Mercenaries in the Classical World- To the Death of Alexander

by Stephen English

  This was not the way a Spartan harmost would expect to be treated, and not how he would have expected an army to behave, but these Greeks had been through much together, and they now acted rather differently that they would have done when they were recruited only a few short months before.

  After this incident, the army marched west towards Byzantium. As they approached, it became increasingly apparent to them that they were unlikely to receive a warm and welcoming homecoming. Anaxibius, the navarch supporting Pharnabazus, was at something of a loss as to what to do with the mercenary army. Pharnabazus instructed Anaxibius to offer the Greeks transport into Thrace; the main justification was to get them off Asian soil, along with an offer of future employment if they accepted. 75 The mercenary generals retired to consider the offer, and apparently Xenophon wanted to leave the army immediately to sail home, but was persuaded to cross into Thrace with the army and only then decide upon his future. Once across the Bosphoros, and as Xenophon had seen all along the route, the Byzantines did not appear to want them anywhere near their city and sought to prevent access. 76 The mercenaries had no money or plunder with which to purchase provisions, and if the Byzantines had been sensible they would have realized the danger a large, hungry and unpredictable mercenary army posed, and provided them with provisions that would take them far enough into Thrace that they would no longer represent a threat. Anaxibius gathered together the Greeks, as it was becoming evident that trouble was brewing, and addressed them as follows: 77

  Get your provisions from the Thracian villages; there is an abundance there of barley and wheat and other supplies; when you have got them, proceed to the Chersonese, and there Cyniscus will take you into his pay.

  While some of the assembled mercenaries were discussing this proposal, and which route they would take on the prospective march, some mercenaries snatched up their arms and charged for the city gates, determined to gain access. The defender of the gates, Eteonicus, along with some of his men, immediately slammed the gates closed and dropped the huge wooden bar into position. 78 The attackers were not put off; they hammered at the gates and demanded entry. Some other troops inspired by their actions: 79

  ran down to the shore, made their way along the break-water, and thus scaled the wall and got into the city, while still others, who chanced to be within the walls, seeing what was going on at the gates, cut through the bar with their axes and threw the gates open, whereupon the rest rushed in.

  The mercenary army rushed through the gates in disorder with the intention of sacking and plundering the city. The citizens made for the harbour with the intention of boarding any ships they could, believing their city lost. Xenophon claims much of the credit for stopping the plundering and saving the city, but this makes little sense. Generals typically could not stop their troops from sacking a city once the frenzy had begun. Communication in the ancient world simply was not sufficient to stop groups of soldiers that were spread out over the greater part of the city. Coupled with that, and in this specific case, the mercenary army was tired, hungry, desperate for plunder, and had demonstrated many times that they were often undisciplined. One must conclude that either fewer soldiers had broken through the gates, and these were tracked down and stopped quickly, or there was rather more of the city sacked than Xenophon implies.

  Whilst the discussions were underway that apparently saved the city, and in which the mercenaries were again debating what to do next, a certain Coeratidas arrived in camp:80

  While the soldiers were still in session Coeratidas the Theban came in, a man who was going up and down Greece, not in exile, but because he was afflicted with a desire to be a general, and he was offering his services to any city or people that might be wanting a general; so at this time he came to the troops and said that he was ready to lead them to the [Danube] Delta, as it is called, of Thrace, where they could get plenty of good things; and until they should reach there, he said he would supply them with food and drink in abundance.

  Wandering generals were not a particularly common phenomenon, and one wonders if they were ever terribly successful in wandering into a city in need of a general. In this case, Coeratidas must have sought out the mercenary army with a specific goal in mind, although we never discover what that was. The Theban’s offer to feed the army at first implies that he was a man of considerable independent means, and it was undoubtedly the promise of food and plunder that led the assembly to elect him as their new general. Almost as soon as they did, they withdrew from Byzantium and headed for the Danube Delta. Only one day into the journey, however, twenty of his followers brought food to the army, but there was not enough to go round and he was swiftly removed from his position.

  The army left the environs of Byzantium without any real direction or purpose. The senior commanders continued to squabble amongst themselves as to what their true purpose and destination should be, and the army again began to fracture. Around 5,000, including Xenophon himself, took up service with Seuthes, the first time Greek mercenaries had been employed by a Thracian warlord.81 Their actions were limited to border raids into neighbouring territory, with little gain for the mercenaries themselves. Eight hundred others broke away under Neon and marched to the Chersonese. Others left the army in smaller numbers and presumably made for their homes further afield.

  After a short term of employment, during which the mercenaries were becoming increasingly unhappy with Seuthes and his failure to live up to his promises, including those regarding payment, two Spartan ambassadors approached the surviving members of the army and offered them employment under the command of Thibron against the Persian satrap, Tissaphernes, at the standard rate of 1 daric per month. Sparta had finally decided to make open war on the Persians and, given their reluctance to have their own citizens away from the Peloponnese for long periods, a large ready-made mercenary army with experience of fighting the Persians was too good an opportunity to pass up. This represents the first time the Spartans had hired a large group of mercenary hoplites.82

  The story of the 10,000 has always been a fascinating one, and it can tell us a great deal about Greek mercenaries and their attitudes at the end of the Peloponnesian War.

  It is noticeable how many examples of undisciplined behaviour we see. Early in the campaign, before Cunaxa, these examples are surprisingly frequent, given their lack of difficulties during that phase of the march. A certain amount of disorder and undisciplined behaviour was to be expected during the march home, as they were constantly harried, they were hungry, thirsty and constantly betrayed by seemingly everyone they encountered. Some of this was due to the individual nature of their recruitment, in that they were gathered together as a series of individual armies fighting under the same banner, and were therefore not a coherent single entity. It is noticeable, however, that during the battle this individual spirit was overcome to a great extent in order to achieve the greater goal. The arrogance demonstrated by Clearchus at disobeying Cyrus’ direct orders during the battle should not reflect badly upon the mercenaries themselves, but upon their Spartan commander.

  We also see on the march the political power wielded by a mercenary army. They knew they were the most important part of Cyrus’ army, even though they were far from the largest, and Cyrus knew it too; that is why they were hired, after all. The mercenaries were happy to use their position as indispensible troops to demand better financial terms on two occasions, both of which Cyrus had no real option but to acquiesce to. If he had not, and they had deserted, then his rebellion would have been over before it had begun. The march also illustrates the precarious nature of the life of a mercenary. If Cyrus had won at Cunaxa, as he very nearly did, then the mercenaries would have been massively rewarded and would have returned to Greece as wealthy men. As it happens, however, they were on the losing side, which left them without a paymaster, hundreds of miles inside hostile territory, with no obvious means of getting home and no riches to show for their efforts. The almost constant maintenance of democracy within the ar
my, once they were left leaderless, is also an interesting feature of the return journey.

  Their final act was to sign on with the Spartan commander, Thibron, for another campaign against Tissaphernes in Asia Minor. In many ways, this is surprising; after their experiences and privations of the previous months, we can imagine that another campaign against Persian opposition would be the very last thing they would want to undertake, and certainly not immediately having escaped. Once these men were shipped across the Bosphoros, they had the opportunity to march home. The march may well have still been a long and difficult one through Thrace, Macedonia and down through central Greece, and a march that would likely have taken many weeks, but the opportunity was there, and we must think why they chose not to do this en masse, with very few exceptions. The simple truth was, however, that these men were mercenaries. The only way they had of making a living was through force of arms, and they needed to work for whoever would employ them. Sparta, having recently been victorious over Athens in the Peloponnesian War, looked like a good bet in terms of receiving a regular wage, and if that meant a return to Persian soil then so be it.

  Chapter 5

  The Fourth Century

  In this chapter we will address the issue of mercenary service in roughly the first half of the fourth century. There will be a separate chapter on the rise of Macedon that will largely address the remainder of the century. The fifth century saw limited mercenary employment, although it was growing towards the end of the century with the Peloponnesian War and the march of the 10,000. This increasing trend in mercenary employment continued, and indeed quickened, into the fourth century.1 We will also continue the chronological theme by first looking at the situation down to, and including, the Corinthian War and then moving progressively to the rise of the Macedonian Empire.2

  As we noted in the previous chapter, the remainder of the 10,000 had signed up with the Spartan general Thibron in Thrace with the intention of campaigning against Tissaphernes in Asia Minor. Thibron’s newly completed army consisted of a remarkably small percentage of ‘citizens’ when compared to other Spartan armies of the fifth century. There were only 1,000 Neodamodes, 4,000 allies, 2,000 Ionians and 5,000 mercenaries.3 Neodamodes in Spartan armies became increasingly common, along with the rise in mercenary forces. They were former helots who had been freed from slavery in return for military service. They became something of a staple in Spartan armies overseas because of the falling numbers of full Spartan citizens.

  Xenophon, unsurprisingly, tried to argue that it was only the addition of himself and the 5,000 or so remaining mercenaries that enabled Thibron to attack Tissaphernes at all, but this does not appear to be a realistic statement. What they did do was to allow the Spartan the freedom and flexibility to expand his area of operations wider than he otherwise would have been able.4 It would appear from Xenophon’s narrative that the remnants of the 10,000, although useful militarily in allowing an expansion of operations for Thibron, probably did more harm than good to the Spartans and their alliance, although, unsurprisingly, Xenophon tries to downplay the difficulties.5

  When, in pursuance of his intention to march against Caria, he was already at Ephesus, Dercyllidas arrived to take command of the army, a man who was reputed to be exceedingly resourceful; indeed, he bore the nickname ‘Sisyphus’. Thibron accordingly went back home, and was condemned and banished; for the allies accused him of allowing his soldiers to plunder their friends.

  The remnants of Cyrus’ army were clearly so inured to pillage and plunder that they simply saw it as a way of life; this is not altogether surprising, as it was how they had sustained themselves for months in Persia. It was, however, a shock to the Greeks, and had not yet become an accepted way of life for armies at home.

  Part of the problem for the actions of the mercenary contingent of the army was undoubtedly their own ingrained behaviour, but that was not helped by Thibron evidently not understanding their psychology. His successor, Dercyllidas, was a significant improvement. He understood that the wages needed to be paid regularly and promptly, that the army needed to be fed and provisioned, and that during periods when they were not campaigning they should be in enemy territory as far as possible to reduce the risk of friendly populations being brutalized. Xenophon tells us specifically that Thibron had been a burden to friendly cities by wintering his troops close to their population centres, but that Dercyllidas did not do this.6

  After Dercyllidas had accomplished these things and gained possession of nine cities in eight days, he set about planning how he might avoid being a burden to his allies, as Thibron had been, by wintering in a friendly country . . .

  This passage is interesting also because it demonstrates that the mercenaries were employed through at least two consecutive winters. Normally, and before the Peloponnesian War certainly, mercenary armies would tend to be disbanded in the winter and reconstituted the following spring for another campaigning season. This was done partly to save money and partly because campaigns simply were not conducted during the winter. The old rules of warfare had been changed forever.

  When King Agesilaus arrived in Asia Minor in 396 to take over command of operations he brought with him 2,000 neodamodes, 6,000 allies and 30 Spartiates.7 More troops were clearly needed for the campaign in Asia Minor, and it is interesting that emancipated helots and allies were used rather than any attempt being made to hire more mercenaries. This is true as far as infantry were concerned, at least. Agesilaus realized the limitations of an army purely comprised of heavy infantry, or even of an army with some light infantry support. He understood that only cavalry would truly give him mobility and flexibility, both from an offensive and defensive perspective. In order to achieve this, he hired mercenary cavalry locally; the Peloponnese was not traditional cavalry country after all, and neither Sparta nor her allies could supply what was required.

  By 395, Agesilaus was evidently concerned by his mercenaries and appointed one of his thirty Spartiates, Herippidas, to their command. The reasons for this are not stated, but we can assume he felt they would be easier to control in that they were commanded by a Spartan rather than by Xenophon; the latter remained with the army until at least 394 in a more junior position.8 Spartan citizens commanding mercenary soldiers was to become a standard feature of future Spartan campaigns. After the change of command, we hear little of their specific campaigns until Coronea in 394. This battle has the distinction of being the first time that both sides commanded significant numbers of mercenary soldiers.

  The year 395 saw the outbreak of the Corinthian War, a war between a coalition of Athens, Corinth, Thebes and Argos set against the forces of the Peloponnesian League. The first encounter was at Corinth in July of that year, but in terms of mercenary activity it was uninteresting. Of the dispositions at Coronea, Xenophon tells us :9

  Those who were now drawn up against Agesilaus were the Boeotians, Athenians, Argives, Corinthians, Aenianians, Euboeans, and both the Locrian peoples; while with Agesilaus was a regiment of Lacedaemonians which had crossed over from Corinth, half of the regiment from Orchomenus, furthermore the emancipated Helots from Lacedaemon who had made the expedition with him, besides these the foreign contingent which Herippidas commanded, and, furthermore, the troops from the Greek cities in Asia and from all those cities in Europe which he had brought over as he passed through them; and from the immediate neighbourhood there came to him hoplites of the Orchomenians and Phocians. As for peltasts, those with Agesilaus were far more numerous; on the other hand, the horsemen of either side were about equal in number.

  Agesilaus took up a position on the right wing rather than in the centre, which was perhaps the more usual place for the commander-in-chief of a largely hoplite army in the ancient world. This was probably to ensure that he was ranged against the Argive contingent of the coalition army. 10

  Agesilaus occupied the right wing of the army under his command, while the Orchomenians were at the extreme end of his left wing. On the other side, the Th
ebans themselves were on the right and the Argives occupied their left wing.

  The battle was joined when both wings charged each other. The Spartans and their mercenaries charged the Argives from the Spartan right, whereas the Thebans charged the Orchomenians on the Spartan left. Xenophon describes the opening of the battle: 11

  Now as the opposing armies were coming together, there was deep silence for a time in both lines; but when they were distant from one another about a stadium, the Thebans raised the war-cry and rushed to close quarters on the run. When, however, the distance between the armies was still about three plethra, the troops whom Herippidas commanded, and with them the Ionians, Aeolians, and Hellespontines, ran forth in their turn from the phalanx of Agesilaus, and the whole mass joined in the charge and, when they came within spear thrust, put to flight the force in their front. As for the Argives, they did not await the attack of the forces of Agesilaus, but fled to Mount Helicon.

  The Argives retreated without a blow being landed by the advancing mercenaries, whereas on the Spartan left wing the Orchomenians were quickly crushed by the Thebans. When Agesilaus had defeated the Argives, he was celebrating victory in the battle with Herippidas when a messenger arrived with news of the disaster on the Spartan left. The first phase of the battle cannot have lasted long, as it seems there was only a short delay between the mercenary charge, the Argive retreat and news of the Theban victory on the Spartan left. The Orchomenians cannot have put up very much more resistance than the Argives. This first phase ended, then, with both right wings comprehensively defeating both left wings.

  Both the Spartans and the Thebans were surprised that their individual victories had not led to a decisive overall victory in the battle, and their next actions demonstrate significant battlefield discipline. Both armies reformed (there must have been some level of disarray after a victorious charge), turned around to face the enemy and marched back towards each other. Their relative positions means that neither had access to its baggage train, and this lent a certain desperation to the second phase of the battle.12