Spying on the World

by Richard J Aldrich

  68. Force A . A.C.C.A. attack will coincide with an all-out Viet Minh offensive designed to stretch French resources to the utmost and prevent, by guerilla operations of all kinds, the concentration of their reserves. Initially the C.C.A. is likely to infiltrate into Tongking on a broad front in preference to an advance down the main road axis in view of its preponderance of infantry, its lack of mechanisation and its known susceptibility to attacks on the lines of communication. Its primary aim will be to pierce the French defended area and link up with the Viet Minh. Once this has been achieved the C.C.A. must concentrate to defeat the French forces in Tongking and thus open the road between China and the Delta. We estimate that those operations will probably succeed by sheer weight of numbers within four months unless the French can be strongly supported in time by a balanced allied Force. Thereafter consolidation for about a month will be necessary before the C.C.A. and Viet Minh advance against opposition can continue. No defensive position exists in Annam and the French will be faced with the alternative of making a stand in Cochin China or evacuating the peninsula altogether.

  69. After defeat of its garrison in Tongking the balance of the French forces, less well equipped, and with relatively weak artillery support, would be likely to concentrate in the Mekong delta area and in the coastal plain of South Annam. If the Viet Minh had previously been cleared from North Annam the French might fight a delaying action in the Vinh area. The small existing garrisons on the other parts of the Annamite coast and in Laos would be unlikely to offer serious resistance.

  70. Force B. Apart, therefore, from the possibility of delay at Vinh any C.C.A. advance from the Annamite coast to the Siamese border via Laos would be practically unopposed and allowing for shortage of transport should be able to reach the Siamese border in the area of Ubon Ratchatani within one and half months of leaving Hanoi.

  Force C.

  71. The advance along the Annamite coast to Cochin China would be more difficult both on account of resistance by the French defence areas in central Annam, and of the inferior communications, which run close to the coast for long stretches and Are therefore particularly vulnerable to attacks mounted from the sea. If the French have regained control of the communications in this area and have effected a considerable measure of repair, without having the time to offset this by subsequent demolition, the Chinese force might be increased by an additional army group. Nevertheless, the coastal route from Quang Tri to Cochin China is very vulnerable to attack by a power having command of the sea.

  72. The main battle with the French would be likely to be fought between the Mekong delta and the Cochin Chinese-Annamite border and, once the necessary build-up by the C.C.A. had been achieved, to result in the defeat of the French.

  73. A minimum period of seven months would be required from the time of leaving Hanoi to the defeat of the French Forces in Cochin China. This would comprise three months for the southward advance and four months for the build-up and operations. If French resistance had ceased after the battle of Tongking the C.C.A. could move from Tongking to the Siamese border via Saigon in three months. With the capture of Saigon a force of one or two armies (20-40,000) could advance to the Siamese border in the area of Sisophon, and could reach it in six weeks. The administrative problem of this force would be increased by the necessity for road and rail transhipment at Phnom Penh.

  Naval Operations

  74. The Chinese Communists would probably use coast-creeping tactics with junks, small cargo ships and numerous other small craft to land raiding parties and guerillas as well as to supplement their land communications. The difficulties in preventing this sort of traffic even when the Allies have full command of the sea and air are considerable.

  BURMA

  Topography and Communications (See Map)

  75. The present capacity of the Burma road running from Kunming to Mandalay is limited by that of the Chinese sector but there is no reason Why some repairs should not be effected even before the beginning of the period.

  76. The secondary route, direct from Kunming to Kengtung, has a negligible capacity at the moment.

  77. Weather . The rainy season of the south-west monsoon is from May to October. During this period there is exceptionally heavy rainfall a1ong the coast and high ground of Tenasserim and the Arakan, and both land and air operations would in consequence be difficult. Elsewhere in Burma the rainfall during this period is moderately heavy and would restrict and impede movement of military forces. During the north-east monsoon (November to April) conditions are fine and dry and apart from interference to flying caused by persistent thick haze over the Irrawaddy Valley, the weather offers no bar to major military operations.

  Chinese Forces Likely to be Employed

  78. Ground Forces . Owing to the limited capacity of the routes from Yuanan into Burma, together with the road distances involved, the heavy requirements of motor transport, the difficulties of fuel supply and the very considerable road maintenance and commitment, it is unlikely that a C.C.A. force invading Burma would exceed 60,000 men together with some artillery.

  79. Air Forces . The C.C.A.F. would in all probability use only sufficient aircraft to give ground support to their troops, plus a few transports for supplies and some reconnaissance aircraft. Shortage of suitable airfields near the border area would also be a limiting factor. It is considered that not more than 30-40 fighter bombers, 15-20 transports and 10 reconnaissance aircraft would be likely to be employed. It is quite possible that aircraft would not be employed at all in an operation against Burma unless other powers came to her aid.

  80. Naval Forces . The Chinese Communists are unlikely to attempt to employ any Naval forces other than coastal craft in this campaign since the Allies maintain control of sea communications.

  Fifth Column

  81. The Chinese population in Burma is comparatively small and by no means all pro-Communist. There are enough pro-Communist Chinese in Rangoon itself however to create serious trouble. The Burma Communist Party, although now weak and on the defensive, has already showed its willingness to ask for Chinese aid, and might well use its countrywide organisation to help the invader. The number of extreme left-wing supporters of the present Burmese government, particularly amongst the Trades Union Congress Burma, are likely appease any Chinese invaders who look like being successful.

  Burmese Forces

  82. Ground Forces . The Burmese Army consists of some 35,000 regulars together with up to 20,000 armed auxiliaries. It consists of units recruited from the Shans, Chins, Kachins and Burmans of which the former three compose the better fighting elements. This small force suffers from racial dissension and lack of training, and during the period may be almost entirely occupied with internal security operations so that it would be dispersed in small units in the areas of the more important towns and communications. It cannot be expected to offer any effective resistance to external aggression, although weak delaying forces would be stationed on the main routes of entry into the country. Should the Burmese Government reach an accommodation with the Karens during the period, a comparatively large supply of trained and reliable man-power would in time become available for recruiting, but it would take some time before Karen units would be ready for operations. If the present scale of insurrection continues in Burma the government will be unable to make forces available to defend the Chinese frontier.

  83. Naval Forces . The Burmese Navy is the best of the three services, but has suffered a severe setback owing to the country’s internal disturbances and political intrigue. The sea-going fleet consists of one frigate and some twenty-six smaller craft. The Burmese Navy would be likely to operate river and coastal patrols with the object of preventing the movement of C.C.A. by local craft.

  84. Air Forces . The very small Burmese Air Force consists of a handful of non-combat aircraft, some of which are being used operationally at the expense of much needed training. Some expansion is planned, and in particular a few Mosquitoes are being added, but development
will be slow. We consider it improbable that the Burmese Air Force would be able to exert more than a temporary and local effect on the course of the major military operations envisaged.

  Most Likely Chinese Communist Plan

  85. If it were decided to invade Burma, it should be possible for the C.C.A. to capture Meiktila and Mandalay in about one month and thereafter to advance on Toungoo and Rangoon. The capture of Rangoon and the occupation of the main economic areas of the country should then be possible within a further two months.

  86. Any attempt to subjugate more than the lowlying area between Mandalay and Rangoon and the Shan States could result in a major internal security problem owing to the likely resistance from frontier communities and possibly also from the Karens.

  SIAM

  General Considerations

  87. Even with a government as favourably disposed towards the Western Powers as the present one, Siam would be unable to do more than offer token resistance to a Chinese invasion.

  Topography and Communications (See Map)

  88. Eastern axis . From the terminal of the Annan-Laos route at Ubon Ratchatani a railway runs direct to Bangkok, (357 miles). This railroad is reached by a limited capacity ferry over the tributary of the Mekong. There is no direct road from Ubon to Bangkok and movement along the country and jungle tracks would be indirect and difficult. Nevertheless a road has been started and might be completed by the end of 1952. The initial use of the railway Could be denied to the Chinese Communists by withdrawing rolling stock at Bangkok, although it would be unwise to count on this happening. The southern route from Cochin China crosses into Siam northwest of Sisophon and runs direct to Bangkok (200 miles).

  89. Western axis . The main route in Burma from Mandalay to the Siamese border via Kengtung has a very low capacity. Where this route enters Siam a road runs to Lampang. From Lampang to Bangkok there is at present, no through road. A direct railway runs from Lampang to Bangkok. The capacity of the Lampang-Bangkok axis could be augmented by using river transport. We consider that it would not be possible for a force larger than about 20,000 without supporting artillery, to be maintained along this axis into Siam.

  90. Weather . The latter part of the dry season from December to February is particularly favourable for military operations of all kinds. Rainfall during the south-west summer monsoon is generally less heavy than in Indo-China but nevertheless movement would be restricted to the roads during August and September when the rainfall is greatest. Weather conditions during the inter-monsoon periods of October and March to April are unlikely seriously to restrict operations, but there may be extensive flooding in the Manam Chao Phraya River plains in October and November.

  Chinese Armed Forces Likely to be Employed

  91. Ground Forces . From logistic considerations we estimate that the strength of the Chinese Communists would be limited to 80,000 men with supporting artillery.

  92. Air Forces . Assuming no intervention by Western Powers it is considered that the C.C.A.F. would not use more then 40-60 fighter/bombers, 10-20 light bombers, 15-20 transports (this latter may be increased if paratroops are used) and 10-15 reconnaissance aircraft. This of course assumes that aerodromes in Indo-China are available to the C.C.A.F.

  93. Naval Forces . The Chinese Communists are unlikely to attempt to employ any naval Forces other than coastal craft in this campaign since the Allies maintain control of sea communications.

  Siamese Forces .

  94. Ground Forces . The Siamese Army consists of some 34,000 men and might be increased to 80,000 on mobilisation. The standard of leadership, morale and training in the force is not high and military equipment, which includes artillery and armoured fighting vehicles, consists of a wide variety of obsolete and obsolescent types of foreign manufacture. It is not, therefore, capable of effectively waging unaided a defensive war against the Chinese Communists. Efforts are being made to reorganise the forces and by the end of 1951 they should be better able to defend the frontiers for a limited period but, even so, will be incapable of offering prolonged resistance.

  95. Naval Forces . The Siamese Navy consists of 1 destroyer, 2 corvettes, 35 patrol craft, 21 landing craft and some auxiliary vessels many of which are obsolescent. It is unlikely to have much effect on the course of operations.

  96. Air Forces . The small Siamese Air Force does not at present constitute an effective fighting element. It has a few obsolescent aircraft, most of which are trainers. It is, however, about to be equipped with the equivalent of two fighter squadrons (Spitfires) and the addition of a small number of jet fighters is possible within the next two years. It could therefore make some initial contribution to defence against attack, but would have neither the backing nor the experience to sustain operations for any long period, or be effective against the C.C.A.F. at the strength which it is predicted the latter would be during the period.

  Fifth Column

  97. The Chinese minority in Siam amounts to about 14% of the population with a far higher proportion in Bangkok. The Siam Communist Party (S.C.P.) is composed almost wholly of Chinese and is Chinese-led. In the event of a Chinese invasion the Chinese minority would tend to come under complete control of the S.C.P. and would presumably function as a fifth column. It is doubtful however whether the S.C.P. would have at its disposal very many trained saboteurs or sabotage and guerilla units. But those which they had would tend to exert an influence out of all proportion to their numbers, and their activities would be assisted by the dis-affection of the whole Chinese community. There is also a body of Viet Minh adherents among Indo-Chinese residents in N.E. Siam. These are believed to be well organised politically and could no doubt cause considerable embarrassment to an Army trying to defend Siam. Fifth column activities are however not likely to be necessary in conjunction with an attack on Siam unless the Siamese army is supported by troops of the Western Allies. In such a case the fifth column danger in Siam would be no worse and perhaps a little better than that at present existing in Malaya.

  Most Likely Communist Plan

  98. General Consideration . Siam is a country without any natural defensive positions other than those provided by waterways. It is therefore concluded that the Siamese Army would defend the frontiers in the Area of the points of entry of the trans-Laos route, that from Cochin China and the Northern route from Burma. It could not hold these for long, and would be unlikely to offer any further serious resistance, except that it might be able to defend the Bangkok area for a short time. The estimate assumes there would be no intervention by the Western Powers.

  Direction and Phasing

  99. Eastern Axis . The employment of up to one army group (60,000 men) and supporting artillery would be possible on either of the main routes from Indo-China into Siam, and such a force would be adequate to penetrate the frontier defences and to defeat the Siamese Army in the Bangkok area. Such operations would probably be accompanied by considerable fifth column and guerilla activity. After a period of one month to build-up at Ubon Ratchatani and/or Sisophon this force should be able to approach and defeat the garrison of Bangkok within two months on the northern route and one month on the southern route.

  100. Western axis . The number of troops which could be maintained along this axis would be limited by the present low capacity of the Meiktila-Kongtung-Siam border road upon which the Siamese Sector of this axis is entirely dependent. It seems likely therefore that unless improvements to this axis have been carried out, a C.C.A. force would be limited to about one army (20,000) without supporting artillery. We do not consider that such a force would be adequate to over-run Siam and defeat the Siamese Army in the Bangkok area. Nevertheless such a force would probably be used in support of a main advance into Siam along the eastern axis, and in any case could be used to mount an active threat on Siam’s northern frontier.

  101. With the capture of Bangkok any further organised resistance by the Siamese Army would be unlikely. The occupation of the north-west part of the country would then be u
ndertaken by the force advancing southwards from the Kengtung area. Although the internal security problem would not be large once Bangkok had fallen, the maintenance of some security forces would be necessary throughout the country.

  FORMOSA

  Present Situation and Likelihood of a Communist Invasion

  102. The Chinese Communists’ build-up in Fukien against Formosa now totals some 200,000 troops. It is considered that they have sufficient shipping to lift the large numbers of troops required for an invasion. Owing to U.S. air and sea patrols and the Nationalists’ retention of three well placed islands off the mainland coast, there is little likelihood of a surprise invasion being carried out. An attempted invasion of Formosa under existing circumstances would be a hazardous operation and the Chinese Communists are likely to appreciate that without considerable Soviet naval and air assistance it would be unlikely to succeed. On the other hand, full-scale Chinese Communist propaganda on the intention to recover Formosa continues, but seems to be carefully avoiding any mention of dates. Although there are signs *+ that an invasion has been postponed indefinitely and at least until U.S. forces are withdrawn, an attempted invasion remains a possibility.

  Topography and Communications

  103. Landing Areas . There are two main possible landing areas on Formosa:-

  (a) the Keelung-Taipei-Tamsui area in the north together with beaches west of this area along the north-west coast.

  (b) the Tainan-Takao area in the south-west.

  In both these areas beaches and ports suitable for landing heavy equipment are available. The west central Tai-Chung delta area provides a subsidiary beach landing zone.

  104. The Fukien coast abounds in harbours and bays from which an assault could be mounted, although proper communications with the hinterland are only available at the main ports of Foochow, Amoy and Swatow, and the subsidiary port of Tsinkiang.