastery was closed. It sheltered a hospital during the World War II and was damaged during the battle at Borodino. Restored in 1962, the monastery was included in the Borodino Military Historical Museum-Reserve in 1975. After the fall of the USSR, it was returned to the Russian Orthodox Church and became active again in 1992.

  the Westphalian Corps was deployed in a column behind the flèche and was from time to time hit by shells that threw shakos and bayonets into the air. With every such explosion, these poor soldiers threw themselves to the ground but not all of them managed to raise to their feet afterwards.315

  After the French seized the flèches for the final time, a brigade of the 24th Division moved closer to the fortifications but suffered under the Russian guns firing from Semeyonovskoye. Ney then repeated his order for the VIII Corps to proceed south to assist the Poles (see page 138).

  As the French began to regroup, Konovnitsyn faced the challenging decision of continuing to fight for the flèches, which by this time were largely destroyed, or withdrawing his troops to a new position, where they could regroup. Some participants recall overhearing the General’s murmur: ‘My Lord, what should I do?’ He even called upon Rayevsky to come in person to Semeyonovskoye, but Rayevsky was himself under attack and replied that he could not abandon his position. Thus Rayevsky ‘advised him [Konovnitsyn] to act according to circumstances’.316 After some thought, Konovnitsyn decided to withdraw his troops to Semeyonovkoye, which meant the Russians effectively gave up battle for the flèches and took up new positions along the ravine of the Semeyonvskii brook.

  The Russian headquarters was stunned by news of Bagration’s wound. Kutuzov, initially appointed Prince Alexander of Württemberg to lead the 2nd Western Army but then replaced him with the more experienced Dokhturov, who reached the left flank between 10.30 and 11.00 am.

  Dokh
turov’s arrival was witnessed by Glinka, who saw ‘a horseman wearing [a] worn out general’s uniform, with stars on his chest, small but [with] strong features, and [a] genuinely Russian face.’ Dokhturov, ‘calmly riding amidst the raining death and horrors’, saw the entire left wing in disarray and requested reinforcements. He supposedly appealed to the troops: ‘Moscow, the mother of all Russian cities, is behind us!’ and began redeploying his forces. The Life Guard Litovskii and Izmailovskii Regiments were in a chequerboard formation south of Semeyonovskoye, while survivors of the Combined Grenadier Brigade, the 12th and 27th Divisions were nearby in support. The 3rd Division was deployed to their right, while the remnants of the 2nd Grenadier Division occupied the village ruins. Borozdin’s cavalry brigade stood behind the Guard Regiments, while the 2nd Cuirassier Division was rallied behind the 3rd Division. Neverovsky spread a chain of skirmishers in front of the Guard Regiments and assumed command of the Combined Grenadier Battalions and the Don Cossack Horse Artillery Company. Parts of the IV Reserve Cavalry Corps were deployed further to the south, to maintain communications with Shakhovsky’s Jägers.

  Central Sector – The First Assault on Rayevsky’s Redoubt

  While Ney and Davout attacked the flèches, Prince Eugène prepared to assault the Russian positions in the centre. By now, Delzon’s 13th Division was around Borodino, Ornano’s light cavalry brigade was to the north of the village, while the Italian Guard, Morand’s 1st, Gérard’s 3rd and Broussier’s 14th Divisions and Grouchy’s III Cavalry Corps were on the banks of the Kolocha, preparing for the attack. Morand’s skirmishers were already fighting the Russian Jägers that were spread in the bushes along the Semeyonovskii stream. As Zemtsov calculated, Prince Eugène’s forces included about 33,000 men and 7,000 cavalry but he could commit about 24,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry for the attack on the redoubt. They would be supported by over 135 guns

  Rayevsky’s Redoubt was occupied by the 26th Battery Company (twelve guns) of Lieutenant Colonel Shulman (the Russian troops thus called the redoubt the ‘Shulman Battery’) and six guns of the 47th Light Company, under protection of VII Corps; additional batteries were deployed to the north of the redoubt and, according to Larionov, the total number of guns between the New Smolensk Road and the redoubt was close to 110. Rayevsky initially deployed his troops in two lines, with ‘the right wing anchored on the incomplete redoubt […] while the left was in the direction of Semeyonovskoye’. The 12th Division (Vasilchikov) was deployed with the Narvskii and Smolenskii Regiments in the first line, in the Semeyonovskii ravine, and the Ingermanlandskii and Aleksopolskii Regiments in the second line on the hill’s southern slope. As for the 26th Division, a battalion of the Poltavskii Infantry Regiment was deployed in the trench in front of the redoubt, while another Poltavskii battalion, with the Ladozhskii Infantry Regiment, was on the southern side of the redoubt. The Nizhegorodskii and Orlovskii Regiments were placed in two battalion columns on the northern side. The Jägers were spread as skirmishers in the brush, west of the redoubt.317

  Rayevsky’s forces were considerably reduced when Bagration, hard pressed at the flèches, requested reinforcements and, as Rayevsky noted, ‘took the entire second line from me’. Rayevsky deployed the remaining troops in columns and placed the remaining four battalions of the 12th Division on the left, behind the Poltavskii and Ladozhskii Regiments, while four battalions from the 26th Division were on the right side of the redoubt. Vasilchikov and Paskevich were instructed: ‘in case of enemy attack on the redoubt, to attack him from both flanks’.318 Rayevsky also appealed for reinforcement to Barclay de Tolly, who sent him 18th, 19th and 40th Jägers, which were transferred from the northern sector after the combat at Borodino died down. These troops were placed in battalion columns in the reserve behind the redoubt.319 The 6th, 49th and 50th Jägers were spread along the Semeyonovskii stream on the left side of the redoubt, while the 5th, 41st and 42nd jägers were arranged along the Kamenka stream. Further northward, the VI Infantry Corps, and the III Cavalry Corps behind it, supported Rayevsky’s right flank, while IV Cavalry Corps was arranged behind the 12th Infantry Division on the left. Thus the Russians had approximately 27,000 infantry and 8,500 cavalry and forty-six guns concentrated in and around the redoubt.320

  The number of guns initially set up inside the redoubt varies in sources. French scholar, Tranié, and the Russian, Larionov, estimated as many as twenty-four, while Bogdanov, who helped construct the fortification, referred to nineteen. Yermolov, Toll and other Russian participants reported eighteen guns, which is usually acknowledged to be closer to the truth. Still, historians Gerua, Palmer, Thiers, Holzhausen and others argued there were twelve pieces in the redoubt, while Skugarevsky claimed as few as eight. Rayevsky instructed his artillerymen to defend their guns to the last and ordered draught horses and ammunition caissons to be sent away, in case there was a real threat of the enemy seizing the redoubt.321 He remained on foot inside the fortification, since he was suffering from a wound sustained few days before, when he accidentally impaled himself on a bayonet protruding from a stack of hay on a cart. As he recalled: ‘I could barely ride a horse and even then with unbearable pain …’

  Barclay de Tolly, noticing French movement towards the redoubt, ordered Creitz’s Dragoon brigade of III Cavalry Corps to the redoubt. ‘Under heavy artillery and musket fire,’ Creitz recalled, ‘[I] deployed [the] Sibirskii and Orenburgskii [Dragoon] Regiments in the first line and placed the Irkutskii Regiment, which was much weaker, in reserve. Smagin’s Horse Artillery Company with twelve guns was deployed next to it.’322 However, Army roll-calls do no identify anyone by the name of Smagin commanding a Horse Artillery Company and, as Larionov suggested, it might be that Lieutenant Colonel Girsch’s 22nd Light Company was deployed there and, after Girsch’s death, it was probably commanded by Lieutenant Smagin.323

  As the battle began in other sectors, the French made a reconnaissance in force but avoided attacking the fortified battery. This movement is sometimes (especially in Soviet literature) described as a major attack and the first of the three assaults on the redoubt. The memoirs of many participants, however, do not describe this charge and the first Russian histories of Buturlin and Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky are also silent on this count. Bogdanovich simply states that: ‘around 10am, Broussier tried to seize the battery but was repelled and retreated to the ravine to rally his forces’.324 Gerua was more specific in defining this event as an attack and his sequence of events seems to have influenced subsequent generations of Russian/Soviet historians, who began to describe this first assault in increasingly embellished terms. Even such prominent Russian historians as Tarle, Larionov and Troitsky claimed that Broussier’s division made a major assault, which was beaten back with heavy casualties.325 Western historians generally acknowledge some action on Broussier’s part but describe it as an ‘assault’ or ‘reconnaissance’. Chuquet and Rivollet describe such movements taking place around 9am, Popov and Zemtsov between 9am and 10am, Riehn, Duffy, Tranie and Carmigiani at 10am, while Kukiel suggested between 10.30am and 11am. Finally, Elting and Nafziger argued in favour of 11am.

  It seems plausible that, between 8am and 9am, Broussier crossed the Semeyonovskii brook and appeared on the plateau in front of the redoubt. His appearance caused the Russian defenders to assume the French were preparing for an attack, but Broussier was far from launching an unsupported assault, and probably made a reconnaissance in force against the Russian Jägers spread in front of him, before withdrawing his troops to the safety of the ravine. This course of events seems to be supported by Paskevich, who recalled that:

  the skirmishers of my division, lodged in bushes, which the enemy had to pass through, met the enemy [Broussier’s troops] with fire. The French had to make tremendous efforts to pass the bushes and the Jägers of my division halted them for over an hour […] Broussier’s division then remained in the ravine […] while Morand’s and Gérard’s divisions, having deployed in the ravine, suddenly appeared above it and prepared for
attack …326

  Glinka also described ‘Broussier’s division crossing the Kolocha but unable to endure the Russian ire, it took cover in the ravine …’

  The first major assault – attempted by Morand’s division – was preceded by an artillery bombardment to soften the Russian defences and probably continued until after 9am. At that time, Bagration dispatched Mayevsky to see what was happening at Rayevsky’s position:

  Rayevsky took me to the battery, which was to the battlefield what a belvedere is to a town. A hundred guns bombarded it. Rayevsky, with an elated face, told me, ‘Now go back and tell the Prince what is going on here.’327

  Shortly afterwards Rayevsky received a message from Konovnitsyn, who had just assumed command of the entire left wing after Bagration’s injury, asking Rayevsky to come to Semeyonovskoye to help. Rayevsky politely refused in light of impending attack against his own position.

  Morand’s division of some 6,000 men (with twenty-six guns) consisted of three brigades, each containing a single regiment. The division advanced in mixed order with the leading 30th Regiment328 deployed in line and the 13th Light and 17th Line following in battalion columns.329 Prior to the attack, Captain François of the 1st Battalion of the 30th Line tells us that Morand personally reviewed the 30th Line. Then the French advanced across the plateau under a hail of artillery ire and began falling into the wolf pits. Mitarevsky described: ‘besides us, ire was maintained by the batteries to the left of us, as well from the lunette itself and from behind it; musket ire could not be heard at all since it was overpowered by the deafening cannonade.’330 François remembered as

  entire files and half-platoons fell under the enemy fire, leaving great gaps. General Bonnamy, who was at the head of the 30th, made us halt in the thickest of the canister fire, and after he rallied us we went forward again at the pas de charge. A line of Russian [skirmishers] tried to halt us but we delivered a regimental volley at thirty paces and passed over the wreckage.