Arnhem

by William F Buckingham

  While the 2nd Battalion 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment was watching and dining at the Keizer Lodewijkplein, the Regiment’s 1st and 3rd Battalions were facing a resurgent threat on the south and east faces of the 82nd Airborne Division’s perimeter, along with the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment. On 17 September Wehrkreis VI, an administrative HQ located at Münster, had been charged with dealing with the US landing near Nijmegen and operational responsibility was devolved to General Kurt Feldt, who was given two Fallschirmjäger Divisions with which to complete the task. These formations had to be concentrated at Cleve as their constituent units were located at a variety of locations across western Germany however, and while this was being done Feldt had despatched Generalleutnant Gerd Scherbening and the 406 z.b.V. Division to attack the US perimeter in the morning of 18 September; Scherbening’s men rapidly overran the sparsely defended landing area and it took strenuous counter-attacks by elements of the 505th and 508th Regiments to eject the interlopers in time for the 82nd Airborne Division’s glider lift in the mid-afternoon, inflicting a crushing defeat on the motley collection of German units. However, by 20 September the main body of Korps Feldt’s force had reached the front and was poised to deliver a violent and co-ordinated attack along the entire eastern aspect of the 82nd Airborne Division’s already stretched perimeter, in tandem with an attack on the southern aspect from out of the Reichswald forest by General der Fallschirmtruppe Eugen Meindl’s II Fallschirm Korps. The attack was intended to capture the Groesbeek Heights via this pincer movement before clearing the area between the high ground and the Maas-Waal Canal, and securing Nijmegen.99

  The attack from the east was assigned to two formations. Luftwaffe Major Karl-Heinz Becker’s Kampfgruppe was essentially the cadre of the badly mauled 3 Fallschirmjäger Division made up of the remnants of Fallschirmjäger Regiments 5, 8 and 9 augmented with recently drafted recruits totalling around 700 men, together with the Division’s surviving reconnaissance, engineer, anti-tank and flak elements and five assault guns from Fallschirm Sturmgeschütze Brigade 12. Becker’s eastern attack force was augmented with a Heer Kampfgruppe commanded by Hauptmann Clemens Freiherr von Fürstenberg consisting of a reserve aufklärungs abteilung equipped with armoured half-tracks, a small flak detachment with two 20mm and one 88mm guns and Infanterie Bataillon ‘Isphording’, around 500 men in total. Kampfgruppe Becker was to attack and clear Wyler before pushing west across the US landing area and onto the Groesbeek Heights, while on the right Kampfgruppe von Fürstenberg was to attack and clear Beek before pushing into Nijmegen to relieve Kampfgruppen Euling and Henke holding the Waal bridges; both formations were then to push on and clear the east bank of the Maas-Waal Canal as far north as the Honinghutie bridge. The attack on the southern aspect of the US perimeter was also assigned to two formations. Kampfgruppe Geschick was to advance north-west along the Grafwegen-Groesbeek road, envelop and secure the latter before pressing onto the Groesbeek Heights and linking up with Kampfgruppe Becker. To achieve this Major Geschick commanded a Luftwaffe Festung Bataillon, a so-called ‘ear battalion’ made up of overage conscripts with hearing problems attached from 406 z.b.V. Division, backed with a number of 20mm, 37mm and 88mm flak guns from 4 FlaK Division divided into two groups configured for ground support, totalling just under a thousand men. Finally, Luftwaffe Oberstleutnant Hermann’s Kampfgruppe, consisting of Fallschirmjäger Lehr Regiment 21 augmented with a kompanie of Flemish Waffen SS, supported by some 20mm and 88mm flak guns again configured for direct fire support and the guns of Fallschirm Artillerie Regiment 6. This force was reinforced with Kampfgruppe Goebel, which had been ejected from Mook by elements of the 1st Battalion 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment in the late afternoon of 18 September. Kampfgruppe Hermann was tasked to attack north out of the Reichswald forest up the east bank of the River Maas, secure Riethorst and Mook and then push on and seize the Molenhoek bridge over the Maas-Waal Canal, thereby blocking the flow of Allied supplies and troop reinforcements into Nijmegen and severing the Airborne Corridor.100

  The attack on the east side of the US perimeter began before first light with an artillery and mortar bombardment on the hilltop position occupied by two Platoons from Company A 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment, reinforced with a Platoon from Company G commanded by Lieutenant John P. Foley, and a probe against an outpost to the front of the position. The bombardment ceased just after first light and an estimated kompanie of Fallschirmjäger from Kampfgruppe Becker attacked the US position, some of whom pressed forward to within five yards of the defender’s five .30 machine-guns before being stopped. At one point an immaculately dressed German officer came forward and demanded that the US commander surrender his men and assemble them on the road in front of the hill, to which Lieutenant Foley replied, ‘If you want me come and get me!’ The fight went on for an hour before the Fallschirmjäger broke contact and withdrew to regroup. The attack to the southern sector began later, at 11:00. Kampfgruppe Geschick subjected Major James L Kaiser’s 3rd Battalion 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment to a concentrated bombardment from its assorted flak guns before a fierce attack that pushed Major Kaiser’s outposts back half a mile to the outskirts of Groesbeek before the paratroopers were able to impose a pause. To the west Kampfgruppe Hermann treated Major Talton W. Long’s 1st Battalion 505th Regiment to a similarly concentrated bombardment thickened with nebelwerfer rockets before attacking up the main road to Nijmegen, concentrating a complete bataillon on each village to ensure overwhelming numerical superiority. The German advance rolled over a roadblock at Plasmolen manned by Company B, from which only Private Albert Mallis escaped before moving on the half mile or so to Riethorst, which was defended by two platoons from B and C Companies. The first German assault was rebuffed with the assistance of ten 75mm Pack Howitzers, but a subsequent attack drove the US paratroopers out of the village; the survivors regrouped on the wooded Kiekberg hill to the east, from where they continued to harass German traffic on the main road. Kampfgruppe Hermann then pushed on another two miles to Mook, which was defended by two platoons from Company B. After a vicious house-to-house fight one US platoon was pushed back out of the town while the other went to ground in the cellars and continued the fight despite being overrun.101 By the early afternoon of 20 September the south-eastern quadrant of the 82nd Airborne Division’s perimeter was thus again on the verge of being overwhelmed in a rerun of events two days earlier, and the Germans were on the verge of reaching the bridge over the Maas-Waal Canal at Molenhoek. Drastic action was required if they were to be prevented from severing the Airborne Corridor.

  Six miles or so to the north-west of the 82nd Airborne Division’s landing area, the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment spent the small hours of 20 September 1944 absorbing the fact they had been slated for an assault crossing of the River Waal and making preparations. According to one source they were collectively ‘flabbergasted’ and many viewed the prospect with something short of enthusiasm; while the views of the rank-and-file are unclear, the Regiment’s officers were quite forthright. Lieutenant Allen McClain from the 3rd Battalion recalled, ‘If ever I had wanted to be somewhere else…it would have been then.’ His Battalion commander, Major Julian Cook, was reportedly ‘dumbfounded’ and Cook’s Operations Officer, Captain Henry B. Keep, considered that ‘the odds were very much against us’. The sentiment was echoed by Lieutenant John Holabird from the 307th Airborne Engineer Battalion’s Company C, which was tasked to crew the assault boats for the crossing: ‘I still hoped – or believed – the mission would be called off before we left; that we would wait around there until dark and then be sent back.’102 Colonel Tucker had other ideas and issued his orders at 06:00. The move north to the crossing site was to be led by Major Edward N. Wellems’ understrength 2nd Battalion, consisting of just Company D and HQ Company, as Companies E and F were deployed protecting the Grave bridge and crossings over the Maas-Waal Canal; Major Wellems’ men were also to provide security for the crossing site. Major Cook’s 3rd Battalion was
second in the column, tasked to spearhead the river crossing and presumably accompanied by Captain Wesley D. Harris’ Company C, 307th Airborne Engineer Battalion, while Major Willard E. Harrison’s 1st Battalion brought up the rear and were to be ferried over the River Waal in the wake of Major Cook’s Battalion.

  The move to the River Waal began at 07:30 with Company D in the lead, under orders from Colonel Tucker to avoid contact if at all possible in order to avoid alerting the Germans to what was going on. As a result it took Company D around four-and-a-half hours to navigate a path to the crossing site, and the paratroopers, despite orders, were nonetheless obliged to deal with some individuals or small groups of Germans encountered en route. Company D reached the crossing point at around midday and the remainder of the 504th Regiment followed without incident; on arrival the paratroopers were deployed into an area of low ground shielded from enemy observation by factory buildings and the riverside dyke.103 The crossing had been provisionally scheduled to commence at 11:00 but this was put back to 13:30, so the keyed-up paratroopers settled down to await the arrival of the assault boats.

  14

  D Plus 3

  12:00 to 23:59 Wednesday 20 September 1944

  After a largely uneventful march from the Jonkerbosch woods, Colonel Rueben H. Tucker and the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment had reached the launch point for their assault crossing of the River Waal by around midday. As the assault boats were still en route, the paratroopers were deployed into an area of low ground where they were screened from view by the riverside dyke and adjacent factory buildings. On arrival the commander of the 307th Airborne Engineer Battalion’s Company C, Captain Wesley D. Harris, went to investigate the proposed loading site on the Maas-Waal Canal. Major Julian Cook, the commander of the 3rd Battalion, ascended to the ninth floor of a nearby power station accompanied by his Operations Officer, Captain Henry B. Keep, and his Company commanders to get a look at the crossing point. The sight was not a reassuring one.

  The first obstacles were on the south side of the Waal, consisting of the dyke and a 150-yard stretch of mud beach to reach the water’s edge. On the far bank there was 800 yards of totally open ground between the water’s edge and a broad, 30-foot-high dyke carrying the Oosterhoutsedijk riverside road that angled away from the river to the west. The Germans were dug in on and behind the dyke in a network of trenches, bunkers and automatic weapon emplacements, which were reinforced to the east by the Fort Beneden Lent.1 This was a brick defensive work complete with moat, constructed in the mid-nineteenth century to protect the Nijmegen river crossing, and the 20mm flak guns mounted there and those emplaced on the railway bridge were ideally positioned to deliver enfilade fire into the crossing site. The bridge defences, which consisted of thirty-four machine-guns, two 20mm flak guns and an 88mm dual-purpose piece, were to prove especially deadly.2 Unsurprisingly, Captain Keep recalled that the first view of the crossing site drew gasps from the assembled officers and Captain T. Moffatt Burriss, the commander of Company I, thought the upcoming operation ‘looked like a suicide mission’.3 This impression was heightened when a formation of Allied transport aircraft passed overhead heading north and a ‘veritable wall of small arms and flak greeted them from the area north of the Waal’.4

  Major Cook’s party appear to have been joined by Browning, Horrocks, the commander of the 2nd Irish Guards Lieutenant-Colonel Giles Vandeleur and a retinue of staff-officers and observers, along with Gavin and Colonel Tucker and his staff. The precise timing of the conference is uncertain, but it occurred at some point between midday and 13:30, when Gavin was called away to address the rapidly deteriorating situation in the south-eastern sector of the 82nd Airborne Division’s perimeter.5 The meeting was another study in contrasting battlefield sartorial styles, as noted by Glider Pilot Colonel George Chatterton, who presumably attended as part of Browning’s entourage. Chatterton noted one Guards officer in suede shoes perched on a shooting stick, while three more sported suede chukka boots, corduroys and old school scarves, in contrast to the more warlike appearance of Colonel Tucker, ‘who was wearing a helmet that almost covered his face. His pistol was in a holster under his left arm and he had a knife strapped to his thigh.’ Tucker also conformed to Horrocks’ popular American stereotype by chewing a cigar that he only removed occasionally ‘long enough to spit’; Chatterton was amused to note that ‘faint looks of surprise flickered over the faces of the Guards’ officers’ every time he did so.6

  One of the senior officers, presumably Gavin, briefed the assembled officers on the details of the crossing, which was now scheduled to begin at 15:00, dependent on the arrival of the assault boats. A flight of eight Typhoons was to strafe the German positions on the north bank with bombs and rockets beginning at 14:45, simultaneously with a ten-minute supporting bombardment by artillery and mortars. At 14:55 the barrage would switch to white phosphorous ammunition for a further ten minutes to create a smokescreen and thereafter would only respond to specific fire requests called in by the paratroopers on the north bank; to this end Forward Observer teams from the 504th Regiment’s 81mm Platoon and the 376th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion were to accompany the first wave. Direct fire support was to be provided by two 57mm anti-tank guns from the 80th Airborne Anti-Aircraft Battalion and twenty-four Irish Guards Sherman tanks; the latter were tasked to hit identified enemy targets with high-explosive rounds and address any gaps in the smokescreen with smoke rounds; Lieutenant-Colonel Vandeleur ran a line from his Jeep into the power station so he could use his vantage point to control his vehicles’ fire.7 As the expected thirty-three assault boats were insufficient to carry the 3rd Battalion in its entirety, Major Cook selected Companies H and I, commanded by Captains Carl W. Kappel and T. Moffatt Burriss respectively, to make up the first wave accompanied by a Battalion Command Group, a Squad of Engineers from the 307th Airborne Engineer Battalion commanded by Lieutenant John Holabird tasked to neutralise demolition charges on the bridges, Forward Observer teams from the 376th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, and the Regiment’s 81mm mortar platoon. Company I was to assault and clear the dyke and establish a defensive line to protect the crossing point, Company H was to attack and clear Fort Beneden Lent and Company G was to follow in the wake of Company H on crossing. Major Willard E. Harrison’s 1st Battalion was to take over Company I’s line on the dyke and the 3rd Battalion was then to move east to the Nijmegen‒Arnhem road where Company G was to establish a roadblock facing north while Companies H and I attacked south along the road toward the road and railway bridges respectively.8

  Major Cook departed with Colonel Tucker to brief his men and they were informed by Captain Harris that the current at the mouth of the Maas-Waal canal was too rapid to allow laden assault boats to access the River Waal in a safe and orderly manner; Harris therefore recommended that the assault boats be manhandled over the riverside dyke and launched directly onto the river, even though this would be in full view of the enemy. This was accepted by Tucker and Cook as it was assumed the smokescreen would provide cover. The 3rd Battalion moved up into the lee of the riverside dyke where they were organised into boat parties of thirteen and settled down to wait for the assault boats. Major Cook was approached by the 504th Regiments chaplain, Captain Delbert Kuehl, who insisted on accompanying the first wave on the grounds that he had to accompany his men on what he, too, viewed as a ‘suicide mission’. Captain Keep reported there was little conversation among the men during the wait, and some were fatalistic; Lieutenant Virgil F. Carmichael, the 3rd Battalion’s Intelligence Officer, saw Lieutenant Harry F. Busby from Company I light a cigarette with an expensive lighter and then jettison the lighter and the rest of the pack, commenting that he would no longer need them.9 Lieutenant James Magellas, a platoon leader from Company H, recalled that many men opted to catch up on sleep. This display of sang froid made a highly favourable impression on Lieutenant-General Horrocks, who congratulated Colonel Tucker in his usual urbane manner: ‘My God look at ’em…They make an assa
ult river crossing in a very short time…but here they lay some of ’em fast asleep! What wonderful troops.’10 While the 1st and 3rd Battalions prepared, Company D provided security around the concentration area and Lieutenant Edward T. Wisniewski was hit by a sniper while leading one patrol and bled to death as German fire prevented medics from going to his aid despite their use of a Red Cross flag. Wisniewski was a popular officer and word of the manner of his death reportedly stiffened the resolve of some of the paratroopers waiting to cross.11

  The assault boats finally arrived at some point between 14:40 and 14:50.12 They were hurriedly unloaded by the men of the 307th Airborne Engineer Battalion who were to crew them, and who were unimpressed by the 20-foot-long plywood-bottomed vessels with their green canvas concertina sides. Lieutenant John Holabird, who had spent the night hoping the crossing would be called off, was ‘momentarily stunned’ at the sight of the flimsy yet heavy craft, and his reaction was shared by some of the 3rd Battalion’s paratroopers when they were drafted in to help assemble and load the boats. The initial reaction of Private First Class Walter E. Hughes from Company I, a pre-war seaman, was one of ‘complete horror’ at the prospect of employing such craft on a fast-running river.13 Captain Burriss overheard one of his men commenting, ‘I can’t even swim. Oh shit, I’m in big trouble.’ Another enquired as to the whereabouts of the Boy Scouts that came with the toys, while Lieutenant Magellas was reminded of the craft he used for lake fishing trips back in Wisconsin.14 To make things worse, only twenty-six assault boats had been delivered as one truckload had been destroyed en route, which meant a hasty reorganising of the boat parties that allotted some boats sixteen to eighteen passengers in addition to the three engineer crewmen, and not all came with their full complement of eight paddles.15 With the boats erected and loaded Major Cook blew his whistle at 15:00 to signal the start of the crossing, and the individual parties lifted their boats and began moving toward the riverside dyke. The move was none too soon as the Germans, alerted by the activity, began to drop artillery shells into the vicinity of the staging area.