Spying on the World

by Richard J Aldrich

  8. The present strength of the South Vietnamese army is about 196,000. In addition there are para-military forces of about 200,000 mainly in the Civil Guard and Self Defence Corps. The rapid expansion of the Government forces has inevitably resulted in a number of weaknesses which have been aggravated by the recent coups and the consequent confusion and bewilderment thrown up by the fresh wave of changes in the High Command, corps and divisional commanders and provincial chiefs (who are also military sector commanders). Uncertainty about what is going on and fear of further changes and further dismissals have induced a form of paralysis and a reluctance to display initiative or to take offensive action.

  The Military Situation

  9. There is not much time left before the arrival of the south-west monsoon in May/June. The rains and the resultant flooding in the Delta area have generally had the effect of restricting the activities of the Security Forces and of the Viet Cong but in the mountains the Viet Cong are less affected than the Security Forces. The situation continues quietly to deteriorate. The capability of the Viet Cong is increasing. They are successfully penetrating more and more hamlets and villages and it is possible that they could now over-run some of the chief towns of districts (but not of provinces) before Government reinforcements could intervene. Prospects of any significant improvement in the military situation in the immediate future are not good. If some confidence in the military leadership can be restored, however, and if action can displace the current inaction, further deterioration could be checked. The Government will need to use the monsoon period to organise the administration, to bring continuity to senior military appointments, to perfect a comprehensive pacification plan (which we would expect to include a fresh approach to the strategic hamlets programme) and win popular support, if they are to be in a position at the beginning of the next dry season, October/November, to make positive progress. Pacification has always been a long-term project. Recent events have made it even longer.

  TOP SECRET – U.K. EYES ONLY

  PART I

  THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEEPER UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN

  VIETNAM ACTION CONFINED TO SOUTH VIETNAM

  Types of Action

  10. Possible forms of United States action confined to South Vietnam include the following:-

  (a) maintenance of aid more or less at present levels but with increased pressure on the South Vietnamese to get on with the job themselves;

  (b) stationing of United States forces in Saigon or other population centres;

  (c) participation of United States combat forces in the fighting either independently or in support of South Vietnam forces;

  (d) the transfer of offensive elements of the U.S.A.F. to bases in South Vietnam for combat missions against Viet Cong targets;

  (e) implementation of SEATO plan 7 (counter-insurgency in Vietnam) thereby involving other SEATO countries in the fighting.

  Effectiveness of such action and problems involved

  11. Whatever the form of United States action and whatever the degree of South Vietnamese Government/United States military success against the Viet Cong thereby achieved, decisive and final defeat of the Viet Cong cannot be achieved by military means alone. The fundamental task remains that of inducing the South Vietnamese authorities to undertake and persist in a programme of the necessary administrative, social and economic measures, and to winning popular confidence in, and support for such a programme. If the South Vietnamese can be induced to go ahead on these lines there might then be a reasonable chance of ultimate success against the Viet Cong. In the meantime, however, in order to halt the present deterioration in the military situation and to give the South Vietnamese Government a breathing space to get new measures under way, there is clearly a requirement for some greater military effort mainly by the South Vietnamese forces but perhaps also by United States forces. We therefore examine the probable effectiveness of various forms of United States action under the criterion of achieving a temporary stabilisation of the situation rather than of aiming at any more radical solution such as complete annihilation of the Viet Cong.

  12. The problems facing the United States Forces brought into South Vietnam would vary in direct proportion to the scale of intervention. If it were limited to garrisoning key towns only, their difficulties would be localised and could be largely resolved with the assistance of the South Vietnamese administration. The arrival of United States forces for garrison duties could initially provide a substantial boost to the morale of the South Vietnamese Government forces. The long term value of this operation would depend largely on the effectiveness of the Government forces thus released for action against the Viet Cong. There would also be a risk that any improvement would eventually be counterbalanced by increased assistance to the Viet Cong by the North Vietnamese (see paragraph 19 below).

  13. Limited operations in the interior with United States combat units, either initially or as a second step if the garrisoning of key towns did not produce adequate results, could also have a useful effect on the morale of Government forces and would be effective in rapid clearing of small selected areas. They would, however, involve formidable difficulties and inevitably the use of tough methods. The identification of friendly Vietnamese from the Viet Cong could only be resolved with the wholehearted co-operation of the South Vietnamese authorities and the setting up of a form of military control in the areas of operations. Appreciating this difficulty, the Viet Cong would probably rely entirely on guerilla [sic] tactics and, judging from British experience in Malaya, it would probably be necessary for United States and South Vietnamese forces to outnumber guerrillas [sic] many times over. There would be even greater risk of increased North Vietnamese support.

  14. We believe that full-scale intervention, which would require 100,000 or more United States combat troops, would involve proportionately greater difficulties for the United States in South Vietnam. In addition to the military problems of setting up a major base area and communications zone, they would have to establish in effect a military government, with or without the cooperation of the civil power, and probably in the face of increasing xenophobia on the part of the general population. They would have to induce the indigenous forces to accept a subordinate role in the prosecution of the war and in the maintenance of law and order throughout the country. In view of South Vietnam’s limited road and rail communications, its difficult terrain and few tactically sited airfields, the supply problem would be complex and difficult. Air support would be essential for such operations to be effective and the congested state of the limited number of airfields indicate that some construction of new airfields would have to be undertaken. While the Viet Cong would certainly be held in check, the United States commitment could not be substantially reduced without leading to a resurgence of present problems, unless and until considerable progress had been made in establishing a desirable system of internal security which could be run by a non-communist South Vietnamese government. This would almost certainly take a very long time.

  15. The likelihood of successful interdiction by conventional air attacks of the Viet Cong supply lines and bases is remote.

  16. The SEATO Council resolved in March 1961 that it would not acquiesce in a communist takeover of Vietnam. The practical military aid which individual members of SEATO could give would depend on circumstances at the time but it seems unlikely that France and possibly Pakistan would wish to become involved. In any case the problems involved in intervention by SEATO forces would not be less than those described in paragraphs 11 to 15 above.

  CONSEQUENCES

  17. United States intervention by means of the introduction of garrison or combat troops would create a major international crisis. The communists would seek to secure condemnation of the United States action in the Security Council and the passage of resolutions calling for the immediate withdrawal of their forces. A full-scale propaganda campaign would probably be accompanied by threats of military counter-action. Communist propaganda, emphasising
the reactionary nature of the Republican regime in South Vietnam, and the indigenous nature of the revolutionary struggle and drawing a comparison between United States action in South Vietnam and their support for other “corrupt dictatorial” regimes (e.g. Korea, Formosa) might have some success in blurring the real issues involved, and would undoubtedly appeal to the anti-colonialist powers.

  18. Effects in Laos. It is difficult to conceive that the situation in Laos would remain unchanged. If no settlement to the Laotian problems had been achieved, the North Vietnamese forces would probably make greater use of Laotian territory for infiltration in South Vietnam. This in turn might induce the United States to extend military operations to Southern Laos in order to prevent communist reinforcements from reaching South Vietnam. It would be in Souvanna Phouma’s interest to isolate Laos from the struggle to the south east. It is doubtful, however, whether his weak administration would be able to stop a large increase in infiltration through Laotian territory. Again there would be grave danger of the Phoumi and Pathet Lao factions seizing the opportunity to extend the fighting in Laos.

  North Vietnam

  19. The first reaction of North Vietnam would be to increase her covert support to the Viet Cong. North Vietnam has already threatened, in a communication to the International Control Commission, to match United States intervention “man for man and gun for gun”. She would also probably appeal to the Soviet Union and China for increased material support, and, depending on her immediate assessment of the scale of intervention, might feel bound to ask them to be ready to assist in the defence of North Vietnam. Doubtless the North Vietnamese would appreciate that open aggression across her southern frontier would invite a sharp reaction from the United States and very probably cause an increase in the scale of United States intervention. Since this would increase the danger of eventual United States incursion into North Vietnam, it is doubtful if the North Vietnamese would take such a step without first assuring herself of the full and active support of the Soviet Union or China. We believe that no such assurance would be given by the Soviet Union and that the Chinese would only give this support if it appeared to them that the United States intended invading North Vietnam. It seems probable, therefore, that North Vietnamese reactions would be confined to covert support.

  China

  20. China’s suspicions of United States intentions could lead her to believe that any large scale United States intervention in South Vietnam was a direct threat to North Vietnam and consequently to China’s strategic interests. The Chinese would probably hesitate to become directly involved but, should the North Vietnamese have become openly engaged in South Vietnam, they would be reluctant to see her defeated.

  China

  21. Chinese reactions would depend on the type and success of United States intervention and on assessment of its aim. If the United States forces were to fail to achieve any substantial success against the Viet Cong at least outside the southern half of South Vietnam, there is no reason to suppose that the Chinese would do more than they have so far. They would use every bit of bluster and political pressure to hamper the United States effort and would give the North Vietnamese all the help in the way of equipment and advice that the North Vietnamese requested, in order to prevent the suppression of the insurgency and to keep the United States bogged down. It is doubtful whether the Chinese would feel compelled to intervene themselves, even to the extent of putting token forces into North Vietnam. They might concentrate forces on the border and set up some sort of joint military command, but in the last resort they would probably resign themselves to a temporary setback.

  22. If on the other hand the United States appeared to be on the way to complete success and to establishing a strong military presence on the frontier of North Vietnam, it must be assumed that China would react more sharply. If they considered North Vietnam to be threatened, or if they believed, perhaps erroneously, that the United States had the intention of crossing the 17th Parallel or making some other incursion into North Vietnamese territory (for example air attack on tactical targets), there is little doubt that they would do their utmost to ensure the security of North Vietnam, even to the extent of sending their own forces in and of intervening in the fighting themselves. China could not afford to let the Americans have a completely unopposed military success on her own doorstep and the possibility of the development of a Korean type war in Indo-China could not therefore be excluded.

  The Soviet Union

  23. United States intervention would place the Soviet Union in a dilemma, aggravated by her providing the Co-Chairman of the 1954 Geneva Conference. On the one hand, if the Russians failed to support the North Vietnamese, Chinese influence in Hanoi would inevitably become preponderant. On the other hand, they would certainly reject any policy which involved them in armed conflict with the United States in Indo-China. Above all, such a conflict would entail the risk of nuclear escalation. Soviet influence in Indo-China has since 1954 tended to be on the side of moderation and restraint. Indo-China is not of the first importance to Russia strategically, and although the Soviet Government have come out in support of the insurgency in South Vietnam as a “just” revolutionary struggle, we believe that the Soviet Union would wish to avoid actions by the communist powers which could invite an enlargement of the conflict. Their private advice would be in this vein but their public attitude would be to make the greatest possible fuss.

  ACTION AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM

  Types of Action

  24. The type of action that the United States could carry out against North Vietnam could vary in extent from the relatively indirect measures of naval blockade and the support of South Vietnamese infiltration of North Vietnam to full-scale invasion with nuclear or conventional bombing. In the choice of the measures to be taken the ensurances of a speedy and effective result would be a major consideration. The possible forms of intervention considered are as follows:–

  Indirect Support

  (a) Support for the South Vietnamese in –

  (i) Ranger type operations;

  (ii) Covert support for insurgency in North Vietnam;

  (iii) Limited war operations across the 17th parallel;

  (b) naval blockade of North Vietnam;

  (c) support for Right wing and Neutralist forces in Laos against the Pathet Lao and D.R.V. forces which could extend United States/Lao operations into North Vietnam.

  Direct Support

  (d) invasion of North Vietnam by United States and South Vietnamese forces from the air and sea;

  (e) the bombing or bombardment of military targets and population centres in North Vietnam;

  (f) the extension of bombing targets to include parts of Southern China.

  Problems and Effectiveness of Type of Action

  25. Indirect Support

  (a) Ranger type operations . There is a lack of worthwhile targets for short penetration operations. Deeper penetration targets are likely to be more rewarding but introduce problems of supply and require a higher standard of training. No quick or decisive results could be expected by this method because South Vietnamese forces have shown little aptitude for this type of operation against the Viet Cong. There have been raids into communist territory since mid–1961. These have been conducted in secrecy so far as the South Vietnamese were concerned but trials of captured guerrillas by the North Vietnamese have been public. These operations appear to have had little success;

  (b) Covert support for insurgency . There are large areas in the north west of North Vietnam where the mountain tribes are not subject to day-to-day government control and there are indications that resentment of government authority exists among these tribes. There is therefore some scope for the fostering of guerrilla activity in this area. The problems of covert supply would be difficult, but communications are such that these problems are probably surmountable. North Vietnam is at present going through political and economic crises and there is discontent among the Vietnamese peasants as well as among the tribes.
Guerilla [sic] activity by the tribes could lead to localised disturbances and perhaps to revolts elsewhere in the countryside. As news of these reached South Vietnam, this could lower the morale of the Viet Cong and correspondingly raise that of the Government forces. It would obviously be essential if the risk of international repercussions were to be kept to a minimum, that the support operations should be so conducted that the United States would be able to deny direct responsibility.

  (c) Limited war operations . The South Vietnamese Army has now been trained in counter insurgency operations, it would therefore take some time to revive an effective force for limited war operations across the frontier; nor is the terrain south of the Red River delta suitable for operations by conventionally equipped forces.

  (d) Naval blockade . It would be extremely difficult to make a naval blockade effective against coastal junk traffic within the Gulf of Tonking. Even a successful blockade would have but little effect on the jungle war.

  (e) Operations in Laos . If the Viet Cong supply routes could be cut by military action in Laos some advantage would be obtained but only in the long term. Politically, this course would be most difficult because of the “neutralist solution” for Laos.

  26. Direct Support

  (a) Invasion of North Vietnam . Direct invasion would, by the diversion of North Vietnamese resources to meet it, be likely to have an immediate effect upon supply of personnel and arms to the Viet Cong, though this would not diminish the Viet Cong resistance for some time because they can live on their fat. The nearer the invasion point to the Hanoi-Haiphong (Red River delta) area the more decisive the result could be though equally, the sharper the reaction from North Vietnam and the Chinese. We consider that if invasion was undertaken in –

  (i) the Dong Hoi area, an important centre controlling operations in South Vietnam and the supply route across the 17th parallel would be eliminated. Opposition would initially be confined to little more than one North Vietnamese Division. However, such an operation would not cut the supply line to the South through Laos nor bring a speedy end to Viet Cong resistance;