Think Again: How to Reason and Argue
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Lesson: What holds for the whole might not hold for parts.
False Dichotomy
Argument: You are either with us or against us, and you are not yet fully committed to our cause, so you must be our enemy.
Refutation: That’s like arguing that you are either with Fiji or against Fiji, and you are not yet fully committed to Fiji, so you must be an enemy of Fiji.
Lesson: People can be neutral—neither for nor against.
False Equivalence
Argument: There is some argument for adopting this policy, but there is also some argument against it and in favor of an alternative; so both sides are reasonable, and it is unreasonable to favor one over the other.
Refutation: That’s like arguing that there is some argument for jumping off this building (how thrilling!), and there is also some argument against jumping off (how deadly!); so both choices are reasonable, and it is unreasonable to favor one over the other.
Lesson: Not all arguments and reasons are equivalent. Some are better than others. (The same point holds when there are experts on both sides.)
Appeal to Ignorance
Argument: You can’t prove that there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, so there must have been none.
Refutation: That’s like arguing that you can’t prove that there are tiny spiders in this room, so there must not be any tiny spiders in this room.
Lesson: There might have been lots that we did not see, because they are hard to find, even when they are there.
False Cause (or post hoc ergo propter hoc)
Argument: Our economy improved right after he became president, so he helped our country a lot.
Refutation: That’s like arguing that our economy improved right after my daughter was born, so she helped our country a lot.
Lesson: The timing might be a coincidence. More generally, correlation does not imply causation.
None of these refutations is conclusive. In each case, defenders of the argument could claim that (a) the premise in the refutation is false, (b) the conclusion in the refutation is true, or (c) the argument in the refutation is not really parallel to the original argument, because they differ in some relevant respect.
Such attempts at refutation still shift the burden of proof to the defender of the argument, so even inconclusive refutations can make progress. They do not end the discussion, but that is not their purpose. Their goal is to rule out simple mistakes, and they can do that. When arguers succeed in defending their arguments against refutations by parallel reasoning, they usually need to complicate their arguments and add qualifications. The refutation shows that the original argument without the qualifications oversimplified the issues. The revised argument reveals complexities and subtleties that the original overlooked. Refutation can thereby improve discussions without ending them.
CONCLUSION
Rules to Live By
NOW YOU KNOW SOMETHING ABOUT why we need arguments, what arguments are, how to analyze them, how to evaluate them, and how to catch fallacies. What next?
First, admit your limits. This short book has barely scratched the surface. You have seen some purposes of arguments, some words in arguments, some valid forms of argument, some kinds of induction, and some fallacies. That is a lot to have covered, but please do not imagine that you know it all. Nobody does.
Second, learn more. To understand arguments and reasons fully will take a lifetime. In addition to exploring further kinds of arguments,1 we all need to know more about language (our shared means of communication), science (including psychology and economics), mathematics (especially statistics and probability), and philosophy (which explores our basic assumptions and values). There is much more to study.
Third, keep practicing. The only effective way to learn how to identify, analyze, evaluate, and avoid fallacies in arguments and reasons is to practice, practice, and practice again. The best way to practice is with other people, and the best people to practice with are people who disagree with you but sincerely want to understand you and to be understood by you. If you can find such partners, you are lucky. Treasure them and use them.
Fourth, construct your own arguments. When you want to think about an important issue, construct the best argument that you can on both sides of that issue. (For example, if you want to decide whether to buy a larger car or a smaller car, spell out the reasons on both sides, such as greater comfort in a larger car, and less environmental impact from a smaller car. And if you can vote in an election, specify the reasons for and against each candidate, such as more focus on issues that matter to you or less ability to get anything done.) After laying out your reasons in discursive form, do a close analysis and a deep analysis of your own argument and evaluate its validity and strength. If you do this honestly, you will gain a better understanding of your beliefs, your values, and yourself. Then ask a friend, colleague, or opponent to analyze and evaluate your arguments, and return the favor. This exchange will help you both understand each other better.
Fifth, use your skills. When? Throughout your daily life, including Internet chats, political debates, and other contexts where polarization and incivility run rampant. Don’t simply declare what you believe. Give arguments. Don’t let others merely announce their positions. Ask questions about their reasons. Don’t interrupt. Listen carefully to their answers. Don’t attack opponents too soon. Interpret them charitably. Don’t insult or abuse opponents. Be civil and respectful. Don’t commit fallacies. Be critical of your own reasoning. Don’t think that you have all the answers. Be humble.
Sixth, teach others. The skills that you have learned are not widely enough shared, so share them widely. One method involves explicit training or lengthy discussions about argumentation, but that is not the only way. You can also teach others simply by pointing out problems as they arise in informal contexts. When one person interrupts another, you can ask, “What were you saying before you were interrupted?” When someone calls an opponent crazy or stupid, you can say, “I don’t think you are crazy. I want to understand your point of view.” When a speaker presents a bad argument, you can specify precisely what is bad about it. When they present a good argument, you can say why it is good. We too often let teaching opportunities like these slip by.
We cannot always follow these rules. It takes too long to practice or to construct and listen to arguments on every issue. Nobody has that much patience or time. Moreover, not every circumstance is right for teaching, and not every audience is amenable to learning. Even incivility is sometimes justified. Nonetheless, we could all benefit from following these rules more than we do now. So let’s get started.
NOTES
Chapter 1
1. Nathaniel Persily, “Introduction,” in Solutions to Political Polarization in America, edited by Nathaniel Persily (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 4. My discussion of kinds of polarization owes a great deal to Persily’s insightful introduction. Polarization is sometimes seen as a process instead of a state, but I will discuss polarization as a state.
2. The following statistics come from Pew Research Center, “Political Polarization in the American Public” (Washington DC: Pew Research Center, June 2014).
3. Morris P. Fiorina, Samuel J. Adams, and Jeremy Pope, Culture War? Myth of a Polarized America (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, 2005) suggest that these increases in polarization can be explained by “party sorting.” In reply, Michael J. Barber and Nolan McCarty, “Causes and Consequences of Polarization,” in Solutions to Political Polarization in America, edited by Nathaniel Persily (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), argue that “position switching is more common than party switching” (p. 22). Polarization between parties still does not prove that Americans as a whole have grown more polarized, since moderates might have left both parties to become independents. Polarization between the parties remains a problem in any case.
4. See citations in Linda Skitka and Anthony Washburn, “Are Conservatives from Mars and Liber
als from Venus? Maybe Not So Much,” in Social Psychology of Political Polarization, edited by Piercarlo Valdesolo and Jesse Graham (New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 78–101 at 94–95. There is an active debate on whether liberals are more likely than conservatives to reject the science of genetically modified organisms (GMOs), vaccines, and nuclear waste, but there is no doubt that many liberals go against the scientific consensus on these issues.
5. Donald Braman, Dan M. Kahan, Ellen Peters, Maggie Wittlin, Paul Slovic, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, and Gregory N. Mandel, “The Polarizing Impact of Science Literacy and Numeracy on Perceived Climate Change Risks,” Nature Climate Change 2 (2012), p. 732.
6. Barber and McCarty, “Causes and Consequences of Polarization,” p. 38.
7. David R. Mayhew, Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946–2002 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005).
8. The statistics in this section come from Pew Research Center, “Political Polarization in the American Public” in 2014 and 2016.
9. Shanto Iyengar, Gaurov Sood, and Yphtach Lelkes, “Affect, Not Ideology: A Social Identity Perspective on Polarization,” Public Opinion Quarterly 76, 3 (2012), p. 405.
10. Pew Research Center, “Political Polarization in the American Public” (2014).
11. Jonathan Rodden, “Geography and Gridlock in the United States,” in Solutions to Political Polarization in America, edited by Nathaniel Persily (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 118.
12. Rodden, “Geography and Gridlock,” p. 117.
13. See Roshini Wickremesinhe and Sanjana Hattotuwa, “Voting in Hate: A Study of Hate Speech on Facebook Surrounding Sri Lanka’s Parliamentary Election of 2015”, Centre for Policy Alternatives, Sri Lanka (March 2016).
14. See Thitinan Pongsudhirak, “Thai Voters in Yellow and Red Set for Crucial Elections”, The Korea Herald (March 21, 2011).
15. See Hyunji Lee, “Polarized Electorates in South Korea and Taiwan: The Role of Political Trust under Conservative Governments”; at
16. Hulda Thorisdottir, “The Left-Right Landscape over Time: The View from a Western European Multi-Party Democracy,” in Social Psychology of Political Polarization, edited by Piercarlo Valdesolo and Jesse Graham (New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 38–58 at 42.
17. Thorisdottir, “The Left-Right Landscape,” p. 42.
18. Thorisdottir, “The Left-Right Landscape,” p. 46.
Chapter 2
1. Discussed by Daniel Dennett, Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking (New York: Norton, 2013), pp. 31–35.
2. See Ben Shapiro, “The Left Loses its Damn Mind”, The Ben Shapiro Show, Episode 140; at
3. See Boris Johnson, “Boris Johnson’s Speech on the EU Referendum: Full Text”, May 9, 2016; at
4. See tweet by Sayeeda Warsi, “Toxic, divisive & xenophobic political campaigning should have no place in a liberal democracy”, June 20, 2016; at
5. See J. K. Rowling, “On Monsters, Villains and the EU Referendum”, June 30, 2016; at
6. See Arun Kundnani, “The Right-Wing Populism That Drove Brexit Can Only be Fought With a Genuinely Radical Alternative”, AlterNet, July 2, 2016; at
7. See Sandy Marrero, “When it Comes to Human Dignity, We Cannot Make Compromises”, Prezi, January 3, 2015; at < https://prezi.com/lfqwky4jv6em/when-it-comes-to-human-dignity-we-cannot-make-compromises/>
8. See Sarah Wildman, “Marine Le Pen is Trying to Win the French Elections with a Subtler Kind of Xenophobia”, Vox, May 6, 2017; at
9. Diana Mutz, In-Your-Face Politics: The Consequences of Uncivil Media (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015), chapter 2.
10. Cass R. Sunstein, #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017), p. 86.
11. Mutz, In-Your-Face Politics, chapter 3.
Chapter 3
1. Pew Research Center, June 22, 2016, “Partisanship and Political Animosity in 2016: Highly Negative Views of the Opposing Party and Its Members,” p. 2. http://www.people-press.org/2016/06/22/partisanship-and-political-animosity-in-2016/.
2. E.g., Elizabeth Noell-Neumann, Spiral of Silence: Public Opinion—Our Social Skin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).
3. Cf. Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
4. Gregory J. Martin and Ali Yurukoglu, “Bias in Cable News: Persuasion and Polarization,” Working Paper #20798, National Bureau of Economic Research (Cambridge, MA, December 2014).
5. See Jeffrey Gottfried and Elisa Shearer, “News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2016”, Pew Research Center: Journalism & Media, May 26, 2016; at
6. For an interesting example, see https://www.buzzfeed.com/lamvo/facebook-filter-bubbles-liberal-daughter-conservative-mom.
7.Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015). On another issue, a Pew survey in 2012 found that 76% of respondents expressed an opinion about the Supreme Court ruling on the Affordable Care Act, but only 55% responded correctly when asked what the Supreme Court had decided.
8. Cengiz Erisen, Dave Redlawsk, and Elif Erisen, “Complex Thinking as a Result of Incongruent Information Exposure,” American Politics Research (August 30, 2017), DOI: 10.1177/1532673X17725864.
9. Sunstein, #Republic, pp. 91–92.
10. James S. Fishkin, The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995). But cf. also Ian Shapiro, “Collusion in Restraint of Democracy: Against Political Deliberation,” Daedalus (Summer 2017), pp. 77–84.
11. This website can be found at https://www.reddit.com/r/changemyview/. See also Sunstein, #Republic, pp. 134n69 and 232n20.
Chapter 4
1. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, II.3.3, 415.
2. David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Section 1, paragraph 9.
3. See “Migrant Crisis: Migrant Europe explained in seven charts,” 4 March 2016; at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911.
4. Dale Carnegie, How to Win Friends and Influence People (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1936).
5. Oscar Wilde, The Happy Prince and Other Stories (London, 1888).
6. See Megan Phelps-Roper, “I grew up in the Westboro Baptist Church. Here’s why I left,” March 2017; at https://www.ted.com/talks/megan_phelps_roper_i_grew_up_in_the_westboro_baptist_church_here_s_why_i_left/transcript?language=en. See also Adrian Chen, “Unfollow: How a Prized Daughter of Westboro Baptist Church Came to Question Its Beliefs,” The New Yorker (November 23, 2015). More examples of radical conversion in light of evidence can be found in The Best of Enemies: Race and Redemption in the New South (New York: Scribner, 1996), by Osha Gray Davidson about civil rights activist Ann Atwater and former Ku Klux Klan leader C. P. Ellis; in Matthew Ornstein’s documentary Accidental Courtesy: Daryl Davis, Race, and America on Netflix about a black musician who befriended Ku Klux Klan members; and stories about Derek Black, former white nationalist.
7. P. M. Fernbach, T. Rogers, C. R. Fox, and S. A. Sloman, “Political Extremism Is Supported by an Illusion of Understanding,” Psychological Science 24, 6 (2013), pp. 939–946. In their later book, Th
e Knowledge Illusion: Why We Never Think Alone (New York: Riverhead Books, 2017), chapter 9, Sloman and Fernbach add two important qualifications. First, how-questions have less effects with regard to sacred values (such as abortion) than with regard to policy issues (such as cap and trade). Second, how-questions that expose people’s illusions and ignorance can also upset some people and make them less inclined to discuss the issue. Like all tools, questions work only in some contexts and need to be used carefully and sparingly.
8. Among their other works on accountability, see Jennifer S. Lerner, Julie H. Goldberg, and Philip E. Tetlock, “Sober Second Thoughts: The Effects of Accountability, Anger, and Authoritarianism on Attributions of Responsibility,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 24, 6 (1998), pp. 563–574.
9. Jaime Napier and Jamie Luguri, “From Silos to Synergies: The Effects of Construal Level on Political Polarization,” in Social Psychology of Political Polarization, edited by Piercarlo Valdesolo and Jesse Graham (New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 143–161.
10. Pew Research Center, “Political Polarization in the American Public” (Washington DC: Pew Research Center, June, 2014), p. 59.
11. As they are called by Avishai Margalit, On Compromise and Rotten Compromises (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).
Chapter 5
1. Marilyn vos Savant, “Ask Marilyn,” Parade magazine (1990).
2. This mistake is one instance of a more general pattern discussed in Daniel C. Molden and E. Tory Higgins, “Motivated Thinking,” in The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning, edited by Keith Holyoak and Robert G. Morrison (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 295–317.
3. Ben M. Tappin, Leslie van der Leer, and Ryan T. McKay, “The Heart Trumps the Head: Desirability Bias in Political Belief Revision,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 146, 8 (August 2017), pp. 1143–9.