2. The character of Colonel Nasser . There is a considerable element of emotion in Nasser’s actions. As a demagogue he is liable to be carried away by the violence of the passions he himself has whipped up. As a dictator, his actions over the past three years show subtlety and calculation and have so far all resulted in gain to Egypt. We should be prepared for any action that may enhance his prestige and maintain him in power.
3. Effect on other Middle East States . A clear distinction must be made between reactions of governments friendly to the U.K. and press and mob reactions. The Bagdad Pact powers and Nuri Pasha in particular would be delighted to see Nasser brought down but the press, even in Iraq (apart from the one government controlled paper), has welcomed Nasser’s action. While President Chamoun would like to see strong action against Nasser the Lebanese in general support Nasser’s move. Among the mob Nasser’s action has won acclaim not only in Egypt but throughout the Middle East. King Hussein sent a congratulatory message (though he has tried to explain this away to our Ambassador); thanksgiving sermons are reported to have been preached in the mosques of Damascus; in the Sudan the step was welcomed by newspapers of all shades of opinion. King Saud has conveyed his unqualified support for Egyptian action to Nasser through the Saudi Ambassador in Cairo but this has received no publicity as yet in Saudi Arabia. Saud could hardly have done less. The B.B.C. correspondent in Karachi has similarly reported that the man in the street unanimously supported Egypt’s action. Such is the hold built up by the Egyptian propaganda machine that the instinctive reaction of the Arab mind is that the seizure of the Suez Canal is an extension of the national liberation movement, a theme which has also been played up in the Soviet press.
4. Egyptian counter-action to Western measures . Egypt reacted quickly to the West’s announcement of financial counter measures. She has said that she will contest at the International Court the freezing in the United Kingdom and France of the Company’s assets. She has issued a statement alleging that the decision to submit to exchange control Egyptian current accounts in sterling, and financial transactions through the medium of sterling, contravenes the provisions of the United Kingdom-Egypt Monetary Agreement. She has now taken retaliatory exchange measures against U.K. and French accounts. So far no attempt has been made to refuse transit to ships if they have paid dues in cheques drawn upon British or French banks and on July 30 the Minister of Finance announced that this system would be allowed to continue. It appears that Egypt is now adopting a passive attitude of injured innocence towards Western economic measures in order to put the West in the wrong and she is anxious to prove that she can run the Canal without infringement of the Convention of 1688. All her present actions suggest that she wishes to ensure that if there is a breakdown, responsibility can be put on the West.
POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
5. Prospects over the next few months . Nasser’s triumph has been spectacular, and such is his control of public emotion and opinion that he need not show any tangible return for his action, at any rate for the moment. There seems a reasonable prospect that, provided present staff stay at their posts, the canal’s operation can be continued. Only about one third of the canal company’s revenue, however, derives from money paid in cash in Egypt or in cheques negotiable in Egyptian banks. The remainder is paid to London or Paris. To finance the canal’s operations, let alone make any profit from it, some attempts must be made to obtain the two thirds of its current income that are at present unavailable to Egypt. The Egyptian Government may therefore be forced to insist upon payments that will be available to themselves. They may also announce increased charges for transit. If this is done and if the shipping companies give way, Nasser will be able to proclaim a further triumph of the revolution. If they refuse he will be faced with the choice of letting defaulting vessels through or detaining them.
5. Relations with the Soviet bloc . Meanwhile it may gradually become apparent to the Egyptian public that nationalisation cannot provide the funds that are required for the Dam. If the shipping nations were to devise means to avoid using the canal the revenues would be greatly diminished. In these circumstances much would depend upon the actions the Soviet Union might take to supplement Egypt’s sources of income. Nasser’s regime has served the Soviet Government’s interests well but, until the reactions of the Western Powers become clearer, the Soviet Government may well have some misgivings about his latest action. Their present interest is that Egypt’s relations with the West should be as bad as possible without Egypt becoming so completely dependent on the Soviet Union that the concept of neutrality is discredited. The Soviet Government can be expected to pose as Egypt’s and the Arabs’ best friend and to continue to give Egypt economic aid of all sorts, but they probably do not wish to risk a direct clash with the West in support of Colonel Nasser’s ambitions, and they may not wish to take on the whole burden of supporting Egypt financially and economically if Western countermeasures threaten the Egyptian economy with stagnation. Khrushchev has already spoken of the need of a peaceful settlement. The most satisfactory outcome from the Soviet point of view might be some sort of international discussions, preferably in the U.N., leading to an indecisive face-saving solution which would satisfy neither the West nor Egypt. The Soviet Government would then have Colonel Nasser very much at its mercy and would be able to continue penetration of Egypt systematically and at leisure. Nasser is due to visit Moscow in August. The Soviet Government will no doubt take advantage of his weak position but they may hesitate at this stage to make take-over bids.
6. Other possibilities short of intervention by the West . If the economic struggle continues along the lines outlined above, particularly if the financial powers taken by the U.K. and French Governments are applied stringently (or if next January the next instalment of the sterling balances is withheld), there are a number of other actions the Egyptian Government might take. She might:-
(a) Break off diplomatic relations with the British and the French Governments.
(b) Abrogate the Base Agreement of 1954.
(c) Withdraw air transit facilities.
(d) Nationalise all British and French undertakings in Egypt.
(e) Cancel the residence permits of all British and French subjects in Egypt.
(f) Persuade other Arab states to take anti-Western measures including the denial of military facilities.
(g) Incite feeling against British and French nationals in Egypt so as to make their position precarious. We do not rule any of them out; but we think that it would need further Western “provocation” before Egypt would resort to them, since she evidently wishes to demonstrate her ability to take over the Canal peacefully.
8. Effects in other Arab states . If only financial action is taken by the West, other Arab states might feel able to take steps to weaken their ties with or dependence on Great Britain, France and the United States. These steps might include:
(a) Jordan may call for drastic revision of the Anglo-Jordan Treaty.
(b) Libya may denounce the Anglo-Libyan Treaty.
(c) The Tunisian and Moroccan Governments may adopt an even more intransigent attitude towards France.
(d) Syria and the Lebanon may stop or delay deliveries of oil from the Mediterranean terminals.
(e) Members of the Arab League may refuse transit, landing and refuelling facilities for British military aircraft.
(f) Saudi Arabia may step up demands for a greater share of the profits from oil.
In addition, other effects might be:-
(g) Our position may be weakened in Aden, Bahrein, Buraimi, Kuwait and Qatar.
(h) Sabotage of oil installations might occur in any of the Arab states.
(j) The effectiveness and cohesion of the Baghdad Pact might be undermined.
(k) Nuri might feel we had not gone far enough towards bringing Nasser down and his own position in Iraq would become doubtful.
(l) The position of the Oil Consortium in Iran would be greatly weakened.
&nbs
p; WESTERN ACTION
9. Threat of armed intervention. We do not believe that threats of armed intervention or preliminary build up of forces would bring about the downfall of the Nasser regime or cause it to cancel the nationalisation of the canal. Anti-Nasser influences might be encouraged, but we believe the general effect would be to increase support for the Government and Nasser might proceed to take some or all of the measures listed in paragraph 7, if he had not already taken them. He could count on continued support from other Arab countries.
10. Blockade . If imports, particularly of oil, could be prevented from entering Egypt it would have severe effects on the Egyptian economy. A total stoppage of imports could only be effected by a blockade, in the exercise of a belligerent right. The international problems likely to follow, e.g. how to deal with Soviet Bloc vessels, are so complex that they should form the subject of a separate study.
11. Armed intervention . Armed intervention by the West to secure control of the Canal Zone would lead to a state of war with Egypt. Although most, if not all, the Arab States would sympathise with Egypt we do not think that in the event they would come to her aid. Iraq would certainly not help Egypt and might even be prevailed upon to stop Syria or Jordan doing anything in this direction. We also doubt whether the Soviet Union would take any action. She has no treaty of alliance with Egypt and as far as we know, no secret agreement. The support of Egypt in peacetime as a thorn in the side of the West accords with the policy of competitive co-existence, but we do not believe she would embark on global war on behalf of Egypt. The Soviet Government might send technicians and further arms to Egypt but we doubt whether, in the event of hostilities, these would greatly affect the issue. Language difficulties would hinder the operational effectiveness of the former; we have appreciated elsewhere that Egypt is unlikely to be proficient in her existing bloc armaments before the end of 1956. Although the morale of the Egyptian armed forces is at present likely to be high (see Appendix) we consider that the temperament of the Egyptian people is such that were they themselves subject to immediate physical danger, their morale would probably collapse and the downfall of Nasser might result.
12. Effects of Western action on other Arab States .
(a) If steps taken by the West were to lead to an early change of Government in Egypt and a settlement satisfactory to the West, the other Arab States who have a natural admiration for strength, would probably swing in our favour and would in any case probably feel insufficiently strong to abrogate their respective treaties and agreements. Iraq would expect to reap the benefits of her pro-Western attitude and to be set up in Egypt’s place as the leader of the Arab World.
(b) Should Western military action be insufficient to ensure early and decisive victory, the international consequences both in the Arab States and elsewhere might give rise to extreme embarrassment and cannot be forecast.
EFFECT ON THE ARAB/ISRAELI DISPUTE
13. Egypt . As stated above we believe that Egypt is likely to tread warily and to avoid giving the West cause to intervene against her. She would only make her position more difficult in the immediate future by aggression against Israel. If the dispute dragged on without positive action by the West the Egyptian public might come to realise the meagre benefits of nationalisation: should the Soviet Union decline to offer the economic aid that Egypt will need, Nasser might seek to divert attention by raising tension on the frontier with Israel and perhaps by further Fedayeen raids.
14. Israel . Whatever steps the West take there will be a strong incentive to Israel to take military action against Egypt, in the belief that the West will now no longer wish to prevent a blow at Nasser. While there is doubt about the West’s intentions to use force however it is probable that Israel will act with caution and await developments. In the event of Western military action Israel might well take action also on her own account, unless considerable pressure particularly by the United States were brought to bear on her to stay out of the dispute.
15. Other Arab States . Were Israel to attack Egypt while the West were merely applying some form of sanctions the other Arab States would probably be forced by public opinion to go to Egypt’s aid. If Israel attacked when Western forces were engaged with the Egyptians action by the other Arabs would depend on whom she attacked. If Israel attacked only Egypt the other Arab States would probably not join in, but great resentment would undoubtedly be created by what would be interpreted as a plot between Israel and the West.
RECOMMENDATION
16. We recommend that the Chiefs of Staff approve our report, and submit it to Ministers as an expression of their views.
(Signed) P.H. DEAN
J.G.T. INGLIS
C.R. PRICE
C.S. MOORE (for W.M.L. MacDONALD)
M.Y. WATSON (for K.W.D. STRONG)
Ministry of Defence .
3rd August, 1956.
Appendix to J.I.C. (56) 80
General.
1. We have appreciated elsewhere that the Egyptian Armed Forces will not be fully proficient with the new Soviet weapons before the end of 1956. Nevertheless, morale in the Armed Forces must for the moment be high. The political situation and Nasser’s coup against the Suez Canal can only have stifled criticism and united the Army behind him.
Army.
2. Technical efficiency. This is taking its expected course. As each month passes, it is inevitable that the Egyptian Army will become more efficient and better trained although they will remain dependent for some considerable time on foreign technicians.
3. General efficiency. Training in, and absorption of, the new equipment can only lead to increased morale and a higher standard of efficiency. This will be particularly apparent in the armoured corps, who pride themselves on being the elite of the Egyptian Army.
4. Command. The failure of the Egyptian Army against the Israelis in 1948 was largely due, not to the lack of fighting ability of the Egyptian troops, but to the inadequacy of the higher command. The fat, dissolute senior commanders of the Farouk era have now been replaced by younger professional soldiers, who, while lacking in experience, cannot but be better than their predecessors.
5. To sum up, although it has been customary to decry the efficiency of the Egyptian soldier in the past, we feel that for the reasons stated above it would be dangerous at this time to underestimate the capability of the Army, which, although untested under fire since 1948, has developed and improved during the past few years.
Air Force and Navy.
6. Present indications are that the Egyptian Air Force and Navy will not be efficient with their new aircraft and ships, even by Egyptian standards, until towards the end of this year.
7. It is considered, that any increase in efficiency in the Navy may be counterbalanced by deterioration of material and machinery due to poor maintenance during the period. In the Air Force, technical and logistical problems associated with the absorption of relatively large numbers of new aircraft may well delay the attaining of operational efficiency by as much as 6 months. The solutions of these problems are almost entirely dependent on Soviet bloc assistance and supply arrangements.
Notes
1 . JIC(54)57, ‘Egyptian Arms Imports’, 19 June 1954, TNA: CAB 158/17.
2 . JIC(55) 79th Meeting, 29 September 1955, TNA: CAB 159/21.
3 . Keith Kyle, Britain’s pre-eminent historian on Suez, has praised the JIC for its evenhanded assessments during 1956; see Keith Kyle, Suez: Britain’s End of Empire in the Middle East , rev. ed. (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011), pp. 552–3.
4 . JIC(56)80(Final)(Revise), ‘Egyptian Nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company’, 3 August 1956, TNA: CAB 158/25.
5 . For instance, the minutes of the COS meetings for this period are full of references to JIC papers. See TNA: DEFE 4/90 and TNA: DEFE 4/91.
6 . JIC(56)97(Final), ‘Probable Actions by Nasser in Certain Circumstances’, 11 October 1956, TNA: CAB 158/25; JIC(56)102, ‘Israel Attitude towards Arab States in the Context of the Suez Canal Crisis�
��, 28 September 1956, TNA: CAB 158/26; JIC(56)104(Final), ‘The Threat to United Kingdom Interests Overseas’, 18 October 1956, TNA: CAB 158/26.
7 . Philip Davies, Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United States: A Comparative Perspective, Vol. 2: Evolution of the UK Intelligence Community (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2012), pp. 163–8.
12
THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
T HE CUBAN MISSILE Crisis highlighted the importance of both the tactical and the strategic intelligence assessment roles of the JIC. Since the early 1950s it had produced two parallel series of reports: the ‘Weekly Review of Current Intelligence’ or the Grey Book, after the colour of its cover, and the ‘Weekly Survey of Intelligence’ or the Red Book. The Grey Book in this period produced four relevant reports whilst the Red Book included seven. Taken together they reveal something of the JIC’s views and awareness of what was happening 4,650 miles away.
The JIC has to be given credit for anticipating the nature of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Much of the JIC’s work during the Cold War was connected to issues of alerts, warning and nuclear crisis. As early as 1957, the JIC envisaged a situation in which the Soviet Union might send weapons and volunteers overseas to a friendly country. They envisaged that the struggle for prestige might lead to escalating support for proxies and this might include the supply of nuclear weapons. 1
The first indication of what would become the Cuban Missile Crisis was a notice on 23 August 1962, some two months before the crisis erupted. It warned that since July there had been a steady arrival of Soviet merchant ships into Cuba. Intelligence also reported that more ships were en route. For the JIC, this influx could be explained in two ways. Either it could be military personnel returning from training in the Soviet Union; or, more plausibly, it was for economic purposes: the delivery of equipment and economic aid under various recent trade agreements. 2 Both interpretations were supported by a Soviet communiqué of 2 September that announced that the USSR was ‘sending arms and military experts to Cuba and is giving her extensive economic aid’. 3
Spying on the World Page 29