Complete Works of Velleius Paterculus

by Velleius Paterculus

  [108] (1) Nothing remained to be conquered in Germany except the people of the Marcomanni, which, leaving its settlements at the summons of its leader Maroboduus, had retired into the interior and now dwelt in the plains surrounded by the Hercynian forest. (2) No considerations of haste should lead us to pass over this man Maroboduus without mention. A man of noble family, strong in body and courageous in mind, a barbarian by birth but not in intelligence, he achieved among his countrymen no mere chief’s position gained as the result of internal disorders or chance or liable to change and dependent upon the caprice of his subjects, but, conceiving in his mind the idea of a definite empire and royal powers, he resolved to remove his own race far away from the Romans and to migrate to a place where, inasmuch as he had fled before the strength of more powerful arms, he might make his own all powerful. Accordingly, after occupying the region we have mentioned, he proceeded to reduce all the neighbouring races by war, or to bring them under his sovereignty by treaty.

  CIX

  Corpus suum custodientium imperium, perpetuis exercitiis paene adRomanae disciplinae formam redactum, brevi in eminens et nostro quoque imperio timendum perduxit fastigium gerebatque se ita adversus Romanos, ut neque bello nos lacesseret, et si lacesseretur, superesse sibi vim ac voluntatem resistendi ostenderet. Legati, quos mittebat ad Caesares, interdum ut supplicem commendabant, interdum ut pro pari loquebantur. Gentibus hominibusque a nobis desciscentibus erat apud eum perfugium, in totumque ex male dissimulato agebat aemulum; exercitunlque, quem septuaginta milium peditum, quattuor equitum fecerat, adsiduis adversus finitimos bellis exercendo maiori quam, quod habebat, operi praeparabat: eratque etiam eo timendus, quod cum Germaniam ad laevam et in fronte, Pannoniam ad dextram, a tergo sedium suarum haberet Noricos, tamquam in omnes semper venturus ab omnibus timebatur. Nec securam incrementi sui patiebatur esse Italiam, quippe cum a summis Alpium iugis, quae finem Italiae terminant, initium eius finium haud multo plus ducentis milibus passuum abesset. Hunc virum et hanc regionem proximo anno diversis e partibus Ti. Caesar adgredi statuit. Sentio Saturnino mandatum, ut per Cattos excisis continentibus Hercyniae silvis legiones Boiohaemum (id regioni, quam incolebat Maroboduus, nomen est) duceret, ipse a Carnunto, qui locus Norici regni proximus ab hac parte erat, exercitum, qui in Illyrico merebat, ducere in Marcomannos orsus est.

  [109] (1) The body of guards protecting the kingdom of Maroboduus, which by constant drill had been brought almost to the Roman standard of discipline, soon placed him in a position of power that was dreaded even by our empire. His policy toward Rome was to avoid provoking us by war, but at the same time to let us understand that, if he were provoked by us he had in reserve the power and the will to resist. (2) The envoys whom he sent to the Caesars sometimes commended him to them as a suppliant and sometimes spoke as though they represented an equal. Races and individuals who revolted from us found in him a refuge, and in all respects, with but little concealment, he played the part of a rival. His army, which he had brought up to the number of seventy thousand foot and four thousand horse, he was steadily preparing, by exercising it in constant wars against his neighbours, for some greater task than that which he had in hand. (3) He was also to be feared on this account, that, having Germany at the left and in front of his settlements, Pannonia on the right, and Noricum in the rear of them, he was dreaded by all as one who might at any moment descend upon all. (4) Nor did he permit Italy to be free from concern as regards his growing power, since the summits of the Alps which mark her boundary were not more than •two hundred miles distant from his boundary line. (5) Such was the man and such the region that Tiberius Caesar resolved to attack from opposite directions in the course of the coming year. Sentius Saturninus had instructions to lead his legions through the country of the Catti into Boiohaemum, for that is the name of the region occupied by Maroboduus, cutting a passage through the Hercynian forest which bounded the region, while from Carnuntum, the nearest point of Noricum in this direction, he himself undertook to lead against the Marcomanni the army which was serving in Illyricum.

  CX

  Rumpit interdum, interdum moratur proposita hominum fortuna. Praeparaverat iam hiberna Caesar ad Danubium admotoque exercitu non plus quam quinque dierum iter a primis hostium aberat, legionesque quas Saturninum admovere placuerat, paene aequali divisae intervallo ab hoste intra paucos dies in praedicto loco cum Caesare se iuncturae erant, cum universa Pannonia, insolens longae pacis bonis, adulta viribus, Delmatia omnibusque tractus eius gentibus in societatem adductis consilii, arma corripuit. Tum necessaria gloriosis praeposita neque tutum visum abdito in interiora exercitu vacuam tam vicino hosti relinquere Italiam. Gentium nationumque, quae rebellaverant, omnis numerus amplius octingentis milibus explebat; ducenta fere peditum colligebantur armis habilia, equitum novem.Cuius immensae multitudinis, parentis acerrimis ac peritissimis ducibus, pars petere Italiam decreverat iunctam sibi Nauporti ac Tergestis confinio, pars in Macedoniam se effuderat, pars suis sedibus praesidium esse destinaverat. Maxima duobus Batonibus ac Pinneti duribus auctoritas erat. Omnibus autem Pannoniis non disciplinae tantummodo, sed linguae quoque notitia Romanae, plerisque etiam litterarum usus et familiaris animorum erat exercitatio. Etaque hercules nulla umquam natio tam mature consilio belli bellum iunxit ac decreta patravit. Oppressi cives Romani, trucidati negotiatores, magnus vexillariorum numerus ad internecionem ea in regione, quae plurimum ab imperatore aberat, caesus, occupata armis Macedonia, omnia et in omnibus locis igni ferroque vastata. Quin etiam tantus huius belli metus fuit, ut stabilem illum et firmatum tantorum bellorum experientia Caesaris Augusti animum quateret atque terreret.

  [110] (1) Fortune sometimes breaks off completely, sometimes merely delays, the execution of men’s plans. Caesar had already arranged his winter quarters on the Danube, and had brought up his army to within five days’ march of the advanced posts of the enemy; (2) and the legions which he had ordered Saturninus to bring up, separated from the enemy by an almost equal distance, were on the point of effecting a junction with Caesar at a predetermined rendezvous within a few days, when all Pannonia, grown arrogant through the blessings of a long peace and now at the maturity of her power, suddenly took up arms, bringing Dalmatia and all the races of that region into her alliance. (3) Thereupon glory was sacrificed to necessity; and it did not seem to Tiberius a safe course to keep his army buried in the interior of the country and thus leave Italy unprotected from an enemy so near at hand. The full number of the races and tribes which had rebelled reached a total of more than eight hundred thousand. About two hundred thousand infantry trained to arms, and nine thousand cavalry were being assembled. (4) Of this immense number, which acted under the orders of energetic and capable generals, one portion had decided to make Italy its goal, which was connected with them by the line of Nauportum and Tergeste, a second had already poured into Macedonia, while a third had set itself the task of protecting their own territories. The chief authority rested with the two Batones and Pinnes as generals. (5) Now all the Pannonians possessed not only a knowledge of Roman discipline but also of the Roman tongue, many also had some measure of literary culture, and the exercise of the intellect was not uncommon among them. And so it came to pass, by Hercules, that no nation ever displayed such swiftness in following up with war its own plans for war, (6) and in putting its resolves into execution. Roman citizens were overpowered, traders were massacred, a considerable detachment of veterans, stationed in the region which was most remote from the commander, was exterminated to a man, Macedonia was seized by armed forces, everywhere was wholesale devastation by fire and sword. Moreover, such a panic did this war inspire that even the courage of Caesar Augustus, rendered steady and firm by experience in so many wars, was shaken with fear.

  CXI

  Habiti itaque dilectus, revocati undique et omnes veterani, viri feminaeque ex censu libertinum coactae dare militem. Audita in senatu vox principis, decimo die, ni caveretur, posse hostem in urbis Romae venire conspectum. Senatorum equitumque Romanorum exactae ad id bellum
operae, pollicitati. Omnia haec frustra praeparassemus, nisi qui illa regeret fuisset. Itaque ut praesidium ultimum res publica ab Augusto ducem in bellum poposcit Tiberium. Habuit in hoc quoque bello mediocritas nostra speciosi ministerii locum. Finita equestri militia designatus quaesior necdum senator aequatus senatoribus, etiam designatis tribunis plebei, partem exercitus ab urbe traditi ab Augusto perduxi ad filium eius. In quaestura deinde remissa sorte provinciae legatus eiusdem ad eundem missus sum. Quas nos primo anno acies hostium vidimus! Quantis prudentia ducis opportunitatibus furentes eorum vires universas elusimus, fudimus partibus! Quanto cum temperamento simul civilitatis res auctoritate imperatoria agi vidimus! Qua prudentia hiberna disposita sunt! Quanto opere inclusus custodiis exercitus nostri, ne qua posset erumpere inopsque copiarum et intra se furens viribus hostis elanguesceret!

  [111] (1) Accordingly levies were held, from every quarter all the veterans were recalled to the standards, men and women were compelled, in proportion to their income, to furnish freedmen as soldiers. Men heard Augustus say in the senate, that, unless precautions were taken, the enemy might appear in sight of Rome within ten days. (2) The services of senators and knights were demanded for this war, and promised. All these our preparations would have been vain had we not had the man to take command. And so, as a final measure of protection, the state demanded from Augustus that Tiberius should conduct the war.

  (3) In this war also my modest abilities had an opportunity for glorious service. I was now, at the end of my service in the cavalry, quaestor designate, and though not yet a senator I was placed upon a parity with senators and even tribunes elect, and led from the city to Tiberius a portion of the army which was entrusted to me by Augustus. (4) Then in my quaestorship, giving up my right to have a province allotted me, I was sent to Tiberius as legatus Augusti.

  What armies of the enemy did we see drawn up for battle in that first year! What opportunities did we avail ourselves of through the foresight of the general to evade their united forces and rout them in separate divisions! With what moderation and kindness did we see all the business of warfare conducted, though under the authority of a military commander! With what judgement did he place our winter camps! How carefully was the enemy so blockaded by the outposts of our army that he could nowhere break through, and that, through lack of supplies and by disaffection within his own ranks, he might gradually be weakened in strength!

  CXII

  Felix eventu, forte conatu prima aestate belli Messalini opus mandandum est memoriae. Qui vir animo etiam quam gente nobilior dignissimusque, qui et patrem Corvinum habuisset et cognomen suum Cottae fratri relinqueret, praepositus Illyrico subita rebellione cum semiplena legione vicesima circumdatus hostili exercitu amplius viginti milia fudit fugavitque et ob id ornamentis triumphalibus honoratus est. Ita placebat barbaris numerus suus, ita fiducia virium, ut ubicumque Caesar esset, nihil in se reponerent. Pars exercitus eorum, proposita ipsi duci et ad arbitrium utilitatemque nostram macerata perductaque ad exitiabilem famem, neque instantem sustinere neque cum facientibus copiam pugnandi derigentibusque aciem ausa congredi occupato monte Claudio munitione se defendit. At ea pars, quae obviam se effuderat exercitui, quem A. Caecina et Silvanus Plautius consulares ex transmarinis adducebant provinciis, circumfusa quinque legionibus nostris auxiliaribusque ei equitatui regio (quippe magnam Thracum manum iunctus praedictis ducibus Rhoemetalces, Thraciae rex, in adiutorium eius belli secum trahebat) paene exitiabilem omnibus cladem intulit: fusa regiorum equestris acies, fugatae alae, conversae cohortes sunt, apud signa quoque legionum trepidatum. Sed Romani virtus militis plus eo tempore vindicavit gloriae quam ducibus reliquit, qui multum a more imperatoris sui discrepantes ante in hostem inciderunt, quam per explora,tores, ubi hostis esset, cognoscerent. Iam igitur in dubiis rebus semet ipsae legiones adhortatae, iugulatis ab hoste quibusdam tribunis militum, interempto praefecto castrorum praefectisque cohortium, non incruentis centurionibus, e quibus etiam primi ordinis cecidere, invasere hostes nec sustinuisse contenti perrupta eorum acie ex insperato victoriam vindicaverunt. Hoc fere tempore Agrippa, qui eodem die quo Tiberius adoptatus ab avo suo naturali erat et iam ante biennium, qualis esset, apparere coeperat, mira pravitate animi atque ingenii in praecipitia conversus patris atque eiusdem avi sui animum alienavit sibi, moxque crescentibus in dies vitiis dignum furore suo habuit exitum.

  [112] (1) An exploit of Messalinus in the first summer of the war, fortunate in its issue as it was bold in undertaking, must here be recorded for posterity. (2) This man, who was even more noble in heart than in birth, and thoroughly worthy of having had Corvinus as his father, and of leaving his cognomen to his brother Cotta, was in command in Illyricum, and, at the sudden outbreak of the rebellion, finding himself surrounded by the army of the enemy and supported by only the twentieth legion, and that at but half its normal strength, he routed and put to flight more than twenty thousand, and for this was honoured with the ornaments of a triumph.

  (3) The barbarians were so little satisfied with their numbers and had so little confidence in their own strength that they had no faith in themselves where Caesar was. The part of their army which faced the commander himself, worn down according as it suited our pleasure or advantage, and reduced to the verge of destruction by famine, not daring to withstand him when he took the offensive, nor to meet our men when they gave them an opportunity for fighting and drew up their line of battle, occupied the Claudian mountain and defended itself behind fortifications. (4) But the division of their forces which had swarmed out to meet the army which the consulars Aulus Caecina and Silvanus Plautius were bringing up from the provinces across the sea, surrounded five of our legions, together with the troops of our allies and the cavalry of the king (for Rhoemetalces, king of Thrace, in conjunction with the aforesaid generals was bringing with him a large body of Thracians as reinforcements for the war), and inflicted a disaster that came near being fatal to all. (5) The horsemen of the king were routed, the cavalry of the allies put to flight, the cohorts turned their backs to the enemy, and the panic extended even to the standards of the legion. But in this crisis the valour of the Roman soldier claimed for itself a greater share of glory than it left to the generals, who departing far from the policy of their commander, had allowed themselves to come into contact with the enemy before they had learned through their scouts where the enemy was. (6) At this critical moment, when some tribunes of the soldiers had been slain by the enemy, the prefect of the camp and several prefects of cohorts had been cut off, a number of centurions had been wounded, and even some of the centurions of the first rank had fallen, the legions, shouting encouragement to each other, fell upon the enemy, and not content with sustaining their onslaught, broke through their line and wrested a victory from a desperate plight.

  (7) About this time Agrippa, who had been adopted by his natural grandfather on the same day as Tiberius, and had already, two years before, begun to reveal his true character, alienated from himself the affection of his father and grandfather, falling into reckless ways by a strange depravity of mind and disposition; and soon, as his vices increased daily, he met the end which his madness deserved.

  CXIII

  Accipe nunc, M. Vinici, tantum in bello ducem, quantum in pacevides principem. Iunctis exercitibus, quique sub Caesare fuerant quique ad eum venerant, contractisque in una castra decem legionibus, septuaginta amplius cohortibus, decem alis et pluribus quam decem veteranorum milibus, ad hoc magno voluntariorum numero frequentique equite regio, tanto denique exercitu, quantus nullo umquam loco post bella fuerat civilia, omnes eo ipso laeti erant maximamque fiduciam victoriae in numero reponebant. At imperator, optimus eorum quae agebat iudex et utilia speciosis praeferens quodque semper eum facientem vidi in omnibus bellis, quae probanda essent, non quae utique probarentur sequens, paucis diebus exercitum, qui venerat, ad refovendas ex itinere eius vires moratus, cum eum maiorem, quam ut temperari posset, neque habilem gubernaculo cerneret, dimittere statuit; prosecutusque longo et perquam laborioso itinere, cuius difficultas n
arrari vix potest, ut neque universos quisquam auderet adgredi et partem digredientium, suorum quisque metu finium, universi temptare non possent, remisit eo, unde venerant, et ipse asperrimae hiemis initio regressus Sisciam legatos, inter quos ipsi fuimus, partitis praefecit hibernis.

  [113] (1) Listen now, Marcus Vinicius, to the proof that Caesar was no less great in war as a general than you now see him in peace as an emperor. When the two armies were united, that is to say the troops which had served under Caesar and those which had come to reinforce him, and there were now gathered together in one camp ten legions, more than seventy cohorts, fourteen troops of cavalry and more than ten thousand veterans, and in addition a large number of volunteers and the numerous cavalry of the king — in a word a greater army than had ever been assembled in one place since the civil wars — all were finding satisfaction in this fact and reposed their greatest hope of victory in their numbers. (2) But the general, who was the best judge of the course he pursued, preferring efficiency to show, and, as we have so often seen him doing in all his wars, following the course which deserved approval rather than that which was currently approval, after keeping the army which had newly arrived for only a few days in order to allow it to recover from the march, decided to send it away, since he saw that it was too large to be managed and was not well adapted to effective control. (3) And so he sent it back whence it came, escorting it with his own army onº a long exceedingly laborious march, whose difficulty can hardly be described. His purpose in this was, on the one hand, that no one might dare to attack his united forces, and, on the other, to prevent the united forces of the enemy from falling upon the departing division, through the apprehension of each nation for its own territory. Then returning himself to Siscia, at the beginning of a very hard winter, he placed his lieutenants, of whom I was one, in charge of the divisions of his winter quarters.