by Rob Harper
Losses were light but the death of Sapinaud-de-la-Verrie was a terrible blow for the Army of the Centre.
Tuncq advanced to Chantonnay, destroyed rebel supplies, and then sensibly withdrew back to Luçon. The Vendéens soon reoccupied the lost ground. This small action was hailed as a great victory for the Republic at a time when they had little else to celebrate.
Luçon 30 July
With the area around Les Ponts-de-Cé stabilised by Bonchamps’ division, the Vendéens still had their eye on Luçon. A second assault would now see part of the Grand Army linked to the Army of the Centre and would involve D’Élbée, Lescure, La Rochejaquelein, Stofflet, Royrand, Talmont and Marigny. Charette was asked to join in the attack but declined, claiming that he had to defend his area against republicans from Nantes and Paimboeuf.96
Tuncq had warning on 28 July that large numbers of rebels were assembling, giving him time to plan his defence with the meagre forces he had to hand. On the following day the Vendéens set out from Les Herbiers, and that evening, having spotted rebel cavalry, Tuncq deployed his troops. The rebels gathered at Chantonnay, marched through Ste-Hermine and then crossed the River Smagne at the Mainclaye Bridge.97
Tuncq had the confidence to deploy in open country north of Luçon, covering the area from Corpe to north of the Ste-Gemme Forest. His command consisted of little more than three volunteer battalions and a few squadrons of cavalry: in all 1,170 infantry, 400 cavalry and 6 guns of the newly formed horse artillery.98 He was being approached by thousands of rebels supported by 800 cavalry and 6 guns.99
The republican left comprised 350 men from the 6th Charente-Inférieure under Sagot, supported by 250 men from the 11th Hussars.100 Sagot’s Grenadiers were deployed north of Corpe.
Second Battle of Luçon.
Their centre comprised 420 men of the 3rd Charente-Inférieure covering the roads leading to Luçon from Mainclaye and Les Mottes. This weak battalion was supported by around seventy-five mounted gendarmes and possibly some volunteer companies from Parthenay.
The right flank was deployed to the north and north-west of the Ste-Gemme Forest and comprised Lecomte’s 400 strong battalion (Le Vengeur) supported by around seventy-five mounted gendarmes.
Tuncq deployed numerous posts so had plenty of warning of the enemy’s movements. Once again the Vendéens had to face the open terrain north of Luçon.
Around 11am three enemy columns were spotted by Tuncq. The advanced posts were ordered to retire in succession and twenty-five hussars were sent forwards to observe the enemy. They then withdrew as a large body of rebel cavalry approached. To the left the grenadiers of the 6th Charente-Inférieure also pulled back towards Corpe.
The battle initially developed on the western flank as artillery opened up and the grenadiers found themselves defending the approaches to the village against swarms of rebels. Soon the landscape in front of the republicans was thick with enemy troops.
Sagot recognised that the rebels were trying to turn his left flank, so while holding the enemy to his front he bravely countered this move by obliquely marching his battalion to new positions.
Lecomte also found his eastern flank under threat and (although his manoeuvres are not recorded) by advancing his troops he managed to stop the Vendéens.
In the republican centre part of the 3rd Charente-Inférièure wavered and then broke under Royrand’s onslaught, losing a gun in the process. The supporting republican cavalry in the centre and two companies protecting their second cannon seized back the higher ground and recaptured the gun.
The rebels seemed to hesitate and may have exhausted their limited ammunition. The discipline and tactical skill of the small republican force took advantage of this hesitation and frustrated what should have been an easy rebel victory. Sagot had been firing-by-file but now advanced his battalion with fixed bayonets and cavalry support and charged and routed the rebels facing him. On the eastern flank Lecomte also advanced and with their centre rallying the battle was won.
Talmont came to the aid of the rebel infantry and charged the republican cavalry several times with only fifty horse, dispersing successive republican squadrons.101
Tuncq claimed that the Vendéens rallied 3,000 men at the bridge but could not hold it against his troops and boasted that over 2,000 rebels ‘bit the dust’, yet by contrast Beauvais claimed that Talmont’s heroism meant their losses were limited.102 Three rebel guns, two caissons, and a wagon full of munitions also fell into Tuncq’s hands.
D’Élbée’s first battle as commander-in-chief had been a shambles. Their own bulletin claimed that the stragglers at the rear of the columns spread panic and caused the disaster, but this setback was a reminder that good leadership was more important than numbers. It was also a reminder just how vulnerable their troops were in open terrain.
The Vendéens had not given up hope of seizing Luçon and as July slipped into August the Grand Army opened discussion with the armies of the coastal Vendée as they planned yet another assault on that town.
The Coastal Vendée
Les Sables Front July
The Les Sables front was quiet during July due to republican setbacks elsewhere and the political troubles in Nantes. There were several minor skirmishes at Château-d’Olonne and Le Pas-Opton and a 400 man reconnaissance on St-Julien and La Chapelle-Hermier on 24 July was attacked by 1,500 Vendéens and forced to retreat in disorder.
The republicans of Les Sables, however, were beset by serious political divisions that surfaced among the troops and many volunteers were coming to the end of their period of service. The condition of the troops was also abysmal and many were falling ill.103 On 27 July the two Bordeaux battalions left Les Sables for La Rochelle by sea and on 30 July the Lot-et-Garonne Battalion, under Baudry’s command, left their post without orders aiming to head home. Baudry set out from Vairé with 600 men to stop them and forced them at bayonet point to put down their arms. A number of the battalion’s officers were arrested and led away to prison.104
It was near the end of July that Boulard, in very poor health, had his resignation accepted.
The Sans-Culotte Council of War, Saumur 27 July.
In late July Labarolière was busy once again reorganising the army in Tours and Chinon, and Chalbos and Duhoux remained stationary in Niort and Angers respectively. Labarolière again asked to be replaced and appealed for veterans if this war was to be ended.
Following the latest succession of defeats a council of war was held in Saumur on 27 July. This meeting was dominated by the Hébértists: namely Ronsin, Rossignol and Commissaires Momoro, Hazard, Millié, Bodson, Laporte and Parrain, some of whom were among the most unsavoury characters to appear during the French Revolution. They clearly anticipated another rebel attempt on Saumur and met with the officers responsible for the area before issuing the following orders:105
1. Saumur was to be put in a state of siege.
2. The town’s citizens were ordered to assemble in the town square, with all available weapons, on pain of being declared traitors.
3. Commissaires were to be sent to all the communes north of Saumur, from Tours to Angers over a distance of ten leagues, and to assemble all men in a state to fight with all possible weapons (including pikes and pitchforks). They were to be in Saumur in twenty-four hours with supplies for eight days. The tocsin would be sounded to raise people for the republican cause.
Ronsin also ordered Saumur to be fortified, the bridges over the Thouet to be destroyed, and announced to the Minister of War that he and the sansculotte Rossignol were taking measures to save the Republic and not betray it like the former ci-devant generals.106
Chapter 9
‘Destroy the Vendée!’
Towards the end of July the beleaguered garrisons of Mayence and Valenciennes surrendered to the Allies. Although both capitulations were significant blows to the Republic, the Convention did not consider the Vendée to be part of the Coalition formed against France so saw no problem with redeploying the Army of May
ence and troops from Valenciennes to fight in the region.
While this was under organisation the CPS issued the following orders, published in Saumur on 4 August:
1. The staff and commissaires of war of the Army of the La Rochelle Coast are to be ‘purified’ and substituted by strong patriots.
2. The generals are to rigorously execute the law with regard to deserters, traitors, those that flee, those that throw away their weapons, and those that sell their habits (military jackets).
3. The organisation of companies of pioneers and workers…will only be recruited from strongly patriotic communes.
4. The generals are to form bodies of tirailleurs and chasseurs.
5. Inflammable materials are to be sent by the Minister of War.
6. The forests are to be cut down; the lairs of the rebels destroyed; the harvest gathered by the companies of workers and carried to the rear of the army, and the beasts seized.
7. The women, children and elderly are to be conducted to the interior for their ‘subsistence and safety with all due regard for humanity’.
8. The Minister of War will take measures to equip the army with arms, munitions and cannon in preparation for the next general move on the rebels.
9. As soon as the army is ready the representatives in the Departments around the rebel area will sound the tocsin and ensure all men, aged 16 to 60, march on the rebels.
10. All women will be expelled from the army.
11. Wagons will be reduced to the absolute minimum necessary for transporting strictly necessary effects and munitions.
12. The generals will only use patriotic expressions in their orders, in the name of ancient republicans or martyrs of freedom, and never in the name of a living person.1
Twenty-four companies of workers and pioneers were also to be organised.
On his appointment as commander-in-chief, Rossignol was praised for his patriotism. Ronsin was to act as his chief of staff and assist in planning the campaign. Rossignol asked that Ronsin and Santerre be promoted to the rank of general of division and asked for 15,000 veteran troops; even the sans-culottes recognised that the quality of the army was poor.
On 30 July the new command structure of the Army of the La Rochelle Coast was announced and showed a marked dominance of sans-culottes. At the same time Commissaires Grammont and Hazard were busy informing against all activity they considered suspect. Niort’s public spirit, they said, was ‘counter-revolutionary’; La Rochelle needed careful watching as the mayor was an intimate friend of Biron, General Verteuil was a ‘man of straw’, his nephew was a rebel leader, and the commander of the town’s national guards was suspect.2 They added that General Tuncq was an ‘arrogant…old general of the Ancien-Regime’ who had dared to say to them that ‘a general at the head of a victorious army does not need to be lectured.’3
This was as much an ideological war within the army as it was a campaign against the rebels, and when Representative Cavaignac, who was attached to the Army of the Brest Coast, wrote that the new sans-culotte generals were talentless and would prolong the war, he was soon recalled.4
The Vendéens were known to be planning a large expedition but the republicans were in the dark as to where this might be directed. General Duhoux was reporting rebels in Brissac, Doué and Thouars, and also indicated that his posts on the north bank of the Loire were coming under attack.
At the beginning of August Grouchy was in command of 4,000 troops to Duhoux’s west (deployed in posts stretching from Nantes and Ingrandes) and over the next few weeks he was fully occupied preventing rebels crossing the Loire to communicate with sympathisers to its north. His command consisted of twelve companies of grenadiers, a ‘German’ regiment and two Paris battalions – all part of the Army of the Brest Coast. He felt this force was coping reasonably well, but as most of the boats were in rebel hands there were many minor actions along the banks of the Loire and on its many islands.5 Nevertheless, by early August an active field Army of 6-7,000 men had been organised in Nantes and an advance guard was ready to move against the rebels.6
Rossignol’s Army Advances
Rossignol’s Saumur Division started to move on 5 August, aiming to pierce rebel lines near Doué. Ronsin and Salomon marched in advance with 2,700 infantry and 300 cavalry, and Santerre, with 7-8,000 men, deployed on the Bournan Heights to cover their retreat if that was found to be necessary.7
Rossignol’s lack of confidence in his troops is evident in the instructions he issued to his generals. In case they needed to retreat they were advised to familiarise themselves with the roads they advanced along, keep them clear of obstacles, and place a reserve of cavalry to the rear. He also ordered that all non-essential baggage be kept well back from the army and that the batteries of artillery must always be protected by infantry.8
Doué-la-Fontaine 5 August
In spite of this lack of confidence the campaign began well. On 5 August Ronsin’s advance guard defeated royalist posts under Piron’s command encountered on the Montfort Height and pursued them all the way to Doué. Salomon estimated the enemy to be 7-8,000 strong and after a further hour of battle they forced them back to Concourson.
Their advance now ground to a halt, as instead of urging the army forwards Rossignol and the Hébértist commissaires became obsessed with ‘purifying’ the army of suspect generals. On 8 August Rossignol made a series of denunciations: Rey, Duhoux, Menou and Gauvilliers, he wrote, were suspect, and Commissaires Grammont and Hazard were closely watching Chalbos and Nouvion.9 Momoro went so far as to say that Rey was a Bironist who should be guillotined.10
On 19 August Labarolière would have been considered fortunate when he at last got his wish and left the Vendée.
Coastal Vendée
August was a quiet month in the coastal Vendée, not least because many of the rebel contingents joined in the forthcoming attack on Luçon.
The only action of note took place on 10 August when La Cathelinière led 6,000 men, supported by a single 4pdr, in an attack on the 700 strong battalion of the Loire-Inférieure, garrisoned in the Château d’Aux on the south bank of the Loire. La Cathelinière’s aim was to intercept supplies to Nantes. His troops, however, were repulsed and he was wounded.11
The Southern Front
Luçon 14 August
From 1 August Tuncq was expressing concern about a new gathering of rebels reported at La Roche-sur-Yon and one week later he was notified that they were planning a third assault on Luçon and were also assembling at Châtillon and Vihiers.12 He appealed for help and on 9 August Chalbos sent 1,800 infantry, 200 cavalry, light artillery and a howitzer to the camp of Les Quatre-Chemins.13
Bonchamps and Lyrot remained in the north to cover the Loire and Layon, while 30-35,000 rebels and 22 guns were assembled to attack Luçon.
On 12 August the Grand Army linked with the Army of the Centre at L’Oie, and on the following day moved to Ste-Hermine where Charette, Joly and Savin added a further 6,000 men. On 14 August they advanced in three huge columns, each at least 12,000 strong.
Awaiting this vast army was General Tuncq with 5,371 infantry, 414 cavalry, 203 gunners and 14 cannon, all but one of which were 4pdrs. This force included battalions present at the last battle and the 11th Hussars, 14th Chasseurs and some gendarmes.
Once again Tuncq deployed from Corpe towards Ste-Gemme and, although not specified, it is probable that he deployed in two lines: one behind and in support of the other. Most of the cannon were dispersed along his front, with the horse artillery limbered behind the left wing. From the available information it is known that two squadrons of gendarmes and two of hussars supported the centre and cavalry pickets were deployed north of La Fosse.
Following a plan proposed by Lescure the Vendéens were instructed to deploy in echelon, from left to right, as they arrived on the battlefield.14 Charette then Lescure would form the left wing; Royrand then D’Élbée the centre; La Rochejaquelein then Stofflet the right. Talmont would deploy to the rear of the righ
t wing with the cavalry. The artillery would be dispersed in front of the three columns. Knowing the terrain was largely open this would be the first significant attempt by the Vendéens to fight in regular order, but, with the exception of a handful of companies, the men were unfamiliar with regular forms of deployment or manoeuvring. Madame de la Rochejaquelein, who usually praised her former husband’s skill, noted that none of the officers, including the commander-in-chief, could quite comprehend Lescure’s plan.15
Charette and the contingent from the coastal Vendée were on the march by 6am, crossed the River Smagne, and rapidly passed through the village of Les Mottes. They deployed in several loosely formed lines when they reached L’Encreve Farm, and Charette planned to direct the troops towards the east side of the Ste-Gemme Forest.
Third Battle of Luçon.
Lescure followed on Charette’s heels and deployed close to his right flank.
The cannon arrived next, crossed at the Mainclaye Bridge and began to deploy from east to west. Unfortunately the artillery train was delayed by a broken caisson and Marigny halted deployment until this was addressed. Stofflet, in his haste to get to the battlefield, marched straight through the artillery train, delaying its arrival even further.
Beauvais noticed Charette starting to advance and raced across to warn him about the confusion in the centre, calling on him to wait until the artillery was in position with its ammunition. He also advised that a third column was still to the rear. Beauvais was on his way back to the right flank, Stofflet was only just reaching the battlefield, and the caissons were at last appearing, when Charette’s men were spotted rapidly advancing.16