Spying on the World
Page 6
22 Submarines
A large part of this fleet is based on Toulon but would be available for operations in North African waters.
(b) Other heavy units exist but are not considered to be effective. They are:-
(i) The 26 year old battleship “PROVENCE” (modernised in 1933) now being used for training purposes at TOULON. Reduced crew but armament fully effective. At least 5 days to prepare for sea.
(ii) The battlecruiser “DUNKERQUE” believed to be under repair at TOULON until January, 1943.
(iii) The battleship “RICHELIEU” at DAKAR Could be used as a fighting unit though her maximum speed is probably only 23 knots.
(iv) The battleship “JEAN BART” at CASABLANCA with only one 15” turret.
(c) The efficiency of even the better units is estimated being not more than 60% by British standards. Oil fuel stocks are known to be low.
(d) It is believed that the Fleet would obey the orders of Vichy Government and would fight. Their activities, however, would be in defence of French North Africa.
22. Military
(a) The French forces in North Africa, details of which are given in Appendix ‘D’ may be summarised as the equivalent of:-
MOROCCO ........... 4 divisions
ALGERIA ........... 3 divisions
TUNISIA ........... 1 division.
Increase in the above from reserves in North Africa is likely owing to lack of equipment.
(b) The bulk of the troops are disposed to defend landings or near the ports of North Africa. The major concentrations are located at TUNIS, CONSTANTINE, ALGIERS, ORAN, FEZ, MEKNES, CASABLANCA and MARRAKECH. Owing to difficult and inadequate lateral communications, the great distances involved (CASABLANCA to ORAN is some 500 miles, and ORAN to ALGIERS is 250 miles), and also to the shortage of coal, petrol and any rapid major redistribution of forces would be difficult.
(c) Troops are poorly equipped and are particularly short of A.F.V’s, also of field A.A. and anti-tank artillery and ammunition for all arms. It is estimated that there is only through ammunition for about three weeks’ sustained fighting at maximum. This position could be improved by the release of stocks in France at present under Armistice control. Few units, except mechanised cavalry and tank units, are motorised.
(d) It is estimated that, at the most, the equivalent of ten ill equipped French divisions from Metropolitan France might be available for transfer to French North Africa, but only a few rather ill equipped units are likely to be sent.
23. Air
(a) The French air force in North Africa, details of which was given in Appendix ‘A’, amounts to approximately 500 aircraft of all types. It would be possible with German consent to reinforce this from unoccupied France with an additional 120 aircraft.
(b) The types of French aircraft are obsolescent, the best fighter being the Dewoitine 520 with a performance slightly inferior to the Hurricane I, and the bombers with a similar performance to Blenheims.
(c) Stocks of bombs, ammunition and petrol are believed to-day to be adequate for some two months intensive operations. There is reason to believe, however, that during the next month or two these stocks may be further increased from Unoccupied France.
(d) Serviceability is high, probably about 70 per cent. The standard of training is not high, due to limitations on flying caused by necessity to conserve petrol. Morale is good. Lack of M.T. would hamper operational efficiency of squadrons as ground staffs could not be quickly moved.
(e) Lack of combat experience and indifferent organisation is likely to prevent the French air force from carrying out sustained operations in face of modern Allied machines and technique. Doubts of the French High command as to the sympathies of individual pilots are likely also to be a hampering factor.
B – SPANISH
24. The Spanish Fleet is now disposed as follows:-
Ferrol:
l8” Cruiser
16” Cruiser
8 modern Destroyers and 3 older Destroyers
2 Eolo class minelayers
2 Vulcano class minelayers.
Cartagena:
6 modern Destroyers and 1 older Destroyer
1 Vulcano class minelayer
1 modern Sloop
5 Submarines
6 M.T.B’s are based on Cadiz, 1 at Algeciras, and 1 at Tangier; 1 Vulcano Minelayer in Canaries.
25. The activities of the Fleet are strictly limited by the fuel shortage, but it is thought that there may be an accumulated reserve sufficient to enable the Fleet to operate for a short period. Discipline is the best of the three services and there is a wholesome respect for the British Navy.
26. The general feeling is friendly, especially among the officers, many of whom have personal connections with us.
27. It is considered that the friendly Spanish Fleet will take no action at all unless Spain declares war against the United Nations, and even then will only carry out a purely defensive role such as the convoying of coastal traffic.
28. The Army in SPANISH MOROCCO is organised in an army of two corps and comprises some 135,000 men, including 14,000 in labour battalions. (See Appendix ‘E’). Reinforcement of up to 25,000 men might possibly be sent from SPAIN following our landing in NORTH AFRICA. There is a great lack of modern equipment, including M.T. and the standard of training is low. Though ill-equipped by modern standard, the troops can be expected to fight well for any cause in which they believe.
29. The Spanish Air Force consists of some 460 aircraft of all types. Its fighting value is negligible. Through lack of aviation spirit it has for some time been virtually grounded.
C – ITALIAN
30. The normal effective strength of the Italian Navy (Ships in commission) is as follows:-
2 15” Battleships
3 12.6” Battleships
3 8” Cruisers
6 6” Cruisers
2 5.3” Cruisers
4 Destroyers
42 Torpedo boats
60 Submarines
90 M.A.S.
2 additional 15” battleships under construction, of which one may by October be in commission.
31. The Battleships are concentrated at Taranto, Cruisers detached to Messina, Naples and/or Cagliari (Sardinia) and Navarino (Greece).
32. Naval morale has risen slightly recently with German stiffening and consequent on the reduced threat from our fleet, the Italian naval surface forces have been showing more enterprise than formerly. If faced, however, with an equal or superior force they are not likely to show any more aggressive spirit or resolution than they have done in the past.
33. The Italian army is unlikely to be used for operations in French North Africa. Its main preoccupation is likely to become defence and reinforcement of Sicily and Sardinia.
34. Particulars of the Italian air forces likely to be used are dealt with in Appendix ‘C’.
D – GERMAN
35. German naval surface forces are unlikely to move to the Mediterranean. Their forces already in this area as:-
Submarines – 16-20 operating in Eastern Mediterranean off Libyan and Egyptian coast
E-boats – 7-10 operating off North Africa.
Both U-boats and E-boats are more efficient and enterprising than the Italians.
36. The German land force will in October still be fully committed in Occupied Europe, Libya and Russia. There is unlikely to be a strategic reserve in Europe which is not already committed, and everywhere the army will be at full stretch.
37. Germany is unlikely, therefore, to redispose her land forces strategically merely to counter a possible Allied assault on North Africa. This depends, however, largely on the success of the Allies’ cover plans and upon whether the Germans can be kept guessing as to the threat to the Continent, by deceptive action and if possible by diversionary raids. It is not until she definitely knows that the assault is about to take place that she will be constrained to take counter action.
38. There exists the possibility, however, that
by October, Russia will be in a sufficiently weakened state for Germany to have pulled out up to, say, 10 divisions and to have brought them back to Germany ready to counter any Allied action which she might expect in Europe during the autumn. This must certainly be her aim, and its fulfilment is entirely dependent on the way the Russian campaign develops in the next two months. This strategic reserve would be likely to be held centrally in Germany or France.
39. By October the German Air Force, which will have been heavily engaged on the Russian Front for nearly 18 months in addition to operations in the Western and Mediterranean areas, is likely to be at a low ebb. Although the first-line strength may be maintained at some 4,000 aircraft, it will be a force without depth and in need of a period for re-equipment. It may be found to be weak in strength, low in serviceability and difficulty will be experienced in making forces available for sustained operations in a new theatre of war.
PRE-ASSAULT PHASE
40. It is difficult to know whether the Germans will attempt to reinforce the Central Mediterranean area effectively prior to the date of assault. A great deal will depend on the effectiveness of strategic surprise, both as to objective and time. Although the German High Command is bound to be aware some considerable time before the date of assault that a large-scale operation is being planned and although they will suspect French North Africa as a possible objective, they may be uncertain as to the exact locality of the attack until a very late stage.
41. Commitments elsewhere and the limited nature of their resource will, it is thought, prevent them from actually moving reinforcements to the Central Mediterranean area until they are certain that French North Africa is the real objective. We think it reasonable to assume, therefore, that no move is likely to be made until Day –4, by which date air reconnaissance will have disclosed the direction in which the convoy is sailing.
42. Meanwhile the French, faced with the possibility of attacks against the Mediterranean or Atlantic North African Seaboard, or possibly both, will be in a state of alertness but are unlikely to change the disposition of their force until it is known for certain which is the area of the main attack. They may rush over to North Africa some extra equipment supplies as a precaution.
ASSAULT OR 1ST PHASE (say D minus 4 to D 14)
43. At any time after D minus 4 we must be prepared for a move of the Toulon squadron to Oran with the concurrence of the Germans. At the same time, the French may dispose their available submarines in the Eastern and Western approaches to the Straits of Gibraltar. Surface forces based on Casablanca will probably put to sea and, in face of overwhelming force, would probably retire to Dakar. The force at Dakar is unlikely to play any part.
44. Whilst it is possible that the Italian Fleet may endeavour to interfere with our convoys, it is not likely that they will risk bringing their heavy forces to the westward outside the protection afforded by shore-based aircraft. There is a danger from submarines to our ships on passage and when lying off beaches, but it is not considered that the number of submarines in the area could be materially increased during the period of the initial assaults. A subsequent build up of the scale of attack is to be expected.
45. So far as land forces are concerned, the only serious opposition likely to be met is from French forces already in North Africa, the dispositions of which are shown in Appendix “D”. The mobility of these forces will be restricted by lack of M.T. and petrol.
46. In addition to the French air forces based in North Africa, attacks will be sustained from German and Italian air forces based on Sicily and Sardinia. The estimated scale of these attacks is set out in Appendix “D”.
2ND PHASE (say D 15 to D 30)
47. Assuming the fall of Oran and Algiers, Allied troops not engaged in mopping-up operations in Algeria are likely to encounter the next serious opposition in Tunisia. If success in Algeria has been rapid and overwhelming and it has become known that the expedition is predominantly American, French resistance in Tunisia might be half-hearted or even collapse altogether. We cannot, however, count on this.
48. The Germans will have every incentive to attempt to forestall the Allies in establishing themselves in the key position of Tunisia. Their ability to do this will depend both on the rapidity of the Allied advance and on the forces they can make available * in the time.
49. The quickest means of reinforcement would be by air. No trained German air landing formations, however, are likely to be available other than those already in Libya. Transport aircraft at the expense of other duties could be made available at short notice to ferry between 2,000 and 2,500 troops per day from SICILY to AFRICA, if they were all devoted to carriage of personnel, and all but light equipment were taken by sea. The transport aircraft could be assembled within about 48 hours of the decision to do so. Italian troops would be available immediately, but it is unlikely that these would be used in view of possible French reactions.
50. One German Infantry Division and the lorried infantry of an armoured division from France could begin to reach SICILY after one week, when a flow of 2,000 men per day could start. On this assumption approximately 14,000 lightly armed infantry might be available in TUNISIA in 14 days from the order to move.
51. Germany is heavily engaged and will continue to be heavily engaged in supplying Rommel’s forces. She will therefore have only limited air transport to spare. In any case Germany would be unable regularly to supply and maintain by air any considerable forces in TUNISIA. For regular maintenance sea transport would have to be used. Further, the operation of transport aircraft from SICILY whose aerodrome facilities will be fully utilised for operational aircraft would prejudice reinforcement of the latter. Accordingly a steady flow, for any length of time, of 2,000 troops per day by air may not be practicable.
52. The scale and timing of any possible enemy sea-borne reinforcements are set out in Appendix “F”, which shows that first elements might arrive in TUNISIA about two weeks after the assault. A complete division could not arrive and be operationally effective before about four to seven weeks after the assault.
53. If by the end of a week from the date of the assault the German High Command are faced with a situation in which the Allies are well established in Algeria and are developing a threat towards TUNISIA and Rommel is fully engaged in the East, they are likely to hesitate before attempting to forestall the Allies by themselves moving against TUNISIA. The German assessment of the threat from aircraft and light naval forces based on Malta and Algeria would affect their decision.
54. Whether or not an attempt is made to move land forces into TUNISIA, it is not considered likely that during this phase the enemy would operate air forces in TUNISIA (with the possible exception of some fighter aircraft if land forces are moved in) since no advantage could be gained by moving long range bomber and other types from their already well-established bases in SICILY and SARDINIA.
55. The establishment of Axis air forces in Southern Spain and the Balearics is considered improbable during this period. Operationally there would not be sufficient advantages to base aircraft on the Balearics which would be deficient in fuel, bomb-stocks and facilities generally.
THIRD PHASE – LONG TERM POLICY
56. Assuming that French resistance had been overcome and that the Allies were established in Tunisia during the Second Phase, the alternatives open to the Germans if they were to attempt to recover the position would be combined operations based on Sicily or a move through Spain with a view to closing the Straits, and subsequent operations through Spanish Morocco. For maintenance and supply reasons we do not consider that a counter-offensive based on Tripoli (L) is a possible course of action.
(a) Combined operation from SICILY
Once we were established in TUNISIA the Germans would have to stage a large scale combined operation in order to turn us out. This operation could not be mounted before the Allies were in too strong a position to make it too hazardous to attempt.
(b) A move through SPAIN
Formations would have to be withdrawn from Russia for this operation. The size of the force required will depend on the attitude of Spain. The following estimate is made of the time taken from the date of the decision to move, allowing for resting and refitting.
Forces Required
Time required to reach Southern Spain
Should Spain resist
14 divisions
3 to 5 months
Should Spain acquiesce
6 – 8 divisions
2 to 3 months
NOTE: One to two divisions might be made available from France and, with Spanish acquiescence, might reach Southern Spain in 3 to 4 weeks.
We assume that, if the Germans entered Spain from the North, we would have to occupy Spanish Morocco. The above forces would therefore constitute no immediate threat to North Africa, but only to GIBRALTAR. A threat to ALGERIA or SPANISH MOROCCO (apart from air forces based on Southern Spain) could only arise through a combined operation. In face of powerful Allied air defences in Spanish Morocco, we do not believe that the Germans would attempt this combined operation but would have to be content with the threat they themselves could mount against the Straits of Gibraltar with their air forces in Southern Spain.
PART III – IMPORTANT FACTORS AFFECTING THE COURSE OF THE OPERATION
57. As a result of the above appreciation, we are impressed by the following factors which are likely to exercise an important influence on the course of the operation:-
a) Date . The date by which the operation takes place is all important. Whatever the result of this summer’s campaign in Russia, the Germans are bound to start withdrawing substantial land and air forces for resting and refitting some time this Autumn, and we cannot count on this being delayed, at any rate so far as Air Forces are concerned, later than mid October. By the beginning of November Germany’s fears of invasion of the Continent this year may be at rest.