Think Again: How to Reason and Argue
Page 21
4. Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, editors, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), chapter 4. A better-known example of the representativeness heuristic is Linda the feminist bank teller (chapter 6).
5. Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, “Can a General Deontic Logic Capture the Facts of Human Moral Reasoning? How the Mind Interprets Social Exchange Rules and Detects Cheaters,” in Moral Psychology, Volume 1: The Evolution of Morality: Adaptations and Innateness, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), pp. 53–120.
6. Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber, “Why Do Humans Reason? Arguments for an Argumentative Theory,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (2011), pp. 57–111 at 63 and 72. See also Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber, The Enigma of Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017).
7. This process of correction in science is described by Miriam Solomon, Social Empiricism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007).
8. R. Ritchart and D. N. Perkins, “Learning to Think: The Challenges of Teaching Thinking,” in The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning, edited by Keith Holyoak and Robert G. Morrison (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). These negative results could reflect deficiencies in particular teaching methods that were tested.
9. Mercier and Sperber, “Why Do Humans Reason?” pp. 57–111.
Chapter 6
1. See Monty Python, “Argument Clinic” sketch (1976); at
2. See below on ad hominem fallacies.
3. This definition comes from Robert Fogelin. He and I have defended a close relative in Understanding Arguments: An Introduction to Informal Logic, 9th ed. (Stamford, CT: Cengage, 2014).
4. I will not bother with technical issues about whether the premises and conclusion are statements, propositions, or sentences, since that nicety does not affect the general issues in this book. I will also allow arguments with a single premise, but they must have at least one premise. What if the speaker knows that the premises are not really reasons at all, but he presents them as such in order to fool some audience? I am inclined to think that what he gives is an argument, even though he does not intend its premises to be real reasons for its conclusion. This explains why I define arguments as presenting premises as reasons, which means that their premises are intended to be seen as reasons.
5. Aristotle, Physics II, 3, and Metaphysics V, 2. Notice that an arguer’s desire for an argument to serve a purpose is what causes the arguer to give the argument.
6. “Conservative South Koreans rally against President Park’s impeachment”, Asia Times (December 17, 2016); at http://www.atimes.com/article/conservative-south-koreans-rally-parks-impeachment/.
Chapter 7
1. For hilarious examples, see literallyunbelievable.org and Snopes.com
2. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism.
3. See Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Skepticisms (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), chapter 4.
4. For details on how to limit our goals to certain contrast classes, see my Moral Skepticisms, chapter 5.
5. Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, edited by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969).
6. Cass R. Sunstein, Sebastian Bobadilla-Suarez, Stephanie C. Lazarro, and Tali Sharot, “How People Update Beliefs about Climate Change: Good News and Bad News,” (forthcoming; written September 2, 2016 and available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2821919 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2821919).
7. J. O. Urmson, “On Grading,” Mind 59, 234 (1950), pp. 145–169.
8. Advertisement for Equal Exchange fair trade coffee (Copyright © 1997, 1998, 1999).
Chapter 8
1. Which kind of possibility? Consider “This building is 100 meters tall, so I cannot jump over it.” Is this argument valid if jumping over 100 meters is conceptually possible but not physically possible? Luckily, such tricky cases will not affect my main points here, so I will not pause to worry about these complications.
2. See Sinnott-Armstrong and Fogelin, Understanding Arguments, chapters 6–7.
3. “New Approaches Needed to Address Rise of Poor Urban Villages in the Pacific,” Asia Today (October 19, 2016); at
Chapter 9
1. “The Greek Interpreter,” in The Memoirs of Sherlock Holmes, by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle.
2. John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action (New York: Capricorn, 1960).
3. It might sometimes be more intuitive to think of the strength of inductive arguments in terms of conditional reasons instead of conditional probability. Contrast Keith Lehrer, Knowledge (Oxford: Clarendon, 1974), which analyzed justification in terms of probability, with Keith Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge (London: Routledge, 1990), which analyzed justification in terms of reasons. This philosophical distinction will not affect my main points in the text.
4. Assume there are 50,000 cars and 1,000 Fiats in Edinburgh. The witness would identify 90% or 900 of these 1000 Fiats as Fiats. But he would also misidentify 10% or 4,900 of the 49,000 non-Fiats as Fiats. Thus, out of the 900 + 4,900 = 5,800 cars that he would identify as Fiats, only 900/5800 = 15.5% really are Fiats.
5. For more on these and other kinds of inductive arguments, see my and Robert Fogelin’s textbook, Understanding Arguments, and my and Ram Neta’s massive open online course (MOOC), Think Again, available on the Coursera website at < https://www.coursera.org/courses?languages=en&query=think+again>.
6. Martin Luther King Jr., “I Have a Dream . . .” speech (1963); at < https://www.archives.gov/files/press/exhibits/dream-speech.pdf>
7. General Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003; at
Chapter 10
1. From Squad Helps Dog Bite Victim and Other Flubs from the Nation’s Press, edited by Columbia Journalism Review (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1980).
2. From Matthew H. Hurley, Daniel C. Dennett, and Reginald B. Adams Jr., Inside Jokes: Using Humor to Reverse-Engineer the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011).
3. Roy Sorensen, “Vagueness”, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 edition); at
4. “Torture Memos”, Wikipedia; at
5. Jeffrey Hart, “Protesters Are ‘Ugly, Stupid,’ ” King Features.
6. American Psychological Association, “Report of the Task Force on the Role of Psychology in the Criminal Justice System,” American Psychologist 33 (1978), pp. 1099–1113; at
7. See Solomon, Social Empiricism.
8. See “International Panel on Climate Change”, Wikipedia; at
9. This point might seem to suggest that any valid argument from a universal premise begs the question, but it doesn’t, as I show in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, “Begging the Question,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77, 2 (1999), pp. 174–191.
10. For example, Gary N. Curtis, “The Fallacy Files”; at
Conclusion
1. For more lessons on arguments, see my MOOC with Ram Neta called Think Again on the Coursera Platform and my textbook with Robert Fogelin, Understanding Arguments.
INDEX
Page numbers in bold face indicate where the entry is defined.
abstraction, 60–61, 63
absurdities, 204–206
abuse, 78
abusive assurin
g, 100
actions, 3, 14–15, 50, 82–83
and fallacies, 179
actuality, 118
ad hominem arguments, 184, 185–186, 198
and refutation, 207
affirming the consequent, 121, 173
agreement, 26
algorithms, 42
ambiguity, 174–175, 177
amphiboly, 175
analogies, 60
analysis, close, 107, 108–116, 117, 126
and rules to live by, 215
analysis, deep, 117, 126, 215
antagonism, 14, 16, 21–24
and abstraction, 61
and toxic talk, 34, 36, 38
appeals to ignorance, 197
application, 158–160
applications, statistical, 152, 154, 156
arguing, learning how, 67–73
Argument Clinic, The (TV skit), 77–78
argument from analogy, 153–154
arguments, 6–8, 20, 48–66, 80–81
defined, 83
how to complete, 117–141
how to evaluate, 142–169
how to refute, 200–213
how to stop, 88–116
inductive, 149, 156, 193
and joking, 32
parallel, 207–209
recognizing, 77–87
and silencing, 41, 44–46
slippery slope, 179–180
sound, 122
and symmetry, 181
and toxic talk, 26, 33, 35, 38
and trust/trustworthiness, 69, 72
Aristotle, 81
Asian Development Bank (ADB), 187–188
assumptions, 3, 24, 28, 80
and compromises, 62
and fallacies, 177
and formal validity, 122–126
and inferences to the best explanation, 166
and rules to live by, 214
and stopping arguments, 90, 92
assuring terms, 93, 99–101, 103, 108
and close analysis, 113–114, 116
attacking people, 184–187
authority, 39, 100
appeal to, 184, 197, 207
questioning, 187–194
Bayes’s theorem, 153
because clauses, 62
begging the question, 207
beliefs, 50, 52, 54–55, 82–83
and humility, 59–60
and reconstruction, 129
and refutation, 201, 207
and rules to live by, 215
and stopping arguments, 90
bias, desirability, 69
bias, sample, 157–158
Brainwashed: How Universities Indoctrinate America’s Youth (Shapiro), 29
branching structure, 139
Brexit vote, 23, 34–36, 51
and generalizations, 155
Britain. See United Kingdom
Brzezinski, M. (news commentator), 29
caricatures, 25, 27–28
Carnegie, D. (philanthropist), 52
causal reasoning, 153
causation, 81, 212
certainty, 147–149, 193, 206
Chamberlain, N. (British prime minister), 62
“Change My View” (internet thread), 46
China, 56
civility, 26, 48
claims, 7, 20, 53, 59, 89
and authority, 188, 193
and close analysis, 110
and discounting terms, 105–106
and fallacies, 177, 185–186
and guarding terms, 95
and reconstruction, 133, 135
and refutation, 201
and stopping arguments, 91
Climate Change, Intergovernmental Panel on (IPCC), 192–193
coalitions, 15
coherence, 119
communication, 2–3, 47
comparison, 161
competition, 192
composition, fallacy of, 210
compromises, 2, 4–5, 15, 21, 61–62
and Angela Merkel, 37
and arguments, 63
and discounting terms, 107
and guarding terms, 98
and toxic talk, 35, 38–39
Conan Doyle, Sir Arthur (author), 146–147
conclusion markers, 85
conclusions, 7, 49, 80, 81, 82
and application, 159–160
and assumptions, 124
and begging the question, 195–196
and close analysis, 113, 115
and deduction, 146, 148
and evaluating arguments, 143–144
and fallacies, 178–179, 183, 186
and generalizations, 156
and inductive strength, 150
and inferences to the best explanation, 161–162, 168
and irrelevance, 184
and parallel arguments, 208, 210
and questions, 87
and reconstruction, 128–129, 131
and refutation, 201, 207, 212
and soundness, 122
and stopping arguments, 90
and validity, 118–120
conditionals, 121, 148
confidence, 19–20
conservatives, 13, 16, 186
contradiction, 79, 200, 204, 206
controversy, 47, 185, 194
conversations, 3, 26, 29, 40
and assumptions, 123
and humility, 59
conversion, 54
cooperation, 2, 4–5, 15, 24
and arguments, 63
and caricatures, 27
and fallacies, 186
correlation, 212
counterarguments, 46
counterexamples, 202–204
criticism, 25–26, 33, 85, 146
and fallacies, 177, 196
culture, 4
culture wars, 12
cynicism, 55
Daily Show, The, 42
“Dear White America” (Yancy), 32–33
death penalty, 195
debates, political, 41, 81, 183
deduction, 143–149, 145
definitions, 181–183
denial, 79, 200
denying a disjunct, 120
denying the antecedent, 121, 173
descriptions, 119
diagnoses, psychiatric, 28–29
discounting terms, 93, 104–107, 108–109
and close analysis, 115–116
discourse, 2, 32
disrespect, 34, 38
distance, 13, 16, 20–21, 23
division, fallacy of, 210
double entendre, 174–178
doubt, 201
echo chambers, 42, 45
emotions, 5, 8, 35, 48–49
and ad hominem arguments, 184
appeal to, 197–198
and arguments, 50–52, 54
and trust/trustworthiness, 197
equivalence, false, 211
equivocation, 175, 177–178
and refutation, 207
Europe, 23, 34–38, 43, 51
and compromises, 62
evaluating terms, 93, 101–104, 108
and close analysis, 110, 112–113, 116
and validity, 117
evidence, 79, 89–91
and evaluating arguments, 144
and guarding terms, 98
and inductive arguments, 149
evolution, 196
exaggeration, 38
exceptions, 2, 28, 201–204
expert consensus, 190
explanations, 7, 81, 113, 137–141, 164, 200
alternative, 166–167
extremism, 38
facts, 18–19, 38, 42–43
and arguments, 49–52
and fallacies, 198
and humility, 59
and purpose of arguments, 82
‘fake news’, 41
fallacies, 33, 154, 173–199
ad hominem arguments, 184
appeals to ignorance, 197
appeal to authority, 190
appeal to emotion, 197
>
appeal to ignorance, 212
begging the question, 194–196
of composition, 210
of division, 210–211
false cause (post hoc ergo propter hoc), 212
false dichotomy, 197, 211
false equivalence, 211
gambler’s, 197
genetic, 197
hasty generalization, 157, 160
and refutation, 202, 207
and rules to live by, 214–215
tu quoque (appeal to hypocrisy), 197
false cause (post hoc ergo propter hoc), 212
false dichotomy, 197, 211
forgiveness, 7, 26, 48
form, 81
Fox News, 41–42
France, 37
gambler’s fallacy, 197
gay marriage, 43–44
generalizations, 72, 146, 155–158, 173
statistical, 151–152, 154
Germany, 37
governments, 15
graciousness, 7, 48
gridlock, 15–16, 23
guarding terms, 93–98, 108, 111–112
and close analysis, 114–116
and fallacies, 180
and reconstruction, 131–133
and refutation, 202
halo/horn effects, 187
Hartford, J. (musician), 86
hatred, 14, 21
headlines, newspaper, 174
heuristics, 69
Holmes, Sherlock, 143, 146–147, 155, 161
homogeneity, 13, 16, 20–21
homosexuality, 175–177
How the Right Lost Its Mind (Sykes), 29
Hume, D. (philosopher), 48–49
humility, 58–60, 63, 149
humor, 32
hypothesis, 161–162, 166
alternative. See also explanations, alternative
hypotheticals, 121
Iceland, 23
ignorance, appeal to, 198–199, 212
incivility, 14, 16, 25, 27, 34, 38–39
and assuring terms, 100
and rules to live by, 215–216
and silencing, 40
induction, 145, 146–147, 151–154
and application, 158
and rules to live by, 214
inequality, financial, 27
inference to the best explanation, 152, 154, 160–161
and political decisions, 163–164, 166, 168–169