Mercenaries in the Classical World- To the Death of Alexander

by Stephen English

  At this point one may unquestionably call Agesilaus courageous; at least he certainly did not choose the safest course. For while he might have let the men pass by who were trying to break through and then have followed them and overcome those in the rear, he did not do this, but crashed against the Thebans front to front; and setting shields against shields they shoved, fought, killed, and were killed. Finally, some of the Thebans broke through and reached Mount Helicon, but many were killed while making their way thither.

  The Thebans broke through the Spartan lines and made for their base camp, from which they retired from the field. The Spartans did not pursue them, but withdrew themselves. Both sides were badly mauled in the second phase of the battle, and neither was keen to repeat the experience straight away. Xenophon presents the battle as a victory for Agesilaus, who was himself wounded in the second phase of the battle, but the reality was that it was a stalemate and resolved nothing. The Spartan mercenaries acquitted themselves admirably in both phases of the battle and demonstrated once again what they were capable of. The coalition mercenaries, of whom we hear little in reality, were probably significant numbers of lightly armed troops who fought alongside the Thebans, but did not form a central element to Xenophon’s narrative.

  We do not know how many of the original 10,000 were left in Spartan employ by 394, but by that year they had been employed by Sparta for five years and must have undergone a level of attrition during that time. We have very little evidence of any other mercenaries in Spartan service during the early years of the fourth century, and no positive evidence that any of the losses were replaced. Roughly 5,000 were originally recruited, and I think it is feasible that perhaps only half that many remained by the end of the Battle of Coronea. Although this is speculation, the number would certainly have declined from the initial figure.

  The Spartan hiring of mercenaries was a little new for them, but the fact that they were hoplites and employed in exactly the same way that Sparta had employed its hoplites for generations demonstrates that tactically they had not changed their basic thinking. The mercenaries were employed because they were a ready-made hoplite force and saved the Spartans from employing their own citizens, or too many allied troops. The Athenians, on the other hand, do demonstrate some tactical innovations, although these may have been enforced. As noted earlier during the discussion on the Peloponnesian War, Athens did not have ready access to the recruiting grounds of Arcadia from which to hire mercenary forces. The innovation was that she began to employ bodies of lightly armed troops, and to begin using them as distinct operational units. For heavy infantry, she continued to rely upon citizen soldiers, as had always been the case.

  As the Corinthian War dragged on beyond the two indecisive battles of 394, both sides had the potential to be dragged into another Peloponnesian War, as neither alliance seemingly had the strength to decisively defeat the other. Warfare was again year-round, and from 392 most of the engagements were fought by bodies of mercenaries who could be maintained in the field for indefinite periods. 13

  The Corinthians built long walls at the Isthmus of Corinth to prevent the Spartans campaigning to the north, and it was defended largely by Athenian mercenary peltasts, an army that was raised by Conon and later commanded by Iphicrates. Agesilaus besieged the fortifications for two years in a campaign that sapped the energy and financial resources of both sides. During the lengthy siege, the peltasts fared poorly in pitched battles with hoplites, but that was not what they were equipped to do. They were also used by Iphicrates on raids into the Peloponnese, where their mobility was particularly beneficial to them. The finest hour of the Athenians during this was the destruction of a force of 600 Spartan hoplites and Lechaeum by a force of mercenary peltasts. On the Spartan side, Agesilaus also employed mercenary troops, rebels from Corinth who had signed up to fight for the Peloponnesians.

  The peltasts of Iphicrates were a new innovation in warfare. They were lightly armed and fought in open order, which was entirely normal, but they also fought in formations and could be commanded as cohesive units rather than operating as something of a disorganized rabble. Iphicrates’ success during the Corinthian War demonstrated to everyone in Greece that hoplites were not invulnerable; that they suffered from a significant tactical disadvantage when faced with mobile, disciplined and well-commanded light-armed troops.14

  The Corinthian War was not only fought at the Isthmus of Corinth, however. In 388, Sparta sent her admiral, Anaxibius, to the city of Abydos in the Hellespontine region, the only city to remain loyal to Sparta. Anaxibius was also given enough money to raise a force of 1,000 mercenaries from amongst the local populations.15 The Spartan navarch also commanded 250 hoplites from Abydos and a small number of Peloponnesians. His orders were apparently to attempt to disrupt the Athenian grain shipments coming from the Black Sea. The reliance upon foreign grain, and particularly grain from the Black Sea, had long been an Athenian Achilles heel. A strong navy and control of certain key ports could starve the Athenians, or at least force them to look elsewhere, such as Egypt, for their grain supplies.

  Anaxibius raised his mercenary force quickly, and immediately began campaigning in the local area. He had a measure of initial success by winning over a number of local towns and cities from Pharnabazus. Riding high, Anaxibius gathered together his fleet, raised and manned another three ships from Abydos, and attacked the Athenian grain shipments directly, hijacking them and taking them to the harbour at Abydos. 16

  The Athenians were, of course, aware of how vulnerable their food supply was, and were alarmed at Spartan attempts to interfere. Iphicrates was immediately redirected to Asia Minor with eight ships and 1,200 mercenary peltasts to confront Anaxibius.17 The opening moves on both sides were cautious and restricted to raiding each other’s territory, but Iphicrates soon learned that: 18

  Anaxibius had gone to Antandrus with his mercenaries, the Lacedaemonians who were with him, and two hundred hoplites from Abydos, and heard that he had brought Antandrus into relations of friendship with him. Whereupon, suspecting that after he had also established his garrison there he would return again and bring the troops from Abydos back home, Iphicrates crossed over by night to the most deserted portion of the territory of Abydos, and going up into the mountains, set an ambush. Furthermore, he ordered the triremes which had brought him across the strait to sail at daybreak along the coast of the Chersonese, up the strait, in order that it might seem that he had sailed up the Hellespont to collect money, as he was wont to do.

  On his return journey, Anaxibius was informed by the citizens of the friendly cities that he passed that Iphicrates had indeed sailed towards the Hellespont; as a result, Anaxibius took few precautions on his march. Whilst the Spartan was on level ground, Iphicrates kept his troops hidden and waited for the opportune moment to spring the ambush.

  When the troops from Abydos, who were in the van, were now in the plain of Cremaste, where their gold mines are, and the rest of the army as it followed along was on the downward slope, and Anaxibius with his Lacedaemonians was just beginning the descent, at this moment Iphicrates started his men up from their ambush and rushed upon him on the run.

  Anaxibius’ men were too spread out along a narrow path and there was no hope that those at the front or rear could help any of the others. He had been outmanoeuvred by Iphicrates in a perfectly executed ambush by lightly armed mercenary peltasts. Anaxibius, along with several of the Spartans, fell when making a final stand. Much of the rest of the army did not resist Iphicrates for long but turned and fled towards the city of Abydos. Iphicrates’ men followed them and killed as many as they could, fifty hoplites from the city and 200 others.19 After securing his victory, Iphicrates must have campaigned briefly in the area of Abydos, because the Spartans were again confined to their city alone and all of their diplomatic and military gains of the previous months and years were for nothing. Athens was again in control of the region. Iphicrates then returned to the Chersonese and remained in Thrace until
after the King’s Peace. Xenophon does not record what happened to the captured Athenian grain ships, but presumably they were released to avoid further difficulties.

  With the Corinthian war threatening to turn into another Peloponnesian War, and with the front line having moved from the mainland to Asia Minor, the Spartans and Persians were able to force a resolution. They negotiated that the Persians would switch their allegiance from Athens to Sparta and formulated a treaty between the two.20 Without Persian gold, and with no empire to support it, Athens was running dangerously low on funds. Coupled with this was a Spartan fleet of eighty ships, commanded by Antalcidas, which had taken up a position to blockade the Hellespontine region; Iphicrates could do nothing about a large navy, despite still being in the Thraceward region. Athens was left with little choice but to agree to the terms of a peace treaty brokered by Artaxerxes. The terms of the Kings Peace meant that Sparta remained the dominant power on the Greek mainland, with Athens being allowed to retain some of its possessions in the northern Aegean. Many cities became nominally independent, and Asia Minor was again handed back to the control of the Great King.

  The outbreak of peace in the Greek world was, of course, disastrous for the mercenary soldiers fighting on both sides of the Corinthian War. One of the first acts of both Athens and Sparta was to dismiss all of the mercenary troops in their service; they were expensive and an unaffordable luxury, particularly for Athens.

  As was usually the case, however, when one war ended another began. Many of the recently unemployed mercenaries were recruited by Artaxerxes for a campaign against Cyprus.21 These were Greek hoplites recruited from the mainland rather than lightly armed peltasts; Persia could provide her own perfectly adequate light-armed troops. It is an interesting trend of the fourth century that the Greek city-states tended to hire lightly armed mercenaries whereas the Persians tended to hire heavily armoured hoplites.

  Cyprus had been an ally of Athens during the Corinthian War, but the terms of the King’s Peace meant Athens was forced to abandon her onetime ally, lest she be considered to be in breach of the terms of the treaty. Chabrias, an Athenian general, had been campaigning alongside Evagoras, the Cyprian king, until the peace was signed. At that point, Chabrias was instructed to stay in Cyprus along with his mercenaries, who essentially became freelancers, but he was no longer there in an official capacity as a representative of Athens. It seems unlikely that this would have fooled Artaxerxes if they had encountered one another, and Chabrias was kept well away from the invading Persian force to avoid difficulties for Athens. Evagoras did not immediately need the peltasts of Chabrias. as he employed 6,000 mercenaries of his own. These included some troops from the Egyptian Pharaoh Achoris, who was himself fighting for independence from Persia.

  In 386 Achoris requested of Athens that Chabrias be sent to Egypt to aid them in their struggles, and Athens agreed. Chabrias was quickly given a senior command in the Egyptian army and was enjoying considerable success. Although not a breach of the terms of the King’s Peace, the Persians complained to Athens anyway, who recalled their general in response. Chabrias did not have the wealth or personal authority to act independently as a mercenary commander, and returned to Athens, where he was given command of the fleet.

  Iphicrates was also not keen to retire to a peaceful life after the end of the Corinthian War. He moved to Thrace, where he continued campaigning for the next fifteen years in the employ of one Thracian warlord or another. From 384 to 382, he entered Persian service as commander of a mercenary army numbering somewhere between 12,000 and 20,000.22 Pharnabazus had raised a significant army for an offensive against Egypt. Once the campaign had begun, however, the Persian consistently ignored Iphicrates’ advice and demonstrated no strategic innovation or tactical guile. In frustration, Iphicrates abandoned the army and returned to Athens.

  The King’s Peace turned out to be merely an interlude between wars, as was so often the case. Sparta remained the dominant power and was constantly in dispute with Thebes, which wished to reconstitute the Boeotian League, but was still tied to Sparta. Athens, under the peace, had been allowed to retain control of her north Aegean possessions and was keen to expand her influence once again. When war did finally break out, it was not because of a dispute between these traditional rivals, however, but the result of a growing power in the north. Olynthus had formed the Chalcidian League, an alliance based upon trade and legal equality whose influence was growing rapidly. The pretext came in 382, when the Olynthians tried to enrol two local cities into their league (Apollonia and Acanthus), but they resisted and made representations to Sparta for assistance. Ambassadors were sent from both cities, and they made impassioned speeches to the member states of the Peloponnesian League. After hearing the ambassadors, the Spartans invited their allies to speak: 23

  Thereupon many, especially those who desired to gratify the Lacedaemonians, advocated raising an army, and it was decided that each state should send its proportionate contingent for an army of ten thousand. Proposals were also made that any state which so desired should be allowed to give money instead of men, three Aeginetan obols per day for each man, while if any state normally furnished horsemen, pay equal to that of four hoplites should be given for each horseman; and if any one of the states should fail to send its contingent to the army, the Lacedaemonians were to be permitted to fine such state a stater per day for each man.

  The Acanthian ambassador managed to persuade the Spartans, however, that this force would take too long to assemble and that a smaller force should be gathered and dispatched immediately. The Spartans agreed to this and sent a small force of around 2,000, consisting of emancipated helots, perioeci and Scythians, commanded by Eudamidas. 24 On the way north, they took the opportunity presented to them by a group of disaffected Thebans to take control of the Cadmea; as a result they were able to control that city for three years, until 379, when they were unceremoniously driven out by a faction led by Pelopidas.

  The secondary force of 10,000, the vast majority of whom were mercenaries, was also approved and began to assemble but, as predicted by the Acanthian ambassador, this was not a quick process. Eudamidas met with some initial success by accepting the surrender of Potidaea, a city which had been formally loyal to Olynthus, but was to become the Peloponnesian base of operations. Eudamidas’ advantage did not last long, however. The forward troops sent by the Peloponnesian League simply were not sufficient in either numbers or quality to oppose those of the Chalcidian League, and suffered significantly. The main force of around 10,000 arrived not too long afterwards with the reasonable expectations that they would quickly win victory, given that they now had a significant numerical superiority. Again, however, the Spartans suffered setbacks. The main issue appears to be that Spartan generals historically had commanded hoplites, and they were not familiar with the operational advantages and disadvantages of peltasts. Simply put, Teneutias (who had replaced Eudamidas when the main body arrived) had not moved with the times in regard to the changing face of warfare in the Greek world. Xenophon illustrates this brilliantly when he narrates a battle before Olynthus where the Spartans use peltasts against cavalry, with no heavy infantry support.25

  As time went on, however, and Teleutias had led his army up to the city of the Olynthians in order to destroy whatever tree was left or whatever field had been cultivated by the enemy, the Olynthian horsemen issued forth and, proceeding quietly, crossed the river which flows by the city and held on their way towards the opposing army. And when Teleutias saw them, being irritated at their audacity, he immediately ordered Tlemonidas, the leader of the peltasts, to charge against them on the run. Now, when the Olynthians saw the peltasts sallying forth, they turned about, retired quietly, and crossed the river again. The peltasts, on the other hand, followed very rashly and, with the thought that the enemy were in flight, pushed into the river after them to pursue them. Thereupon the Olynthian horsemen, at the moment when they thought that those who had crossed the river were still easy t
o handle, turned about and dashed upon them, and they not only killed Tlemonidas himself, but more than one hundred of the others.

  Teleutias had led the peltasts with what could be described as incompetence. He had made a mistake in allowing the peltasts to chase after the enemy cavalry without providing any sort of support. More than 100 men died as a result, including the commander of the contingent. The sensible thing to have done would have been to withdraw, regroup and consider the next tactical move. Teleutias compounded his mistake by allowing emotions to rule his thinking in his desire to force a victory, and many more died as a result:26

  But Teleutias, filled with anger when he saw what was going on, snatched up his arms and led the hoplites swiftly forward, while he ordered the peltasts and the horsemen to pursue and not stop pursuing. Now in many other instances those who have pressed a pursuit too close to a city’s wall have come off badly in their retreat, and in this case also, when the men were showered with missiles from the towers, they were forced to retire in disorder and to guard themselves against the missiles. At this moment the Olynthians sent out their horsemen to the attack, and the peltasts also came to their support; finally, their hoplites likewise rushed out, and fell upon the Lacedaemonian phalanx when it was already in confusion. There Teleutias fell fighting. And when this happened, the troops about him at once gave way, and in fact no one stood his ground any longer, but all fled, some for Spartolus, others for Acanthus, others to Apollonia, and the majority to Potidaea. As they fled in all directions, so likewise the enemy pursued in all directions, and killed a vast number of men, including the most serviceable part of the army.