by Rob Harper
Kléber recalled that the Vendéen lines stabilised when they rallied in a good position beyond a ravine and occupied woods near Torfou. He also noticed their numbers increasing and soon faced 20,000 men with 2,500 and his back to the wooded valley of the Bon-Débit Stream in terrain perfected suited to rebel tactics. Alarmingly they could see the Vendéen right-wing extending ever further to the north as their numbers increased.
With Torfou around a kilometre to their west the Vendéen line now stretched over 4km. Charette formed the left, Lescure then D’Élbée the centre, and Bonchamps the right.63
Bonchamps, still suffering from his previous wound, had arrived by coach and set out on reconnaissance. With D’Élbée and a small group of officers he only managed to get 500 paces when fusil fire whistled around their ears. Part of Kléber’s left flank was en route to attack them and some gendarmes and tirailleurs had been concealed in a nearby thicket.64
D’Élbée immediately gave orders for the army to attack. Beauvais found the army advancing ‘in the best possible arrangement’ but, taken by surprise when encountering republicans sooner than expected, their right flank began to fall back and spread alarm among the rest of the troops. They may have fallen back following a bayonet charge by a company of the 7th Chasseurs-à-Pied but the rebels now simply spread even further north to turn the republican flank and forced them to pull back.65 Beauvais recalled how their own front ranks held firm and was encouraged to see the centre and left still advancing.66
Kléber felt confident that the two battalions he had placed in reserve could deal with the threat to his left flank but he knew he was running a great risk if Beysser’s column did not appear as his only line of retreat was the difficult route back to Boussay. As a precaution he ordered Targes to move a battalion to secure their line of retreat and another, under Chevardin, to seize a wood to their left. He then decided to move men forwards into the ravine between the two armies and to attack the rebels once more. Just when he was giving these orders he received news from Merlin that the two battalions on the left had fled and but for the determination of a handful of men they would also have lost the cannon on that flank.
The rout of these two battalions was undoubtedly caused by Bonchamps’ column, although a charge by some Vendéen cavalry is said to have been repulsed by some grenadiers.67 Bonchamps had been giving orders from a stretcher and now stood to lead his men into combat. Charette, with his clothes torn by bullets, mounted his horse and with his hat on the point of his sword called on his men to rally around him and follow him back into the fight.68
All the Vendéen army was advancing. To stabilise the situation Kléber ordered Boisgérard to switch one of his battalions from the right to support the exposed artillery on the left, but as they set out the other troops on his right thought this battalion was retreating and became disordered.69 Kléber said many on his right flank now used this excuse to flee.
Firing could now be heard to the rear of the republicans and men were shouting that they had been cut off. A furious Kléber used all means possible to hold his men together. Racing to his left he found Torfou in rebel hands, but fortunately he could see his soldiers contesting every foot of ground as they fought at close quarters. Kléber said he had never experienced so cruel and relentless a fight and with the left stabilised he returned to his right to try to push them forwards once more, but this proved impossible against the vast enemy numbers.
Kléber was now struck in the shoulder by a musket ball but managed to remain in command as he ordered the retreat. His priority was to extract the artillery and he intended to redeploy his men on the Boussay Heights, still hoping that Beysser’s column would appear on the enemy’s left flank.
Kléber set everyone around him to work clearing the way for the guns, but a caisson broke on the narrow road forcing them to abandon their efforts. The capture of two howitzers emboldened the Vendéens and a further four cannon and four caissons fell into their hands. Royalist accounts talk of their men racing to get amongst the artillery to kill the horses and capture the guns.70
Royrand had been moving along the south bank of the Sèvre with orders to cut the republican line of retreat by crossing at the Boussay Bridge. Kléber had the foresight to send Chevardin with the battalion of the Chasseurs Saône-et-Loire to hold that bridge at all costs.
Championnière was full of admiration for the Mayence troops, recalling that they never retreated more than thirty paces without turning to face them. ‘Their fire-by-file resembled a roll of drums’ and ‘wherever they found space they deployed in line.’ But, unlike the republicans, the Vendéens were only suffering light casualties as they slid close alongside the flanks of Kléber’s men, exploiting the cover of hedges and ditches ‘never more than thirty paces from them’.71
D’Élbée, who moved parallel to the republicans, reached L’Éraudière but Kléber managed to reach Boussay before him.
Chevardin’s stand at the Boussay Bridge held Royrand’s column in check and enabled the rest of Kléber’s men to struggle back to the heights west of Boussay, but this heroic defence cost the Chasseurs Saône-et-Loire devastating losses and Chevardin his life.72
Earlier in the day Kléber dispatched messages to Canclaux and Aubert-Dubayet calling for reinforcements and as he approached Gétigné, Vimeux’s 2,500 men appeared led by Canclaux in person.
Kléber formed his men in line between the Sèvre and Moine, rallying on the high plateau of Garenne less than a kilometre from Clisson, and now stood in reserve.73 Meanwhile Vimeux advanced aggressively against the Vendéens and some of Kléber’s men joined in as they forced the rebels back. Around 5pm Canclaux’s cavalry infiltrated Gétigné and clashed with Charette’s men who had been pillaging abandoned military supplies. Charette rallied his men and by putting up a determined front drew the battle to a close.
The republicans had taken heavy losses with the Vendéens claiming between 1,200 and 1,500 killed.74 They also lost six cannon and two howitzers.75
The rebels had decided beforehand not to take prisoners from the Army of Mayence who, they said, had broken the terms of their parole by fighting within a year of their surrender.76 When looking for wounded on the following day General Decaen noted that the bodies of their troops were in part reduced to ashes.77 The Vendéens suffered around 600 killed and wounded.78
With odds so much in their favour the Vendéens ought to have achieved more, although the battle did boost their morale as they could now legitimately claim to have defeated veteran troops in battle. Kléber was certainly impressed with their fighting ability.
Eager to know why Beysser had not advanced on Tiffauges, Kléber was told by Canclaux that Beysser was under the impression he needed to await a second order before marching.79 As he must have heard the battle in the distance his failure to race to Kléber’s support is inexcusable.
On the following day Kléber pulled back to Clisson.
On the evening of their victory the Vendéen generals gathered in Tiffauges. They agreed to follow up their success with further aggressive action and decided to coordinate an attack on Canclaux’s troops in and around Clisson. Bonchamps was to attack their northern flanks, D’Élbée their front, and Lescure and Charette, after first attacking Beysser in Montaigu, would attack their southern flank. Lyrot and D’Ésigny, whose bands were between Clisson and Nantes, would cut their line of retreat.80
First, however, Bonchamps was asked to complete the assembly of his parishes which had been interrupted by the urgent need to race to Torfou.81 He set out on the evening of 19 September, while also making contact with Lyrot’s troops preparatory for the forthcoming assault.
While the battle of Torfou had been underway Beaupuy had continued with his orders and by the evening of 19 September was at the Château of La Galissonnière, between Clisson and Nantes. His troops had skirmished with rebels during the day. Canclaux apprised him of the current situation and intended to use his troops to take revenge, with support from Grouchy and the Reserve.82
Grouchy had encountered Vendéens around La Plée and La Louée as he moved forwards in support of Beaupuy. The Légion-Nantaise had meanwhile cleared the villages of Haute and Basse-Goulaine as instructed.
Canclaux ordered the army to rest in their current positions on 20 September while the advance guard moved beyond Gétigné, pushing forward patrols on its flanks and front. He was confident that Grouchy was now protecting his line of communications with Nantes.
However, on 21 September he received news that Mieszkowski’s division had been ordered to retreat from St-Fulgent. Concerned that this would leave Beysser exposed he ordered him to move his cannon and baggage under escort on the Clisson road and the rest of his men on Boussay by the Montaigu road, to deploy between Boussay and the Sèvre. Kléber’s advance guard, now totalling 1,800 men, was ordered to move forwards to the heights near Boussay, and Vimeux’s 1st Division was ordered up to Gétigné. The horse artillery was to march at the head of the column while the rest of the artillery would follow on behind.83 Beaupuy’s 2nd Division was ordered to occupy Clisson.
However Beysser, who was busy ransacking the area around Montaigu, did not move as promptly as ordered and was caught in a Vendéen onslaught.
Montaigu 21 September
In accordance with the agreed plan, Lescure, Charette, Joly and Savin left Tiffauges to attack Montaigu, supported by part of D’Élbée’s forces. D’Élbée’s plan was to act as a reserve to Charette and Lescure, who would be supported by Des Essarts.84 Royrand, meanwhile, was tasked with escorting the bulk of the artillery back to Les Herbiers.
Early on 21 September the Vendéens were on the march and Beysser was entirely oblivious to the forthcoming attack. Joly formed the advance guard with Charette following behind. Splitting from the rest of the army at Treize-Septiers they took up position in hilly terrain north of Montaigu on the Clisson road and took shelter while they awaited cannon fire that would signal Lescure’s attack.85
In his report to Canclaux, Beysser said his advanced posts were attacked around 9am to the north and east of Montaigu. He deployed his troops and sent out scouts but as nothing seemed to happen over the next couple of hours he took advantage of this respite to find something to eat.
Second Battle of Montaigu, St-Fulgent and the pursuit of Canclaux.
He claimed that he only now received Canclaux’s letter ordering his artillery on the Clisson road and the rest of his troops to Boussay, but due to his current predicament he decided to wait until 3pm before marching, when suddenly he was attacked.86
Beysser’s advanced posts were repulsed by the Swiss, German and French Companies under Lescure’s direction.87 Representative Cavaignac managed to rally these posts and halt Lescure’s advance near the edge of the town while Beysser deployed under its walls (according to Beauvais in a poor position).88
Lescure’s artillery began a sustained and accurate fire, supported by Charette’s artillery to the north, and forced the republicans to pull back into the town. Beysser had at last managed to deploy his own guns on the two fronts.
The Vendéens were now deployed in a wide arc stretching from the Nantes road to Le Prieuré south-east of Montaigu.89 The salvoes from the republican artillery led the rebels to revert to their usual tactic of throwing themselves to the ground before rushing the guns and killing the gunners.
They stormed Montaigu from three directions and at one point fired on their own troops as the columns became embroiled in the town. Beysser claimed that it was the retreat of the post on the Boussay road that spread disorder amongst his troops.
While Charette was fighting in the northern part of the town Joly and Du Chaffault attacked the Château held by 500 republicans. Beysser ordered the Dragons-de-Lorient to rescue them but they panicked and fled on the Nantes road. Beauvais deployed some guns on a height overlooking Montaigu, but with men racing on ahead he was forced to follow on and came up against Beysser’s troops fighting fiercely in the town. Auguste de Béjarry had his horse killed beneath him but went on to lead growing numbers of Vendéen infantry into the battle.
Although giving ground on all fronts Beysser managed to force his way out of Montaigu on the Nantes road, led by the 79th and 109th Regiments and with the rest of his disorganised column followed behind. Charette pursued with his cavalry, harassing the republican rearguard which was now formed by the same two regiments. Once again the Vendéen infantry slid alongside either side of the republicans, using the cover of hedges to continually snipe at their column.
On high ground a league from the town, Beysser had some respite and put some order back into his column, deploying some guns to cover their further withdrawal. At one point some Vendéen guns were deployed and a large body of their infantry were poised to charge in once the republican guns were silenced but, making no progress, Beauvais then outflanked these republicans with this infantry and caused them to abandon their guns and flee in disorder.90
Beysser failed to rally and deploy on the Remouillé Heath and congestion at the Remouillé Bridge cost him a large quantity of equipment and a number of cannon. Beauvais was now ordered to restrain troops as D’Élbée did not want the victory compromised by counter-attacks, especially as Canclaux was still believed to be in Clisson.
Beauvais caught up with the pursuing troops and aimed to stop them at Aigrefeuille. Here, once more, the republicans deployed and a fierce fight developed. Two rebel guns eventually arrived and their fire swept aside an enemy column. An attempt to turn the republican position by an outflanking march caused Beysser to continue his retreat.91
With nightfall the pursuit ended and as Beysser’s troops marched on to the Sorinières Camp the Vendéens pulled back to Montaigu.92
A grenadier corporal named Broussais left a particularly interesting description of the battle and subsequent retreat, demonstrating how chaotic the day’s events had been.93 Having initially been deployed in a village outside the town, where he had been sent on reconnaissance with a party of grenadiers, they were forced to fight their way back into Montaigu only to find it evacuated. Under continual fire they managed to reach the rearguard. He described nearly being surrounded, being separated from the main column, having to leave the wounded behind, and experiencing moments when the enemy burst on them as they were often only a few paces away. The retreat, he said, lasted five hours.
Beysser complained to Canclaux about the conduct of the Battalion of Bas-Rhin: ‘The officers were more cowardly than the cowards they commanded,’ he wrote.94 However, within a matter of days Beysser was sent to Paris and would be guillotined in April 1794.
The rebels claimed fourteen cannon, two howitzers, twelve caissons and a vast haul of supplies.95 There are several reports that the Vendéens massacred hundreds of prisoners in Montaigu, hurling 400 alive into the château’s well in retaliation for republican brutality.96
Broussais wrote, ‘I am unable to evaluate our losses. Some say 1,200, others 1,500 to 1,800, several 2,000. I reckon we had lost 1,500.’97
Canclaux’s Retreat: 22nd September
A council of war was held in Montaigu at dawn on 22 September. At the opening of the meeting D’Élbée reminded those present that Bonchamps was to attack Clisson that same afternoon and that he was counting on their support. In fact Bonchamps and Lyrot were already on route with 7-8,000 men. Overnight, however, those in Montaigu received an appeal from parishes to their south reporting that Mieszkowski’s division had advanced to St-Fulgent and was laying waste to the area.
There is disagreement between sources over who was responsible for the decision to attack St-Fulgent: some say Charette, others Lescure. One of them argued that St-Fulgent was an open town and would be easy to attack, while Clisson was walled and protected by the River Sèvre.98
They debated for some time and while D’Élbée urged them to stick to the agreed plan, Lescure and Charette ultimately disobeyed. D’Élbée was evidently a commander-in-chief without the strength of character to enforce obedience. So while D’Élbée and part of the
army marched north, Lescure and Charette headed south. Charette sent a message to Royrand asking him to cut Mieszkowski’s southern line of retreat.
With Beysser’s defeat Canclaux knew he must act quickly and pull back to Nantes to avoid being surrounded. On 22 September he ordered Vimeux to move from Gétigné and camp that night at La Plée and at 1am Kléber received orders to follow him. The supply train was ordered to march next, with Beaupuy bringing up the rear, again with orders to camp at La Plée. Haxo, then in Pallet, received orders to follow Beaupuy once he had safely passed by.99 This 12,000 strong column was preceded by two battalions escorting the ambulance train.100
Canclaux moved as quickly as he could, with his southern flank covered by the Sèvre. When the front of the column reached La Galissonnière, just beyond Pallet, Bonchamps and Talmont launched an attack to cut their line of retreat. Deniau indicates that Bonchamps expected Charette to simultaneously attack from south of the Sèvre and when there was no sign of anyone he appeared to hesitate.101 However they soon pressed an attack near La Mercredière and Lyrot’s men began killing the wounded until Bonchamps personally intervened.
Aubert-Dubayet sent some troops forwards to assist the front of the column and succeeded in forcing the enemy to pull back, capturing two cannon in the process. The Chasseurs of Mayenne and twenty-five dragoons of the Ille-et-Vilaine had successfully stalled the Vendéen assault, enabling the column to continue its march.
An hour later cannon fire on the La Louée Heights indicated that the Vendéens were attacking once more. Aubert-Dubayet once again attacked with part of his column and Kléber wrote that the soldiers no longer marched but ran at the enemy, charging in with the bayonet. Under both infantry and cavalry attack the Vendéens withdrew once more, losing two more cannon in the process.102
Deniau suggests that when Bonchamps and Talmont next attacked, D’Élbée had joined them with reinforcements. Between them they launched a vigorous and determined assault on both the front and flank of Kléber’s men, held respectively by Targes and Patris.