Secret Alliances

by Tony Insall

  14 TNA, FO 371/36886.

  15 Ibid.

  16 TNA, FO 371/43228.

  17 T. K. Derry, A History of Modern Norway 1814–1972 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1973), p. 388 footnote.

  18 For a detailed consideration of this, see the papers by H. P. Wilmott and Einar Grannes in Salmon, Britain and Norway in the Second World War, pp. 97–108 and 109–118.

  19 TNA, PREM 3/328/11A.

  20 TNA, FO 371/43242.

  21 TNA, PREM 3/417/5A.

  22 TNA, Warner to Collier, 18 July 1944, FO 371/43259.

  23 Paal Frisvold, in Salmon, p. 200.

  24 TNA, Wilson to Gubbins, 20 June 1944, HS 2/223.

  25 Ibid. A number of operational files do not exist in TNA. Several of them, such as Gannet, Chaffinch and Goldfinch, would have described the training of specialists intended to deal with traitors.

  26 TNA, HS 7/178.

  27 TNA, HS 7/180.

  28 TNA, HS 7/174.

  29 Nøkleby, Pass godt på Tirpitz, p. 121.

  30 Bjørn Rørholt, Usynlige soldater, pp. 444–445.

  31 TNA, directive from Wilson, 31 July 1944, HS 2/235.

  32 Arnfinn Moland, in Salmon, p. 148.

  33 TNA, HS 2/130.

  34 TNA, HS 2/215.

  35 NHM, Wilson history, pp. 105–106.

  36 TNA, HS 9/679/4, HS 7/174 and Wilson history, p. 163.

  37 TNA, HS 2/204.

  38 Mackenzie, The Secret History of SOE, p. 671.

  39 https://www.axishistory.com/books/134-campaigns-a-operations/campaigns-aoperations/2085-number-of-german-divisions-by-front-in-world-war-ii

  40 For more details, see Tony Insall and Patrick Salmon (eds) The Nordic Countries: From War to Cold War, 1944–1951, DBPO Series I, Volume IX (London, Routledge, 2011), passim.

  * SOE did of course provide arms to communist resistance movements in several occupied countries such as Yugoslavia, Malaya and also to both EAM-ELAS and EDES, the communist and non-communist movements in Greece. The situation in Greece was much more complicated and very difficult for SOE to deal with effectively. The two resistance groups started fighting each other and their rivalry later developed into a civil war. Things in Norway were much more straightforward.

  † Commenting on the problem caused by the serious lack of forces, General Bedell Smith, chief of staff to General Eisenhower, told him that he did not know what he would do if the German garrison in Norway fell apart.

  ‡ Færøy unsuccessfully tried to hang himself but was released on 7 May and then participated again in Polar Bear work, helping to ensure that all demolition charges were removed from the harbour.

  § I am grateful to Nick Adamson, Joe’s son, for this information.

  CHAPTER 11

  HUNTING DOWN THE TIRPITZ

  CHURCHILL’S OBSESSION

  [After the attack by X-craft on Tirpitz] the first damage reports came from Raaby. They were the first he sent. Thereafter he and Ultra kept up a running commentary on the repairs to the wounded battleship. In fact, Raaby was to transmit daily for ten months … [Following one air attack in April 1944], the navy had to depend entirely on Raaby for information on the progress of repairs. Follow-up attacks were attempted by the carriers for which Raaby, with utmost daring, transmitted hourly weather reports. All were frustrated and in July, Raaby having been forced to flee into Sweden, another agent from a safer place in Altafjord reported Tirpitz again on the move. A further large-scale attack was planned and this time, at my suggestion, we took Raaby with us in the Duke of York. Alcohol meant no more to him than mother’s milk and my mess bill soared.

  EDWARD THOMAS, INTELLIGENCE STAFF OFFICER ON DUKE OF YORK, ADMIRAL MOORE’S FLAGSHIP, DESCRIBES SOME OF THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF TORSTEIN RAABY, THE SIS AGENT WHO PLAYED THE MOST PROMINENT AND VALUABLE PART IN REPORTING ON TIRPITZ.1

  Throughout the war, and particularly after it had moved to Trondheim in January 1942, Winston Churchill was almost obsessed with the threat which Tirpitz posed to both Atlantic and Arctic convoys. The heavily armoured sister ship of Bismarck was nearly 300 yards long and weighed over 50,000 tons. She carried a more powerful range of armaments than any warship in the Royal Navy. By May 1942, when Tirpitz had been joined by four heavy cruisers, Hipper, Lützow, Admiral Scheer and Prinz Eugen, they represented a very considerable threat to Atlantic and later Arctic convoys. The cruisers did not remain constantly in Norwegian waters. However, Tirpitz did, and by its mere presence tied down significant elements of the Home Fleet which could otherwise have been deployed to the Far East or elsewhere. Churchill took a very close interest in the progress of operations intended to sink the battleship, and constantly nagged the Chiefs of Staff, admirals and air marshals for information and for more operations aimed at destroying her. Between October 1940 and November 1944, Tirpitz was the target of twenty-four air and naval operations.2 Many of these were bombing and mining operations carried out by the RAF and the Fleet Air Arm, some of them were carried out by naval submariners with assistance from SOE and some were planned by SOE. The intelligence provided by SIS on movements of Tirpitz, her status and battle readiness and the progress of repairs, was highly prized by both the Admiralty and the Air Ministry.

  First steps against Tirpitz: Frodesley

  After Theta had reported the arrival of Tirpitz in Norway in late January 1942, John Godfrey, the Director of Naval Intelligence, asked for ideas about how to destroy her. He suggested that possible schemes could include ruses for tempting or forcing Tirpitz to put to sea, where it could be engaged; making her berth unattractive while she was exercising in the Trondheimfjord; attacking the morale of the ships’ company and also the judgement and determination of the German High Command. He copied the minute to SOE, saying he would welcome ideas from them. Nelson, then director, replied on 3 March that there might be a possibility of attacking Tirpitz by a special development of the idea for a one-man submarine. ‘SOE is in fact working on the construction of a one-man submarine to be propelled like a bicycle by pedalling. It might be necessary to fasten the submarine beneath an ordinary Norwegian fishing boat, which would go up the fjord near to the Tirpitz before releasing it.’ This was given the codename Frodesley. Research seemed promising, and SOE thought that a prototype might be available for testing by the end of June.

  Churchill took a close interest in the project, commenting and annotating approvingly the photographs and reports which he was shown. His interest was so great that Selborne, the minister, asked him whether he would like to watch some trials on Staines reservoir, near London.3 Wilson discussed with Hambro, who had by then taken over from Nelson as director of SOE, whether his staff could be considered for the operation. He did so before he raised it with the Norwegian authorities, since he assumed that the operation would be carried out by British personnel. Hambro replied that all his staff were too busy, and after some internal wrangling, it was concluded that attack crews would be better drawn from the navy and that it would therefore be more suitable for Admiralty use.4 The idea was eventually dropped.*

  Few of Godfrey’s other suggestions received much consideration. However, in 1943 some thought was given by SOE to the possibility of introducing an explosive charge in Tirpitz’s berth during her absence, either by air, small submarine or by SOE. They hoped that since the berth was less likely to be well guarded when Tirpitz was at sea, it might be worth exploring further. In the end, once again, nothing came of it.

  SIS intelligence on Tirpitz

  Admiralty records suggest that from the time of her launch in April 1939 until her arrival in Trondheim in January 1942, Tirpitz was the subject of just one SIS report, which described gunnery practice she had carried out off Sassnitz, east of Lübeck. During the time she was in Norway, until her sinking in November 1944, she was the subject of considerably more. For example, NID files contain details of 145 SIS reports about Tirpitz, most of which were graded B2, i.e. given a high degree of reliability. This list is far from complete, because it does not include many of the
reports provided by coast-watching agents about her movements, or the weather reports which were sent regularly before bombing attacks by the RAF or the Fleet Air Arm. But they give a good idea of the extent of the comprehensive reporting which SIS was able to provide on Tirpitz and how far this complemented and added to Ultra reporting from GC&CS. Chapter 8 has already described the coverage provided by Magne Hassel in the Agdenes Fort, but it is also worth looking at some further examples to examine how, when Tirpitz moved north and used a series of different anchorages, SIS had to react quickly to establish adequate coverage of these sites. SOE also contributed quite regularly to intelligence reporting on Tirpitz. For example, Antrum (based near Ålesund) was asked on 4 March to provide a description of the anchorage which Tirpitz was using. It replied on 7 March that it was lying at Langstein in the Fættenfjord, off Åsenfjord, close in to the cliff wall, and that it was camouflaged with trees.5

  Arctic convoys: the fate of PQ 17

  The greatest damage caused by Tirpitz during the war occurred during an operation in which it did not take part, but where the threat of its imminent participation was sufficient to cause the Arctic convoy PQ 17 to be ordered to disperse. The history of this ill-fated convoy is well known and needs little description here. PQ 17 left Iceland for Murmansk on 27 June 1942. Ultra intercepts did not provide a clear picture of the intentions or movements of the German battle fleet, which might have included three further warships in addition to Tirpitz – Hipper, Admiral Scheer and Lützow. There were however undoubtedly signs that it was preparing to move to intercept the convoy. In the absence of confirmation that Tirpitz had remained in the Altafjord, Sir Dudley Pound, the Chief of the Naval Staff, ordered PQ 17 to disperse. As a result, fourteen of its thirty-seven ships were lost to German air attack, and a further ten to U-boats. Ultra later showed that Tirpitz had indeed sailed, but was recalled once it became clear how much damage was being done to the dispersed convoy by the German Air Force and U-boats. There was no need to involve the German battle fleet.6 That Tirpitz could have caused so much damage, without even firing a shot, can only have increased Churchill’s determination to ensure that it was disabled or destroyed as soon as possible. The pressure on SIS to provide intelligence on its activities increased even further.

  Operation TITLE

  TITLE was an operation intended to use two submersible chariots to deposit large warheads under the keel of Tirpitz while it was at anchor in one of the smaller fjords off the Trondheimfjord. This was one of the most imaginative, enterprising and daring operations mounted by SOE during the war, and it came very close to succeeding.

  The idea for TITLE was first suggested in mid-June 1942 by Admiral Submarines, Sir Max Horton. He asked SOE about the possibility of using chariots to attack Tirpitz, which at that time was still at anchor off Åsenfjord, close to Trondheim. The original SOE plan involved sending a team and their equipment to a small island outside the fjord, and putting them on a local fishing boat. SOE sent a courier from Stockholm to put this request to the owner of a fishing boat which was thought suitable. This took time, but when the courier returned in early September, he reported that the owner had refused to consider their suggestion. Herluf Nygaard, the organiser of the SOE Lark station in Trondheim (not to be confused with the SIS Skylark B station, also in Trondheim), suggested sending a boat from the Shetlands instead, equipped with forged papers to get through the German security controls in the fjord. SOE was also given local advice that since a large number of commercial vessels and fishing boats which took cargo into Trondheim were not based in the port, there was a 75 per cent chance that their boat would get past the controls and gain access into Trondheimfjord. It was eventually determined to use Arthur, which Leif Larsen had stolen when Nordsjøen had sunk in heavy seas in October 1941, and then sailed back to Scotland. Larsen volunteered to lead the operation.

  Leif Larsen (centre, wearing a cap) on board the Arthur in Scalloway. To his left are three of the most effective members of the Norwegian resistance: Bjørn Rørholt (then with SIS, in the white coat), Odd Sørli and Arthur Pevik (SOE). © Scalloway Museum

  The preparatory research done for TITLE was meticulous. SOE agents collected information about everything which might affect the effectiveness of the charioteers. They gathered details of topography, meteorology (daylight and darkness, winds, temperatures, snow and frost), oceanography and also hydrography. This was particularly important as water density can vary at different temperatures. That could affect buoyancy, and the ability of the chariots to remain submerged at a particular depth. They also collected information about the warships anchored there and the nature of the booms which were protecting them – which cannot have been easy to obtain.7

  There was still plenty of preparatory work to be done, to test the battery-driven chariots, to adapt Arthur to provide a hiding place for the six British seamen who were needed to carry out the attack (four chariot operators and two dressers to help them into their diving suits), to work out a suitable cargo to provide the pretext for their journey and to prepare all the false documentation needed to get them through the German controls. Nygaard, and Lark, provided much of the information and advice which was required. They also prepared plans to enable those involved to escape to Sweden afterwards. Peat was chosen as cargo for Arthur rather than fresh fish, as it would not be practical to arrange for supplies of fresh fish to be available daily. This would have been required if Tirpitz was not available in its berth and the attack had to be delayed. The problem with peat as an alternative was that it required a special permit from the supply commission, so that had to be arranged too. This meant that in all, seven different types of documentation had to be provided. Some of them were not available for copying, but fortunately on 23 September Svalen arrived in Shetland with most of those required, which provided suitable templates for the forgers. There were plenty of other last-minute problems also needing to be resolved. These required Odd Sørli, the original SOE contact in Trondheim, to coordinate most of the communications from Stockholm and then to fly back to Shetland to add to the final briefing of the Arthur crew and the briefing of the whole party about possible escape routes to Sweden. It was intended that the Norwegian crew and naval dressers should escape once the chariots had been launched. The attackers themselves were to try to get away and hide up and then escape, although it was accepted that the prospects of achieving this would be very small.

  There was one final last-minute change. Since the operation had originally been planned, Tirpitz had left Trondheim to attack PQ17. After this sortie was abandoned, it moved to Bogenfjord, near Narvik. Larsen was intending to sail there. However on 23 October, Tirpitz was reported to have left. It arrived in Trondheim the following day. So Larsen had barely twenty-four hours to change the arrangements he had made and come up with a new plan. The trip itself was not without incident. There were engine problems, with a cracked cylinder which needed local tools to repair. These were found on the island of Hitra. The charging motor for the chariot batteries broke, and it was decided that the batteries would have to be used as they were. There were also encounters with inquisitive and potentially talkative fishermen who asked the crew some searching questions. The chariots were put on deep towing wires and Arthur successfully negotiated the security control. This was quite rigorous, though the German officer did not ask to see all their papers. However, he gave Larsen an anxious moment when he looked at the signature on one of the forged documents and commented that he knew the German officer who had signed it, but had not realised that he was in Ålesund. Also, to Larsen’s relief, he did not inspect Arthur closely enough to notice the chariots, which were plainly visible in the clear water beyond the stern.†

  Once past this check, it seemed to Larsen and his crew that they were now through all the obstacles and ready to mount the attack. But the Trondheimfjord channel is wide and subject to the vagaries of the weather. Conditions deteriorated and shortly after they rounded a point, Arthur ran into two large waves which
cause the boat to rise on the crest and then sink sharply. They felt a bump as a chariot hit the propeller. One of the divers, Able Seaman Evans, went down and reported that both the towing cables had sheared at the point where they were attached to the chariots and that the chariots had sunk. So Larsen had no choice but to scuttle Arthur and escape. Unfortunately the unpredictable current later caught Arthur and she sank in shallows from which the Germans managed to salvage her. This unexpected misfortune meant that the party was unable to contact those who were standing by to help them to escape. The Norwegian crew and the British attack team split into two groups, with Norwegians in each, for the journey on foot to Sweden. This was not an easy passage, for the snow in places was three or four feet deep. There were also rivers to cross. One party called at a farm where the farmer’s wife was very unfriendly. It was later discovered that she had reported them to the police. Soon afterwards they were challenged by two policemen, who attempted to arrest them. There was an exchange of shots. Evans was wounded, but the others were able to escape. They all managed to make their way to Sweden and then eventually back to England. However, Evans was harshly interrogated by the Germans and, together with the remaining survivors of the FRESHMAN operation, was shot at Trandum a couple of months later in January 1943.8

  The new Admiral Submarines, Claud Barry, asked SOE to send a message to Lark thanking them ‘for the most admirable work done on our behalf by all your people in Trondheim, at grave risk to themselves’. With a view to the next operation which was being planned, he added ‘the fact that they are willing to continue to play their part should another occasion arise, is first rate and shows the fine spirit of the Norwegians’.9 Larsen was awarded the Conspicuous Gallantry Medal for his part in TITLE, a medal which at that time was only given to naval ratings. He was told that this was the first time that it had been given to a non-British recipient.