The Great Illyrian Revolt

by Jason R Abdale

  However, the idea that the Illyrians were compelled by necessity to knock out Severus’ army before it could lay siege to Cibalae is only one hypothesis. A second one, and one that is just as believable, is that the Illyrians felt confident enough to tackle Severus’ force out in the open. Cassius Dio states in his account that the Illyrian force which would soon attack Severus was far larger than the Romans had anticipated.16 So perhaps the Illyrians were once again trying to overwhelm the Romans through sheer force of numbers.

  How were the Illyrian rebels able to muster up the numbers that would make them bold enough to take on three Roman legions? Cassius Dio states that the two Batos joined forces for a combined massive assault on Severus’ camp.17 This demonstrates a few things:

  1.Before the battle, Bato the Daesidiate and Bato the Breucian actually met each other face to face and discussed strategy.

  2.Bato the Daesidiate, who commanded the rebel forces in the south, did not feel confident enough in his own strength against Severus’ army, and so he had to call in reinforcements from the north. This would leave the north vulnerable, and that would explain why Tiberius and Germanicus advanced with such ease during their march during the early stages of the campaign of 7 AD: the Illyrian rebels had been pulled southwards to fight against Severus’ army, which was deemed a much more serious threat.

  3.The Illyrian rebels were not numerous enough to deal with both Tiberius’ force and Severus’ force simultaneously. Casualties that they had suffered during the first year of the war had hit them hard and had greatly reduced their strength. Therefore, the leaders of the rebellion had to shuffle their forces around to meet threats as they presented themselves.

  4.Between the two Roman armies that were arrayed against them, the Illyrian rebels decided that Severus’ army was the much more serious threat. Even though Severus’ force was far smaller than Tiberius’ army, Severus’ troops had been able to push themselves into Illyria much further and faster than Tiberius’ large and unwieldy horde. Besides, Severus’ army, being smaller than Tiberius’ army, was a much more tempting target. Maybe the Illyrians adopted a version of the Schlieffen Plan. If the Illyrian rebels could quickly destroy Severus’ army right now, or even just force it to retreat back to Moesia, they would not have to fight a two-front defensive campaign. Once Severus and his legions were defeated, the Illyrian rebels could do an about-face and concentrate their full strength upon Tiberius.

  It has been hinted that Bato the Daesidiate might have had military experience prior to the outbreak of the Great Illyrian Revolt, possibly serving as an auxiliary commander. If this is true, then this should mean that he would have been fully aware of the dangers of assaulting the Roman forces within their camp, especially one that was located within difficult terrain. The fact that he chose to assault Severus and his men while they were within their camp would have gone against his better judgement. One of them might have been persuaded or pressured by the other to attack the camp. If so, it’s likely that Bato the Breucian (who, as far as we can tell, didn’t have any military experience of any kind prior to the outbreak of the rebellion) goaded his colleague Bato the Daesidiate into launching an attack on the Roman camp, perhaps out of a hunger for glory and plunder and partly in the belief that it would be an easy victory. In later years, the Germanic rebel leader Arminius would have the same trouble with his subordinate commanders, notably his uncle Inguiomerus, who insisted on assaulting the Romans head-on rather than waiting for more appropriate circumstances.

  After joining their forces together, both Batos launched a direct mass assault on Severus’ camp. Cassius Dio relates that the attack was completely unexpected. Severus had not prepared himself for facing so many people. He likely knew that there was an Illyrian force up ahead, but he may not have known that the force was as large as it was. The sentries that were posted beyond the ramparts to guard the camp were so terrified at the large rebel army now barrelling towards them that they fled back into the camp. However, from within the protection of their ramparts, the wavering legionnaires mustered up their courage and arrayed themselves upon the walls, ready to repel anyone who attempted to storm the camp. The Illyrians charged the Roman position, hoping to take possession of it through sheer brute force, likely launching human wave attacks. Despite the impressive size of the enemy force, which likely surrounded their position, and the ferocious tenacity with which they threw themselves at the defences, the men in the camp stood their ground. In the end, with no progress being made, the Illyrians were forced to withdraw. The historical accounts do not make any mention of the Illyrians being able to break into the camp, so the perimeter must have held firm. The scene that day must have been truly gut-wrenching to behold, as thousands of corpses lay heaped upon each other in the swamp.18

  Once again, Governor Severus had just barely scored a victory. It is not stated if the Romans pursued or if they were content to simply let the Illyrians go. I’d wager the second option. As long as the Romans were protected behind their fortifications, they were okay. Once they left that protection they were targets, and Severus couldn’t afford to lose any more men.

  Burn All, Kill All, Destroy All

  The recent near-defeat that Severus had suffered at the Battle of the Volcaean Marshes may have convinced Tiberius that a change of strategy was needed. Ever since the war had begun the previous year, the Romans had been seeking pitched battles with their Illyrian opponents. While they were largely successful, they had been so severely mauled in the process that it should have been clear to them that if they continued the war in this fashion, they would soon exhaust all of their military capacity. Something else had to be done.

  As is the case so many times throughout history, from ancient to modern times, when one army faces very hard resistance from an opponent, the generals resort to attrition. If they could not exact decisive blows upon the enemy in the open battlefield, then they would take the war to the home front, steamrolling over the country, burning and looting farms and villages, taking everything of value and destroying the rest, crushing the enemy’s capacity and will to fight on.

  Cassius Dio reports that to better carry out this policy, Tiberius took his large and unwieldy force and split it up into several smaller forces, fanning them out over the land, with orders to kill and destroy everything in sight. One of these detachments was commanded by Tiberius’ nephew, Drusus Claudius Nero Germanicus:

  After this the Romans were divided into detachments, in order that they might overrun many parts of the country at once; most of these detachments did nothing worthy of note, at least not at that time, but Germanicus conquered in battle and harassed the Mazaei, a Dalmatian tribe.19

  Who were these people? Strabo calls the Mazaei a Pannonian tribe living in southern Pannonia, while Cassius Dio calls them Dalmatian. According to Pliny the Elder, the Mazaei were one of the more powerful tribes in the region, stating that the territory they occupied was divided into 269 districts.20 Lindsay Powell states that the Mazaei were a Celtic tribe that lived in the land located between the Una and Bosna Rivers.21

  For Germanicus’ ragtag unit of slaves, ex-slaves and citizen-soldiers, it was a remarkable victory, and one that definitely helped to boost their morale. The fact that Cassius Dio states that this was the only event worthy of note for that campaign season shows that even the Romans thought this feat was impressive. The Mazaei occupied a sizeable portion of territory within central Illyria. Cassius Dio implies that Germanicus and his men only fought one battle against the Mazaei tribe. ‘Harassing’ is likely referring to the piece-by-piece assault upon their land, sweeping into and burning down one village after another, slaughtering anything they came across.

  So we can likely infer from this account that Germanicus and his men, previously untested in action, fought one major engagement against the much larger and much more powerful force of Mazaei Illyrians and emerged victorious. After this victory, the Mazaei were thrown on the defensive and were forced to continuously pull back while
Germanicus’ troops advanced further and further into their domain, methodically looting and destroying their settlements one by one.

  Such tactics have several goals. First, such wanton attrition destroys the enemy’s home base by depriving them of lodging, food and supplies. Second, these actions may also serve to gain much-needed supplies for one’s own forces. Thirdly, and most importantly, it is meant to induce fear. This is, in some respect, psychological warfare. As your army burns and destroys its way through an enemy country, every little victory is a constant reminder of just how powerless the enemy is to stop you. The message is clear: All of this can end if you surrender.

  Now, with the tide turning against them, many Illyrians were thinking of doing just that.

  The Rebel Alliance Begins to Break Apart

  When the revolt kicked off in the spring of 6 AD, it appeared that the Illyrians were unstoppable. They had scored many victories against the Romans and had seized control of a large amount of territory. However, in the second half of 6 AD, the Romans got a second wind and they began to push the Illyrians back. Battles against the legions and Rome’s Thracian allies resulted in high casualties for the Illyrian rebels. They could not afford such losses as those that Severus had inflicted upon them at the Battle of the Volcaean Marshes. Tiberius and Germanicus were pushing down from the north-west, while Severus was pushing in from the east.

  Now the rebels were squabbling and intriguing among themselves. Bato the Breucian, the leader of the Pannonian uprising, received an offer: if he betrayed his co-commander Pinnes, he would attain the right to rule over all of the Pannonian tribes. Bato immediately seized the opportunity to do away with his rival and become the sole leader of the Pannonian rebels. The records stated that Pinnes was not killed, so he must have been imprisoned somewhere. Bato the Breucian was now in complete control, but Pinnes was popular with the men and Bato became concerned about the loyalty of the tribes that he commanded. So Bato went to each of the tribe’s lands and demanded that they hand over peace hostages. I assume he threatened that if these tribes wavered in their loyalty or even flatly refused to follow him, he would kill the hostages as an example. Such was a common practice in those times.22

  It seems that both Bato the Daesidate as well as General Pinnes were more concerned with the big picture, while Bato the Breucian was using the war as an opportunity to win glory as well as to exercise personal power. That would explain why Pinnes was imprisoned rather than murdered, and that would also explain why Bato the Breucian questioned the loyalty of the people that he now ruled over and demanded that they hand over hostages to keep the peace. Pinnes was evidently a popular commander and if he was executed, it might spark an uprising. As long as Pinnes was still kept alive but in bondage, and as long as a potential threat existed to murder him if the people rose up, the threat of a coup would be neutralized. However, there was still a lot of grumbling and dirty looks. Knowing that the people supported Pinnes more than him, Bato the Breucian ordered the tribes to hand over hostages.

  When Bato the Daesidiate heard about Bato the Breucian’s actions, he decided that he had had enough of his Pannonian colleague. Bato the Daesidiate, the leader of all Dalmatian forces as well as the de facto leader of the Illyrian rebellion as a whole, immediately marched his men northwards. Pinnes could be relied upon to rally his men to fight the Romans, but Bato the Breucian might cause just as much damage as the Romans. Bato the Breucian had to be eliminated and Pinnes had to be restored to a position of command.23

  Bato the Daesidiate likely wanted to get this operation over and done with in one quick bloody move since a protracted conflict within the alliance would only distract the Illyrians from fighting the Romans and with casualties mounting, their fighting strength would continue to deteriorate. The result was just as Bato the Daesidiate intended: quick and bloody. In a surprise attack, his warriors ambushed the Pannonian leader and his men, and defeated the Pannonians in a battle. None of the sources state where this battle took place, nor do they state how many people were involved in it. Regardless of the details, the rebels were now fighting each other instead of fighting the Romans.24 The casualties suffered in this battle were ones that the rebel alliance could ill afford, since every death meant one less warrior available to fight off the legions.

  Bato the Breucian fled to the protection of a nearby stronghold, which is unfortunately unnamed in the sources. However, when Bato the Daesidiate approached with his army, Bato the Breucian was immediately handed over to the Dalmatian warlord by those inside. Bato the Breucian was presented before the whole rebel army, was publically condemned to death and was executed right there.25

  The Pannonians Surrender

  With Bato the Breucian dead, General Pinnes (who by now was presumably released from his imprisonment) was placed in command of all Pannonian forces. Straight away, Pinnes began a fresh offensive. This shows two things. First, Pinnes was a charismatic fighting man who was able to immediately rally his forces to launch a new attack upon the Romans. In this way, Pinnes sort of resembles an Illyrian version of Germanicus. Second, this shows his dedication to the rebel cause. No matter what, defeating the Romans was the foremost priority. Knowing this, it becomes easier to understand why Bato the Daesidiate made Pinnes his right-hand man during this stage of the war.26

  Unfortunately General Pinnes’ offensive failed: he was checked by the Roman commander Marcus Plautius Silvanus, who had fought alongside Aulus Severus the year before. The ancient sources do not state how much damage Pinnes and his troops managed to cause before they were defeated, nor do the sources state where the showdown between himself and Silvanus took place. It is also not clear if the Pannonians were defeated in one concise engagement or if they were gradually worn down little by little and their advance was finally stopped.27

  After General Pinnes and his men were defeated, Marcus Silvanus and his men conquered the Breucian tribe. This was likely a very severe blow to the rebels’ morale, since the Breucians had been one of the major players in this revolt. Their defeat likely signalled to many that the Great Illyrian Revolt was failing. After the Breucians fell, some other Pannonian tribes submitted voluntarily to Rome without offering any further resistance.28 There could no longer be any doubt that the war was now definitely going in the Romans’ favour.

  When Bato the Daesidiate heard about the dire circumstances happening in Pannonia, with the Romans gaining much territory, with one tribe conquered and many others laying down their weapons without a fight, he gave up on Pannonia. Realizing that Pannonia was doomed to be overwhelmed by the legions sooner or later, he stationed his warriors in the mountain passes leading to Dalmatia, his homeland, to try to stall the Roman advance while other bodies of armed men continued to ravage the Roman settlements in southern Illyria. With Pannonia being overwhelmed by Silvanus’ legions, in the summer General Pinnes offered to surrender both himself and all rebel forces in Pannonia.29

  Something must have happened for General Pinnes to make such a drastic decision. It must be stated that the war in Pannonia had not been going well for the rebel side. Rome had inflicted one defeat after another upon them. Hundreds and perhaps thousands of Pannonian rebels had died the previous year. At the present rate of destruction, the rebel forces in Pannonia would be wiped out before the year was over.

  Perhaps General Pinnes believed that continued resistance to Rome was futile. He had suffered many losses, his army had lost a lot of territory and reinforcements didn’t seem forthcoming, so a counter-attack was out of the question. All he could hope to do was to hold his ground and be gradually pushed back mile by mile, and all the way the route would be marked by piles of rebel bodies killed by Romans on one nameless battlefield after another. Rather than face certain extinction, General Pinnes surrendered, perhaps believing that if he surrendered, he and his men would be granted mercy.

  Another possibility is that Tiberius himself proposed such an offer. This war was a costly one and had distracted him from carrying out the
war against the Marcomanni. The sooner he could have this war ended, the better. That way, things would get back on schedule. So Tiberius might have sent a secret message to the Pannonian rebels stating that the war was all but over and that Rome was certain to crush the resistance, but if they surrendered, they would be shown mercy. Tiberius may have even offered some type of bribe to sweeten the deal, either a pardon or an actual bribe in cash. The reason why I say this is because it says in the historical sources that Pinnes was defeated by Marcus Plautius Silvanus, but instead of surrendering to him, Pinnes surrendered to Tiberius. Wouldn’t it make better sense that Pinnes surrender to the general who had defeated him? Not necessarily. Not if Tiberius was the one who actually persuaded Pinnes to give up, especially if Tiberius’ terms were preferable.

  Another distinct possibility was the environmental factor. The winter of 6-–7 AD had been very bad and the year 7 AD did not improve things. Throughout that year, much of southern Europe underwent a crushing famine and this included the western Balkans. Faced with food shortages, the warriors simply might not have had the will or even the physical strength to continue fighting.30 Regardless of the reasoning, General Pinnes decided that he would surrender. It was over.

  The official surrender of all rebel forces in Pannonia took place on the banks of the Bathinus River in the summer of 7 AD. According to the Fasti Antiates, the exact date of the surrender was 3 August. General Pinnes led thousands of his warriors to this location, surrendered himself and his men to Rome, and then laid down their weapons on the ground. They all then either knelt or lay down on the ground in submission. Paterculus states that these thousands of warriors who had boasted not so long ago that they would conquer all of Italy now surrendered themselves ignominiously to Tiberius. The historical records do not state what the fate of Pinnes and his men were. It is likely that they were sold into slavery.31