by Rob Harper
Beauvais abandoned his plan and joined Marigny and the cavalry. They descended from the high ground, crossed a large stream on their right and took a road to the left, in an attempt to reach Martigné-Briand by marching around Villeneuve. But in this unfamiliar terrain and with no guide they were soon completely lost. When they eventually reappeared they were surprised to see both sides routing, only to be informed that it was the appearance of this very cavalry that had caused their own men to rout. Waving handkerchiefs in an attempt to show they were friends only aggravated the situation. The rout in Bonchamps’ ranks caused others to follow and soon the whole army took flight, covered by around forty officers and some cavalry.62
Beauvais accepted that it was their actions that had provoked this disaster.
Madame de la Rochejaquelein said few were killed in the battle but around fifty died from heat exhaustion and even Lescure collapsed and was unconscious for two hours.63 Bonchamps, in his first battle since Fontenay, was surrounded by five hussars during the retreat and wounded again when a bullet shot away the bone at the extremity of his elbow. Beauvais also recalled that although they had captured five guns they abandoned three of their own in the rout.64
Writing that same evening, Labarolière reported that he had been attacked on his right and rear as the advance guard had begun its march on Vihiers. He acknowledged that the rebels managed to break through his centre, but said they were repulsed and pursued for over two leagues. The 8th and 9th Hussars, he said, contributed greatly to the success of the day. Ronsin, however, confessed that the republican losses had been quite high and that the battle had been in the balance for some time.65
The Vendéen divisions dispersed once again and within a few days their high command was informed that a battle had taken place at Vihiers, but this time none of them were involved.
Vihiers 18 July
On 17 July Labarolière continued his advance and was now marching west on the Cholet road. He camped at Vihiers, leaving his baggage and part of his artillery park at Montilliers 4km to the north-east. That same day his advance guard was repulsed by 600 German and Swiss troops under Baron Keller who were deployed in Coron. The republicans pulled back to Vihiers and on 18 July came under attack.
Labarolière deployed covering the north, south and west approaches to Vihiers as follows: under Menou’s command, General of Brigade Gauvilliers deployed on the west bank of the Lys from the Galerne Heights to near the bridge and château lake; a second brigade (under Léopald Hugo, called ‘Brutus’), came under Gauvilliers’ orders; and one of Santerre’s battalions was deployed in support.66
On high ground near the Jusalem Farm a second body of troops deployed, with a third deployed close to the southern edge of Vihiers near the cemetery and steep fields at La Dauphinerie.67 Santerre’s troops were both in the town and on the approaches to this cemetery and the cavalry were held in reserve in Vihiers.
With the main royalist divisions dispersed, and the most senior leaders at Châtillon deciding on Cathelineau’s replacement, Piron worked wonders in raising peasants from surrounding parishes. Although their morale would have been brittle, all would have been aware of the gravity of the situation. The rebels did, however, have the advantage of terrain that suited their tactics which included woodland, undulating terrain, and plenty of high-hedged fields.
Piron was mounted on a white horse and deployed his men in three columns in copses facing the enemy. He commanded somewhere between 10,000 and 15,000 men.68 The left was under Guignard-de-Tiffauge; the centre under the Chevalier de Villeneuve supported by Baron Keller with the Swiss and German companies; and the right was led by La Guérivière and Bonnin facing the cemetery fields. Piron had the support of Forestier, with perhaps 500 cavalry, who deployed towards Le Voide. Herbault was tasked with deploying their artillery in a favourable position.
The Battle of Vihiers.
Piron placed himself with the centre on the Cholet to Saumur road and launched all three columns in an all-out attack around midday, apparently while Santerre was eating his lunch. Although initially holding well, Menou’s men proved unable to withstand the fire from Keller’s troops, supported by a turning movement from Piron, and several of his battalions fled. Menou was wounded in the chest as his troops routed.
Piron was soon in command of the bridge over the Lys, with Herbault targeting the enemy as they routed alongside the lake.69 A squadron of hussars managed to cross the bridge to charge the rebels but by aiming at the horses this charge was disrupted and the cavalry routed.
Forestier had been pinned down in a valley under bombardment from republican artillery until Piron came to his aid. Their combined force caused the republicans’ right to panic and rout.
Santerre’s Paris battalions led the rout as the republicans pulled back beyond Vihiers.
The republican left put up more resistance but was forced to retreat when the rest of the army collapsed. The official royalist account, quoted in Savary, indicated that the battle in the town was ferocious and ‘after forty-five minutes…the victory was complete’.70
The entire republican army fell to pieces as the rebels plunged into their ranks. Bourbotte with a body of 1,200-1,500 men tried to stop the rout in Vihiers but dispersed when at risk of being surrounded. Santerre came close to being captured and it was only the ability of his horse to leap a five foot wall that saved him. The republicans routed in more than one direction and were pursued to Montillé and Concourson.71
The royalists estimated enemy losses at 2,000 killed, 3,000 captured, and a haul of 7,000 fusils, 25 cannon, 100 horses and plenty of provisions.72
An officer in the 6th Orléans reported that the battle lasted around two hours, at which point the right gave way and the rout soon became widespread. They ran so quickly that some appeared at Saumur in three hours.73 The defeat was blamed on the badly organised battalions under officers with no understanding of their profession; the impossibility of being able to charge in mass in such difficult terrain; and the tactics used by the Vendéens and their great numbers.74
Davout, who later become one of Napoleon’s finest marshals, was present at this battle. In early July 1793 he had been transferred to the Vendée and joined Labarolière’s division. Although recently promoted general of brigade he only commanded a small detachment of cavalry in this action and formed a protective screen that enabled some infantry to escape. He was soon transferred to Niort with orders to escort a detachment sent to reinforce General Tuncq. Arriving at Tuncq’s headquarters he received news of his promotion to general of division and his recall to the Army of the North.75
Berthier and Dutruy presented a report to the CPS stating that
‘This army was composed of levies with the few experienced troops forming the advance-guard. Having left 1,500 at Saumur, and 1,500 at Les Ponts-de-Cé, the army went to Brissac where a further post was left to protect their communications. Around the Layon, being near hostile territory, discipline broke down and looting of the area began. The Paris battalions were especially difficult to control and even threatened Santerre’s life when he tried to intervene. It was the advance guard that was largely responsible for the victory at Martigné, as some battalions gave way and others showed little willingness to get involved until victory was assured. The bread due did not arrive and this prevented the army marching on 16 [July].
‘Some of the generals were concerned about marching with the murmurings among the troops, saying it would be better to head for Doué or Argenton, but Labarolière said they would camp at Vihiers and defend themselves if attacked.
‘Towards 1pm the enemy appeared in force; the advance-guard fought with valour, but all the rest retreated in spite of contrary orders. The Paris battalions retired without having fought, threatening their leaders and crying treason! Two battalions, being led to support the advance-guard, turned back like cowards on sight of the enemy. The rout soon spread through the army.
‘The advance-guard had lost some of its best infantry. The
army lost five or six cannon.’
They noted that the drivers abandoned their guns and concluded that the war needed a new approach, asking for four experienced light infantry battalions who could be employed as tirailleurs; eight line battalions; two battalions of workers armed with good tools; two companies of sappers; four howitzers and a regiment of chasseurs-à-cheval or dragoons.76
Berthier’s republican credentials, however, were now being questioned and he felt it necessary to add that he was not related to two other Berthiers (one being the former king’s secretary), that he was at the Tuileries on 10 August 1792, that he had a certificate of bravery for action on the northern frontier, and that he had the full confidence of the representatives and commissaires with the army in the Vendée. But according to Savary, Ronsin now made sure Berthier was no longer employed in the Vendée and that his report was ignored.77
The rout of the army at Vihiers was an embarrassment to the extremists both in the army and in Paris but, as it was the sans-culotte officers and troops who were evidently responsible, no action was taken against them.
On 19 July, when ordered to occupy the positions around Doué, Labarolière’s battalions refused and wanted to cross the Loire; that is until the artillery and cavalry were deployed to persuade them to remain.
Once again the Vendéens had a breathing space and the initiative had swung back in their favour.
The Election of a new Vendéen Commander-in-Chief
With Cathelineau’s death the Vendéens convened a council of war in Châtillon on 19 July to elect his replacement. Some generals sent substitutes to act on their behalf.
Two leaders stood out from among the divisional generals: D’ Élbée and Bonchamps. However, as both Bonchamps and Lescure were wounded they were absent and it was relatively easy for D’ Élbée, with broad support, to secure the appointment.
In addition to appointing the commander-in-chief, rebel territory was split into four principal commands, each under a lieutenant general: Bonchamps for Anjou; Lescure for Poitou; Royrand for the area of the Army of the Centre; and, most surprisingly, Donnissan for Bas-Poitou. The first three were obvious choices, but to assign Donnissan command of an area he had no connection with could only have been due to the lack of unity evident in the coastal Vendée, with some leaders unlikely to accept Charette in that role. Donnissan would certainly have given them a voice at the Superior Council and as he was not one of the more active field commanders he left them to run operations as they saw fit.
Four men were appointed second-in-command in each area: La Rochejaquelein under Lescure, the Chevalier Fleuriot under Bonchamps, Cumont under Royrand, and Charette under Donnissan.
Les Ponts-de-Cé 26 July
After Labarolière’s rout, Angers was again exposed. On 20 July Bourgeois, who commanded the 8th Paris, was ordered to occupy the strongpoint of Roche-de-Murs on the south bank of the Loire. He placed 600 men and two guns in that position and dispersed the remaining 377 men of his battalion to cover the Moulins d’Érigné, a redoubt at the junction of the Brissac and St-Lambert roads, and the Pont-du-Louet (two more guns being deployed at the latter). The 6th Paris Battalion held an entrenchment at the side of the Chêne road.78
On 23 July, Duhoux placed a further 1,500 men at Les Ponts-de-Cé and spread 3,248 men in posts stretching along the north bank of the Loire as far as Ingrandes. He also put Angers in a state of siege, declaring that every day spies were trying to find out all they could about his forces.79
Bonchamps was acutely aware of the need to watch Les Ponts-de-Cé as it was the springboard for many republican assaults. He therefore placed his 10-12,000 strong division under D’Autichamp’s command and ordered him to seize it. This would not be easy as in addition to the republican entrenchments covering the approach, three bridges separated Érigné from the north bank of the Loire. Nevertheless the Vendéens marched overnight and were in position for a dawn attack on 26 July. D’Autichamp’s right wing soon routed the republicans on the Chêne road and at the Pont-du-Louet, pushing forward with ‘dreadful cries’.80
Scépeaux, commanding the left wing, dispersed republicans at Quincé and then met with limited resistance when he assaulted those at Roche-de-Murs, many falling to their deaths down steep rocky slopes.81
The Vendéens crossed the first bridge and captured St-Maurille as General Desclozeaux and the Jemappes battalion fled after only limited resistance.82 The Vendéens closely pursued them and captured the second bridge and then the third, some even pursuing to the suburbs of Angers.
The administrators of the Department of Maine-et-Loire condemned the cowardly behaviour of the troops, reporting that they bayonetted Desclozeaux in the foot when he tried to rally them. Others accused Desclozeaux of being drunk and falling from his horse as they fled.83
The situation was stabilised by a counter-attack from the national guards who although outnumbered managed to push the rebels back on Les Ponts-de-Cé and then wisely held the approaches from this town to Angers.
This series of battles ended around 10pm and D’Autichamp cut the bridge to the northern bank and dug in. The royalists claimed 900 republicans killed or captured, although Hostis suggests a figure of around 450 is probably nearer the truth.84
Les Ponts-de-Cé 27 and 28 July.
All was quiet on the following day as the two sides watched each other but made no move.
Les Ponts-de-Cé 28 July
At 5pm on 28 July, Adjudant General Talot commanding the 6th Paris, the ‘Vanqueurs de la Bastille’, a Sarthe Battalion, and the debris of the Jemappes Battalion, launched a sudden attack on Les Ponts-de-Cé.85 The official Republican account states that he crossed the Loire in some boats, seized the far bank, then overcame strong resistance and fought his way into Château. He pressed on, pushing the rebels back beyond the Érigné Heights where he established a new post before pulling most of his troops back at around 9pm. The Vendéens vigilantly watched this post from this date while the republicans constructed stronger defences supported by many guns.
With Labarolière clinging to the banks of the Loire and calling for more help, General Barbazan wrote that the only solution was to ensure all the generals were sans-culottes both in morals and principles, and that they should remove all reminders of the Ancien Regime.86 He would have been heartened, therefore, with Rossignol’s appointment.
Southern Front
While all this intrigue continued, the army along the southern front proceeded with the plan established by Biron, and in his absence Chalbos advised Boulard that he would head for Châtillon on 21 July, marching via St-Maixent, Parthenay and Bressuire with the 8,000 men under his command. However news of the catastrophe at Vihiers immediately curtailed his plans and he indicated that he would now await the army’s reorganisation.87
Pont-Charrault and Pont-Charron 25 July
Tuncq had replaced Sandoz on 1 July. On 8 July he said he only had 700 infantry with him in Luçon and was expecting to be attacked at any moment. Chalbos therefore sent him some battalions to replace ones sent on to Les Sables.
Impatient for action Tuncq planned a surprise attack on Pont-Charron, a frontier post held by the Vendéens under Sapinaud-de-la-Verrie. The Vendéens had constructed redoubts and entrenchments along the north bank near the stone bridge. Centred on Chantonnay Sapinaud’s 4,000 troops formed the advance guard of the Army of the Centre.
The republicans marched in two columns: one under Adjudant General Canier comprising 480 infantry, 100 mounted gendarmes and two guns, and the other under Tuncq’s personal command formed of 780 infantry, 80 cavalry and a single 4pdr.88 In the early hours of 24 July Canier had been ordered to march on Pont-Charrault, overpower its 100 strong post and single gun, and then attack the eastern side of the entrenchments covering Pont-Charron. Tuncq was to head directly north from Ste-Hermine on the main Pont-Charron road.
Canier set out at 4am and Tuncq at 11am. At 2am on 25 July Canier crossed the Grand Lay at an undefended ford at La Solissonnière an
d appeared above the town of St-Philbert, while some of his men crossed at a ford west of Pont-Charrault. His troops may have been marching disguised as rebels.89
The Vendéens spotted the enemy approaching from the south and were ready to resist them, but suddenly found themselves under attack from the north as Canier’s main force appeared. They put up little resistance as Pont-Charrault fell to the republicans.90 Canier’s men then massacred a post at La Gué.91
As soon as he heard gunfire Sapinaud and thirty cavalry raced from Chantonnay to Pont-Charron. Finding it undisturbed he headed towards Pont-Charrault via Vildé.92 They spotted some republicans lying flat on a path not far from Les Gabardières, clearly waiting to ambush them. As they turned to withdraw, Sapinaud was struck by gunfire and cut down by republican cavalry before the others could come to his aid.
Pont Charrault and Pont Charron.
Canier continued his march on Port-Charron and picked up speed when he was told rebel reinforcements were on route to the two bridges.93 He attacked Pont-Charron just as Tuncq launched his attack from south of the river. Tuncq had also sent cavalry across a ford further to the west.94 The rebels now came under attack from three directions at once and after initial resistance they retreated via Chantonnay to St-Vincent.95