by Rob Harper
Lescure felt he had no choice but to follow Charette’s advance and these two columns were soon pushing back the republican left wing and moving through the Ste-Gemme Forest, capturing five cannon in the process.17
D’Élbée and Royrand were last onto the field of battle having crossed the Mainclaye Bridge sometime after 9am. Assuming the timings are correct, this was two hours after Charette had launched his attack.18 When at last they deployed, wide gaps separated the three columns.19
Beauvais indicates that the plan was to put several guns on the right and he noted that Talmont deployed a large body of cavalry behind the right flank and then promptly abandoned them to join La Rochejaquelein in person. Probing attacks by their right did however disperse some chasseurs-à-cheval.
Beauvais informed La Rochejaquelein that the enemy’s line was wider than their own and he could easily lengthen theirs. Talmont wisely advised La Rochejaquelein to do this discreetly, but while these troops had been ponderously deploying, Charette and Lescure’s attack lost momentum and Tuncq had been able to send reinforcements to counter their advance.
The enthusiasm of the Vendéen right meant they could no longer be restrained and the men kept moving forwards shielding their guns.20 In clear evidence of the use of combined-arms Beauvais had these guns limbered and moved forward with the troops, while some cavalry were ordered up in support to prevent the republicans rallying if broken. However, Marigny now arrived and abruptly halted the advance, reminding Beauvais that the army was meant to be attacking in echelons with the right wing advancing last of all.
The Vendéen centre and right were under continual artillery bombardment and there is little evidence that the Vendéen artillery retaliated. While enduring this bombardment D’Élbée, some 800 metres south of the Mainclaye Bridge, spent time trying to align his troops in loosely formed columns twelve to fifteen ranks deep, to the bemusement of the men.21 Part of the centre column was unaware of the decision to deploy in regular order and had moved forwards, only to become isolated in the middle of the open terrain.22
While D’Élbée had been struggling to get his troops into position the right wing was left standing and without orders. Whether D’Élbée’s centre started to move forward before the right is not clear, but Beauvais indicates that when the right did start to move forwards again they had lost their initial ardour. The stress of the bombardment was now causing problems in the centre, where the poorer quality troops started to give way, and when the right wing spotted them they also began to withdraw. The cavalry led their retreat.
Tuncq made a feint with his cavalry on D’Élbée’s troops and unmasked a battery of horse artillery which fired into the rebels at close range. With no cavalry to repel them, or counter the republican horse, the fate of the Vendéen centre was certain. Republican infantry had taken advantage of the rolling terrain to shelter in the dips and behind what trees and bushes there were in the open landscape. They now fixed bayonets and went on the attack.
Béjarry estimated that barely twenty shots had been fired by their own artillery before the gunners fled with their horses, leaving the infantry exposed.23
With their line of retreat threatened, Lescure and Charette pulled back towards the Mainclaye Bridge, linking with Royrand’s men on the way. Charette’s troops managed to maintain some order as they covered this retreat.
A cannon became jammed at the Mainclaye Bridge, preventing access for other guns and the vast number of troops retreating in that direction, all now coming under bombardment. Beauvais managed to divert some troops to a ford and succeeded in removing the cannon and withdrawing some guns.
On reaching L’Encreve, Charette was charged by Tuncq’s hussars and gendarmes and dispersed but then rallied behind some copses. Crossing the Mainclaye Bridge he deployed on the opposite bank and Beauvais records that a handful of officers and men, including both D’Élbée and La Rochejaquelein, held the republicans back for over half an hour before making their escape northwards.
Beauvais blamed Marigny for the defeat, saying he should not have stopped the right flank’s advance. He added that Marigny’s violent temper was a liability in battle and argued that if Charette had not attacked so rashly, and the two wings had been left to outflank the enemy, then the enemy’s centre would never have attacked as it did and victory would have been certain.24 He also criticised the attempt to form up in echelon rather than allow the troops to fight in their normal manner.
Madame de la Rochejaquelein recalled that the Vendéens lost most of their artillery and 2,000 men and the army blamed Lescure for a plan the troops were incapable of following.25
A few days later the republicans were back in Chantonnay and the troops of the coastal Vendée returned to their own territory.
Mieszkowski replaces Boulard
When Boulard left Les Sables a third of his division was sick with fever.26 He was replaced on 20 August by the Polish-born General Mieszkowski, Biron’s former ADC and friend. How he managed to avoid immediate dismissal for this association is not clear. He had originally been sent to command Chalbos’ advance guard, but was directed to Les Sables on Boulard’s departure. Baudry, like Boulard, was exhausted and left the army around 7 September.
Mieszkowski moved his 5,000 men to La Mothe-Achard and was soon reinforced by 960 men from the 24th Charente-Inférieure. There was still trouble in the Les Sable Division as the 3rd Paris had gained a reputation for indiscriminate looting, such that when they were seen marching towards Les Sables on the Olonne road they were refused admittance and cannon were deployed ready to stop them by force if necessary. All of Mieszkowski’s troops refused to serve with this notorious battalion.27
La Roche-sur-Yon 26 August
In late August Charette retained a few troops in Legé and marched with 500 infantry and 150 cavalry to support Joly and Savin in an assault on La Roche-sur-Yon.28
A Battalion of the Marne formed the core of the town’s garrison and on 26 August came under attack by three rebel columns approaching on the La Mothe-Achard, Poiré and Les Essarts roads. Charette combined his horse with those of Savin and advanced to assault the town, followed at a distance by their foot. However, this cavalry was vigorously repulsed and their infantry became disordered and withdrew. Charette had no option but to cover this retreat and among those helping him was Madame Bulkeley, wife of one of the rebel leaders and not unfamiliar with combat herself.29 The Vendéens suffered about eighty casualties.30
Charette’s camp was notorious for drinking and dancing and he was surrounded by a number of women, drawn in some cases by his charismatic personality and striking looks and referred to as his Amazones. Any frivolity was to be short lived however, as new republican assaults were already underway.
Battles around Sorinières, Naudières and Vertou 26 to 31 August
On 26 August Canclaux was beginning his move south from Nantes hoping to re-establish communications between Nantes and Les Sables. He gathered 5,000 men at Naudierès and grenadiers under Adjudant General Blosse seized Sorinières, routing some of Lyrot’s men after a brief combat. Lyrot’s cavalry made a diversionary attack on the Les Sables road but were routed by Grouchy and the Dragoons of Ille-et-Vilaine.
That same day Chef de Brigade Radermacher seized the Château of La Maillardière following stubborn resistance from the parish of Vertou.31
Canclaux established a camp at Naudières, at the junction of the Montaigu and St-Philbert roads, and placed an advance guard in Sorinières under Grouchy. Alarmed by these developments the Vendéens were determined to force the republicans back to Nantes.
Engagements south of Nantes: 26 to 31 August.
On the following day Lyrot’s officers Goulaine, Massip and La Sécherie went on the offensive.32 Grouchy reported that his advance guard faced several attacks. Around 4pm the rebels marched in force on Sorinières along the Les Sables and La Rochelle roads, flowing around the enemy’s flanks and forcing their tirailleurs back. Grouchy arrived from Naudierès and Adjudant Genera
l Cambray, sent to find reinforcements, succeeded in forming two columns to stabilise the flanks.
Although reinforcements had yet to arrive, two columns advanced: Blosse commanding the right and Grouchy the left. The rebels were firing from ditches and hedgerows but were eventually charged by these columns and pursued to entrenchments at Villeneuve. The first entrenchment and a prepared house were captured and a second entrenchment carried at bayonet point by grenadiers from the 9th and 109th Regiments. With nightfall closing in the Republicans dropped back to Sorinières.
Beysser returned to the army and was given command of 6,000 troops at Naudières on 28 August, while Grouchy remained at Sorinières with 2,000 men.
On the following day Canclaux warned Beysser that the enemy were aiming to cross the Sèvre to attack the camp on the following morning. Leading the 77th Regiment and two Paris battalions, Beysser went on the offensive and seized the Château of La Bretèche. As he continued to advance he came under attack from an enemy column which fell back to a second château and after a prolonged firefight they were charged and routed by Republicans. Beysser went on to seize Vertou, but wisely retired to Naudières towards midday having taken no casualties.
While Beysser had been thus engaged, Blosse discovered a large number of rebels threatening the right of the camp. He advanced with a fresh brigade to discover them in prepared positions in some woods and a house. In less than an hour the rebels were overpowered, pursued to a place called Moulin-Cassé, then dispersed.
In the evening numerous bands attacked Grouchy’s advanced posts but were unsuccessful once again and pursued by the Republicans to Villeneuve.
Beysser enthusiastically reported that this was the first time his troops had marched without their artillery and believed such courage, unhindered by baggage and artillery trains, would speed up the end of the war.33
On 31 August Canclaux left for Saumur to discuss the campaign plans and on that same day Beysser discovered rebels moving in strength to seize, cut, and dig in at the Villeneuve Bridge. He marched from Naudières leading a few hundred infantry with some cavalry and artillery support. As he approached, the rebels fled.
Over 500 Vendéens appeared at Vertou that day, aiming to threaten the left of the camp. Chef de Brigade Radermacher repulsed them and forced them back across the Vertou Bridge.
Unlike the Army of the La Rochelle Coast, the troops of the Army of the Brest Coast had sustained numerous assaults and had held firm.
Chapter 10
‘The Promenade of the Sovereign People’
The Saumur Conference 3 September
The Saumur Conference, between the generals, representatives and commissaires, would determine the course of events over the next month. Two campaign plans were debated: the Nantes Plan, prepared by Grouchy in discussion with Beysser, Canclaux and Representatives Philippeaux, Gillet, L.Turreau and Cavaignac; and the Tours Plan put forward by Ronsin in discussion with Bourbotte, and Choudieu.
The first stage of the Nantes Plan would be to cut rebel communication with the sea in cooperation with the Les Sables Division. Part of the Army of the Brest Coast would be attached to the Army of Mayence and this large body of troops would be split into three columns to advance concentrically on Mortagne. Here they would link up with the Army of the La Rochelle Coast in a joint march on Cholet. This concentration would be completed by 14 September and Grouchy predicted that ‘with the Army of Mayence reunited to that of the Brest Coast, the rebels will submit within fifteen days.’1 While those on the southern front would join in the advance, Grouchy added that the Army of Tours and Saumur would form a reserve and cover the Loire.
Cavaignac presented the Nantes Plan to the CPS on 14 August. He also expressed disgust at the Army of La Rochelle Coast and was particularly critical of Fabrefond (brother of Fabre d’Églantine) who had bought a property worth 100,000 francs to serve as a ‘place of pleasure’ for six courtesans kept with him during his military expeditions.2 The Dantonist Representative Philippeaux shared Cavaignac’s view:
‘The brigands committed no more atrocities against peaceable citizens than our own soldiers… It is a strange thing that the royalist soldiers who fight for despotism are the real sans-culottes, without gratification, unpaid, with only a morsel of bad bread to eat, while ours, for the sublime cause of liberté, make war with slaves and sybarites.’3
On 23 August the CPS voted in favour of the Nantes Plan and Philippeaux raced back to the army to give them the news.4
On 29 August, however, Ronsin was in Paris and met with the CPS to promote his Tours Plan. After a tirade against the undisciplined rabble that made up the royalist army, he claimed that a combined and vigorous attack would liberate the area in fifteen days.
His plan suggested that they should advance in five columns, two of which would be formed from the Army of Mayence. These two columns, each 7,000 strong, would assemble at Tours and Doué respectively: the first would head for Mortagne via Argenton and Châtillon; the second on Cholet via Vihiers, Coron and Vezins. A third column, of similar strength, would march from Brissac direct on Clisson via La Jumelière, Chemillé, Jallais and Beaupréau. They would cover the north bank of the Loire in case the enemy, repulsed by the first two columns, moved on Nantes. A fourth column would move from Chantonnay to Montaigu, via Puybelliard and Mouchamps, and a fifth column would camp between Les Sables and Machecoul to cover La Rochelle and move on the rebels if they attempted to seek refuge towards the sea.5
Choudieu indicated that the Tours Plan could be enacted on 4 September, whereas the Nantes Plan would take longer to be put into effect.6
As a consequence of this second proposal the CPS advised Philippeaux that although they supported Grouchy’s Plan they recognised there were strong opinions on both sides and ordered that the two plans be put before the generals and representatives at a council of war to be held in Saumur.
The following were present: Representatives Reubell (chair), Merlin de Thionville, Richard, Choudieu, Bourbotte, L.Turreau, Cavaignac, Méaulle, Philippeaux, Ruelle and Fayau; Generals Rossignol, Canclaux, Duhoux, Menou, Santerre, Aubert-Dubayet, Chalbos, Salomon, Rey, Mieszkowski and Dembarrère.
The decisive argument was presented by Vergnes, chief of staff of the Army of the Brest Coast who, although not part of the debate, was allowed to answer questions directed to him.
He argued that the only decent road in the Vendée ran from Nantes to La Rochelle. The enemy, he added, had the advantage of knowing their terrain intimately and it was cut up with ravines, streams and woods that were particularly difficult late in the season. He advised, therefore, that this territory be penetrated in mass and in a single army corps.
He described the organisation and fighting methods of the rebels and estimated that they had 10,000 capable troops, 30,000 armed peasants, and an abundance of cannon.
He indicated that the Army of the La Rochelle Coast risked being overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers if they attacked in separate columns, adding that these columns would not be able to come to each other’s aid.
The disciplined Army of Mayence, however, reinforced by 6,000 seasoned troops taken from the Army of the Brest Coast, would create a formidable force. Their first step should be to clear the coast, which would be relatively easy as the republicans already held Paimboeuf, Noirmoutier and the Château d’Aux. He also pointed out that the roads from Nantes to La Rochelle via Machecoul, and from Nantes to Clisson, were good for moving supplies.
After this first step the Army of Les Sables would link with the main column, followed in turn by those of Luçon and Niort, until they arrived before Mortagne. This march would retain the army’s supply line to Nantes, and after the capture of Mortagne, and by holding the Loire, they would force the rebels to surrender or drown.
Merlin de Douai and Gillet du Morbihan had ensured that the army was well supplied from Nantes; cannon had been manufactured in Rennes to supply the Army of the Brest Coast and twenty-four guns were available for the Army of Mayence
. It was also pointed out that the morale of the Army of the La Rochelle Coast was low due to its frequent defeats, unlike that of the Army of the Brest Coast.
It took two rounds of voting to conclude with support for the Nantes Plan, but due to his influence Vergnes was placed under surveillance by Ronsin and while Canclaux and Rossignol worked on the campaign plan, orders were in preparation to dismiss all ci-devant officers.
South of Nantes 5 September
Informed that Canclaux had left for the conference in Saumur Charette, Lyrot, Couëtus and La Cathelinière planned more assaults on the Naudières Camp which had been burning property south of Nantes, but as many of Lyrot’s men were busy harvesting, the date for the attack was postponed until 5 September.7
Coincidentally, Canclaux was back in Nantes in the early hours of 5 September and ordered Beysser to go on the offensive. At 5am Beysser clashed with Lyrot who was advancing on Naudières from the east – hours before the time agreed with Charette.8 Canclaux ordered Beysser to attack their left, with a column consisting of the 77th Line and five companies of grenadiers, while Cambray with the 13th Seine-et-Oise and the 12th République, attacked their right.9 Lyrot was repulsed and pursued to Vertou.10
Engagements south of Nantes 5 September.
A second rebel column under Goulaine was ordered to contain the enemy in Sorinières while Charette attacked Naudières. Goulaine successfully pinned Blosse’s advance guard, even after it was supported by Grouchy with the 34th Line and 12th Seine-et-Oise. Eventually, however, Goulaine was repulsed.
Charette marched with 2,000 men. At 5am, as he passed close to Villeneuve, he heard cannon-fire to the north-east as Lyrot’s premature attack went in. His troops attacked Naudières in two columns along the La Rochelle and Les Sables roads. Those on the La Rochelle road were forced back at bayonet point and pursued for over a league by Verger’s grenadiers; they lost a cannon and flag to the Hussards-Américains.11 The column on the Les Sables road was pursued as far as Villeneuve by Grouchy and Blosse.12