by Rob Harper
The army reached Châteaubriand on the evening of 30 November to news that Angers was under direct threat. Marceau immediately wrote to Rossignol asking for orders, but none were forthcoming. Early on 2 December he again asked for orders, indicating that Angers was now under siege, but Rossignol’s only response was to say he would join them on the following day.
Rossignol had been too engrossed in political manoeuvring with Bourbotte, Prieur and Turreau against Danton’s friend Westermann, who they considered to be unprincipled and against whom Rossignol still bore a personal grudge. Late on 3 December Rossignol and the representatives arrived at Châteaubriand, and when asked why he had not ordered the march on Angers, the commander-in-chief simply blamed Marceau. After an angry confrontation Prieur concluded that it was less Marceau’s fault but rather Kléber’s, and announced that they would set up a military tribunal and have him guillotined.25
When Marceau passed on this news to Kléber he was furious, and in a state of near despair he confronted the representatives and told them some home truths about Rossignol. Their response was to order both Kléber and Marceau to march forthwith, and Rossignol was sent back to Rennes where he was quietly sidelined. At midnight, between 3 and 4 December, the army was on the march and great fires were lit along the way to provide moments of respite during a very cold night.
The Vendéens meanwhile had set out from Fougères on 25 November, passed through Ernée with their advance guard, and reached Mayenne that same day. Dysentery was taking hold as the weather closed in and many refugees and stragglers fell behind. It became a common sight to see bodies by the side of the road.
Their best cavalry resembled a band of pirates: each trooper armed with swords, carbines and several pistols, and many dressed in captured overcoats.26 A Council of War held in Mayenne on 26 November concluded with an agreement to march on Angers to force a breakthrough to the Vendée.
On 27 November the first of the rebels reached Laval and the rest drifted in over the following day; their rear was now continually harassed by 300 horse and 100 foot under Marigny and Decaen.
As the Vendéens advanced, so Danican dropped back towards Angers. On 29 November the rebels covered a considerable distance to reach Sablé and arrived at La Flèche on the following day, where they rested on 1 December. Never was the army so eager to march: both to escape the republicans and to get back to their home territory.
On 2 December they passed through Durtal and camped that evening under heavy rain around 10km north-east of Angers.
The Siege of Angers 3 to 4 December
The garrison of Angers was about 4,000 strong, including Boucret’s Brigade that had been dispatched from Rennes on 26 November, and Danican’s 2,000 troops who arrived two days before the siege.27 General Beaupuy, still recovering from the wound received at Entrammes, was also present.
Angers was surrounded by medieval walls interspersed with fifty-seven towers and many gateways, although the Vendéens only attempted to attack the part of the city on the east bank of the River Maine. The republicans had hastily walled up the Port Cupif and Port Saint-Michel, and had patched up areas of the town walls in particularly poor condition. They deployed six guns at the Port Cupif (two 8pdrs and four 4pdrs), a 36pdr at the Haute-Châine, and one in a redoubt on the opposite bank. The weakest points were protected by large ditches and earth ramparts. At the Port Cupif they constructed an inner defensive wall in dry stone, and two great ditches were cut on the Paris road, roughly 2km from the city, and another on the Saint-Serge Quay.28 A cutting was also made on the La Flèche road around a kilometre from Angers, served by two 4pdrs.29
The republican troops included two battalions of the 28th Line, one battalion of the 29th, one of the 78th Line, the 5th Paris, the Battalion de l’Unité, and a battalion of Veterans; all under the command of Danican and Boucret. The Angers National Guard was commanded by Captain Ménard who expressed concern that they did not have enough men to hold the length of the town’s walls.30 They had few cavalry.
Beaupuy played an important role advising on the defences and instructed the troops to place sacks of earth on the parapet to absorb enemy musket fire. However the defences were still incomplete when the Vendéens arrived.
Marigny filled in the ditches near Mortiers to enable the Vendéen artillery to move forwards and their army arrived under the walls of Angers early on 3 December.31 Around 9.30am part of their army was seen heading towards the Port Cupif.32 This was considered the weakest point of the city and suggests the Vendéens may have had some prior knowledge from their many sympathisers within Angers.
The Vendéen Assaults on Angers.
Their baggage was left around a kilometre back on the main road and the cavalry dismounted to join with the infantry. All those not fighting dispersed to find shelter and food, cramming into the buildings in the eastern suburbs.
Deniau indicates that the Vendéens deployed 8pdrs in the Rue des Pommiers, a cannon on the Rue de Paris, another on the Rue de Bouillou, and one above the course of the Pigeon Stream, near to a mill.33
The Departmental authorities recorded that the rebels attacked the Port Cupif ‘with audacity in spite of a well sustained fire-by-file and that of two 4pdrs posted on the ramparts’.34 The attack failed.
By 11.30am the Vendéen rearguard had arrived and moved into the area around the Joubert Factory and the vicinity of the Minimes, preparatory to attacking the Port St-Michel. Some guns were pushed forwards to target this entrance.35
A column of royalists, deployed on a nearby road ready to make an assault on this gate, was taking casualties from the republicans around the St-Michel Church.36 O’Daly provided covering fire so these royalists could advance, but the men would not cross the square as they had no ladders and no breach had been formed. Eventually some were pressed forwards and Beauvais recalled crossing the square and a ditch to reach the town gate, soon joined by Cady, Stofflet, several other leaders and more men. All they could do, however, was hurl insults at the enemy beyond the gate. In hindsight Beauvais regretted that they had not prepared explosives to help create a breach.37
The 36pdr at the Haute-Châine fired grapeshot and dismounted an 8pdr that had advanced along the Rue des Pommiers, and another gun was dismounted on the La Flèche road.38 The Vendéens had by now largely fallen back to the Saint-Serge Church and its neighbouring houses.
In spite of the lack of success at the Port St-Michel and Port Cupif, a third attack was made on the Port St-Aubin further south. Here the royalists took advantage of cover from houses that had not been demolished before the siege and which limited the effect of republican artillery from nearby towers. Nevertheless they could make no progress, as the republicans covered the approach and dismounted two cannon deployed on the road to fire on the gate.39
Ménard later reported that twenty cannon, supported by infantry, countered the Vendéen fire all the way from the Haute-Châine to the Port St-Aubin, and that the interior of the gates had been lined with further walls supported by heavy guns.40
Several times during the night the Vendéens near the Port St-Michel sent for news from their left, but with no response. It was clear that the attacks were not being coordinated, enabling the Republicans to race to each point in turn as they became the focus of battle.
4 December
Beauvais remained near the Port St-Michel until 2am, in the vain hope that someone would find a way to form a breach, but the plummeting temperature forced him to pull back. Under cover of darkness the rebels had managed to sneak across the St-Aubin Square, armed with axes to beat in a chevaux-de-frise protecting the Port St-Aubin, but once the firing recommenced, ‘all who dared to advance were shot.’41
Around 9am rebel fire once again intensified at the Port St-Michel, where Marigny, Herbault and Piron were then located.42 By keeping careful watch on this area the republicans noticed that during the night, under the cover of some houses near the gate, the enemy had moved forwards, filled up two ditches, and had been busy picking awa
y at the dry stone walls.
The danger became more imminent when a column was spotted gathering behind these houses to await the call that the gate was open to rush into the town.43 A wall ten to twelve feet thick was constructed behind this gate in a matter of hours. Combustible material was also gathered, its smoke soon filling the area and forcing the rebels to withdraw. Ménard was praised by Benaben for having fascines smeared with tar, resin and pitch, and having these thrown down onto the Vendéens.44
At one point in the battle an 8pdr, placed on a roof near the Port St-Michel, fell through and crushed some of the defenders.45
La Rochejaquelein was furious that the soldiers did not join him in an assault on a small breach made near the Port St-Michel. Dismounted, and with fusil in hand, he called on them again, but as only a handful of officers joined him the attempt was soon abandoned.46
At the Port Cupif a number of Vendéens were gathered by Perrault and La Ville-Baugé but their attack was beaten back and groups of Vendéen cavalry were cut down by the 36pdr firing from the Haute-Châine.47 Another small breach seems to have been formed at Lices, south of Port St-Aubin, but when a group of attackers attempted to break in they were cut down by grapeshot.48
Groups of Vendéens were starting to slip away from the action to find shelter in the suburbs away from the fighting and soldiers were even resorting to firing pebbles as they were running so low on ammunition.49
With little progress being made, and with no siege guns, the Vendéen leaders discussed various options, including building up fascines to make an attempt to escalade the Port Cupif; operating a diversion on Les Ponts-de-Cé to secure an escape route in that direction; or leaving 1,500 men to cover Angers while they made a feint on Les Ponts-de-Cé while moving on Ingrandes.50
Les Ponts-de-Cé was protected by 1,800 soldiers and ten guns, but D’Autichamp was adamant that his division could secure the crossing. When La Rochejaquelein sent cavalry to scout out the area they reported back that such an attempt would be futile.51
While a final attempt on Angers was underway reports were coming in that the rear of the Vendéen army and their baggage train was under attack. La Rochejaquelein set out with the cavalry, but the Republicans were only forced to retreat once Stofflet had joined him with a few hundred infantry and some cannon an hour or so later.52
General Moulin, who commanded at Les Ponts-de-Cé, now appeared with around sixty cavalry and a detachment of infantry in the Bressigny Suburb, surprising the Vendéens in that area.53
With republican detachments to the north and east, and their main army beginning to arrive from the west, the Vendéens were in imminent danger and quickly lifted the siege. Between 4 and 5pm they departed in a northeasterly direction, camping that night in a village at the junction of the Baugé road.54
At midnight on 3 December Kléber and Marceau had set out for Angers and began arriving at 4pm on the following day.
The heavily outnumbered Republican garrison had been quite content to sit behind their defences and await their main army.
Ménard wrote:
‘All of the troops deserve praise, and especially the national guards. The veterans policed the interior. The old, young girls, women and children, carried munitions and supplies to the soldiers on the ramparts. The military men and the inhabitants formed a family that day.’55
The Vendéens lost 600 killed, an unknown number of wounded, and left behind three cannon and a vast quantity of fusils. The republican losses, in killed and wounded, totalled around 400.56
Benaben accused General Danican of treachery, indicating that while the battle was underway Danican was in bed claiming to be recovering from a fall from his horse, and when the town was in the greatest danger he moved his effects by wagon to the Port St-Nicholas on the far side of Angers. He also accused Danican of deploying his cavalry and a battalion of the 38th Regiment in the vicinity of the bridge, which he had illuminated as a signal to the brigands that he had withdrawn his regiment from the Port Cupif, thus encouraging them to make one more assault. As a result, he claimed, that gate was only guarded by five soldiers between 10pm and 1am. Ménard apparently had the position occupied by the 2nd Battalion of the 38th Regiment.57
Although Danican was now considered suspect, with some justification he claimed that it was the 2,000 men he sent to Angers that had saved the town. Danican was dismissed, having been accused of deserting his post at Entrammes and of aiming to abandon Angers during the siege.58
General Marigny, one of the finest officers in the republican army, was sent in pursuit of the Vendéens as they moved north from Angers. Aiming to take advantage of their disorder he charged a large column with 150 men but was struck by a cannon ball and killed.
Marceau’s column finally reached Angers around 10pm on 4 December, followed the next day by Westermann and Tilly. Kléber and Marceau rested the troops that day while, in company with Westermann, they investigated which road the Vendéens had taken and came across many men, women and children who had died from cold and hunger. They massacred other stragglers and brought others back as prisoners.
Chapter 15
The Death of an Army
The March on La Flèche
The Vendéen army spent the night of 4 to 5 December at Pellouailles, and Suette and a council of war failed to reach agreement over what they should do next, so they headed to Baugé in the hope of securing provisions.
It was on 5 December that Marceau was confirmed as general of brigade, brevet general of division, and interim commander-in-chief of the Army of the West, with orders to pursue the Vendéens until the arrival of General Turreau. Representative Turreau headed for Saumur to coordinate its defence with General Commaire as he feared it might be a potential target for the rebels.1
Marceau had received orders to suspend a number of officers including Kléber, but also received a secret communication from the Minister of War not to reveal Kléber’s suspension as they still believed he could be of service to the Republic. Marceau and Kléber had both been in a precarious position for several days, Kléber even dryly joking that they would at least be guillotined together.2
Kléber’s division was sent along the north bank of the Loire to cover Saumur, and Tilly was sent towards Suette. Westermann received orders to harass the enemy and Muller was ordered to follow him with his division, to occupy strong positions in case they were attacked, and to protect Westermann’s cavalry if they were forced to retreat. Under no circumstances was anyone permitted to take unnecessary risks. The republicans were on the march in the early hours of 6 December.
The Vendéens entered Baugé unopposed and on route Royrand died, having at last succumbed to the wound received at Entrammes.
On 6 December republican chasseurs and horse artillery appeared before Baugé. Madame de la Rochejaquelein wrote that these troops were posted in a small wood at the end of a plain that surrounded the town. From her window she watched as a body of Vendéens crossed the plain at great speed to attack the enemy. The republicans quickly fled.
When the Vendéens assembled on the following day, they believed that they were about to march on Saumur, but with no explanation the order was changed and they took the road to La Flèche instead.3
La Flèche 7 and 8 December
By the time the Siege of Angers was underway, General Chabot, previously at Alençon, became commander-in-chief of troops in Le Mans. With Representative Garnier, 700 infantry and 160 cavalry, he marched to La Flèche to cut the bridges over the Durtal and Lude Rivers.
Towards midday on 7 December a detachment of Vendéen cavalry, that was leading their advance guard, approached La Flèche. They were spotted by some national guards who had now been reinforced by Chabot and were supported by two guns. The Pont-des-Carmes had been cut and the republicans deployed along the north bank of the Loire to prevent various fords being used.4
The assault on La Flèche.
A cannon deployed on the Pont-des-Carmes opened fire, as did troops deployed nea
rby. For two hours the Vendéen advance guard exchanged fire with the republicans, hoping to find a way across the river.
At around 1pm three large Vendéen columns appeared, supported by many cannon. On 8 December, writing to his colleague Letourneur, Garnier-de-Saintes would claim that they were attacked by 18,000 Vendéens at four or five points.
When La Rochejaquelein arrived with the bulk of the army he knew they needed to cross the river urgently as Westermann was harassing their rearguard around Clefs. Sending men along the river to test its depth, he was advised that a crossing was possible downstream at La Bruère Mill and that it was only weakly guarded.5
According to Bordereau and D’Obenheim, some Vendéens crossed the river in small boats, under covering fire from artillery and small arms, and soon repulsed a detachment of republicans that attempted to stop them. Madame de la Rochejaquelein, however, suggests that this crossing was very much in the hands of the commander-in-chief, indicating that he took 400 cavalry, each with an infantryman riding pillion, and dashed to the ford. They crossed the river with the water reaching up to their necks and, she states, encountered no resistance. They then marched under cover of fog to the edge of the town, where the infantry dismounted and were all instructed to cry ‘Vive la Roi!’ before being ordered to rush into the town.6 When this column was spotted, Chabot’s men quickly retreated to Foulletourte on the Le Mans road.