Secret Alliances
Page 30
In his post-war history, Wilson wrote of FRESHMAN, ‘This was the first occasion on which COHQ were to use gliders, and Norway was hardly the country to experiment on. Our advice and that of others was ignored.’18 It is not clear what representations he and his unnamed colleagues made, but given the importance which was known to be attached to the operation at the highest level, it was never likely that their views would have carried much weight.
Preparations for GUNNERSIDE
When Wilson heard of the disasters which had befallen FRESHMAN, he contacted Tronstad to discuss what to do next. They concluded that there was a possibility that the operation could be carried out instead by a small number of members of the Linge Company. Wilson rang COHQ to ask whether they would permit SOE to take over responsibility for the task, noting that ‘there was a heartfelt “Thank God for that” on the phone’. Only then did Wilson inform Gubbins of what he had done, telling him that they had already selected the leader of the party. Not surprisingly, Gubbins hesitated, but Wilson was able to persuade him and he undertook to seek the consent of the War Cabinet. In the meantime, Wilson gave instructions for Joachim Rønneberg to be informed that he had been selected to lead a very important mission, and to choose a team of five expert skiers to accompany him.19 Rønneberg selected Birger Strømsheim, Fredrik Kayser, Kasper Idland, Hans Storhaug and Knut Haukelid. Haukelid had originally worked for SIS as a member of the Skylark A station in Oslo, until he had been forced to leave when the station was broken up. He transferred to SOE in December 1941 because he wanted to take a more active part in the war, and joined the Linge Company.¶ He was due to join the Grouse team, but shot himself in the foot during a training exercise. He was replaced by Claus Helberg on Grouse, but recovered in time to join the GUNNERSIDE party. There is plenty of evidence, not surprisingly, that the members of both GUNNERSIDE and Swallow (as the Grouse party was renamed) were spirited young men. Kasper Idland’s SOE file20 reveals that he was fined £10 (a substantial sum in those days) for unspecified damage which he had caused to an isolated farm used by SOE, while Claus Helberg21 was fined £2.10/- for fishing in Loch Morlich out of season. Rønneberg was not entirely exempt, either. At Brickendonbury Hall, when examining a new Colt 45 which he had procured for the operation, he accidentally fired a bullet into the ceiling, feigning casual indifference when questioned by an alarmed adjutant shortly afterwards.22 And other members of the Linge Company just about managed to escape being caught red-handed when found poaching deer up on the hills…
Joachim Rønneberg, who led the successful GUNNERSIDE operation against the heavy water plant at Vemork. © NHM
Rønneberg was a perfect choice to lead the party. He was an inspirational leader, well at home and experienced in the mountains, a consummate professional and extremely thorough in his preparations.|| This was just as well, for when Rønneberg was briefed on GUNNERSIDE on 24 November, he was told that they were due to leave barely three weeks later. In fact, they were delayed by poor weather during two moon periods including an abortive trip when the landing zone could not be located, and were not dropped by parachute until 16 February. This allowed him more time for meticulous preparation in the selection of suitable weapons (he did not wish to take Sten guns which had a reputation for unreliability, preferring Tommy guns instead even though they were heavier), skis, better watertight boots, warmer clothing and sleeping bags, and the preparation of concentrated, dehydrated (and therefore lighter) combat rations. In many cases, these items were made to his specifications. And while the delays were frustrating, they also allowed time for additional training. At the SOE training school at Brickendonbury, STS 17, guided by advice from Tronstad during his regular visits, they familiarised themselves with scale models of the factory at Vemork. Tronstad also briefed them in detail on the defences around the factory.23 They also practised with the weapons and explosives they would use, using charges specially prepared by experts. Later, they trained even harder in remote and inhospitable areas of Scotland to make themselves fitter. Rønneberg began to conclude that a party of six men might not be sufficient, and they would need additional cover. This coincided with a message from Swallow (as the Grouse party was renamed for security reasons in November) asking whether it was intended that they should be involved, because they doubted that six men would be enough.24 This was accepted and, apart from their radio operator Haugland, who remained to look after communications, the rest of the team did take part.
Meanwhile, Wilson wrote to SIS to inform them of the failure of FRESHMAN and plans for GUNNERSIDE. He requested SIS to provide him with any available information about German reinforcements to their garrisons in the Rjukan valley in general, and Vemork in particular. On 9 December Swallow reported the first details of such reinforcements, the extent of hostage taking after FRESHMAN as well as the extensive raids which were being mounted in the area. The SIS station Corona (located near Oslo) transmitted a warning on 15 December, ‘If you are going to drop agents in northern parts of Telemark be very careful. The Germans know about the place.’25
While Swallow were waiting for the arrival of GUNNERSIDE, their conditions became even more difficult. They all narrowly avoided being discovered by German raiding parties on separate occasions when out searching for food or meeting contacts. They had not expected they would need to survive so long in such an isolated area, and took with them only a month’s worth of provisions, so soon ran very short of food and fuel. Semi-starved, all of them became sick. They were reduced to eating a watery soup made largely with reindeer moss, which had practically no nutritional value. Fortunately, on 23 December and after many fruitless hunting expeditions, Poulsson managed to shoot a reindeer, the first of over a dozen which they hunted successfully. Consequently they were able to eat a little better. Soon afterwards, they were joined by Einar Skinnarland, whose brother Torstein had been arrested, a fate which he had only just avoided himself. He provided the party with considerable assistance, fetching stores and helping to operate the hand accumulator for the radio set, which was a very tiring job.
The GUNNERSIDE party was finally dropped on the night of 16 February. A subsequent SOE report noted that ‘the party were dropped in accordance with the leader’s arrangements made with the pilot before departure’, which may have contributed to the fact that they landed near Lake Skrykken, some twenty miles away from the Swallow reception committee. That was not the only reason, though. On 16 December, the senior RAF officer Group Captain Grierson had instructed that the aircraft carrying GUNNERSIDE was to be equipped with Rebecca if possible, to link up with Eureka (a system which had not worked during FRESHMAN). The Swallow team was briefed, and made an arduous journey back to their original landing zone to collect the receiver. However, for reasons which are not entirely clear, the Eureka system was not used when the team was finally dropped – but Swallow were not informed and Poulsson only found out when told by Rønneberg after the war.26
When the GUNNERSIDE party landed, they had no idea where they were. They collected the containers holding their stores and equipment and stored most of it in a trench which they dug, carefully marking the site. Soon after they had set off to look for Swallow, weather conditions deteriorated suddenly and very badly, with heavy snow and strong winds. In conditions of almost zero visibility they providentially stumbled upon a cabin they had found earlier, by retracing their steps along a compass bearing. The violent storm lasted for five days, and was so powerful that they were unable to leave the cabin at all. However, Rønneberg was at least able to identify where they were from a map on the wall. On 22 February, the storm abated, and they prepared to leave. At that point, they were approached by a reindeer hunter. Uncertain whether to trust him or whether to kill him to protect their mission, they decided to take him with them, benefiting from some of the reindeer meat which he had been carrying with him and enlisting his help to pull a sledge. The following day, they came across two members of the Swallow team who were out looking for them. After discussion with Poul
sson, Rønneberg decided to release the reindeer hunter, having first given him a very stern warning about the consequences which would follow if he spoke to anyone about their presence. And that evening, benefiting from the supplies which the GUNNERSIDE party had brought with them, the Swallow team had their first decent meal in over four months.
The following day, they discussed the best means of making their attack on the plant, which was in quite a remote and inaccessible location. The presence of new guards, and additional minefields, limited their options to two avenues of attack. They could either approach it via the bridge across the gorge facing the plant, where they would have to dispose of the guard force which could likely warn of their presence. Even if they were successful, they would probably have to carry out their sabotage while fighting off a German reaction – with little chance of escape afterwards. The other way would be to descend into the gorge below Vemork, cross the river and climb what appeared to be a sheer cliff before making their way to the factory. Rønneberg sent Helberg to meet a contact in Rjukan to obtain updated information about German defences, and then to make a reconnaissance assessing the viability of the route through the gorge. He reported that the bridge was better defended than they had expected. The gorge looked more promising, for there was still an ice bridge across the river, and he judged that there was a passable route up the cliff, which they could also use for their retreat back up to the Hardangervidda and thence across country to Sweden. There followed a lively discussion, with a narrow majority in favour of using the route across the gorge. Idland sought a private word with Rønneberg, to tell him that he doubted that he was a good enough skier to be able to keep up with the rest of the team, and that he would escape on his own. Rønneberg dismissed his concerns, and said that they would stay together as a team. Idland came from Stavanger and was not experienced in mountain conditions. In Rønneberg’s report on Idland, written after GUNNERSIDE, he noted that Idland ‘was no skier at all. However he did a marvellous job in completing the retreat without delaying the party.’27
Their route was indeed very difficult and demanding, but with an ice bridge able to withstand their weight as they crossed the river, it was just possible. They walked along the railway, carefully negotiated a minefield and then the demolition party cut through the fence to get into the plant. Haukelid and four others kept watch outside. Although their initial access point was blocked by an unexpectedly locked door, Rønneberg and Kayser found a tunnel giving access into the room with the high-concentration cells. There they detained a Norwegian night watchman. As they laid the charges, weighing barely five kilos, on each of the eighteen cells, they were joined by Strømsheim and Idland, the back-up party. They shortened the fuses from two minutes to thirty seconds and then left. Rønneberg carefully dropped some items of British military equipment, intended to convince the Germans that the sabotage party was British and reduce the chances of their retaliating against Norwegian civilians. The thickness of the walls, the noise of the wind and hum of the power station all helped to dull the noise of the explosion, which was no more than a muffled thud. A German sentry came out twice briefly to look around, but did not investigate further, and the team was able to retrace their route back into the gorge, over the road and up through forest onto the Hardangervidda. Their sabotage was completely successful, for they had destroyed all eighteen of the high-concentration cells – and left again unnoticed, without firing a shot.
General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst and Reichskommissar Josef Terboven visit Vemork, the target of Operation GUNNERSIDE. © NHM
The escape of the sabotage party was helped that night by another storm, which removed any traces of their ski tracks for the Germans to find. The group split up. Haukelid, alone of the GUNNERSIDE party, remained to organise resistance cells in the Telemark area, assisted by Arne Kjelstrup. Poulsson left for Oslo, where he planned to meet Helberg. Haugland would also remain, continuing to act as the communications link. Rønneberg led the remaining members of GUNNERSIDE on an arduous trip on skis to the Swedish border. He would leave a message at a prearranged cabin along their route for collection by Haugland, to report the successful outcome of the mission back to London. Despite checking regularly, Haugland did not find any message. Instead, he was told the news in person by Haukelid and Kjelstrup, and reported to London, where the news was received on 10 March. Rønneberg’s journey to Sweden, a distance of well over 300 miles, took more than a fortnight. The Swedish authorities accepted the cover story which they all told, and the party were able to continue to Stockholm without much delay. SOE instructed Stockholm that the whole GUNNERSIDE team should be congratulated, that priority return flights were being organised, and that no report should be made to anyone in Stockholm. All the members of both Swallow and GUNNERSIDE continued to carry out important tasks for the resistance during the remainder of the war. After the war, Haugland (and Torstein Raaby, an SIS agent whose activities will be described in Chapter 11) took part in the Kon-Tiki expedition, a journey on a balsawood raft across the Pacific Ocean from South America to Polynesia, which was led by the Norwegian explorer Thor Heyerdahl.
The German reaction to the raid was extensive, as they searched for those who were responsible, and also for those who had helped them. Swallow reported that over 300 civilians had been arrested as part of their search, and as a reprisal. However, when General von Falkenhorst (who commanded the German occupation forces in Norway) arrived to inspect the damage, he was reported to have smiled and said, ‘this is the most splendid coup I have seen in this war’.28 He accepted the evidence of discarded British equipment as a suggestion that only British troops had been involved, and all of those who had been arrested were released. The German hunt continued. The reindeer hunter was subsequently arrested. According to a later report from Helberg after his arrival in Stockholm in June, the hunter helpfully and inaccurately told his captors he had been detained by English soldiers, as he could not understand the regional accent of those who came from Bergen and so thought that they must be British! Helberg also reported that tension among the German troops searching the inhospitable terrain on the Hardangervidda was so great that more than once they ended up opening fire on each other, inflicting a number of casualties on their own side.29 Helberg had earlier nearly been caught twice. On the first occasion he was surprised by a small German patrol and pursued for hours across the mountains. He eventually managed to shoot and injure the only one who had kept up with him, and make his escape. However, soon afterwards in the darkness he skied over a cliff and broke his arm. He took refuge in a hotel where most of the guests were arrested, following an altercation between a Norwegian woman and Terboven, the Reichskommissar who was staying there. They were put on a bus to be taken to prison at Grini. Helberg knew that his identity papers would not stand scrutiny and despite his broken arm managed to leap out of the bus at an opportune moment. He escaped into the woods and fortunately avoided further injury as his German pursuers shot and threw grenades at him. For a while, SOE thought that Helberg had been killed, but after a period of recuperation near Oslo, he turned up in Stockholm.
Estimates varied as to how long the plant at Vemork would remain out of production. On 7 April, the Chief of the Air Staff informed the Military Mission in Washington that it would be out of action for twelve months and ‘so the question of bombing the plant does not now arise’.30 Wilson had been rather more realistic a fortnight earlier, when he predicted that it would take six months to build another high-concentration plant. (The poor weather had prevented the GUNNERSIDE party from taking sufficient explosives with them to be able to attack other parts of the plant, thereby putting it out of commission for longer.31) Anderson asked his secretary Gorell Barnes to inform Gubbins that he wanted all the participants to be suitably rewarded, and once he had seen a report on the operation, Churchill famously asked Lord Selborne, ‘What rewards are to be given to these heroic men?’ Rønneberg and Poulsson, who led GUNNERSIDE and Swallow, received the DSO. The other officers
(Haugland, Idland and Haukelid) were given the MC, while the rest each received an MM. Wilson and Tronstad were given the Order of the British Empire (OBE), while Brun was made a Member of the British Empire (MBE). The citation for Brun stated that he had provided complete technical information on the plant and ‘his specialist scientific advice was of the greatest value, as it showed that the attack could be carried out by a small party without danger to the lives of loyal Norwegians or the causing of damage which would involve Norway in severe economic loss after the war’.32