Secret Alliances

by Tony Insall

  However, SOE were in a position to provide some significant support to certain elements of RANKIN, and contributed to the fairly tortuous process by which SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force) was attempting with Scottish Command to work out a feasible plan – a process made more complicated by changing political circumstances, shortages of resources, and limited knowledge among SHAEF planners of conditions in Norway. Wilson told Georg Unger Vetlesen, his OSS counterpart, that ‘their general attitude is such as to make my somewhat remote Viking blood boil’. He was only slightly more moderate in a comment to Gubbins:

  I feel you are bound to agree that this plan has been drawn up without expert advice on political or topographical details. SF HQ have not been consulted by SHAEF in any way in regard to this plan, and were not even on the distribution list until I was informed by General Officer Commanding in Scottish Command that copies had been distributed. I am aware that it does not fall within the province of SOE to comment on the military and strategic aspects of these plans, but this seems to be a case in which SOE would be entitled to do so, on account of the accumulative experience and knowledge which it possesses.24

  SHAEF’s plan went through four drafts, was immensely detailed, and was finalised and put out on 10 July 1944, a month after D-day.

  SOE concluded that if no regular Allied troops would be left for deployment to Norway, there would be an even greater number of tasks which SOE could perform. In preparation for this, they stepped up Norwegian training programmes so as to prepare and organise a larger resistance force. These programmes were extensive and built on previous experiences which had been shown to be effective, such as those of Gannet, which dropped into the Gudbrandsdalen area in November 1942. In four months, they ran eleven courses and trained fifty-nine men, as well as a few smaller teams who were intended to deal with traitors.25 At the same time, SOE took advantage of the greater number of both British and American aircraft available and significantly increased the supply of weapons and other equipment, with well over a thousand sorties – ten times more numerous than in all the preceding seasons. There was an equally large increase in the number of deliveries by sea, with over 150 tons of arms and equipment despatched from the beginning of 1944.26 It is estimated that by the end of the war, there were light arms available to equip some 30,000 men. When young Norwegians started to seek refuge to avoid labour mobilisation, it was agreed in August 1944 that Milorg should organise a series of five bases in the mountains where it was intended to assemble, arm, equip and train a force of up to 2,000 members in each. In the event, only three became operative – Elg, north-west of Oslo, Varg in the Setesdal mountains in the south and Bjørn, north of Bergen. Their complements had not reached the planned capacity by May 1945, but they were able to play an effective part following the German surrender on 8 May 1945.27

  Special Forces headquarters issued a directive in September 1944, which noted that no Allied offensive operations were planned for Norway. Therefore no steps were to be taken to encourage the resistance movement to overt action, since it could not be supported. Resistance activity should be concentrated on preventing the Germans from pursuing a scorched-earth policy any further. Efforts were to be concentrated on providing protection to their likely targets, which were expected to be power stations, communications, public utilities (particularly ports) and industrial plant. Considerable effort was put into planning adequate protection against these eventualities. However, SOE was taking other measures as well. For example, from August 1944 onwards and with Swedish agreement they set up bases in northern Sweden, codenamed Sepals, to report German naval and military movements and provide weather reports. On occasion they sent fighting patrols across the border to interfere with the German withdrawal from Finnmark, though supply problems and poor weather made this difficult.28 Sepals sometimes used SIS communications facilities, such as Brunhild, which had been set up in June 1943 north of Torneträsk on the Swedish side of the border (though without Swedish knowledge).29 Brunhild also operated a radio beacon to help Allied bombers returning from raids in Norway, such as the attack on Tirpitz on 12 November 1944.30

  This did not mean that SOE abandoned sabotage operations. However, it changed its emphasis and concentrated on targets which were of more immediate value to the Germans, particularly those which supported German offensive capabilities such as fuel supplies, construction or repair facilities, weapons stores and factories such as those which made sulphuric acid which could be used in explosives or in batteries for U-boats.31 However, as the campaign developed, Milorg gradually increased its influence over these joint operations. FEATHER II, an attack launched from Sweden on the Thamshavn railway in April 1944, was the last British operation to have been planned outside Norway,32 although SOE remained responsible for authorising sabotage attacks proposed by the resistance.

  Sunshine and Polar Bear

  The plan for infrastructure protection, or counter-sabotage, was divided into six separate categories, of which Sunshine and Polar Bear were the most important. The objective of Sunshine was the protection of hydro-electric power installations in south-eastern Norway, while Polar Bear involved the protection of harbours throughout the country. The Sunshine party was led by Leif Tronstad. He commanded a party of eight officers including Norman Lind, an engineer who was one of only a handful of British members of SOE who deployed to Norway during the occupation. (The others included members of the Scale/Quaver party led by Joe Adamson and, separately, Ragnar Christophersen who jumped into southern Norway on 17 April 1945 with the Varg IV party.) They were dropped into Norway in October 1944 and linked up with Einar Skinnarland and former members of GUNNERSIDE. In the course of the next six months, they worked intensively to arrange protection of all the important plants by recruiting loyalists working in them, who concealed their weapons inside the buildings for use if the Germans showed signs of preparing to destroy their installations. Sadly, Tronstad was killed in March 1945 while interrogating a quisling official, when he was shot by the man’s brother. He had been an inspirational leader who had not only played a key role in the planning of GUNNERSIDE, but also achieved much in building better cooperation with his British and Norwegian colleagues in SOE.

  The ten Polar Bear parties were selected to cover the most important ports in Norway between Narvik in the north and the Swedish frontier. They were deployed between mid-January and May 1945, and were generally successful though one party had to be replaced when Åsmund Færoy of Polar Bear IV was arrested on 9 April, soon after his arrival.‡ The most outstanding achievement was that of Inge Steensland, assigned to Polar Bear VI E (East) to protect the ports of Moss and Fredrikstad. He devised and executed a plan to seize all the tugs operating from Fredrikstad, as the Germans were largely dependent on them for moving their shipping in Oslofjord. This was successful, and he arrived with eleven tugs and the salvage vessel Uredd in the Swedish port of Strömstad on 8 February 1945. Steensland returned to Norway, and on 20 April he brought out to Sweden the cargo ship Aktiv (650 tons) and the tanker Denofa (3,250 tons), which it was believed the Germans intended to use as blockships. His final action was to evacuate all of the local pilots to Sweden, in eight cutters, at the end of war. For these actions he was awarded the DSC.

  Scale

  Scale was an example of SOE’s further contingency planning. The most significant element was Scale/Octave, whose aim was to place Allied representatives in the field at the earliest opportunity. It would constitute an Allied mission representing SHAEF through SF HQ, intended to help bring about the capitulation of the German armed forces as soon as possible and to help Milorg to facilitate the arrival of Allied forces and supplies. It was to be led by Bjarne Øen. In the event, circumstances changed so much that it was cancelled. The task of another, Scale/Minim, was to represent SOE with SOE and OSS missions on all matters for which SOE were responsible to SHAEF, dealing with future plans involving military action in Norway launched from Sweden.

  The only other
Scale operation to take place was Scale/Quaver, led by Joe Adamson, who had been in SOE since 1940 and worked for Wilson as SN/Plans, responsible for planning. Its mission was to deploy to the Saltfjellet area of Nordland and contact local resistance elements. The objective was to report on southbound German troop movements, and to coordinate interference with their progress. Adamson and his party were dropped on 16 October. From the outset, the operation did not go well. They were dropped in broad daylight at 0900 because in view of the nature of the chosen landing site, a night drop was thought to be very hazardous. Wilson noted that the group would be willing to drop by daylight if the Air Ministry had no objection, while the RAF also preferred this timing to facilitate navigation.33 There was no reception committee at the drop site, and Adamson injured his knee on landing and could not walk. He was captured by the Germans. The rest of the party were able to escape and make their way to Sweden. Adamson was able to convince the Germans that he was in the RAF. He was wearing army battle-dress with his parachutist’s wings on the shoulder. As the German airborne forces were part of the air force and not the army, the German military may have chosen to accept his story that he had been an observer on an RAF aircraft when the captain ordered them to bail out after they had been hit. He was never interrogated by the Gestapo.§ (There were precedents for this: the Welman driver Bjørn Pedersen, who was captured by the German Navy during an attack in Bergen harbour in November 1943, was not landed in Bergen but was sent by them straight to the naval POW camp near Hamburg. This saved his life.) Adamson ended up in Germany in Dulag Luft Wetzlar, a transit camp for RAF prisoners. Earlier, while he was being interrogated in Oslo, SOE asked Coppersmith Blue whether there was any chance of rescuing him. They thought not.34 Scale/Quaver was abandoned and there were no further operations mounted in the northern area. Adamson was released at the end of the war, and returned to Norway in time to join Wilson on his Scandinavian tour. Wilson later observed that Adamson’s success in resisting German interrogation may also have been helped by the fact that he had been a member of the Oxford University Dramatic Society! He had already had to apologise to Boyle, assistant to Gubbins, for having failed to obtain written consent for Adamson to proceed to enemy occupied territory, and accepted responsibility for having been out-argued in allowing the operation to proceed in the first place.35

  Jens Chr. Hauge meets SOE in London

  Hauge, the head of Milorg, visited Britain twice, in August and November 1944. Before his arrival, SOE had not known his identity, which was a carefully concealed secret. On his first visit, in addition to extensive discussions with the Norwegian government, he met combined staff at SF HQ and attended a meeting of the ANCC. He also held discussions about protective measures against further German scorched-earth activities, and actions before and after the liberation. This included the capture and preservation of Gestapo and other documents, the planning for which Milorg had well in hand. Hauge also floated the idea of blowing up Gestapo headquarters in Victoria Terrasse by smuggling explosives into the cellar, though doubted that the time was right for such a venture. These productive exchanges reflected the closeness of the relationship which Milorg had now developed with SOE, who, following Øen’s visit to Sweden in the summer, had already agreed to facilitate direct wireless communications between them. After Hauge’s return to Norway, Milorg issued a directive to all district leaders concerning actions to be taken in the event of a German surrender. On his next visit, Hauge discussed some of these subjects in greater detail, and agreed that action would be taken against a list of the most notorious Norwegian collaborators. There was also agreement that the RAF would make an attempt to bomb Gestapo headquarters in both Oslo and Kristiansand. The RAF attack on Victoria Terrasse on 31 December 1944 was unsuccessful. The Mosquitoes largely missed their target and seventy-eight Norwegians and twenty-eight Germans were killed, the worst single incident in Oslo during the war.36 The plan to attack the Gestapo headquarters in Kristiansand was therefore dropped. Apart from this very unfortunate aftermath, the success of Hauge’s visits reflected the extent to which Milorg and SOE interests had converged since the difficult days of 1941. Gunnar Sønsteby, the leader of the Oslo gang, also visited at the same time as Hauge. With Hauge’s consent a directive was agreed for him, which specified that Sønsteby’s Oslo detachment was to be held separate from local district organisation and remain available for special operations. The directive set out his priorities for sabotage both of industrial plant and Abwehr equipment such as direction finding vehicles which could be used against Milorg and SOE – or SIS stations, for that matter. It also specified the order of priority in which leading Norwegian quislings were to be assassinated, starting with Karl Marthinsen, head of the Norwegian police, who was killed in February 1945.37

  Action against the railways

  Milorg members had become increasingly frustrated by restrictions preventing them from taking action against the Germans. After the invasion of Normandy, SHAEF was reluctant to order sabotage against Norwegian railways, which might prevent Germans leaving to take part in the campaign in western Europe. They maintained this position despite representations from both the Commander in Chief of the Home Fleet (Vice-Admiral Fraser) and the Commander in Chief of No. 18 Group Coastal Command (Air Vice-Marshal Simpson) who both wanted interference with internal railway traffic so as to drive the Germans to make use of sea routes. SHAEF argued that it might complicate attempts to liberate Norway when the time came. However, their position softened slightly when, in October, they agreed to some sabotage actions against the railways, as they acknowledged the benefit this could give to resistance morale. Soon afterwards, when fighting on the Rhine became bogged down, SHAEF decided that it would be desirable to try to limit German withdrawals from Norway. On 5 December they issued a directive calling for railway and road sabotage, which was intended to force all German traffic to proceed by sea, where it could be attacked by Allied warships, submarines and aircraft.38 The effectiveness of this measure is not entirely clear, for German documents captured after the war cast some doubt on SHAEF’s estimate that the rate of movement was reduced from four German divisions every month to just one. But it certainly made a significant difference. For much of the war there were seven divisions in Norway, increasing to thirteen by the end of 1943 and then to eighteen as the Germans withdrew from Finland. At this time, there were well over 400,000 German troops stationed in Norway, one soldier for every eight Norwegians. By the end of the war, there were eleven divisions left.39

  Lie’s visit to Moscow

  In May 1944, Norway signed agreements concerning civil administration and jurisdiction in liberated territories with Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union. This permitted military authorities to retain control over administration as long as conflict persisted. In October 1944, the Russians moved into Finnmark in pursuit of the retreating German Army. The latter carried out a scorched-earth policy to try to slow down the Russian advance, enabling many German troops to avoid capture and escape southwards. The Norwegians sent a small force of several hundred men to support the Russians, later reinforced by two companies of the police troops which had been trained in Sweden. In November 1944, Trygve Lie visited Moscow for discussions about the Russian campaign, and was confronted by Vyacheslav Molotov with demands for significant concessions over both Svalbard and Bear Island, which lies roughly halfway between Svalbard and the North Cape of Norway. This was an unexpected shock and on his return to London, Lie decided to discuss it with Eden before briefing his own government (see Chapter 1). The Norwegians stalled for a while, but the Russians returned to the charge and only finally dropped their claim over two years later, after the Norwegians made a robust rebuttal and put out a public statement to that effect.40 Kirkenes was abandoned by the Germans and became the first town in Norway to be liberated on 25 October 1944. The Soviet Army advanced further into Finnmark, but stopped at Neiden, well short of Alta. Concerns that they might refuse to leave proved to be unfounded, and t
hey withdrew from Norway in September 1945.

  Notes

  1 TNA, 18 February 1944, FO 371/43221.

  2 TNA, HS 7/174.

  3 Ibid.

  4 Herrington, SOE in Norway, p. 341 and p. 346.

  5 Kjeldstadli, Hjemmestyrkene, p. 280. Morten Conradi and Alf Skjeseth, Osvald. Storsabotøren Asbjørn Sunde (Oslo, Spartacus, 2016), pp. 97–99.

  6 Kjeldstadli, p. 163.

  7 Tore Gjelsvik, Norwegian resistance 1940–1945 (London: Hurst, 1979), p. 127.

  8 TNA, FO 371/43223.

  9 TNA, FO 371/32825.

  10 TNA, minute by Galsworthy, 30 May 1944, FO 371/43223.

  11 Ibid.

  12 TNA, FO 371/36886.

  13 TNA, FO 371/3674.