Carthage Must Be Destroyed

by Richard Miles

  25 For a detailed account of the battle see Hoyos 2007, 115–24.

  26 For more on Naravas see Hoyos 2007, 146–50.

  27 Polybius 1.75.1–1.78.9.

  28 Ibid. 1.78.10–1.80.13.

  29 Ibid. 1.81.1–1.82.10.

  30 Ibid. 1.83.1–11.

  31 Ibid. 1.83.6–8, 3.28.3–4; Appian 5.2.3, 8.12.86; Zonaras 8.18; Hoyos 1998, 123–6. Appian’s assertion that the Romans also sent mediators to North Africa is very unlikely to have been true (Hoyos 2007, 129). There is no evidence to support the contention of Hoyos (1998, 125) that the Romans agreed to lower or to postpone the indemnity that Carthage had to pay.

  32 Crawford 1985, 41–3, 106–9; Polybius 1.58.7–1.59.1.

  33 Hoyos 1998, 126.

  34 For a study of this arsenical copper-alloy coinage see Carradice & La Niece 1998, 41–5.

  35 Polybius 1.84.1–1.85.7. For a reconstruction of events at the Saw see Hoyos 2007, 197–218.

  36 Polybius 1.86.1–6.

  37 Ibid. 1.87.1–1.88.7.

  38 Ibid. 1.79.1–7; Hoyos 2007, 154–9.

  39 Polybius 1.79.9–10. Both African and Sardinian rebels used the motif of three ears of corn on their coins, which was not a design found on Carthaginian coins (Visonà 1992, 125–6; Carradice & La Niece 1988, 38–9), which suggests some contact between the two groups.

  40 Polybius 1.88.8–12, 3.10.3–5.

  41 Ibid. 3.28.1–2; Champion 2004, 119–20.

  42 Zonaras 8.18; Appian 6.1.4, 8.1.5. Other later Roman historians would argue that Sardinia was merely ceded to Rome (Livy 21.40.5, 22.54.11). For the lack of evidence for a series of new confrontations between Rome and Carthage in the early 230s see Hoyos 1998, 134–5.

  43 Harris 1979, 192–3; Huss 1985, 266–7, contra Hoyos (1998, 142), who sees it as a way of protecting Sicily and perhaps Italy.

  44 Polybius 1.88.9.

  45 Hoyos 1998, 142.

  46 Ibid., 135.

  47 Lancel 1999, 23.

  48 Visonà 1998, 11.

  49 Hoyos 1994, 264.

  50 Livy 21.1.

  51 Polybius 1.82.12.

  52 Cornelius Nepos Ham. 3.2.

  53 Appian 6.1.4. There has been some dispute over the correct dating of the attempted prosecution of Hamilcar Barca. Loreto (1995, 205–10) and Lancel (1999, 28) accept Appian’s date of 237, whereas Seibert (1993, 13–14) and Hoyos (2007, 20–21) insist on 241, when Hamilcar’s popularity and political power base were at a low ebb.

  54 Polybius 6.51.6–8.

  55 Aristotle Pol. 2.11.1–2.

  56 Huss 1985, 496–7.

  57 Although around 10 per cent of the votive dedications that have been found in the city were erected by females, it is striking that in most cases female supplicants were identified by their patrilineal descent or by the name of their husband (Amadasi Guzzo 1988, 144–7). Elite families also made joint sacrifices, with father and daughter offering male and female sacrificial victims respectively.

  58 Huss 1985, 497–8. On some inscriptions, named individuals are referred to as ‘belonging to’ (š) another person (Amadasi Guzzo 1988, 143–4).

  59 One inscription lists guilds of porters and packers, gold-smelters, smiths, vessel-blowers and even sandal-makers who had contributed to the construction of a new street.

  60 Champion 2004, 173–234.

  61 Diodorus 25.8.

  62 Zambon 2006, 78–85.

  63 Polybius 2.1.5; Diodorus 25.8.

  64 Polybius 3.24.

  65 Wagner 1989, 152. It has been suggested that a series of fortified compounds dating from the fifth to the third century located in eastern Andalusia may have been Carthaginian bases for controlling the mines.

  66 Guerrero Ayuso 1989, 101–5.

  67 Strabo 3.2.14.

  68 Jenkins 1987, 215–16; Visonà 1998, 14–16.

  69 Blásquez Martinez & García-Gelabert Pérez 1991, 33–8.

  CHAPTER 9: BARCID SPAIN

  1 Although those who argue that that Barcid Spain operated as a kind of independent monarchy probably take this argument too far (Blásquez Martinez & García-Gelabert Pérez 1991, 38ff.).

  2 For Barcid political domination of Carthage during this period see Hoyos 1994, 259–64.

  3 Lancel 1999, 29–30.

  4 Appian 7.2, 6.5; Zonaras 8.17.

  5 Appian 7.2, 6.5; Hoyos 1994, 270–72.

  6 Polybius 2.1.6, contra Diodorus (25.10.1), who states that the army sailed from Carthage.

  7 Blásquez Martinez & García-Gelabert Pérez 1991, 28–9; Barcelo 1988, 37. There is certainly evidence of later tensions. During the Second Punic War the Carthaginian commander of Gades requisitioned all the valuables from the temple and the city and imposed a war tax on its inhabitants. The city council retaliated by secretly negotiating the handover of Gades to the Romans. Mago, the Carthaginian commander-in-chief, executed them for their treachery.

  8 Blásquez Martinez & García-Gelabert Pérez 1991, 33.

  9 Diodorus 25.10.1–2.

  10 Lancel 1999, 36.

  11 Diodorus 5.35–8; Healy 1978, 68.

  12 Polybius 34.9.8–11; Strabo 3.2.10; Blásquez Martinez & García-Gelabert Pérez 1991, 33–4.

  13 González de Canales, Serrano & Llompart 2006.

  14 Diodorus 25.10.3; Lancel 1999, 36–7.

  15 Diodorus 25.12.

  16 Villaronga 1973, 95–107.

  17 Ibid., 98–101. It is now believed that an issue of Carthaginian silver drachmas found in Spain date to well before the Barcid expedition (Villaronga 1992).

  18 Villaronga 1973, 124–5. See Lehmler 2005, 60–96, for the coinage of Hiero II.

  19 Warships also appear on the coins of Tyre and Sidon during this period (Villaronga 1973, 57).

  20 Blásquez Martinez & García-Gelabert Pérez 1991, 48.

  21 Villaronga 1973, 61.

  22 Ibid., 49–50; Chávez Tristán & Ceballos 1992, 173–5.

  23 There is certainly a case for arguing that this design was chosen simply because the Alexander/Heracles tetradrachm was the most ubiquitous silver coinage in the Hellenistic world during that period, and would therefore have been attractive to the mercenary troops in Carthaginian employ. In fact it has been calculated that this same image was being produced on coinage by at least 51 different mints throughout the Mediterranean world and the East in the last quarter of the third century BC (Price 1991, 72–8). Its use may also have been a reaction to Agathocles, who had also put Heracles on his coinage. Just as the ‘portrait’ of Heracles on some of Alexander’s coinage minted after his demise was an idealized likeness of the Great King, there has been some suggestion that the ‘portrait’ of Heracles on these coins may have borne some idealized likeness to Agathocles (Dahmen 2007).

  24 Piccaluga 1974, 111–22.

  25 Polybius 2.1.7–8; Diodorus 25.10.3–4; Cornelius Nepos Ham. 22.4.2; Appian 6.1.5; Zonaras 8.19.

  26 Livy 21.2.4.

  27 Polybius 3.8.1–4; Cornelius Nepos Ham. 22.3.3. Hoyos (1994, 247–59; 1998, 150–52) argues that Barcid political support in Carthage itself was very secure, and that ‘from 237 the Carthaginian republic was in some ways a de facto military monarchy.’ My own view follows that of Schwarte (1983) and Huss (1985): that there was in fact a good deal of tension between pro-Barcid and anti-Barcid factions in Carthage.

  28 Blásquez Martinez & García-Gelabert Pérez 1991, 48–9. Cf. Crawford 1985, 87, for the lack of a real fiscal structure in Barcid Spain.

  29 Diodorus 25.12.

  30 Polybius 10.10.

  31 For Barcid ambitions in Spain see Barcelo 1988, 145–51; Schwarte 1983, 37–74.

  32 Visonà 1998, 15–16; Jenkins 1987, 215–16.

  33 Rich 1996, 20; Errington 1970, 37–41, for possible Massilian involvement –an idea strongly disputed by Hoyos (1998, 171). The Massilians had a colonial presence in north-eastern Spain.

  34 Dio Fr. 48. Errington (1970, 32–4) and Hoyos (1998, 147–9) both argue that the story was false; however, they have no real
ly strong grounds for such an opinion.

  35 Polybius 2.13.7, 3.27.10; Lancel 1999, 40–41. Hoyos (1998, 169–70) subscribes to the idea that Hasdrubal threatened either to ally himself with or to take advantage of the chaos caused by the much anticipated Gallic invasion of northern Italy. This idea had earlier been discounted by Rich (1996, 21–3).

  36 Polybius 2.36.1; Livy 21.2.6.

  37 Livy 21.3.3–8.

  38 Ibid. 21.3.5. See also ibid. 21.4.2.

  39 Villaronga (1973, 121) contends that this group of coins (III) were minted during the command of either Hamilcar or Hasdrubal. However Volk (2006), in a closely argued study, has recently put forward the suggestion that this series and the later series XI, which were previously associated by scholars with the Second Punic War, were in fact much closer together in time. As series XI is clearly dated to the correct period, this suggests that series III must be later than Villaronga’s dates.

  40 There has been much scholarly debate about whether any of these coins portrayed the Barcids (Robinson 1953, 42–3; Villaronga 1973, 45–7).

  41 Livy 24.41.7.

  42 Polybius 3.13.5–3.14.10; Livy 21.5.1–17.

  43 Polybius 3.30.1–2; Harris 1979, 201–2.

  44 Polybius 3.15.7.

  45 Ibid. 3.15. Livy (21.6) makes no mention of the ambassadors visiting either destination, but merely states that the Roman Senate had decided to send an embassy, but this did not have time to leave before events overtook it. See Rich 1996, 10–12, on why the Roman ultimatum and its rejection occurred long before Hannibal crossed the Hiberus.

  46 Pliny NH 33.96–7; Blásquez Martinez & García-Gelabert Pérez 1991, 33–4; Villaronga 1973, 97–101.

  47 Polybius 3.17.1–11; Livy 21.6–9. There is some debate over whether the Roman embassies mentioned by Polybius and Livy respectively before and during the siege of Saguntum may in fact have been the same incident (Lancel 1999, 50).

  48 Livy 21.9.4.

  49 See Rich 1996, 13, on opposition to the Barcids in Carthage.

  50 Visonà 1998.

  51 Greene 1986, 118–51; Bechtold 2007, 65.

  52 Morel 1982; Chelbi 1992; Bechtold 2007, 53–4. This black-glaze pottery was so popular that Carthaginian potters began to imitate it.

  53 This was certainly the position of the first Roman historian, Fabius Pictor, who, as a senator during this period, was party to the discussions and debates that went on (Polybius 3.8.1–3.9.5).

  54 Schwarte 1983, 64–74.

  55 Livy 21.10.2–13.

  56 Ibid. 21.11.1.

  57 Seibert (1993, 58–60) speculates that there may have been some kind of debate before the Carthaginian Council of Elders gave their support to Hannibal.

  58 Dio 13.54.11.

  59 Zonaras 8.22.2–3; Polybius 3.20.1–5. Rich (1996, 29–30) sees the delay as being for mechanistic and strategic reasons, rather than the result of a real division in opinion among the Roman Senate. Hoyos (1998, 226–232) sees the delay as being primarily caused by dissension within the Senate.

  60 Livy 21.11.3–21.15.2.

  61 The councillor probably had a valid case, as Hasdrubal’s agreement with Rome was a unilateral covenant, pledged by the general on campaign, but never validated later (Bickerman 1952b). For Polybius’ rather partisan view of Carthaginian fault in regard to Saguntum, see Serrati 2006, 130–34.

  62 Livy 21.16.1–21.18.14; Polybius 3.20–21, 3.33.1–4.

  63 Polybius 3.9.1–6, 3.12.7. Two exceptions were Bagnall 1999, 124, and Dorey & Dudley 1971.

  64 Goldsworthy 2000, 148.

  65 Huss 1985, 288–93.

  66 Harris 1979, 200–205; Hoyos 1998, 264, for the idea that after the Carthaginian capture of Saguntum, the Romans ‘foresaw a straightforward and no doubt profitable war’.

  67 Rich 1996, 31–2.

  68 For the most lucid exposition of this argument see ibid., 14–18.

  CHAPTER 10: DON’T LOOK BACK

  1 Livy 21.21.10–13; Polybius 3.33.5–16.

  2 Cornell, Rankov & Sabin (eds.) 1996, 52–3.

  3 Polybius 6.52.3–4.

  4 Daly 2002, 128.

  5 Polybius 9.22.1–4, 9.24.5–9.25.6.

  6 Livy 21.11.13.

  7 For a detailed breakdown of the different ethnic components and their particular specializations see Daly 2002, 84–112; Lazenby 1978, 14–16; Lancel 1999, 60–61.

  8 On Celtic warfare see Rawlings 1996, 86–8.

  9 For the most recent research on Hannibal’s use of elephants in his campaigns see Rance 2009; Charles & Rhodan 2007. For a general study of the use of elephants in the Graeco-Roman world see Scullard 1974.

  10 Lancel 1999, 62–4; Rance 2009, 106–7.

  11 Daly 2002, 83.

  12 Brizzi 1995, 312–15. On the make-up of Hannibal’s army more generally see Goldsworthy 2000, 32–6.

  13 Sabin 1996.

  14 Polybius 6.52.10–11.

  15 Even in the mid second century BC, when Polybius gained his experience of the Roman army, there were still considerable tensions between the Romans and Italians, which eventually led to a terrible civil war.

  16 At the Battle of the Trebia, there were 20,000 allied troops, compared with 16,000 Roman citizens.

  17 Lazenby 1996, 11–12.

  18 Lazenby 1978, 31–2.

  19 Livy 21.20.6.

  20 Polybius 3.16–19.

  21 Polybius 3.20.8, 7.9.1; Walbank 1957–79, I: 334–5, II: 44–5.

  22 For an example of the difficulties created by the imposition of a monolithic and modern model of ‘propaganda’ on the Greek and Roman worlds see P. Taylor 1995, 25–48.

  23 Both Sosylus and Silenus wrote accounts of Hannibal’s campaigns which, although probably written after the Carthaginian general had eventually been forced to evacuate Italy, undoubtedly drew on earlier accounts. See Diodorus 26.4; Cornelius Nepos Ham. 23.13.3; Walbank 1985, 129–30.

  24 Spencer 2002, 7–9.

  25 Cornelius Nepos Ham. 23.13.3. For the debate over the origins of Silenus see Spada 2002, 238. A number of other Greek historians had also quickly realized that Hannibal had the necessary star quality for a major historical blockbuster, although only their names now survive–for example Eumachus of Neapolis, mentioned in Athenaeus 13.576. However, Hoyos (2001a) is surely correct in his assessment that there is no clear evidence that the papyrus fragment P. Rylands III.491, which appears to relate to the peace terms dictated to the Carthaginians in 203 BC and the following breakdown of that truce, should be viewed as a pro-Carthaginian account. Hoyos’s argument that the author was in fact the Roman historian Fabius Pictor is impossible to substantiate.

  26 Walbank 1957–79, I: 316.

  27 Cicero Div. 1.24.48.

  28 Brizzi 1995, 309.

  29 Cornelius Nepos Ham. 23.13.3. Those works reportedly included a study addressed to the people of the island of Rhodes on the Roman general Gnaeus Manlius Vulso’s subjugation of Asia Minor. The fact that an ancient forger wrote a fictitious letter in Greek from Hannibal to the Athenians shows that it was generally recognized in the ancient world that the Carthaginian general was a well-educated man (Brizzi 1991).

  30 Dio 13.54.3.

  31 Sosylus, Pap. Wurzburg, FGH, IIB: 903–6. Although scholars have long argued over the location of this defeat without any definite conclusions, it is widely believed that it is most likely to have been off the coast of Spain (Krings 1998, 217–60).

  32 Krings 1998, 226. Recently it has been tentatively suggested that Sosylus may have been the original source of a small excerpt relating to Hannibal’s use of elephants now attributed to Diodorus Siculus (Rance 2009, 108–10).

  33 Polybius 3.20.1–5.

  34 Spada 2002, 239–40. Surviving excerpts of the work include a description of a garden used by Hieron, king of Syracuse, explanations for the name of a common herb on the island, and the source of the name of the Sicilian city of Palice. Walbank (1968–9, 487–97) perhaps underestimates their significance, although he is probably right th
at the Sicilia was not a conventional history, contra La Bua (1966, 277–9).

  35 Cicero Letters to Friends. 9.25.1; Franke 1989, 456, n. 1.

  36 Campus 2005.

  37 Pausanias 12.3.4.

  38 Picard 1983–4; Rawlings 2005, 164–71; Knapp 1986, 118–19.

  39 Polybius 12.28, 3.48.

  40 Polybius 14.1; Walbank 1957–79, I: 63–130; Scuderi 2002, 277–84; Hoyos 1998, 42–3, 55–6, 82–3, 95–8, 100–104. Polybius clearly respected Philinus’ didactic approach, which closely mirrored his own (Walbank 1985, 77–98). La Bua’s (1966) elaborate hypothesis (that Philinus was Polybius’ main source for his account of the First Punic War, and that Diodorus’ account from the death of Agathocles through to the First Punic War came from Philinus via the later western-Greek historian Silenus) is impossible to prove. It has also been suggested that Philinus was personally influenced by the harsh treatment that his home city received from the Romans on its capture in 261, and that he may have accompanied the Carthaginian army on campaign (Galvagno 2006, 254–6; Scuderi 2002, 275–7). Thus it has also been argued that Polybius’ detailed account of the siege of Lilybaeum in 250–249 (41.4ff.) came from Philinus’ eyewitness account (Lazenby 1996, 2).

  41 Diodorus 23.1.4.

  42 Walbank 1985, 90.

  43 Broughton 1951–6, I: 229; Badian 1958, 36–43; Hoyos 1998, 122.

  44 Polybius 3.28.1–2, 3.15.9–11.

  45 Ibid. 7.4.1–2; Livy 24.6.4–8.

  46 This can also be seen in the treaties that he later agreed with some Greek cities in Italy, which recognized their political freedoms (Hoyos 1998, 268).

  47 De Angelis & Garstad 2006, 213–25; Malkin 2005.

  48 Diodorus had extensively used Sicilian Greek authors such as Timaeus, and perhaps also Silenus (La Bua 1966, 249–52, 277–9; Vattoune 2002, 217–22; Pearson 1987, 11–12, 24–5).

  49 Dionysius 1.41.1.

  50 Fox 1993, 144–5; Rawlings 2005, 169–70.

  51 Dionysius 1.41.1–2.

  52 Ibid. 1.42.2–3.

  53 Ibid. 1.42.4.

  54 Twelve inscriptions have so far been found in the Oscan language spoken in these areas. In a recent essay, Guy Bradley (2005) has persuasively argued that many of the commonly assumed reasons for the popularity of Hercules in central Italy, such as Samnite bellicosity and local religious ‘beliefs’, are heavily influenced by later Roman and modern constructions of what these peoples were like.