Spying on the World
Page 7
b) Initial success . Neither French North Africa nor Spain will risk incurring German displeasure until they are satisfied that the Allies mean business and have the forces to establish themselves firmly in North Africa. French resistance, therefore, and Spanish independence in face of German pressure will be influenced by the initial success of the Allies. Last but not least, Germany’s difficult position as to whether or not to risk moving troops into Tunisia will be governed by the speed of the Allied approach to Tunisia. The importance of overwhelming force, to gain initial success, must be stressed.
c) Strategic Surprise . Initial success, in turn, is largely dependent upon strategic surprise. Until Vichy and the German High Command are convinced beyond doubt that the expedition is destined for French North Africa, no German troops or air forces are likely to be moved there. In face of their other commitments and subject to paragraph (a) above, it is unlikely that any troops would be moved to a preparatory assembly area such as Sicily.
d) Use of U.S. Troops . There is no question but that the will to resist invasion by U.S. Troops would be weaker than the will to resist invasion by the British.
e) Preparatory steps . French North Africa may provide scope for discreet preparatory moves, particularly by the United States. If found practicable, personal contact, bribery, infiltration of personnel under guise of commercial relationship and even some form of Trojan Horse, methods should facilitate the initial assault but such steps must be very discreet, as strategic surprise is of primary importance.
f) Allied Policy towards Franco Government . In the initial stages the Franco Government have more to fear from Allied action than from German.
g) Propaganda , allied to military strategy, towards France, French North Africa and Spain will be of the utmost importance.
h) Supplies to North Africa . Since one of the difficulties of our operation will be communications and supply, any arrangements that can be made to time the arrival of ships from North America carrying oil and coal so as immediately to precede or coincide with our assault, may be of great subsequent assistance to ourselves. Between now and the time of the operation, however, it would be important that French North Africa should not receive supplies likely to stiffen French resistance.
58. The following Appendices are attached:–
Appendix “A” – Strength and Dispositions of French Air Forces.
Appendix “B” – Strength and Dispositions of Spanish Air Forces.
Appendix “C” – Strengths and Dispositions of German and Italian Air Forces.
Appendix “D” – Distribution and Strength of French Land Forces.
Appendix “E” – Distribution and Strength of Spanish, Moroccan Army.
Appendix- “F” – German Land Forces Available to Oppose the Operation.
(Signed)
J. H. GODFREY
(“)
F. H. N. DAVIDSON
(“)
C. E. H. MEDHURST
(“)
C. G. VICKERS
(“)
C. BRAMWELL
(for V. CAVENDISH BENTINCK)
Great George Street, S.W.l.
7TH AUGUST, 1942.
Appendix “A”
FRENCH AIR FORCES
1. The estimated strength and disposition of the French Air forces in North Africa at the beginning of October are likely to be as follows:–
Fighter
Bomber
Recce
Naval
Total
TUNISIA
33
–
13
29
75
ALGERIA
69
51
21
6
147
MOROCCO
152
122
26
–
300
254
173
60
35
522
2. Faced with the possibility of attacks against their Mediterranean and Atlantic North American seaboards, it is unlikely that the disposition of the French Air Force would be substantially changed, at any rate until it was known for certain which was the area of the main attack.
3. The above forces might be reinforced by some 3 bomber and 3 fighter groups (29 L.R.Bs. and 78 S.E.F.) despatched to North Africa from Unoccupied France either immediately prior to the date of the assault, if the French had obtained reliable intelligence as to the projected operations, or immediately after the assault. Part of these reinforcements might become available within two days and the whole force within 10 days of the decision to transfer them.
4. The types of French aircraft are obsolescent, the best Fighter being the Dewoitine 520 with a performance slightly inferior to the Hurricane I and the Bombers with a similar performance to Blenheims.
5. Stocks of bombs, ammunition and petrol are believed today to be adequate for some two months intensive operations. There is reason to believe, however, that during the next month or two these stocks may be further increased from Unoccupied France.
6. Serviceability is high, probably about 70 per cent. The standard of training is not high, due to limitations of flying imposed by necessity to conserve petrol. Morale is good. Lack of M.T. would hamper operational efficiency of squadrons as ground staffs could not be quickly moved.
APPENDIX “B”
SPANISH AIR FORCES
The estimated first line strength and disposition of the Spanish Air Forces at the beginning of October, 1942 are likely to be as follows:–
Region
Bomber
Fighter
Recce .
Seaplanes
Total
Peninsula
115
183
12
6
316
Belearics
12
18
–
11
41
Spanish Morocco
–
17
39
7
63
Rio de Oro (and Canary Islands)
11
28
–
3
42
138
246
51
27
462
The fighting value of the Spanish Air Force is negligible. Since March 1942 the Air Force has been virtually grounded owing to lack of aviation spirit and although within the last few weeks activity has very slightly increased, it is not thought that there will be any improvement in the fighting efficiency by the beginning of October. Serviceability is not above 35%.
APPENDIX “C”
GERMAN AND ITALIAN AIR FORCES.
1. The scales of attack given in this appreciation are based on that normally attained by the German Air Force. Experience during the last 12–18 months indicates that neither strength nor serviceability are maintained in the Mediterranean area as efficiently as in other theatres. The figures which are given therefore probably represent the maximum which it is possible for the G.A.F. to reach, and no account has been taken of the likely diversion of aircraft against Malta or for shipping escort to Libya which are incalculable factors today.
2. The scales of attack to which the assaulting forces are likely to be subjected fall into three phases:–
First Phase . During the approach to the objective and for a period of approximately a fortnight thereafter before reinforcements can begin to be operational in the Central Mediterranean.
Second Phase . While the Allies are still in process of consolidating their position in Algeria and extending their operations into Tunisia.
Third Phase . If the Allies succeed in establishing themselves in North Africa, up to and including Tunisia, so that the Germans, in order to evict the Allies if they so decide, are forced to mount combined operations based on Italy and Sicily through Spain.
First Phase
&nbs
p; 3. Estimate of the Axis Air Forces likely to be available in the Central Mediterranean during the First phase.
SICILY
SARDINIA.
G.A.F.
I.A.F.
G.A.F.
I.A.F.
L.R. Bombers
105–165
100+
30
50–100−
Bomber Recce.
15
10
5
20
Dive Bombers
–
15
–
–
S.E. Fighters
30
120
–
30
Coastal
–
50
–
30
150–210
295
35
130–180
+ including 30 torpedo-carrying aircraft
– including 30-50 “ “ “
Estimated strength – 90 percent of I.E.
Estimate serviceability – 50 percent of I.E.
4. Reinforcements (taken into account in the higher figures above)
On its becoming clear by D minus 4 that the operation was likely to take place against the French North African Coast, a reinforcement of 60 German long range bombers could be moved from the Western Front and become operational from Sicily by D 3 to D 14.
The Italian reinforcement of Sardinia up to a maximum of 100 long range bombers, of which 50 would be torpedo bombers, could be effected by D minus 2 and would be operational during the whole of the First Phase.
5. Scale of Effort
The average daily scale of effort per 24 hours by the combined Axis forces during the First Phase is estimated as follows:–
oran – 30 sorties by long range bombers and torpedo carrying aircraft.
or ALGIERS – 100–120 sorties by long range bombers and torpedo carrying aircraft.
or TUNISIA – 120–140 sorties by long range bombers and torpedo carrying aircraft. In addition up to 15 Dive Bomber sorties and 120 S.E. Fighter sorties
CASABLANCA – Out of range for all types of aircraft.
Second Phase
6. Estimate of the Axis Air Forces likely to be available in the Central Mediterranean during the Second Phase.
SICILY
SARDINIA
G.A.F.
I.A.F.
G.A.F.
I.A.F.
L.R. Bombers
165–195
100
30
100
Bomber Recce.
15
10
10
20
Dive Bombers
–
15
–
–
S.E. Fighters
30
120
–
30
Coastal
–
50
–
20
210–240
295
40
180
Estimated strength 85–95 percent of I.E.
Estimated serviceability 45–50 per cent of I.E.
7. Reinforcements (taken into account in the higher figures above)
There would be a further increase between D14 and D21 of 30 G.A.F. long range bombers operating from Sicily, raising the total G.A.F. long range bomber force to 225 aircraft. Otherwise there would be no change in the forces available during the first phase.
8. Scale of Effort
These reinforcements would not affect the scale of attack on ORAN, but would increase that against ALGIERS and TUNISIA by up to 10 sorties per 24 hours in each case.
9. Move to Tunisia
It is not considered likely that the Axis would operate air forces in TUNISIA, with the possible exception of some fighter aircraft if German land forces were moved there, since no advantage could be gained by moving long range bomber and other types from their already well-established bases in Sicily and Sardinia.
10. Balearics
The establishment of Axis air forces in Southern Spain and the Balearics is considered improbable during this phase.
Third Phase
11. Estimate of the Axis Air Forces likely to be available in the Central Mediterranean during the third phase The forces likely to be engaged during November and December are estimated as follows:–
SICILY
SARDINIA
G.A.F.
I.A.F.
G.A.F.
I.A.F.
Long Range bombers
195–255
100
30
100
Bomber Recce
15–30
10
10
20
Dive bombers
0–30
15
–
–
S.E. Fighters
30–80
120
–
30
T.E. Fighters
0–15
–
15
–
Coastal
50
50
–
20
290–460
295
55
170
Estimated strength – 80 percent of I.E.
Estimated serviceability – 45–50 percent of I.E.
12. Reinforcements (taken into account in the higher figures above).
During the Third Phase, estimated to cover the period November – December, it is considered that the G.A.F. in the Central Mediterranean could be reinforced as follows:–
November
December
Long Range Bombers
30
30
Dive Bombers
–
30
S.E. Fighters
20
30
T.E. Fighters
30
–
80 aircraft
90 aircraft
After December any increase of the G.A.F. in Sicily would be unlikely in view of the restricted aerodrome accommodation, whilst shipping and supply difficulties would make the establishment of any greater forces in Sardinia improbable.
13. Effect of Postponement of the Operation form the beginning of October to the beginning of November
The postponement of the operation to the beginning of November would make it possible for the G.A.F. to strengthen their forces available throughout the First phase by approximately 30 long range bombers and 20 S.E. fighters, but would not affect the Italian Air Force. Thus throughout the First Phase, if in November, the G.A.F. would consist of:–
SICILY
SARDINIA
L.R. Bombers
195
30
Bomber Recce
15
5
Dive Bombers
–
–
S.E. Fighters
50
–
260
35
During the Second Phase G.A.F. reinforcements could come into operation at an earlier stage but would not differ materially from those already given. This would result in a more rapid increase in the scale of effort and by the end of the Second Phase this could be approaching that likely to be attained towards the end of the Third Phase with the operation beginning on 1st October.
14. G.A.F. Operations in Spain
Even assuming Spanish acquiescence it is unlikely that air attack would be encountered from the G.A.F. during the first week of the operation. A striking force of not more than 60 long range bombers could however become operational during the second week. These would be at the expense of reinforcements to Sicily unless the Germans were prepared to reduce even further their depleted forces on Western front.
By February, a force of some 450 aircraft could be made available to support a move by la
nd forces through Spain and to support combined operations thence against North Africa.
APPENDIX “D”
FRENCH LAND FORCES IN NORTH AFRICA.
MOROCCO
ALGERIA
TUNISIA
Infantry Regiments
13
14
3
Cavalry Regiments
4
3
2
Mechanised Cavalry Regiments
2
4
1
Field Artillery Regiments
3
4
1
A/A Artillery Regiments
1
1
1
Tank Battalions
2(?)
–
–
Engineer Battalions
2
–
–
In addition – Coast Defence and A/A Artillery at ports.
APPENDIX “E”
SPANISH MOROCCAN ARMY
EASTERN ZONE
WESTERN ZONE
TOTAL
Army Troops
4,000
27,000
31,000
Labour Units
2,500
11,500
14,000
IX Corps
–
40,500
40,500
X Corps
27,500
–
27,500
Khalifian Troops and Civil Guard (500)
5,500
11,500
17,000
39,500
90,500
130,000
Note 1: The inter-zone boundary runs southward from VALHUCEMAS. The bulk of the troops in the Western zone is located in the western half of that zone.