Secret Alliances
Page 29
65 Sverre Bergh and Svein Sæter, Spion i Hitlers rike (Oslo: Damm, 2006). Bergh is the only XU agent who has publicly commented in detail about his activities on behalf of XU. There is also an account in Arnold Kramish, The Griffin: The Greatest Untold Espionage Story of World War II (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1986). See also Michael Smith, Foley, pp. 250–252.
66 Letter from Rosbaud to Sam Goudsmit, 16 July 1961, Samuel A. Goudsmit papers, Box 28, Folder 44, Niels Bohr Library & Archives: http://repository.aip.org/islandora/object/nbla%3A248880#page/27/mode/1up. I am grateful to Mike Goodman for drawing my attention to this correspondence.
67 NHM, FO.II 8.2 E5.4
68 NHM, FO.II 8.2 E3.1a.
69 The website wwiinorge.com mentions two more students, Øivind Holt and Frithjof Thingstad, who were both studying in Munich and also worked for XU.
70 RA, Nagell box 3.
71 NHM, FO.II 8.50001.
72 Account by Ole Snefjellå.
73 Nøkleby, p. 146, Rørholt, p. 485 and Ulstein, Vol. 2, pp. 50–55.
74 TNA, HS 2/135.
75 TNA, HS 2/135. Rørholt, pp. 322–328 and 466.
* Chief of SIS, Stewart Menzies.
† NKVD records are held in the SVR archives, Moscow.
‡ The fact that SIS only passed this information to the Security Service right at the end of the war might suggest that they continued to regard his reporting as extremely sensitive and so its circulation remained restricted. However, it is also possible that the agent did not discover these details until a very late stage.
§ Gestapo headquarters in Oslo.
¶ BBC messages were often used to alert stations to drops which were planned for the following night. This suggestion, if followed, could have misled the Germans about what was planned.
|| As well as providing cryptographic material, documents captured in the Vågsøy raid in December 1941 included full details of German coastal defences from Norway to France. But these needed to be updated.
** Puddefjord and Damsgårdfjord lie off Byfjord, in the central part of Bergen.
†† Nagell calculated that there were altogether about 1,800 such Norwegians who helped to support SIS stations, while Nøkleby reckons that the figure was closer to 2,000.
‡‡ Svardal returned to Norway to run Roska, near Florø, and was killed in March 1945 when the Germans located the station through direction finding and raided it.
§§ See Chapter 11.
CHAPTER 9
OPERATIONS FRESHMAN AND GUNNERSIDE
ATTEMPTS TO DESTROY THE HEAVY WATER PLANT AT VEMORK
At Vemork, I met Dr Brun, whose technical knowledge was so valuable to Gunnerside … Among those present were Poulsson, Skinnarland, Helberg and Lind. I felt that if I had seen the actual terrain, I would have said that the attack on the heavy water high concentration plant was an impossibility. I said so to those who had taken part in it, and they grinned.
DIARY ENTRY DESCRIBING WILSON’S TOUR OF NORWAY, JUNE 1945.1
Allied attempts to prevent Norsk Hydro’s production of heavy water, which was thought to be a critical ingredient in the production of a German atomic bomb, are among the best-known stories of the Second World War. Operation GUNNERSIDE, the daring and well-executed operation carried out by Norwegian members of SOE against the heavy water plant at Vemork, stands prominently among the most successful of SOE’s achievements – and in stark contrast to the tragic outcome of its predecessor, Operation FRESHMAN, where the British commandos involved lost their lives, many of them brutally murdered by the Germans. It is also a good example of a target on which SIS and SOE were able to collaborate quite effectively.
Norsk Hydro was founded in 1905, shortly after Norway gained its independence from Sweden. Its early development centred on the building of a factory producing fertiliser in Rjukan, which was linked to a hydro-electric plant (the largest in Europe at the time of its construction) in Vemork.* Some of the water from the power station was diverted to a hydrogen plant nearby, which consumed most of the power it generated to produce the hydrogen which was the basis of the fertiliser. A part of the water used in this process was then channelled through a further cascade of more specialised electrolysis cells to produce a very small amount of low-purity deuterium oxide, or heavy water. The process was extremely resource-intensive, requiring the use of much electricity and a considerable volume of water. However, in 1933, Leif Tronstad, a talented young Norwegian scientist, collaborated with Jomar Brun who ran the hydrogen plant at Vemork, to develop a heavy water industrial facility which they hoped would have a commercial value. They designed a system which was much more efficient and produced heavy water of 99.5 per cent purity. There was insufficient commercial demand and production stopped in June 1939, though it restarted again a few months later in November. It was during this period that German scientists working on nuclear fission concluded that heavy water, rather than graphite, offered the best chance of serving as the moderator necessary to separate U-235 and produce a bomb. The plant at Vemork was the only source producing heavy water on any scale. However, German attempts to buy large quantities were unsuccessful because their purchasing agent, I. G. Farben, would not reveal the purpose for which it was required. A Norsk Hydro representative informed the French of this German interest in early 1940, for the French bank Paribas owned a large stake in Norsk Hydro, and had done so since 1905. Acting on advice from a French physicist Frédéric Joliot-Curie, and with consent from Axel Aubert, the director-general of Norsk Hydro, the French government took steps to remove the large quantity of heavy water which by now had been produced, some 185 kg. They were able to ship it out of Oslo via Scotland to France, in March 1940. After the German invasion of France in June, it was removed to Britain.2
Tronstad and Brun remained in contact, and exchanged visits between Trondheim where Tronstad was working at the Norwegian Technical High School (NTH), and Vemork. Brun told Tronstad about a series of increases in German orders for the production of heavy water. By March 1941, they were demanding 1,500 kg a year. Not long after that, Tronstad was approached by a member of the SIS Skylark B station in Trondheim, who told him that SIS wanted intelligence about Vemork and heavy water, which he provided.3 In September, Brun visited Trondheim and reported that the Germans had ordered a more than threefold increase in heavy water production to 5,000 kg a year. This coincided with German arrests of several members of the Skylark B station. Tronstad himself was in danger and had to escape from Norway. He made his way to Sweden and arrived in London in October. He briefed SIS and developed contacts with Tube Alloys, a subsidiary of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR), responsible for work on developing an atomic bomb, where he liaised with Wallace Akers and Michael Perrin. He became a close and valued contact of both SIS and SOE and later was closely involved in the planning of the main sabotage Operations, FRESHMAN and GUNNERSIDE, against the heavy water facility at Vemork. In October 1942, Brun was also requested to come over to London, so as to contribute to the planning for these operations.
Leif Tronstad. © NHM
FRESHMAN
The news of the German demand to increase production at Vemork coincided with a meeting chaired by Churchill in early September 1941, which determined that nothing should be spared to promote the development of an atomic weapon, in Britain and not abroad. General Ismay, the secretary of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, wrote to Sir John Anderson, Lord President of the Council (and from September 1943 Chancellor of the Exchequer), and asked him to take charge of the project. Anderson had responsibility not only for work on the development of a bomb, but also for British attempts to prevent the Germans from doing the same.4 Rjukan was first mentioned in this connection in early December 1941, when the Assistant Chief of Air Staff was informed that during a meeting of the Consultative Council under Sir John Anderson, investigating ‘certain scientific developments in this country’, it came to light that the Germans were obtaining heavy water from a plant near Rjukan. It was suggested that the facil
ity should be attacked to deny them this substance.5 The possibility of an attack was discussed shortly afterwards during a meeting of the Air Ministry’s German target committee, but it decided that such an attack was not yet merited.6
Not long after this, Tronstad was interviewed by R. V. Jones, head of the scientific section at SIS, and Professor F. Lindemann, Churchill’s scientific adviser. As a result of his information, Welsh at SIS, himself a scientist, proposed the destruction of the facility by bombing or sabotage. He observed:
the removal of this source of supply would completely cripple any designs the Germans may have had with regard to this type of weapon and … the Allies are not in a position to use this type of weapon themselves for at least eighteen months as they are only now considering building a suitable plant in America.7
Tronstad himself offered to organise an action to stop or delay production by a means which would minimise harm to the civilian population. He was told that his proposal was not considered relevant.8
It took time for planning for the FRESHMAN operation to crystallise. However, SOE took an important step when Einar Skinnarland, who lived in the valley near Vemork and whose brother Torstein was the warden of the dam from which Vemork drew its power, arrived in Scotland on the Galtesund with Odd Starheim. In a mere eleven days, he was trained as a radio operator, briefed by Tronstad, and parachuted back onto the Hardangervidda (the plateau above Rjukan), on 28 March 1942. He developed contacts among the Norwegians working at Vemork, and provided regular intelligence reports essential for all the operations which were subsequently planned against the heavy water target. So when on 9 April DSIR contacted SOE to ask for information on this, it did not take them long to respond.9 In early May, Wilson informed DSIR that while SOE had a small project for an attack on Rjukan, it would really take a major combined operation to deal with the whole supply satisfactorily. In July, Norman Brook, the Deputy Secretary to the War Cabinet, approached the Chief of Combined Operations (CCO) with a request that Vemork be attacked. SOE prepared an outline plan, presented on 15 September, which proposed a combined attack, with an SOE advance party to act as local guides, and the main attack being carried out by airborne troops.
After two false starts, the SOE party, initially codenamed Grouse and led by Jens-Anton Poulsson, was dropped successfully on 18 October. They had to carry their heavy equipment quite long distances in relays during a series of forced marches in slushy and unfavourable conditions before making their base in a cabin on the Hardangervidda plateau. Wireless communications were established on 9 November. They maintained regular contact despite the fact that weather conditions, in particular the extreme cold, were difficult for them. On one occasion Wilson was informed of concerns that the station had been captured because the ‘hand’ of the wireless operator (i.e. manipulation of the sending key) did not match their records. The operator, Knut Haugland, satisfactorily answered the special security question and SOE’s concerns were allayed. Haugland later explained to Wilson that owing to the intense cold, he was forced to operate with only the almost frozen tips of his fingers protruding from his sleeping bag.10 The success of MUSKETOON, an earlier combined SOE/Combined Operations (CO) attack on Glomfjord power station in September 1942, had put the Germans on a higher alert and the garrison in the Rjukan area had increased by over a hundred men. General von Falkenhorst visited the Vemork plant in early October and briefed the senior management on the increased security precautions he was taking as a result of these attacks. He said that he was also going to mine the area around the factory perimeter, because he could not afford to release the number of troops required for the safe protection of the plant. Commenting on this, Wilson also noted that von Falkenhorst had particularly mentioned the raid at Glomfjord, acknowledging his very great admiration for the British commandos used there, and admitting that the attack had caused a complete standstill of production.11 SIS station Beta, in Oslo, reported on the extent of these reinforcements on 28 October.12 This led Gubbins (then D/CD (O) with responsibility for European operations) to write on 30 October to Major-General J. C. Haydon at Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQ) suggesting that, in view of the report, he might decide that the FRESHMAN operation was currently impractical. Haydon passed this to the planners, but the suggestion was not taken up.13
The length of time it took to finalise the plan, and the increased priority it had been given, meant that there was relatively little opportunity for the commandos to practise and train for the operation. The timetable was accelerated further when COHQ was informed on 24 September of the Lord President’s view that the objective was of the utmost importance and of the greatest urgency. On 30 September, the Chief Air Planner concluded that the only way a military force could be introduced was by parachute. On 13 October, after discussions with Roscher Lund, the use of Catalinas was reconsidered, but it was concluded that the lakes would be frozen by the time the party was ready to move, so this would be impractical. Roscher Lund also thought, based on his memory, that the area at the south-east end of Lake Møsvatn would be suitable as a landing ground for gliders or as a dropping zone for parachutists. The meeting he attended then concluded that gliders should be used, because they would be less likely to cause many casualties than a parachute drop. The Chiefs of Staff Committee approved in principle on 19 October.14
It was accepted from the outset that FRESHMAN involved considerable difficulties and a high degree of risk. For this reason, it was decided to use two Horsa gliders and twice as many commandos as were originally thought necessary, to improve the chances of success. The problems facing the planners started with the need to obtain Halifax aircraft to replace Whitleys, which were unsuitable and did not have adequate endurance. The aircraft were dogged by unserviceability and problems with maintenance, which further limited training opportunities. Difficulties with operating the gliders included the duration and length of the tow, much further than anything previously attempted, unpredictable weather, uncertainties about identifying the landing area with only limited technical assistance,† and also inadequate and sometimes inaccurate maps exacerbated by difficulties with map reading over snow-covered terrain at night. Moreover, none of those involved had any operational experience, for this was the first Allied mission of the war in which gliders would be used to transport troops.15 On the night before their departure, Captain F. Carver, an SOE administrative officer based in the Shetlands, visited the base to pass on a request from Hansteen, approved by COHQ, that only eight of the generators at Vemork should be destroyed. This would leave two intact, which would facilitate the resumption of some work in the power station, judged essential for the livelihood of the civilian population and the production of even a reduced quantity of fertiliser. He spoke to a young subaltern and asked how the gliders were performing. The officer replied that over Salisbury Plain they were quite satisfactory but that they had never used them over mountains and expected a rough passage. ‘One of the pilots in the mess said that he had had a bad trip towing a glider over the Highlands, when owing to air currents he found himself dropping at 500 ft a minute when at full climb!’‡ He continued that he was confident of success, adding poignantly that he was computing his chances of getting back in time to be married late in December.16 He was, sadly, killed less than a day later. On the day of the operation, the Norwegian meteorologist provided by COHQ, Dr Petterssen, advised delaying the operation by a couple of days because he anticipated that the weather would improve and provide better conditions. The senior British officers in command at the base at Skitten, Lieutenant Colonel Henniker and Wing Commander Cooper, decided to ignore this advice because they were concerned about the possibility of deterioration in the weather for the remainder of the November moon period. They decided to proceed that night, 19 November.
† The aircraft attempted to use a short-range radio navigation system. Rebecca was an airborne transceiver and antenna, while Eureka was the ground-based transponder. Rebecca calculated the range to Eureka based on the
timing of the return signals, and its relative position using a highly directional antenna. Both the towing aircraft were fitted with a Rebecca system which should have connected to the Eureka operated by the Grouse reception party. However, the generator lead on the surviving aircraft failed. Grouse heard a tone from Rebecca, but it is not known whether this was reciprocal and transmitted to the crew of the other Halifax, because they did not survive.
‡ The Hardangervidda, where the gliders were to land, was between 1,100 and 1,700 metres (3,500–5,600 feet) high, much higher than the Scottish Highlands.
The tragic outcome is well known. Both Halifaxes made their landfall in Norway as planned, but despite searching for two hours were unable to find the landing site. They experienced increasing problems with ice, and both tow ropes sheared. One Halifax managed to return to Wick in Scotland, but the other crashed into a mountain at Hæstadfjell, killing all the crew. One glider crashed near Egersund between Helleland and Bjerkreim, the other near Lysefjord.
A Kommandobefehl, or Commando Order, had been issued by the German High Command on 18 October 1942, stating that all Allied commandos should be killed immediately without trial, even if they were in proper uniforms or tried to surrender. The commandos captured after FRESHMAN were among the first victims of this Order, which was a direct breach of the laws of war.§ There were fourteen survivors from the first crash, three quite badly injured. They were taken to a military camp at Slettebø, where they were briefly and unsuccessfully interrogated by the Gestapo. Later that day, all of them were then taken out to a deserted valley, and spaced out along the road, some fifty metres apart, each guarded by two soldiers. One by one they were taken into a quarry and shot by a firing squad. This took more than an hour. They were buried on a nearby beach by Polish prisoners of war. The nine survivors from the Lysefjord crash, four of them very badly injured, were taken to a jail in Stavanger. A couple of days after their capture, the Germans brought in a Norwegian SOE wireless operator whom they had caught, Ernst Kirkeby Jakobsen, to interpret for them, as they were not certain whether their prisoners were Norwegian or British. He confirmed that they were all British.17 The five uninjured commandos were taken to the camp at Grini, where they were kept in isolation and interrogated at length by the Gestapo. They were unable to avoid giving up some information, but the Germans already knew plenty about their mission from examination of maps and other equipment recovered from the crash sites. On 17 January 1943, they were told that they were going to meet a high-ranking German officer, and would accordingly be blindfolded. They were taken to Trandum, lined up in front of an open trench, and shot without warning. The remaining four injured prisoners were tortured and given a series of morphine and then air injections which only killed two of them. One of the others was strangled with a belt, while the fourth was kicked down stairs and then shot in the back of the head. Their bodies were taken out into the fjord that night, weighted and dumped overboard. Chapter 14 will examine how after the war some of those responsible were charged with war crimes and punished appropriately.