by Rob Harper
La Cathelinère led a fourth column, which the Republicans claimed was 10,000 strong, and came into conflict on the Ragon Heath south of Naudières. Once again the Vendéens were defeated.13
A fifth attack developed north-west of Naudières but was contained by two battalions of the 109th Line sent by Canclaux.14 Then a sixth column advanced between Canclaux’s advance guard and La Belinière to attack the right and rear of the Naudières Camp held by General Vergnes. During this assault the 12th Seine-et-Oise retreated and had to be replaced by the 3rd Orne. Beysser, who had been victorious on the left, now transferred his troops to the right, fell on the flank of the Vendéens, and forced them to retreat.15
By nightfall the Republicans had conclusively repulsed all attacks. Naudières was much too tough a target, and Charette, who had been suffering from a fever all day, fell back to Legé.
To the south, however, a more significant battle had been underway near Chantonnay.
Chantonnay 5 September
On 4 September General Tuncq seized the line of the River Lay with 8,000 men and established a large entrenched position at the Camp-des-Roches north of Chantonnay. He placed detachments at Chantonnay, Puybelliard, St Vincent-Sterlinges and Pont-Charron.
In retaliation the Grand Army and Army of the Centre gathered 25,000 men and 21 guns under La Rochejaquelein, Stofflet, D’Élbée, Royrand, Lescure and Fleuriot (commanding in place of the wounded Bonchamps), and approached Tuncq’s forces from the north, south and east. The rebels marched through the night of 4 to 5 September, and while Royrand was ordered to make a feint on the Camp-des-Roches from the north to hold the enemy’s attention, most of the army converged on the republicans from the south and east.
The timing of these attacks worked perfectly and by 3pm on 5 September all possible escape routes were securely in rebel hands and Fleuriot had evicted the 4th Dordogne from Pont-Charron.16
The main body of Vendéens deployed in three columns with Fleuriot on the left, Stofflet on the right and D’Élbée in the centre. Both sides recalled that the battle was ferocious and the republicans were well aware of the desperate position they were now in.
Lecomte, with no more than 150 cavalry, raced to support the solitary Lorient Battalion facing the approach of Royrand’s 2-3,000 men moving south from St-Vincent-Sterlinges. On arrival he saw that these rebels had been repulsed and were being pursued, unaware that Royrand was simply making a feint.
Lecomte now received news that other columns were closing in from the south and east. He raced back to the Camp-des-Roches and dispatched 150 cavalry and the Chasseurs de l’Oise towards La Réorthe (9km south of Chantonnay) to secure his line of communications, and the 7th Orléans was ordered to Pont-Charron to reinforce the 4th Dordogne.
News now arrived that the 4th Dordogne had abandoned its post, and Marceau, who had been ordered to rally them and retake Pont-Charron, found them near the Camp-des-Roches with the 7th Orléans, both retreating.
Chantonnay had also fallen into rebel hands and Marceau deployed two battalions in line to its north (east of the road to St-Vincent-Sterlinges), with orders to hold the enemy and support two light guns and a body of cavalry that were to their front. Beauvais recalled that the republican artillery fought well and caused the Vendéens problems as they debouched from Chantonnay, yet in spite of this they managed to capture two batteries a little beyond the town: one on the road and another in a field to its east.17
While these Vendéen troops were moving through and beyond Chantonnay, D’Élbée and Stofflet were forming up the two main columns of their army. Fleuriot was unable to break the troops to his front but Stofflet had more success and after obstinate resistance overcame two battalions beyond Puybelliard. With their left flank now uncovered Marceau vainly tried to rally these battalions. He ordered the hedgerows to be held to slow the enemy’s advance and Lecomte sent the 10th Orléans to temporarily secure this flank.
The line of battle now seemed to stabilise and stretched from near Puybelliard to the St-Vincent-Sterlinges road north of Chantonnay. It had been secured by the 10th Orléans, L’Union, L’Égalité and Vengeur battalions. Marceau believed now was the time to send in the cavalry, held in their centre, but he could not get them to charge.
The Battle of Chantonnay.
Beauvais was with Fleuriot’s column when they were reinforced by the Swiss and German Companies and witnessed the Vendéen cavalry charge in the centre but stop short under heavy fire. Seeing that his artillery could do little more on the left Beauvais was permitted to join the cavalry, and found them badly deployed and in range of the enemy as nightfall rapidly approached. He sent men to find cannon in Chantonnay and eventually an 8pdr arrived and began to cause problems for the republicans.
Lecomte had meanwhile ordered the 3rd and 6th Charente-Inférieure to advance on the Vendéen right as it appeared to be faltering. They skilfully swung into the exposed rebel flank and if their cavalry had charged the republicans might have defeated them, but once again they refused and Beauvais recalled that when their 8pdr fired on the enemy cavalry they retreated to their rear as quickly as they had appeared.
Dense smoke and darkness now obscured Vendéen movements, although Lecomte still held his troops in line as musketry erupted along the whole front once again. However a gap formed in the republican centre, after a Calvados battalion routed under sustained infantry and cannon fire, and the Vendéens poured through the breach and cut the republican army in two.
The Vengeur and 3rd Deux-Sèvres soon found themselves under attack from all sides and the republican right flank collapsed as men fled into nearby woodland in search of safety. Lecomte remained alone with two Charente-Inférieure battalions and some gendarmes, and more than an hour passed as they stood their ground against vast numbers of rebels. Marceau cut through the enemy to re-join Lecomte and brought news that all the republican troops in the centre had vanished. Lecomte therefore withdrew through woodland and successfully saved the debris of the army.
The battle fell silent around 9pm with republican losses almost certainly in the thousands and most of their artillery in royalist hands.18 Lecomte gathered what remained of his army in Luçon but they had been dispersed across a wide area, including 2,000 who turned up in Les Sables trailing five guns and seven caissons.19
This remarkable victory was to have direct consequences for the republican campaign plan.
The Advance of the Army of La Rochelle
On 7 September a huge levy was summoned across a wide area north and north-east of rebel territory as all able-bodied men were ordered to gather in Saumur and Angers ready to support the planned invasion of the Vendée-Militaire.
Érigné 7 September
The Vendéens had been in control of the Érigné Heights for some weeks, cutting communications between Angers and Doué. Salomon and Turreau had orders to seize this post as a first step in their move south and set out from Angers around 4am on 7 September with 1,800-2,000 men.20
The 8th Hussars and a division of Gendarmerie led the assault, successfully expelling the Vendéens from their camp at Roche d’Érigné. Salomon returned to Angers and Turreau was repairing the bridge when at 9am his advance guard was assaulted by three enemy columns totalling around 3,000 men. His tirailleurs were forced to retreat and the central rebel column came within 300 paces of the Érigné Redoubts but, says Turreau, they were routed by a charge from this redoubt and a flank attack by the hussars. Danican and the 8th Hussars came in for particular praise and pursued the rebels for a considerable distance.
Saumur Council of War 11 September
News of the disaster at Chantonnay made Rossignol hesitate and he convened a council of war in Saumur with the few generals to hand. Although he claimed that he did not diverge entirely from the agreed plan he now changed key details without informing Canclaux. His aim, he claimed, was ‘to avoid defeat by putting up a solid defence and enable his army to present a more active mass if they took the offensive’. He ordered the following:
21
• 10,000 men were to occupy Doué, 3,000 Les Ponts-de-Cé and 3,000 Thouars.
• In second line positions new levies would occupy extensive areas to the right and left of each of these bodies of troops. 12,000 would deploy from Brissac to bridges over the Thouet in support of those in Doué; 6,000 from Ferrières and fords on the Thouet as far as St-Gemme, in support of those in Thouars; and 8,000 in woods and thickets stretching to Juigné and the island from St-Maurice and Port-Godard, in support of those in Les Ponts-de-Cé. If it was felt necessary to advance the 3,000 in Les Ponts-de-Cé to the heights beyond the Érigné Mill, then these 8,000 would be deployed from Rochefort to Avrillé.
• Chalbos was to be notified of these dispositions, with orders to follow the same principle (i.e. unite the mass of troops in the centre of his area and hold two main posts to his left and right).
• The Les Sables Division was given the same instructions.
• Finally, Saumur was to be garrisoned by 1,000 men supported by 3-4,000 summoned by tocsin.
The most significant consequence of this change of plan affected Chalbos’ command. On 14 September he advanced on La Châtaigneraie in accordance with the 3 September orders, but on 16 September he received Rossignol’s orders to return to his original positions and was back in Fontenay two days later.
The Luçon column had been rebuilt after Chantonnay and placed under Beffroy’s command. He advanced beyond Ste-Hermine around 13 September, encountering plenty of resistance. On receipt of Rossignol’s orders he pulled back to Luçon three days later. Mieszkowski, however, advanced to St-Fulgent and when he received the same order, instead of retiring he remained where he was to consult with Canclaux first.
By retreating, Chalbos and Beffroy would not be in position to link up with Canclaux and Dubayet’s column as they marched in an anti-clockwise direction from Nantes to south of Mortagne and risked leaving these generals isolated. But it was already clear that the 20,000 levies marching with Chalbos’ troops were a significant liability and were guilty of indiscriminate pillaging and violence. Complaints were such that on his return to Fontenay he disbanded them.22
The advance of the Saumur Division
Martigné-Briand 11 September
Ronsin had persuaded Rossignol that Santerre’s Saumur column was best placed to seize Cholet while most of the Vendéen forces were busy fighting Canclaux, even though this does not appear to have been part of the Nantes Plan. Santerre’s division totalled 16,500 men, of which 10,000 were raw levies. As these levies had no uniforms they were given tricolor ribbons to tie to their shoulder belts to distinguish them from the enemy.23 Santerre proudly described them as his ‘military men in carmagnoles’ marching in ‘a promenade of the Sovereign People’ who he reported were enthusiastically chanting ‘To Cholet, to Cholet!’24
Salomon commanded Rossignol’s advance guard and had already set out from Saumur with orders to watch the Layon. He was accompanied by troops of the new levy and a detachment of the 8th Hussars.25 According to Savary he exceeded his orders and marched to attack Martigné-Briand where La Rochejaquelein had linked with D’Autichamp. The Vendéens were caught by surprise when Salomon suddenly attacked with 1,200-1,300 men. Madame de la Rochejaquelein noted that both armies were small, although Rossignol claimed the rebels were 4-5,000 strong.26 A long and obstinate battle ended with Salomon being repulsed. During the battle La Rochejaquelein had his thumb smashed by a shot and was obliged to wear a sling for months to come and to take time out to recover.
Érigné and Les Ponts-de-Cé 12 September
The strategic significance of Érigné and Les Ponts-de-Cé was such that Bonchamps again ordered its recapture and, thanks to Beauvais, who accompanied this expedition, we have a detailed account.
As the battle of Martigné was underway to the south-east, 8,000 men under D’Autichamp and Talmont, accompanied by six guns and the cavalry, assembled in Brissac.27 D’Autichamp was detached to Mozé and Beauvais accompanied him with the cannon. On route they came across a large number of cavalry which Beauvais’ guns dispersed.
Commandant Bourgeois had been dispatched with 500 men and a handful of cavalry and had orders to repulse enemy posts occupying Soulaine and surrounding communes south of Érigné.28 Around 6am they came into contact with some rebels and repulsed them, but on the arrival of D’Autichamp’s column the situation changed.
Approaching the republican camp at Roche d’Érigné, Beauvais deployed his battery on high ground and although at long range he began to cause noticeable damage to the enemy position. Meanwhile D’Autichamp marched on the left and rushed the enemy infantry, who fled as soon as the rebels opened fire. The republicans failed to remove timbers from the bridge over the Louet in time to prevent the rebel pursuit and Bourgeois was wounded while desperately trying to throw some planks in the river.
The rebels crossed the bridge and captured both St-Maurille and the Île-aux-Chevaux but were unable to take the next bridge as the enemy had deployed cannon and occupied a watermill and houses on the opposite bank.29 Deploying artillery along the south bank the Vendéens began to bombard them, but counter-battery fire put some of their own guns out of action.
At this point more of the Grand Army arrived. D’Autichamp and Beauvais wanted to continue the assault on news that the river between them and the enemy was fordable. Talmont, however, convinced Stofflet and others that the republican column in Doué posed the greater threat.
The battle therefore ended around midday and most of the Vendéen army moved south on 13 September, abandoning Érigné to the republicans.
The Lévee-en-Masse joins the Army of La Rochelle
By 13 September tens of thousands of raw levies had assembled in the area around Saumur, Angers and Thouars, many armed with farmyard weapons and in civilian dress. From this vast pool of levies three columns were created: as already noted 10,000 joined Santerre, 20,000 were gathering towards Thouars under Rey, and around 5,000 were added to Duhoux’s command. Tens of thousands were also flooding into St-Maixent, Niort and Fontenay, and as has been seen Chalbos dissolved those with his column.30
Representative Richard boasted on 14 September that ‘In two days 20,000 Republicans will plant the Tree of Liberty in Mortagne.’31 As far as they were concerned the war would be over in days.
Thouars 14 September
In the Airvault and Thouars area General Rey’s division was to be the nucleus around which the 20,000 levies would rally and Lescure was determined to launch a pre-emptive strike on these assembling troops from his camp at Saint-Saveur where he had gathered 3,000 men and two guns.
Lescure attacked around 3,000 patriots in Thouars, including reinforcements from Airvault led by Rey in person.32 These 3,000 must have formed part of the 20,000 levies being assembled in the area.
Lescure launched his attack at the Vrines Bridge at 8am. After hand-to-hand fighting, and with artillery support, they overcame the republicans. With most of the levies armed with pikes they were no match for Lescure’s men.33 However, as Lescure approached Thouars, he came up against Rey and a reinforcement of 5,000 troops who had arrived at the Paris Gate. Rey had been warned in the night that the rebels were marching on Thouars and raced from Airvault to its support. Reluctantly Lescure was forced to abandon the fight, being tentatively and ineffectively pursued.34
Beauvais remarked that Lescure had an obstinate character and in this battle had such contempt for the enemy that he handled his men carelessly and came close to being turned. He added that he only retired after inflicting 1,200 casualties on the republicans and losing 200 casualties and two cannon.35
The advance of the Saumur Division continues
Doué 14 September
Sweeping down from Érigné the Vendéens were without the injured Bonchamps, D’Élbée and La Rochejaquelein. Stofflet took command of both his and La Rochejaquelein’s troops.36 Santerre’s troops in Doué were nominally under Turreau’s command but were being directed by the more experienced Genera
l Dembarrère. Turreau was forewarned that the rebels were on their way and deployed at dawn on 14 September between Doué and Soulanger with most of his army behind earthworks constructed under Dambarrère’s direction. In total he led 6,500 infantry, 500 cavalry, two 12pdrs, two howitzers and several battalion guns. An additional 5-6,000 levies were kept well to the rear.
Stofflet split the army into two columns as he approached and they advanced on the Angers and Doué roads respectively. Most of their artillery was left well to the rear, although two guns supported their right and four were deployed on the road in their centre. The battle began around 11am.
Perrault and Beauvais soon advanced the guns in their centre to counter an enemy battery holding up their advance but under a hail of shot and shell some ammunition received a direct hit ‘throwing men over twenty feet in the air’.37 The rebel gunners, however, calmly fought on.
The Vendéen right had been successfully pushing the republicans back when they were caught by cavalry in their flank, thrown into disorder, and forced to retreat. Their left had failed to make inroads and with the retreat of their right they soon followed. Around 2pm their army withdrew on the Brissac and Vihiers roads.
Beauvais complained that the army had been too large for its objective, was badly handled, and that the two columns were too far apart and failed to stay in touch. They lost around 500 men and Stofflet was wounded in the thigh.