Spying on the World

by Richard J Aldrich

  35. Naval Forces . The Chinese Communist Navy located North of Shanghai at present consists of a few small craft whose operational value IS likely to be negligible except for minelaying purposes. Consistent unconfirmed reports have been received, however, to the effect that Soviet advice and training have been given to the Chinese Communist Navy in Manchuria and North China, and that a small number of ex-Japanese craft and some submarines have been supplied. Even if these reports are true the operational value of the submarines is likely to be negligible and that of the other craft extremely limited without substantial Soviet support in trained personnel.

  36. In the face of U.N. sea and air opposition we consider it unlikely that in the event of China becoming directly involved units of the Chinese Communist Navy could be moved from Shanghai or from South China into the Yellow Sea.

  37. The Chinese Communist Navy is therefore likely to confine itself to mine 1aying and defensive patrols of the Manchurian and Chinese Yellow Sea coastline, but the possibility of the use of ex-Japanese craft, and of submarines with substantial covert assistance by Soviet personnel, cannot be entirely disregarded. In this event the maximum forces which could be employed would consist of six submarines based on Tsingtao or Dairen, 6 Destroyers, 17 Destroyer escorts and 22 miscellaneous craft including some Motor Torpedo Boats. Of these only 1 destroyer and 14 miscellaneous craft including MTBs are likely to be operational in the immediate future from purely Chinese resources.

  United Nations Forces

  38. Ground Forces . The total force at present numbers some 263,000 comprising six American Divisions (150,000), one Brigade of Commonwealth Troops (3,000) and six South Korean Divisions (100,000).

  39. Naval and Air Forces . The exact strength of these forces is not known but the United Nations Naval and Air forces are overwhelmingly stronger than the maximum that could be employed by the Chinese Communists. United Nations sea and air supremacy will therefore continue.

  Courses open to the Chinese Government

  40. There are four courses open to the Chinese Government:

  (a) To continue their political and propaganda campaign in the hope of deterring United States forces from entering North Korea and at the same time to encourage North Koreans to continue guerilla warfare in Korea.

  (b) To enter Korea and occupy a defence line covering the Manchurian frontier, and as far forward as possible but not to engage in hostilities with United Nations forces unless attacked by them.

  (c) To make their forces available to the North Koreans in the form of a “volunteer” army, but not to become committed nationally.

  (d) To invade North Korea with the object of driving back any United Nations forces who had advanced North of the 38th parallel.

  41. The main advantage in adopting course (a) would be that there would be no risk of China becoming involved in a major war with the West. In addition Chinese propaganda could effectively exploit their “moderation” and might appreciably increase their chances of obtaining membership of the United Nations and a say in the United Nations’ settlement in Korea.

  42. The Chinese Government may decide that they are now so committed that they must take some military action in the event of a crossing of the 38th parallel in order to save face and maintain national morale. The adoption of course (b) might in their view be the minimum military action feasible to demonstrate clearly their intention to defend Manchuria and resist American aggression. They might also hope that it would not involve them in hostilities with the West; but they would probably realise that it would increase the risk of a clash between Chinese and U.S. forces.

  43. Course (c) would avoid their becoming involved nationally, but we doubt whether they would risk putting their best forces under command of the defeated North Koreans.

  44. Course (d) would be their only method of restoring the status quo of North and South Korea but this course would however involve them in hostilities with British Commonwealth and American forces. If this occurs we consider it unlikely the conflict could be localised and war with China, though not necessarily world war, would result.

  45. We still consider the Chinese do not wish to become involved in a major war with the Western Powers, and that they may therefore consider the risks intailed by course (d) are too great, despite the advantages of maintaining North Korea as a buffer state. Furthermore, with the lesson of the recent campaign in South Korea before them, they wi11 undoubtedly appreciate that their lines of communication would be rapidly dislocated by the over-whelming U.N. air power which would lead to the isolation and defeat of their forces at the front. Moreover, as we have stated in paragraph 2, we do not consider that the Chinese Government are so amenable to Soviet dictation that they would impair their own interest to the extent of adopting this course.

  46. On balance we consider the Chinese leaders are likely to adopt course (a), but should they consider themselves forced to pursue a policy of military intervention, we consider they would adopt course (b).

  Implications of Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea.

  47. If the Chinese do intervene, they will realise that the prospects of localising the conflict are poor, but they will, we think, try to do so at any rate at first. They are therefore unlikely initially to attempt to divert U.N. resources from Korea by staging some act of aggression elsewhere, for example, against Hong Kong, or Indo-China.

  48. On the other hand it is clear that however much the Chinese might represent the conflict as a war between themselves and American aggressors the conflict would have repercussions in other areas on the Chinese perimeter, since Britain and France would find themselves obliged to tighten up the economic blockade of China in support of their American allies and to institute other measures which would increase tension between themselves and China. In their inflamed state of mind the Chinese might regard these measures as a prelude to aggression against the southern part of China from Indo-China or Hong Kong and decide to forestall this by ejecting the Western Powers from these places.

  49. We examine more detail below the implications on the threat to Hong Kong, Indo-China and Formosa.

  (a) Hong Kong . We consider that on balance even if hostilities could not be confined to Korea and general hostilities were to ensue between the United Nations and China, China would still in the initial stages probably want to limit the field of hostilities as much as possible and would not extend the conflict by an attack on Hong Kong unless she considered that measures taken by the United Kingdom to strengthen the position of the colony compelled her to do so. The risk of action against Hong Kong taking place would, however, be much greater than at present.

  (b) Indo-China . If the war extends to China we consider that the Chinese might openly intervene on the side of Viet Minh.

  (c) Formosa . In the event of open war between the West and the Chinese Communists, we consider the latter would be forced to give up all hope for the present of mounting an operation to recover Formosa.

  50. We believe that the Chinese Communists have sufficient ground forces in central and south China to carry out attacks against Hong Kong and Indo-China.

  INDO-CHINA

  General consideration

  51. In attempting an invasion of Indo-China, the C.C.A. would, for the first time, come up against sea, land and air forces of a Western standard. The French have however, many limitations. Although they have the infantry component of the four divisions they consider necessary to meet external aggression, they are very short of artillery and armour. Their forces are almost entirely deployed on internal security tasks, and although several infantry battalions are earmarked as reserves, they too are deployed on an internal security role; in addition no brigade or mobile H.Q. exists which is capable of assuming command functions in field operations. The French have no intention of meeting Chinese aggression on the frontier and are likely to pull back to a defensive position in the Red River Delta area, but no defence works have been prepared in this area nor has any reconnaissance been carried ou
t. Furthermore as late as 17th August, General Carpentier stated he had not yet made up his own mind on how he would meet an external threat. In short, therefore, the French have no long or short term plan to meet external aggression.

  52. Elsewhere in Indo-China the French would be likely to retain their garrisons in the main area which they occupy, namely Central Annam and Cochin China. The practicability of using in Tongking considerable reinforcements from these areas would be dependent on the state of security in the south.

  Present situation and likelihood of invasion

  53. We have no reason to change our previous view * - that the Chinese Communists are unlikely to attack Indo-China in the near future; they are likely however to continue to give the Viet Minh forces considerable morale and material support. There are further reports that arms are already being supplied and recently arrangements were made to transport overland from the Canton area to Tongking a substantial consignment, including artillery, A.A. guns and Bazookas, which the Viet Minh forces have hitherto particularly lacked. Heavier junk traffic from Hainan to the Viet Minh held coastal areas has been reported. The Chinese have at present seven armies and elements of three more, totalling some 200,000 men, in the French Indo-China frontier area. And although this force may not be organised on the scale envisaged in para. 34 they constitute a very real potential threat and could quickly cross the frontier if such a decision were taken. Militarily we cannot be sure of receiving any warning, should Chinese Communist forces be used in Tongking. It is possible however that some warning might be obtained from Chinese and Viet Minh propaganda.

  Topography and Communications (See Map)

  54. The terrain on the Sino-Indo-Chinese border is generally hilly or mountainous and covered with thick forest, scrub and grassland. The main strategic route Liuchow-Langson-Hanoi is destroyed along most of its length, but the French have already started work on a loop which may well be completed before 1952. Secondary routes are:-

  (a) Nanning-Moncay-Haiphong;

  (b) Nanning-Langson-Tien-Yen-Haiphong. Each has a very limited capacity but may be developed.

  Further possible routes are:-

  (c) Kweiyang-Caobang-Hanoi which, even after considerable reconstruction, would have a smaller capacity than

  (a) or (b);

  (d) The Viet Minh have constructed a road from the Sino-Tongking border to their northern redoubt, by-passing Caobang, which, with further development, might become an additional route;

  (e) The bed of the Kunming-Laocay-Hanoi railway which, after reconstruction of tunnels and bridges, could be used as a small capacity supplementary route. In addition, there are some hill tracks crossing the Sino-Tongking border which an invading force could use, but it would haVE to be supplied by one of the main routes. The only railway link serving the above routes is that of the low capacity Shanghai-Nanchang-Liuchow line, with connections to Hankow and Canton. This railway terminates about 200 miles short of the Indo-China border but is being completed.

  55. With the capture of Tongking the subsequent advance of the C.C.A. could follow either or both of the direct roads across Annam and Laos into Siam (924 and 1146 miles respectively to Bangkok), or the longer coastal route to Cochin China, and thence to Siam (1,627 miles to Bangkok).

  56. The Annam-Laos route . Two roads strike westwards to the Laotian-Siamese border from the coastal road at Ha Tinh and Quang Tri respectively. They converge at Ubon Ratchatani in Siam (approximately 360 miles from Hanoi) east of which the river Mekong has to be crossed by ferry.

  57. The coastal route . The coastal route from Hanoi to Saigon (1,077 mi1es) consists of a road and railway. Both are disrupted where they run through Viet Minh occupied territory and very considerable rehabilitation would be necessary there to restore them to normal working. From Saigon to the Siamese frontier there is a secondary road and from Phnom Penh there is also a rail link into Siam.

  58. Airfields . There are three operational airfields in Tongking and numerous landing grounds in North and Central Indo-China. The landing grounds have a limited capacity: during the wet season serviceability declines and often they become unusable. The difficulties of supplying both airfields and landing grounds would restrict their use by the enemy, although there would be a threat of attacks from Soviet type twin-engined bombers based in South China.

  59. Weather . Weather is best for campaigning during the dry fine period of November and December. Persistent very low cloud and drizzle would hamper air operations from January to March. Rain is not heavy between April and mid-June or between mid-October and November, and would not seriously hamper operations. There is, however, very heavy rain during the rest of the year, and this would restrict movement to the roads. Further restriction of movement may occur in the rice-growing areas of Tongking and northern Annam; double cropping is practised and the paddy fields are flooded from July to October and from December to May.

  Chinese Armed Forces Likely to be Employed

  60. Ground Forces . The strength of the force invading Tongking is likely to be in the nature of one field army (250,000 men) together with up to two artillery divisions, each of 108 guns. We believe that the Chinese would consider such a force to be strong enough to defeat the French and to advance thereafter through Siam to the Malayan border. In any case the capacity of the routes, probable shortage of motor transport, and Allied operations would probably limit the strength of their force unless the French and their Allies had been unable to deny them the use of sea communications.

  61. Air Forces . The C.C.A.F. would probably throw all its available resources into the air battle, but the number of AIRCRAFT MAY well be limited by the necessity for retaining aircraft in China as a defence against possible Nationalist attacks from Formosan bases. The possibility of the Soviet Union undertaking responsibility for the air defence of China is remote. The main targets for attack by Chinese aircraft would probably be airfields and lines of communication together with military objectives in the area of the Red River delta, but Chinese pilots have little or no battle experience and could be expected to prove inferior to those of any Western air force.

  62. Naval Forces . Although the easiest way for the C.C.A. to move into Indo-China and southwards would be by sea they could not do this on a large scale so long as the Allies maintained control of sea communications. We have assumed that this will be the case although the Chinese Communists would probably employ large numbers of junks and coastal craft to supplement their land communications and for the purpose of landing raiding parties and guerillas.

  Viet Minh Forces

  63. The Viet Minh forces comprise 86,000 regular troops together with a militia of 90,000. Its regular forces are organised into some 188 battalions and constitute a well organised, well trained and well disciplined guerilla army of high morale. It is relatively well equipped with small arms but is short of heavy weapons of all kinds. Most of the Viet Minh operations are carried out by its irregular forces employing terrorist tactics. We believe that the Viet Minh is now approaching the status of a regular army. It is possible that without waiting for the assistance of Chinese Forces it will embark on a full scale offensive (as opposed to guerilla operations) against the French as soon as it considers itself strong enough.

  French Forces

  64. Ground Forces . Although the approximate strength of the French Land Forces in Indo-China totals some 300,000, the regular French Forces number only about 104,000 and are widely dispersed. In Tongking the French forces comprise 53,500, but practically the whole of this force is engaged on internal security duties and though a reserve of 13 battalions is earmarked it cannot be made readily available to meet an external threat. We doubt whether any further reinforcements for the French and Colonial troops can be provided by France without severely curtailing her contribution to Western Union land forces and jeopardising the reconstruction of the French Metropolitan Army. Recruits could be found for the units raised locally but equipment from French sources would not be forthcoming. However, c
onsiderable aid is now being provided under the American Military Aid programme and this is likely to be effective by October. In addition the French submitted a general request for aid to H.M. Government.

  65. Air Forces . The French Air Force has available in Indo-China 80 fighters/bombers, 56 transports, 6 reconnaissance aircraft are 30 light communication or spotter aircraft. 40 fighter aircraft are due to be delivered by the U.S. some time this year. In the absence of air opposition the French Air Force has been reasonably efficient with the limited equipment at its disposal. In the event of an attack by the C.C.A.F. it is thought that the French should give a good account of themselves.

  66. Naval Forces . French naval forces at present in the area consist of one cruiser, ten sloops, fourteen minesweepers and about 170 miscellaneous landing craft and supporting auxiliary vessels. The effectiveness of this force is likely to be greater than that of the combined Chinese Communist and Nationalist fleets.

  Most Likely Communist Plan

  67. If it were decided to invade Tongking the Chinese Communists’ attack would be directed as follows in conjunction with Viet Minh forces:-

  (a) Force A . Up to 250,000 men supported by an Artillery force of 576 guns and all available aircraft would make an all-out effort to capture Tongking.

  (b) After the capture of Tongking operations against the remainder of Indo-China would be in two parts:-

  (i) Force B. About 60-80,000 men with an artillery force of 100 guns and 30 fighter and 20 light bombers in 1950, and possibly 70-100 fighters or fighter-bombers and 30-40 light bombers during 1951, would advance from the Annamite coast to the Siamese border.

  (ii) Force C . About 60,000 men supported by artillery comprising about 100 guns with 30 fighter and 20 light bombers in 1950 and possibly 70-100 fighters or fighter-bombers and 30-40 light bombers during 1951, would advance along the Annamite coast to Cochin China.