Spying on the World

by Richard J Aldrich

  5. One of the most vivid of the impressions we have gained in the course of our association with the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, and, particularly, during our recent enquiry, has been of the great volume of the available material and of the number and variety of the Departments and organisations interested in it as producers or consumers of intelligence, or both.

  6. Intelligence reaches this country in war-time through many channels, of which the following are the principal:-

  (a ) The reports reaching the Foreign Office from our Diplomatic and Consular officers abroad.

  (b ) The reports reaching the Service Ministries from Naval, Military and Air Attachés, Naval Reporting Stations, the interrogation of prisoners of war, captured documents and equipment, &c.

  (c ) The product of the “Y” Services.

  (d ) The product of the Government Code and Cypher School.

  (e ) The reports from agents of S.I.S.

  (f ) The reports received through the channels of the Security Service, including the interrogations of persons entering the United Kingdom.

  (g ) The product of Postal and Telegraph Censorship.

  (h ) The product of aerial photographic reconnaissance received in the Air Ministry.

  (i ) The reports reaching the Dominions Office from our High Commissioners in the Dominions.

  (j ) The reports reaching the Colonial Office from our Governments in Colonial and Mandated Territories.

  (k ) Reports to S.O.E. from their agents.

  (l ) The foreign press-reading organisation of P.W.E.

  7. In addition to these official channels, a deal of information reaches this country both in peace and war through private channels. There is correspondence between the representatives of British commercial and financial organisations abroad, and their head offices in this country. There is the information obtained from the correspondence of individual scientists and academic figures as well as that of learned societies. Learning knows no boundaries. There is the information collected by newspaper correspondents abroad and by private travellers. In war-time, much valuable information is drawn from this mine of unofficial intelligence. In peace-time, however, much of it is wasted as far as the Government machine is concerned. Even the information reaching this country through official channels, as outlined in the last paragraph, has rarely, till recently, found its way to all those who could put it to the best use.

  8. War-time relaxation of financial control and the urgent need of the different organisations engaged directly in military operations to be sure of getting quickly the intelligence they require, have resulted in some overlapping of responsibilities and duplication of work which should not be acceptable or permissible in peace-time, and should, if possible, be avoided in war. The remarkable diversity of controls during most of the war both in intelligence producing and intelligence consuming organisations, has fostered the tendency to duplication. The three principal fighting Services, though they have their own Ministries as in peace, are operationally directed by the Chiefs of Staff Committee under the ultimate control of the Minister of Defence. S.O.E. (which developed into an intelligence producing agency) has, however, been under the ministerial direction of the Minister of Economic Warfare; the Political Warfare Executive under that of the Foreign Secretary and the Minister of Information; the S.I.S. under that of the Foreign Secretary; the Security Service, until recently, under the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, though now under the Foreign Secretary; and the Postal and Telegraph Censorship Department, under the Minister of Information. There were, no doubt, excellent reasons for the decisions that led to this state of affairs. It may well have been right under the pressure of war to avoid the dislocation that any attempt at rationalisation would have caused. Goodwill, and the national genius for making the best of anomalies, has produced remarkably good results from this strange machine. None the less, we believe that a more symmetrical organisation could have done at least as well at less cost. Certainly, if we are to plan an organisation for peace capable of ready adaptation to the needs of a future war, something simpler and more economical must be devised.

  9. In the international field it is now generally recognised that the price of peace and security in the modern world is some surrender of national sovereignty. Hence such experiments as the League of Nations and the Dumbarton Oaks concept. The pressure of war has led to the remarkable innovation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the various integrated Allied Headquarters. It is, however, noteworthy that this country, which has taken the lead in these directions, pays perhaps more regard to responsibility of Ministers to Parliament for the conduct of their Departments. Yet, in defence matters, the war has brought about a considerable degree of inter-departmental co-operation through the machinery of the Chiefs of Staff organisation. We believe that few now would contend that this development has been anything but advantageous. If, therefore, in this report we recommend its extension, involving the surrender of some departmental sovereignties, we do so in the firm belief that it is essential. We recognise that each Department affected could make a convincing case for the retention unimpaired of its own sole authority, but we are confident that whatever disagreement there may be with our individual recommendations, any objective study of the problem confronting us would have led to the same general conclusion, namely, that we cannot afford to start another war unprovoked with the necessary intelligence; and that we cannot afford in peace (or even perhaps in war) the kind of intelligence organisation we have to-day.

  10. We have not, in this report, dealt in detail with the internal organisation of the intelligence directorates in the three Service Departments. To have done so would have destroyed the balance of the report and laid us open to the charge of making proposals on insufficient evidence and superficial enquiry. We have preferred instead to propose a certain amalgamation of existing inter-service and inter-departmental bodies so as to provide a central intelligence agency and to leave it to Departments to work out the alterations in their own organisation that would be possible and desirable were that proposal accepted.

  11. Enquiries under other auspices have been or are being made into the two principal branches of our Secret Service, and we do not, therefore, propose in this report to deal in detail with this aspect of the problem, save in so far as it is necessary for our purpose. We believe, however, that there will be general acceptance of the contention that the secret vote should be relived of as much as possible of the expenditure on intelligence. A great part of the expenditure now, in war-time, borne on the secret vote for, for example, P.W.E. and S.O.E., represents acknowledgeable activities. The more that expenditure on intelligence can be placed on the public vote, the less temptation there will be in future to raid the secret vote in times of financial stringency. It is because we are convinced of the need for the strongest possible Secret Service in peace-time in preparation for our war needs, that we urge that everything possible should be done to protect the Secret Service from having to bear responsibility for activities that need not of themselves be regarded as secret.

  12. As regards the other peace-time intelligence producing Departments, there is one general observation that we desire to make. Whereas in the Service Departments intelligence is the sole responsibility of certain officers specially selected for dealing with it, in the Political Departments, e.g . the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office, the officials who receive, collate and assess information are also responsible for formulating policy. This is not necessarily a bad thing, but the system does possess a serious weakness. One who is concerned in devising and recommending policy, and in assisting in its execution is likely, however objective he may try to be, to interpret the intelligence he receives in the light of the policy he is pursuing. To correct this possible weakness, it is clearly desirable that some quite objective check be placed on all intelligence received. So far as intelligence affecting the conduct of the war is concerned, the problem has been to some extent solved in the Foreign Office by the establish
ment of the Services Liaison Department, whose function it is to take part at all levels in the deliberations of the J.I.C. in the preparation of intelligence appreciations, and to interpret to the Planning Staffs the foreign policy of His Majesty’s Government. This departure has justified itself in war, and we hope that it will be decided to continue it in peace. We believe that no Department, however experienced and well-staffed, has anything to lose by bringing the intelligence directly available to it to the anvil of discussion and appreciation among other workers in the same field.

  13. To sum up, the machine that it is our task to devise should, we suggest, have the following characteristics. It should ensure that the agency best fitted for the collection of a particular type of intelligence continues to collect it. It should ensure that, as far as possible, no other agency should collect the same material from the same source. It should ensure that the material collected is collected with other material bearing on the same subject, so that the best possible evaluation may be made. It should ensure that the information, when received and collated, is made available to all those with a legitimate interest in it and whose work will profit from its receipt. It should be controlled at the top by a strong inter-service and inter-departmental body, representing the needs of producers and consumers of intelligence.

  II. The Existing Organisation.

  14. The Chiefs of Staff Committee receive their advice on intelligence matters from the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, which is the principal inter-service and inter-departmental body dealing with intelligence and security. The J.I.C. is composed of an Assistant Under-Secretary of State from the Foreign Office, as Chairman, together with “C,” the three Service Directors of Intelligence, one of the Directors of the Security Service and the Director-General of the Economic Intelligence Organisation, which, until recently, formed part of the Ministry of Economic Warfare, and has now been absorbed by the Foreign Office.

  15. Under the J.I.C. a number of inter-service bodies have grown up during the war, such as I.S.T.D., C.S.D.I.C., and C.I.U. Owing to the lack of any central organisation to which they could all be attached, these bodies have been grafted on to existing Departments or fathered on to some particular Minister as an individual. Their policy has, however, been generally directed by the J.I.C. The authority acquired by the J.I.C. has come about largely through force of circumstances. The J.I.C. has never been formally invested with any executive authority. Yet in practice it has been found convenient that it should acquire such authority, and no objection has been raised in any quarter. It would be disastrous if the lessons in co-operative working between the Services which have been learned during the war should be lost in peace. Yet we must face the prospect of the disappearance of most of these inter-service bodies unless some central home can be found for them in peace. Departments, particularly Defence Departments, struggling to carry out their own individual responsibilities in peace time within a rigid financial provision, will be most unwilling to bear the cost of inter-service organisations from which they only derive a partial benefit.

  16. In war the J.I.C. has developed into a forum of discussion of all matters of common “intelligence” interest to its members, and thus into a kind of Board of Directors laying down inter-service intelligence and security policy at home and abroad. It has come to be consulted in the establishment of similar organisations in the Middle East and Iraq, and at the various Combined Allied Headquarters. Its representatives at Washington form with the United States J.I.C. (which has been modelled on it) the “Combined Intelligence Committee” which reports to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

  17. While it may be that in peace the composition of the Committee may have in some respects to be modified, we are satisfied that the organisation has sufficiently justified itself and shown sufficient vitality for it to be right to recommend that it should be the controlling body for the inter-service and inter departmental machine that we advocate, and that so far as possible all intelligence producing and using agencies should be represented on it or have access to it according to their needs.

  18. We have, during the war, formed within the Joint Intelligence organisation a whole-time staff responsible for preparing for the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee the appreciations required by the Chiefs of Staff and other authorities of enemy intentions and capabilities, and for giving advice on these matters at all times to the Planning Staffs. It was not until the spring of 1943 that the Joint intelligence Staff was set up. Before then the appreciations of the J.I.C. were prepared on an ad hoc basis. Experts from the different Departments concerned were summoned to meetings, and the Secretary drafted reports as a result of their discussions. This was a clumsy system. It resulted in delay in the production of reports and in considerable interference with the work of Departments. Moreover, the permanent Planning Staffs established in the Cabinet Office had no Joint Intelligence advice at their own level. Each Planner sought the opinion of the Intelligence Directorate in his own Ministry. Frequently one or other of the Directors of Intelligence found himself in disagreement with the intelligence assumptions upon which the Directors of Plans advised the Chiefs of Staff. Now the Joint Intelligence Staff is composed of whole-time officers from the three Services and both the political and economic intelligence sides of the Foreign Office. This Staff works in offices adjoining those of the Joint Planning Staff. The Joint Intelligence Staff is thus constantly informed of operational events and requirements, and the Joint Planning Staff is equally constantly provided with intelligence advice. This system has worked so well in war that we urge that it be retained in peace, in whatever shape the Joint Staff organisation emerges after the war.

  19. While the Joint Intelligence Staff is well equipped to prepare for the J.I.C. papers on enemy intentions generally, there exists no similar inter-service body to draft papers for the J.I.C. on enemy technical developments. Each of the three Intelligence Directorates has within it a technical section, but we are not satisfied that this is enough. We believe that there should be more interdepartmental discussion on technical intelligence. With the perfection of modern weapons, the responsibility as between the Services for watching particular developments is increasingly ill-defined. Moreover, now that on the operational side the Joint Committee on Research and Development Priorities and the Joint Technical Warfare Committee have been established, it is desirable that inter-service technical intelligence should be similarly integrated.

  20. The information of military importance collected by the agencies referred to in paragraph 6 is collated separately in “country sections” or corresponding divisions in the Departments concerned. Generally speaking, each Department considers that it requires the information for its own special purpose, and therefore employs its own separate staff to study and interpret it. In war time, the final interpretation of most of this intelligence is made by the J.I.C., who use the Joint Intelligence Staff for the purpose. Before the war, no such final interpretation was ever made. Each Department reached its own conclusion, and, unless the matter was of sufficient importance to be brought either to the Cabinet or to the Committee of Imperial Defence, each Department proceeded on its own interpretation, which might well differ from that of other Departments. It is as well to remember how recent has been the growth of the appreciating organisation as we know it to-day, since, unless a positive decision to retain it is made, it is highly likely that in peace it will be allowed to disintegrate.

  21. It should be noted that the J.I.C., which grew up as a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, has no representation from a number of intelligence-producing agencies, e.g ., Postal and Telegraph Censorship, P.W.E., S.O.E. and the Colonial Office. This is because some of those agencies were set up to meet special needs during the war and were not, at the time of their creation, brought within the framework of the Joint Staff organisation which has grown up under the Chiefs of Staff. Others which existed before the war were not represented on the J.I.C. at the time of its foundation because it could not b
e foreseen how it would develop under the impetus of war. In later paragraphs of this report we consider in some detail the various intelligence organisations now in existence, including those which have grown up during the war, and discuss the extent to which it is proper that their activities should be continued in peace time, and the organisation in which these activities should be conducted.

  III. Organisations whose Policy is now under the Direction of the J.I.C.

  22. Apart from the Joint Intelligence Staff, there are now the following inter-service organisations whose policy is directed by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, but which are administered by one or other of the Service Departments:-

  The Inter-Service Topographical Department (Admiralty).

  The Intelligence Section (Operations) (War Office — but housed in the Offices of the War Cabinet).

  The Inter-Service Security Board (War Office).

  The Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre (War Office).

  The Central Interpretation Unit (Air Ministry).

  The Inter-Service Topographical Department.