Carthage Must Be Destroyed

by Richard Miles

  72 Ibid. 21.16.5. This was said to have been a divine punishment for seizing sacred offerings to the fire god Hephaestus some years previously (Ibid. 20. 101.1–3).

  73 Plutarch Pyrrh. 14.5.

  CHAPTER 6: CARTHAGE AND ROME

  1 Eckstein 2006, 131–8.

  2 Ibid., 138–47.

  3 Harris 1979.

  4 Eckstein 2006, 177. More generally, ibid., 118–80.

  5 Dench 2003, 307; Lomas 2004, 207–13.

  6 Eckstein 2006, 245–57.

  7 Cornell 1995, 293–326, 345–68; Harris 1979, 58–67; Crawford 1993, 31–42; Lomas 2004, 201–6.

  8 Livy 7.38.2.

  9 Polybius 3.24; Livy 7.27.2; Diodorus 16.69.1.

  10 Palmer 1997, 15–45.

  11 Varro Lat. 5.145–59.

  12 Palmer 1997, 73–9.

  13 Ibid., 118–19.

  14 Varro Lat. 5.146–7.

  15 Palmer 1997, 115.

  16 Di Mario 2005.

  17 Bechtold 2007.

  18 Diodorus 15.24.1.

  19 For the strong cultural links between Sicily and Latium see Galinsky 1969, 63–140.

  20 Diodorus 15.24.1.

  21 Plutarch Pyrrh. 13.2–6.

  22 Franke 1989, 456–61; Plutarch Pyrrh. 2.1–13.1.

  23 Plutarch Pyrrh. 15.1–17.5.

  24 Justin 18.2.1–3; Valerius Maximus 3.7.10.

  25 Plutarch Pyrrh. 18.1–21.10.

  26 Ibid. 22.1–6.

  27 Polybius 3.25.1–5.

  28 Plutarch Pyrrh. 22.4–6.

  29 Ibid. 22.1–23.6.

  30 Diodorus 22.7.5. Hoyos (1998, 14) argues that there were no Roman participants in this raid. However, the hypothesis put forward by Huss (1985, 212) that Romans were part of the expedition is more convincing, as it appears unlikely that the Romans would have been happy to let such an operation take place on the Italian mainland without their involvement.

  31 Plutarch Pyrrh. 24.1.

  32 Ibid. 25.1–26.1.

  33 Zonaras 8.6; Plutarch Pyrrh. 34.2–4.

  34 Diodorus 22.3; Dionysius 20.4–5.

  35 Livy Epitome 14; Zonaras 8.8; Lazenby 1996, 34–5; Hoyos 1998, 15–16. One much later Christian writer, Orosius (4.3.1–2), actually described a sea battle between the Carthaginian and Roman fleets that is almost certainly fictitious, although his claim that the Romans sent an embassy to Carthage to complain may be true.

  36 Harris 1979, 183–4.

  37 Lancel 1995, 365. See Hoyos 1998, 20–21, for a critique of a possible Campanian conspiracy.

  38 Bechtold 2007.

  39 Livy Epitome 14; 21.10.8, Dio Fr. 43.1; Hoyos 1998, 15–16; Lazenby 1996, 38–9.

  40 Hellanicus of Lesbos Frs. 31, 83, FGH, I: 115, 129 (Dionysius 1.72.13). For scepticism in regard to whether Hellanicus was the source of these claims see Gruen 1992, 17–18. However, see Solmsen’s (1986) convincing reiteration of Hellanicus’ authorship, which is backed up by Malkin (1998, 199–202). In fact the idea that some non-Greek peoples owed their existence to Greek heroes was not a new one. The claim that the Etruscan and Latin peoples had been ruled over by the sons of Odysseus had been circulating in Greek literary circles since at least the mid sixth century BC, and perhaps earlier. The Etruscans were themselves quite receptive to the idea that their origins were linked to the legendary Homeric wanderer (Malkin 1998 & 2002). These Greek-authored ethnographical studies also acted as powerful exclusionary devices, because, while underlining the ‘Greekness’ of some peoples, they also highlighted the alien nature of others. These ideas would soon have a significant impact in Italy, where they were enthusiastically adopted and adapted by non-Greek ethnic groups in order to define their superiority over their equally non-Greek neighbours (Dench 2003, 300).

  41 Cornell 1995, 63–8. The story of Aeneas, although enormously embellished later, had its roots in Greek Homeric epic, and the first references to the Trojan prince travelling to the West are found in a Greek author, the sixth-century-BC Sicilian Greek Stesichorus (Gruen 1992, 13–14). The story of Aeneas in the West was also known in Etruria by the sixth century BC, as seen on decoration on imported Greek pottery and on locally made ware (Galinsky 1969, 105). However, Gruen (1992, 21–6) has convincingly argued that it was Latium that remained the centre of interest in Aeneas.

  42 Gruen 1990, 33; 1992, 31.

  43 Gruen 1992, 15–16. The Sicilian Greek writer Callias (Fr. 5A (Dionysius 1.72.5)) argued that Rome had been founded by the twins Romulus and Remus and an unnamed third brother, the offspring of Latinus (king of the Latin people) and Roma (a Trojan woman who had come to Italy with Aeneas, although she was not related to him). Alcimus, another Syracusan historian, produced a slightly different version of this story, which named Romus, son of Romulus and grandson of Aeneas, as the founder of the city (Vattoune 2002, 220). Indeed, such was Rome’s increasing profile that, by the fourth century, a number of Greek writers, from both the Aristotelian and Platonic schools, argued that the city was a purely Hellenic foundation (Dionysius 1.72.3–5; Plutarch Cam. 22.2). Vattuone (2002, 220) sees the insistence by many fourth- and third-century Syracusan writers that Rome was a Latin and/or Trojan rather than a Greek foundation as a sign that Rome, because of its alliance with the Carthaginians, was seen as an enemy of the western Greeks. However, the fact is that the Greek view of the Trojans was already more nuanced than that, and Timaeus, who clearly viewed Rome in a positive light, also insisted on Rome being a Trojan foundation.

  44 The real power of these Greek ethnographical theories lay not only in the ideas themselves, but also in the authoritative rhetoric of scientific investigation in which they were couched. Bickerman 1952a; Momigliano 1975, 14–15; Cornell 1995, 60–63.

  45 Strabo 5.3.5.

  46 Ovid Fasti 2.237.

  47 Certainly it has been argued that the Greek Arcadian king Evander, a key figure in the story, was introduced into the Roman mythological past only in that period (Bayet 1926; Cornell 1995, 68–9).

  48 Fabre 1981, 287.

  49 Franke 1989, 463–6.

  50 Pausanias 1.12.1; Gruen 1990, 12.

  51 Zonaras 8.9; Gruen 1990, 12–13; Galinsky 1969, 173.

  52 Momigliano 1977, 53–8; Walbank 2002, 172–7. For the major influence that Timaeus’ views had on Roman perceptions of Carthage see Feeney 2007, 52–7.

  53 Dionysius 1.74.1. For Timaeus and his use of synchronisms see Feeney 2007, 43–52.

  54 Timaeus explained that the Festival of the October Horse at Rome, during which a horse was sacrificed, was related to the Greek capture of Troy (Polybius 12.4b.1–12.4c.1). He also stated that the Penates, sacred objects supposedly taken by Aeneas from Troy, were kept in the Latin town of Lavinium (Dionysius 1.67.3–4). For evidence of Timaeus’ research techniques see Festus Rufus Avienus 190 L. However, Timaeus’ claim to accuracy and emphasis on visiting places and interviewing its inhabitants were met with great scepticism and derision by Polybius (12.4d.1–2).

  55 Vattuone 2002, 221–2. Pearson 1987, 255–9, for the paucity of surviving Timaean references to Pyrrhus.

  56 Diodorus 4.21.6–7, 4.22.1–2; Pearson 1975, 188–92.

  57 Ritter 1995, 27–9. The emblems also had personal connections for the victorious Roman generals, one of whom was a member of the Fabii. Both Gaius Fabius and the other consul, Quintus Ogulnius, could boast family associations with the image of Romulus and Remus too. The Fabii were supposedly descended from the group of shepherds who had been supporters of Remus (Ovid Fasti 2.361, 2.375). For Ogulnius, the wolf with the twins was an aide-memoire of one of his finest moments, when, nearly thirty years previously, he had successfully brought to trial several detested loansharks. A proportion of the fines had then been used to commission a group of statues, representing Romulus and Remus as infants being suckled by the she-wolf (Livy 10.23).

  58 Polybius 1.10.1–2; Zonaras 8.6, 8.8; Diodorus 22.13.5–7; Lazenby 1996, 35–7.

  59 Polybius 1.10.7–9.

  60 Eckstein 1987, 76–7.

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sp; 61 Polybius 1.10.3–1.11.4; Lazenby 1996, 37–41.

  62 Polybius 1.11.4–5; Diodorus 23.1.3–4.; Zonaras 8.8–9; Lazenby 1996, 43–6.

  63 Diodorus 23.1.2; Polybius 1.11.7.

  64 Diodorus 23.1.4.

  65 Zonaras 8.9; Frontinus Strat. 1.4.11; Lazenby 1996, 49.

  66 Polybius 1.11.9, 1.20.15.

  67 Lazenby 1996, 49–51.

  68 Polybius 1.16; Diodorus 23.4; Lazenby 1996, 52–3.

  69 Zonaras 8.8.2–3.

  70 On Roman acquisitiveness as a cause of the First Punic War, Polybius 1.11.12; Florus 1.18.

  71 Hoyos 1998, 51–7.

  72 Harris 1979, 9–53. However, Rich (1993, 38–68) highlights the dangers of overplaying Roman bellicosity as the major motivation for Rome’s involvement in a significant number of wars during this period. Eckstein (2006, 181–243) questions how much more militarized, warlike and diplomatically aggressive Rome was compared with its rivals.

  73 Eckstein 1987, 92.

  74 Although the Roman historian Livy (Epitome 14; 21.10.8) alluded to such a treaty, as did the Vergilian scholar Servius (Aen. 4.628), Polybius (3.26) vehemently denied its existence. For arguments for there being no 306 treaty, see Lazenby 1996, 33; Eckstein 1987, 77–8. For arguments in favour of the Philinus treaty, see Huss 1985, 204–6; Lancel 1995, 362; Barceló 1988, 140–41; Serrati 2006, 120–29.

  75 Lazenby 1996, 33.

  76 Eckstein 1987, 93–101.

  77 Hoyos 1998, 4–32.

  78 Polybius 1.5.1, 39.8.4; Walbank 2002, 172–3.

  CHAPTER 7: THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

  1 Polybius 1.20.12.

  2 Casson 1971, 100–122.

  3 Morrison & Coates 1986, 259–60.

  4 Goldsworthy 2000, 101–2.

  5 Frost 1989, 127–35; Lancel 1995, 131–3.

  6 Moscati 1986, 95–6.

  7 Polybius 1.20.6–14.

  8 Ibid. 1.17.4–1.19.15; Diodorus 23.7.1–23.9.1; Zonaras 8.10.

  9 Diodorus 23.9.2.

  10 Polybius 1.20.1–2.

  11 Ibid. 1.21.2.

  12 Ibid. 1.20.10–1.21.2; Lazenby 1996, 63–6.

  13 Polybius 1.21.3–1.21.9.

  14 Pliny NH 8.169; Lazenby 1996, 66–7.

  15 Polybius 1.21.8–11.

  16 Ibid. 1.23.3–10; Zonaras 8.11; Lazenby 1996, 70–72; Goldsworthy 2000, 106–9.

  17 Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum 12.2.25.

  18 Diodorus 23.10.1; Dio 11.18; Zonaras 8.11; Valerius Maximus 7.3.

  19 Zonaras 8.12. In another version of this story he was stoned to death (Orosius 4.4.4). Polybius (1.24.5–7) merely states that Hannibal was punished for losing many ships and being blockaded in one of the harbours.

  20 Polybius 1.24.3–4; Diodorus 23.9.4; Goldsworthy 2000, 82–4; Lazenby 1996, 74–6.

  21 Polybius 1.25.4. Some sources suggested that the Carthaginian admiral, Hamilcar, had been tricked by the Romans, who had divided their ships (Zonaras 8.12), or concealed a number of their craft (Polyaenus 8.20). Lazenby 1996, 78–9.

  22 Polybius 1.26.1–9. For a discussion of these numbers see Goldsworthy 2000, 110–11; Lazenby 1996, 81–4.

  23 Frontinus Strat. 2.13.10, although Lazenby (1996, 96) has doubts about whether this incident really took place at Ecnomus.

  24 Polybius 1.26.10–1.28.14; Goldsworthy 2000, 109–15; Lazenby 1996, 81–96.

  25 Zonaras 8.12; Valerius Maximus 6.6.2.

  26 Polybius 1.29.1–1.30.8; Zonaras 8.12; Goldsworthy 2000, 84–6; Lazenby 1996, 97–100.

  27 Polybius 1.30.9–1.31.8; Diodorus 23.11–12; Zonaras 8.13; Livy Epitome 18; Orosius 4.9.1; Eutropius 2.21.4; Lazenby 1996, 100–102.

  28 Polybius 1.36.2–4, contra other stories that told of his murder by the Carthaginians (Diodorus 23.16; Zonaras 8.13; Valerius Maximus 9.6; Silius Italicus Pun. 6.682; Appian 8.1.4); Lazenby 1996, 106.

  29 Polybius 1.32.1–1.39.6; Diodorus 23.14.1–23.19; Zonaras 8.14; Appian 8.1.3; Orosius 4.9.3–8; Eutropius 2.21.4–2.22.3; Lazenby 1996, 102–12; Goldsworthy 2000, 88–92.

  30 For the Carthaginians’ harsh pacification of the Numidians, see Orosius 4.9.9.

  31 The Carthaginians had sent spies into the city, but they were supposedly uncovered by Metellus, who assembled all the citizens and asked them to take hold of all those whom they recognized (Zonaras 8.14). However, it should be said that Zonaras says that the same tactic was used by Mummius at the fall of Corinth in 146 BC.

  32 Polybius 1.40.6–16.

  33 Polybius 1.39.7–1.40.16; Diodorus 23.21; Zonaras 8.14; Eutropius 2.24; Orosius 4.9.15. The numbers of elephants cited vary from 10 (Polybius 1.40.15) to 142 (Pliny NH 8.16). Metellus was said to have offered freedom to any of the captured drivers who could control the elephants, and arranged their transport back to Italy on a series of enormous rafts (Diodorus 23.21). Zonaras (8.14), Pliny (NH 8.16) and Frontinus (Strat. 1.7.1) all give descriptions of the triumph–after which the elephants were killed. Lazenby 1996, 112–22; Goldsworthy 2000, 92–4.

  34 Zonaras 8.14.

  35 Polybius 1.41–47; Diodorus 24.1.

  36 Polybius 1.49.1–1.54.8; Diodorus 24.3–4; Orosius 4.10.3; Eutropius 2.26.1; Livy Epitome 19; Suetonius Tib. 2.3; Aulus Gellius 10.6. Publius Claudius Pulcher would be described by the Roman poet Naevius as a man who ‘with pride and contempt ground down the legions’ (Naevius Fr. 42). Lazenby 1996, 132–41, Goldsworthy 2000, 119–22.

  37 Crawford 1985, 106–7.

  38 Visonà 1998, 11–12.

  39 Jenkins & Lewis 1963, Groups VIII & IX; Baldus 1982; 1988, 171–6.

  40 Baldus 1988, 178–82; Manfredi 1999, 72.

  41 Jenkins & Lewis 1963, Group X; Baldus 1988, 176–9; Crawford 1985, 136; Visonà 1998, 14.

  42 Appian 5.1.1.

  43 Hoyos 2003, 11.

  44 For an overly scathing view of Hamilcar’s talents as a general see Seibert 1993, 95–106.

  45 Hoyos 2001b.

  46 Polybius 1.56.1–1.58.6; Diodorus 24.5.1–24.9.2; Zonaras 8.16; Lazenby 1996, 143–50.

  47 Goldsworthy 2000, 124.

  48 Polybius 1.59–1.61; Diodorus 24.11.1–2; Lazenby 1996, 150–56; Goldsworthy 2000, 122–7.

  49 Polybius 1.62.1–1.63.3; Lazenby 1996, 158.

  50 Diodorus 24.10.2; Polybius 1.73.1, 1.74.7.

  51 Hoyos 2007, 16–19.

  52 Greene 1986; Hoyos (2007, 23–4) questions whether Hanno’s outlook was exclusively focused on expansion in Africa.

  53 Bechtold 2007.

  54 They had been illicitly dug up and sold to a private collector. At least one of the tablets (VII) has been exposed as a fake. The recent bibliography for the Entella tablets is understandably very large, and still growing. The clearest general survey is still Loomis 1994. Hoyos’s arguments (1998, 28–32) for a possible earlier-fourth-century date seem implausible.

  CHAPTER 8: THE CAMP COMES TO CARTHAGE: THE MERCENARIES’ REVOLT

  1 Polybius 1.62.3–6.

  2 Ibid. 1.66.1; Diodorus 24.13.

  3 Polybius 3.9.6–7; Livy 21.1.5.

  4 Polybius 1.66.12; Appian 5.2.2–3. I have given Hoyos’s calculations (2007, 27–31) contra Loreto (1995, 48–9, 64–7), who, without any historical justification, argues that the arrears were no more than two months’ pay.

  5 Polybius 1.66.1–1.67.12. For a detailed account of events at Sicca see Hoyos 2007, 40–50. Hoyos (2007, 46–7) must be correct in his argument (contra Loreto 1995, 57–61) that there was no offer from Hanno to reemploy the troops for a further military campaign in Africa.

  6 Polybius 1.67.4.

  7 Ibid. 1.67.8–11.

  8 Hoyos (2007, 53–60) sees many of the mercenaries’ claims as being essentially legitimate, if exaggerated.

  9 Polybius 1.68.1–1.69.3. Hoyos (2007, 26) is most probably correct in rejecting a story in Appian (5.2.3) that the Carthaginians massacred 3,000 Libyan deserters, who had been handed over to them by the Romans (contra Loreto 1995, 89).

  10 Acquaro 1989, 137–8.

  11 Polybius 1.69.4–
1.70.6.

  12 Ibid. 1.70.8–9, 1.72.1–5. Hoyos (2007, 93–4) thinks that it is possible that the rebels at the height of the conflict did have this number of troops. See Hoyos 2007, xiii, n. 2, for a list of previous Libyan insurrections and alliances with Carthage’s enemies. Loreto (1995, 87–113) makes too much of Libyan disaffection being at the heart of the conflict, while at the same time playing down the role of the mercenaries in the insurgency. Manfredi (2003, 378–404) argues that during the mid third century BC, the Carthaginians were engaged in a campaign of Punicization in the Libyan interior. However, the process of acculturation through a number of different channels, including army service, had probably been taking place over a much longer period.

  13 Hoyos 2007, 84–5.

  14 Polybius 1.67.7; Hoyos 2007, 6–10, on the ethnic make-up and conditions of service for these mercenaries.

  15 Carradice & La Niece 1988; Acquaro 1989. For the various interpretations of the initials M, A and Z also found on the coins see Hoyos 2007, 141–2. The most plausible, but by no means secure, theory is that they stand for the initials of the rebel leaders Mathos, Autaritus and Zarzas. The theory of Manganaro (1992, 93–9) that these coins were minted much later, and based on Sicilian coinage dating to 214–211, is clearly incorrect.

  16 There is no real evidence to support the claim, made by Loreto (1995, 112), that Mathos’ ambition was to establish a Libyan monarchical state.

  17 Carradice & La Niece 1988, 51. The heads of the deities Zeus and (wearing a Corinthian helmet) Athena were both commonly used on Syracusan coinage. The horned bull was the most common emblem for the cities of Campania. The lion was a popular emblem in Punic Sicily. Manfredi (1999, 74) sees this coinage as an opportunity for the different ethnic elements within the rebel force to proclaim their known autonomy.

  18 Carradice & La Niece 1988, 37.

  19 There is no evidence to support Loreto’s argument (1995, 87–113) that this was essentially a Libyan rebellion, with the other mercenaries in the Libyans’ paid employ.

  20 Polybius 1.65.6.

  21 Carradice & La Niece 1988, 49–50.

  22 Polybius 1.71.6–8.

  23 Ibid. 1.74.6–7.

  24 Ibid. 1.73.1–1.75.2.