Arnhem

by William F Buckingham

  I saw the remains of the battalion as it turned off the main road, following the line of trees into the HQ area. The men were exhausted, filthy, and bleeding; their discipline was immaculate…Their commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Ken Smyth, his right arm bandaged where a bullet had struck, reported breathlessly: ‘We have been heavily taken on, sir. I have sixty men left.’ ‘What has happened to Hackett?’ I asked. ‘He’ll be here as soon as they can disengage…They were in rather a mess in the woods up there.’83

  The move had cost the 10th Battalion around 190 killed or missing, comparable to the 179 men lost by 156 Battalion in its vain attempt to force a passage down the Breedelaan. The difference was that Colonel Des Vœux’s Battalion, along with Hackett and Brigade HQ, were still embroiled in the mess in the woods, and would remain so for several hours.

  ***

  Fifty miles to the south at Son the end of the German Tuesday evening attack along the Wilhelmina Canal sparked a furious bout of redeployments and defence building that lasted into the early hours of Wednesday 20 September. In the immediate aftermath of the attack the 1st Battalion 327th Glider Infantry Regiment was brought down from the landing area to establish a defensive perimeter south of the Wilhelmina Canal, reinforced with two more 57mm anti-tank guns from the 81st Airborne Anti-Aircraft Battalion and augmented by a ‘narrow minefield’ laid by a platoon from the 326th Airborne Engineer Battalion. As the partial delivery of the third lift had left the glider battalion understrength, the 2nd Battalion 506th Parachute Infantry was brought up from Eindhoven and deployed east of Son on the north side of the Canal, and at 05:00 the 15th/19th Hussars were also put on standby to move south over the Son bridge to assist if necessary.84 These precautions proved to be prudent as Panzer Brigade 107 renewed the attack along the south side of the Wilhelmina Canal at 06:15, on the assumption that the US defenders would not be expecting an attack on exactly the same point so soon, and because Major von Maltzahn considered a daylight attack feasible owing to the amount of self-propelled flak deployed by his formation ‒ around 250 assorted 37mm, 20mm and 15mm weapons.85 The attack once again came during a US reconnaissance effort, this time involving two Jeeps carrying Captain T. P. Wilder and nine men from the Division Reconnaissance Platoon, who were despatched to locate the German concentration area and ascertain how and where they were moving men and vehicles across the canal. Departing while it was still dark, Captain Wilder’s party came upon an unidentified British Colonel after a mile or so, likely Lieutenant-Colonel Anthony Taylor commanding the 15th/19th Hussars, who was on the same mission in an armoured scout car. The three vehicles therefore travelled together for another mile or so before Taylor stopped in the pre-dawn gloom to allow a 150-strong party of what he assumed were US troops to cross the road. The infantry were in fact Germans and realised that the vehicles were enemy as Taylor and Wilder tried to quietly reverse back to where the road was wide enough to turn their vehicles around. The scout car and Jeeps then escaped unscathed under a fusillade of German fire, and the Captain Wilder set up two mutually supporting machine-gun posts back down the road toward Son that successfully held the German column back until the Reconnaissance Platoon was relieved later in the day.86

  Back at the Son bridge Panzer Brigade 107’s 06:15 attack fell on the sector occupied by Captain Walter L. Miller’s Company C from the 327th Glider Infantry Regiment, which, due to the fragmented glider lift, consisted of just the Company HQ element, 1st Platoon and the Company mortar and machine-gun squads. The attackers overran and wiped out an outpost that nonetheless managed to raise the alarm in the process, but Miller managed to rebuff the German infantry by keeping control of the few shallow ditches leading toward the bridge site by switching his men back and forth across his sector, while the 57mm anti-tank guns kept the accompanying Panthers at bay; the attackers were also constrained by a lack of cover and room to manoeuvre because of the Canal. Major von Maltzahn then launched an additional assault on the 1st Battalion 506th Parachute Infantry north of the Wilhelmina Canal before renewing the attack on Captain Miller’s sector at around 07:15, employing more infantry and eight Panthers, which was only held by reinforcing Miller with a platoon-and-a-half from the 326th Airborne Engineer Battalion and co-opted HQ elements from the 506th Regiment en route to join the 1st Battalion north of the Canal. The day was saved by the arrival of ten Cromwells from the 15th/19th Hussars from the 05:00 stand to. The first two vehicles ran onto the US minefield despite attempted warnings from Company C. Captain Miller was blown off the rear deck of one vehicle and then wounded in the leg by German machine-gun fire. In a sharp exchange of fire the British tanks knocked out four Panthers in exchange for another Cromwell. By the late morning the attack was over and, having failed again to reach Son or the bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal and losing ten per cent of its strength, Panzer Brigade 107 withdrew eastward to regroup and work out a more integrated plan of attack.87 They were followed at 11:45 by a sweep to clear the area east of the Eindhovenseweg up to the River Dommel as far as Bokt to open the road to traffic, carried out by the 327th Glider Infantry Regiment’s Companies A and C reinforced with a platoon from the 1st Battalion 506th Regiment and supported by the 15th/19th Hussars’ seven surviving Cromwells; three of them followed the sweep line while the remaining four covered the flank with fire from the Eindhovenseweg. The action cost the 101st Airborne Division two dead and twenty-eight wounded and while German casualty figures are unclear, the Airborne soldiers and Hussars took eighty-five German prisoners. It also underscored the vulnerability of the location, so while the Division service area remained at Son with the 326th Airborne Engineer Battalion as security, Division HQ temporarily relocated at 08:30 to Wolfswinkel, just over a mile north of Son, and then to a permanent site in the castle at St. Oedenrode at 16:00.88

  While all this was going on the remainder of the 327th Glider Infantry Regiment was taking responsibility for protecting the artillery and support units in the Division area and LZ W for future use. To that end, the 2nd Battalions swept the Zonsche Forest prior to setting up a defensive position on the eastern side and embarking on an intensive programme of patrolling, while the 3rd Battalion was made responsible for gathering supplies and forwarding them to Division HQ; this led to an afternoon skirmish with a German patrol that penetrated onto the LZ, which was driven off after suffering a number of casualties. Similarly, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions 502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment were to be reunited with the Regiment’s HQ and 1st Battalion at St. Oedenrode and made responsible for that area. The withdrawal from east of Best was delayed by accurate German shelling until counter-battery fire from the 377th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion suppressed the German guns and prevented German reinforcements reaching Best from the north, and the two Battalions finally moved off at 17:00, although their destination had suffered from ‘spasmodic but heavy shelling’ throughout the day. The 1st Battalion’s Command Post was hit by an artillery salvo just after midday that killed four men and wounded two more, compelling Lieutenant-Colonel Cassidy to relocate to a factory cellar. In the late afternoon the Division HQ advance party came under direct fire from German self-propelled guns while preparing the castle for its new role as the Division Command Post. Cassidy responded by personally sallying forth into the growing dusk with a platoon from his Company A and two of the 15th/19th Hussars’ tanks, and successfully drove off the enemy guns.

  Another hot spot in the 101st Airborne Division’s area on 20 September was the east bank of the River Aa north of Veghel, involving Lieutenant-Colonel Harry W. O. Kinnard’s 1st Battalion 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment. In order to keep the enemy off balance the 501st Regiment’s commander, Colonel Howard R. Johnson, authorised Kinnard to carry out a Battalion sweep to eliminate the enemy from the area between Veghel and Heeswijk, four miles to the north along the parallel River Aa and Zuid Willems Canal. As the 1st Battalion’s Company C was already ensconced in the area of Heeswijk and nearby Dinther on outpost duty, Kinnard intended to have it seal the north
ern end of the area by securing bridges over the River Dommel and Zuid Willems Canal directly west of Heeswijk, while Companies A and B moved north in-line abreast, with Company A between the watercourses and Company A on the right between the River and the Veghel‒Heeswijk road. The attack began at 09:30 and ran into the German main line of resistance thirty minutes later; by 17:30 the manoeuvring force had pushed the Germans back out of two sets of prepared positions into the kill zone prepared by Company C to their rear. The fight cost the 1st Battalion four dead and six wounded, the dead including Lieutenant Henry J. Pulhaski from Company A, killed on going forward to investigate a white flag. The action inflicted forty dead and the same number wounded on the enemy. A further 418 Germans surrendered. The attackers then set up individual Company perimeters in the vicinity of Dinther and Heeswijk where they remained unmolested through 21 September. The remainder of the 501st Regiment also had a relatively quiet day, with the 2nd Battalion in Veghel processing the prisoners coming back from the 1st Battalion’s fight while the 3rd Battalion conducted patrols around Eerde to the west, which noted the Germans digging in around Schijndel. Of more immediate concern was the supply situation, as fuel was running short and the K and D Rations brought in on 17 September were all but exhausted; only thirty per cent of the latest supply drop had been recovered and many paratroopers were thus becoming increasingly short of food despite the best efforts of the local civilian population, especially those farthest from the Division service area at Son. On the other hand, the morning of 20 September brought a solution to the plight of the mounting number of Airborne casualties, with the arrival of a convoy of thirty ambulances and four 2½-ton trucks, which carried the casualties south to the 24th Evacuation Hospital at Bourg Leopold in Belgium. This shuttle continued throughout the remainder of the Operation, apart from temporary halts caused by the Germans cutting the road south.89

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  In the 82nd Airborne Division’s area to the north, Major-General Gavin spent the small hours of Wednesday 20 September working out the details of his scheme to secure the Nijmegen road and rail bridges across the River Waal. The scheme was relatively simple but relied upon speed and bold application to head off the developing impasse by securing both ends of the bridges. The effort against the south end of the road and rail bridges was to be resumed by the West and East Forces, while Colonel Tucker and the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment was to advance north from the Jonkerbosch wood and clear the three miles up to the crossing point on the River Waal, just east of the confluence between the Maas-Waal Canal and the River Waal. Gavin had selected that spot as the canal provided a covered embarkation point and a calmer area for the paratroopers to familiarise themselves with the assault boats rather than the fast-flowing open river; the boats were to be crewed by men from the 307th Airborne Engineer Battalion. On the downside the crossing point was 1,500 yards downstream from the railway bridge and a further 1,000 yards from the road bridge, although the distance would hopefully keep the boats clear of the German defences protecting the bridges. Artillery support was to be provided by the 504th Regiment’s organic 81mm mortars, the 376th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, which Gavin had relocated to bring the crossing site within range, and the Guards Armoured Division’s 153 Field Regiment RA equipped with twenty-four Sexton self-propelled 25-Pounder guns. Direct fire support was to be provided by two 57mm anti-tank guns from the 80th Airborne Anti-Aircraft Battalion and the Sherman tanks of the 2nd (Armoured) Battalion Irish Guards, which were to line the south bank and shoot the paratroopers across; it is unclear if the tanks were also to assist in the clearing of the area up to the crossing point. The major question mark hung over the arrival of the assault boats, which Gavin had hoped would be delivered before daybreak to allow the crossing to begin under cover of darkness, although this somewhat optimistic hope was dashed at some point during the night when word reached Gavin’s HQ that the boats would not arrive until at least midday. The crossing would therefore have to take place in full daylight and thus in full view of the Germans manning the defences on the north bank of the River Waal.90

  Back at the Keizer Lodewijkplein Lieutenant-Colonel Vandervoort’s paratroopers from Companies E and F, 2nd Battalion 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment spent the night shoring up their hold on the buildings adjacent to the traffic circle and patrolling to probe the German positions and dominate the flame-illuminated streets, again sparking numerous no-quarter fights between small groups in darkened rooms and alleyways. As muzzle flash tended to attract unwelcome attention firing was kept to a minimum and many encounters were decided with rifle butts, bayonets or trench knives; one party from Company E resorted to exactly those means to empty a group of occupied slit trenches.91 Their opponents were engaged in similar activities. A six-man German patrol approached the house occupied by Corporal Earl Boling and his Squad and attempted to storm the building when the paratroopers engaged them with a hand-thrown rifle grenade. One German almost gained entry via the window guarded by Boling after he fumbled changing magazines on his Browning Automatic Rifle; the interloper was shot several times in the face at point-blank range by Private George Wood using a Beretta pistol he had picked up as a souvenir in Sicily.92 Rank meant nothing: when another German patrol approached the house occupied by Lieutenant-Colonel Vandervoort’s HQ they were cut down by his men firing through the ‘lace curtained front door and windows’.93 The fighting may have been sharp and brutal by necessity but there was also the occasional flicker of humanity. Sometimes men were taken prisoner rather than killed, and at one point in Company E’s sector the Germans requested and were granted a short local ceasefire to evacuate some wounded; the paratroopers stood watching their opponents work, albeit with weapons at the ready.94

  Shortly after distributing the order to suspend the attacks toward the rail and road bridges Lieutenant-Colonel Goulbourn was summoned to 5th Guards Armoured Brigade HQ, where Brigadier Gwatkin informed him that the Grenadier Guards Group and the 505th Regiment were to be responsible for resuming the effort the following day, and that US troops would be conducting a river crossing to the west of Nijmegen supported by tanks from the Irish Guards Group. For some reason Gwatkin’s instructions also differed somewhat from Gavin’s stated intent, for Captain Neville’s West Force was to remain in place rather than renewing its drive for the railway bridge and act as a flank guard for the drive on the road bridge and the proposed river crossing to the west. As he was leaving Gwatkin’s HQ, Goulbourn overheard a snippet of conversation from a staff officer, reporting that the Irish Guards tanks would no longer be required at 08:00 as planned. This was likely connected to the delay in getting the assault boats to the head of the Guards Armoured Division’s column, but Goulbourn interpreted it to mean that the river crossing to the west had been cancelled. He therefore returned to his HQ via Lieutenant-Colonel Vandervoort’s Command Post under the false impression that his attack toward the road bridge was to be the sole effort to cross the River Waal that day.

  Lieutenant-Colonel Goulbourn’s scheme for 20 September was a two-stage affair. The first stage involved the 2nd Battalion 505th Parachute Infantry’s Companies E and F holding in place masking the Hunnerpark on either side of the Keizer Lodewijkplein while the Grenadier Guards Group expanded the attack frontage on their left toward the River Waal; the expansion would take in the entire north-west side of the Valkhofpark and Hunnerpark, which would mean the SS defenders would have to protect themselves from three directions at once. With this complete, the second stage was to be a co-ordinated and simultaneous attack by Guardsmen and paratroopers intended to pinch off the SS defences at the south end of the road bridge in their entirety and allow the entire structure to be secured. To that end Major Harry Stanley’s No. 4 Company, presumably accompanied by Major George Thorne’s column and possibly reinforced with a Troop of Shermans, was to extend its frontage to the right from the post office and link up with Vandervoort’s paratroopers on the left of the Keizer Lodewijkplein. Goulbourn’s No. 2 Company
, also reinforced with a Troop of tanks, was to move in on Stanley’s left and Captain the Hon. Vicary Gibbs King’s Company on his left, also reinforced with four Shermans. The repositioning was scheduled to begin at 08:15.95 Although it took longer than expected, by 14:00 the 1st Grenadier Guards three Companies had not only completed the repositioning but had pushed east and cleared the area of narrow streets up to the Lindenberg along the western edge of the Valkhofpark, including the large police station and convent buildings; in doing this they liberated Captain Jonathan E. Adams and his men from the 1st Battalion 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment, who had been in hiding since the initial abortive attempt to seize the road bridge on the night of 17-18 September.96 With stage one of his scheme completed, Lieutenant-Colonel Goulbourn conferred with Lieutenant-Colonel Vandervoort on the details for the co-ordinated assault on the SS defences covering the south end of the bridge, which was scheduled to go in at 15:30.97 While all this was going on the men of the Companies E and F, whilst remaining alert, turned their attention to the pressing matter of food as the K and D Rations brought in on 17 September had run out the previous day and no resupply had reached Vandervoort’s Battalion. The paratroopers made up the shortfall by helping themselves to the tame rabbits and vegetable patches that abounded in the Dutch suburban back gardens and ‘GI rabbit stew’ became the plat du jour. Although it likely did not overly worry the hungry Airborne recipients, the quality appears to have been variable; Lieutenant-Colonel Vandervoort remarked that he did not ‘recall that it qualified as gourmet’.98