Delphi Complete Works of Dio Chrysostom

by Dio Chrysostom

  The Third Discourse on Kingship

  When Socrates, who, as you also know by tradition, lived many years ago, was passing his old age in poverty at Athens, he was asked by someone whether he considered the Persian king a happy man, and replied, “Perhaps so”; but he added that he did not really know, since he had never met him and had no knowledge of his character, implying, no doubt, that a man’s happiness is not determined by any external possessions, such as gold plate, cities or lands, for example, or other human beings, but in each case by his own self and his own character.

  [2] ὁ μὲν οὖν Σωκράτης, ὅτι ἐτύγχανεν ἄπειρος ὢν τοῦ Πέρσου τῆς ψυχῆς, ἄπειρος ἡγεῖτο εἶναι καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας αὐτοῦ. ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ γενναῖε αὐτοκράτορ, παραγέγονά σοι, καὶ τυχὸν οὐδενὸς ἧττονἔμπειρός εἰμι τῆς σῆς φύσεως, ὅτι τυγχάνεις χαίρων ἀληθείᾳ καὶ παρρησίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ θωπείᾳ καὶ ἀπάτῃ.

  [2] Now Socrates thought that because he did not know the Persian king’s inner life, he did not know his state of happiness either. I, however, most noble Prince, have been in your company and am perhaps as well acquainted with your character as anyone, and know that you delight in truth and frankness rather than in flattery and guile.

  [3] αὐτίκα τὰς μὲν ἀλόγους ἡδονὰς ὑποπτεύεις, καθάπερ ἀνθρώπους κόλακας, τοὺς δὲ πόνους ὑπομένεις, ἐλέγχους ὑπολαμβάνων εἶναι τῆς ἀρετῆς. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁρῶ σε, αὐτοκράτορ, ἐντυγχάνοντα τοῖς παλαιοῖς ἀνδράσι καὶσυνιέντα φρονίμων καὶ ἀκριβῶν λόγων, φημὶ δὴ σαφῶς ἄνδρα εἶναι μακάριον, τὸν μεγίστην μὲν ἔχοντα δύναμιν μετὰ τοὺς θεούς, κάλλιστα δὲ τῷ δύνασθαι χρώμενον.

  [3] To begin with, you suspect irrational pleasures just as you do flattering men, and you endure hardship because you believe that it puts virtue to the test. And when I see you, O Prince, perusing the works of the ancients and comprehending their wise and close reasoning, I maintain that you are clearly a blessed man in that you wield a power second only to that of the gods and nevertheless use that power most nobly.

  [4] ᾧ γὰρ ἐξὸν ἁπάντων μὲν ἀπολαύειν τῶν ἡδέων, μηδενὸς δὲ πειρᾶσθαι τῶν ἐπιπόνων, ῥᾳθυμοῦντα δὲ ὡς οἷόν τε βιοτεύειν, συνελόντι δὲ εἰπεῖν, πράττοντα ὅ,τι βούλεται,οὐ μόνον κωλύοντος οὐδενὸς ὅ,τι βούλεται ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπαινούντων ἁπάντων, οὗτος ὁ ἀνήρ,

  [4] For the man who may taste of everything that is sweet and avoid everything that is bitter, who may pass his life in the utmost ease, who, in a word, may follow his own sweet will, not only without let or hindrance but with the approval of all —

  [5] ὅταν ᾖ νομιμώτερος μὲν δικαστὴς τῶν κατὰ κλῆρον δικαζόντων, ἐπιεικέστερος δὲ βασιλεὺς τῶν ὑπευθύνων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀρχόντων, δικαιότερος δὲ στρατηγὸς τῶν ἑπομένων στρατιωτῶν, φιλοπονώτερος δὲ ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς ἔργοις τῶνὑπ᾽ ἀνάγκης πονούντων, ἔλαττον δὲ βουλόμενος τρυφᾶν τῶν μηδεμιᾶς εὐπορούντων τρυφῆς, εὐνούστερος δὲ τοῖς ὑπηκόοις τῶν φιλοτέκνων [p. 35] πατέρων, φοβερώτερος δὲ τοῖς πολεμίοις τῶν ἀνικήτων καὶ ἀμάχων θεῶν, πῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴποι τις τοῦδε τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸν δαίμονα, οἰκ αὐτῷ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασι;

  [5] when that man, I say, is at once a judge more observant of the law than an empanelled jury, a king of greater equity than the responsible magistrates in our cities, a general more courageous than the soldiers in the ranks, a man more assiduous in all his tasks than those who are forced to work, less covetous of luxury than those who have no means to indulge in luxury, kindlier to his subjects than a loving father to his children, more dreaded by his enemies than are the invincible and irresistible gods — how can one deny that such a man’s fortune is a blessing, not to himself alone, but to all others as well?

  [6] τῶν μὲν γὰρ πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἰδιωτῶν μικράν τινα ἀρχὴν ἐχόντων ὀλίγος ὁ δαίμων καὶ μόνου τοῦ ἔχοντος: ὅτου δ᾽ ἄν παμπληθεῖς μὲν ὑπακούωσι πόλεις, πάμπολλα δὲ ἔθνη κυβερνᾶται διὰ τῆς ἐκείνου γνώμης, ἀνήριθμα δὲ φῦλα ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἄμικτα ἀλλήλοις ἀποβλέπῃ πρὸς τὴν φρόνησιν, πάντων οὗτος ἀνθρώπων γίγνεται σωτὴρ καὶ φύλαξ, ἄνπερ ᾖ τοιοῦτος. τοῦ γὰρ πάντων ἄρχοντος καὶ κρατοῦντος ἡ μὲν φρόνησις ἱκανὴ καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας ὠφελεὶν: βουλεύεται γὰρ ὁμοίως ὑπὲρ πάντων.

  [6] For in the case of the generality of men, those either in private station or holding some petty office, the individual’s personal fortune is of slight account and concerns himself alone; but let untold cities yield obedience to a man, let countless nations be governed by his judgment, let tribes of men unnumbered and hostile to one another look to his prudence alone, and that man becomes the saviour and protector of men everywhere — that is, if such be his type.

  [7] ἡ δὲ σωφροσύνη καὶ τοὺς ἀκολαστοτέρους σωφρονεστέρους ποιεῖ: ἐφορᾷ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἅπαντας. ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τοῖς ἀδίκοις αὑτῆς μεταδίδωσιν, ἡ δὲ ἀνδρεία καὶ τοὺς ἧττον εὐψύχους οὐ μόνον σῴζειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ θαρραλεωτέρους ποιεῖν δύναται.

  [7] For when a man governs and holds sway over all mankind, his prudence avails to help even the imprudent, since he takes thought for all alike; his temperance serves to restrain even the intemperate, since his eye is over all alike; his justice gives of itself even to the unjust; and his courage is able, not only to save the less valiant, but even to fire them with greater courage.

  [8] οὔτε γὰρ δειλὸς οὕτως ἄγαν οὐδεὶς ὥστε μὴ θαρρεῖν ἑπόμενος μεθ᾽ οὗ νικᾶν ἕτοιμον, οὔτε ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἀνειμένος ὥστε ῥᾳθυμεῖν παραταττόμενον ὁρῶν ᾧ μόνῳ τὸ προστάττειν ἔνειμεν ὁ θεός, οὐδ᾽ αὖ σφόδρα οὕτως ἀναίσχυντος ὥστε περὶ ἑτέρου πονεῖν ἀναγκαῖον, τούτῳ δὲ μὴ συμπονεῖν ἐθέλειν.

  [8] For no one is such a coward as not to feel reassured when he follows a general with whom victory is certain, nor so exceeding indifferent as to sit at ease when he sees submitting to take orders that man to whom God has apportioned the right to give orders only, nor, again, so completely lost to a sense of shame that he can watch a man toiling in behalf of another although under no necessity to toil — and yet refuse him aid.

  [9] δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ Ὅμηρος αὐτὸ τοῦτο φράζειν: μνησθεὶς γὰρ τοῦ χρηστοῦ βασιλέως ἐπὶ πᾶσιν εἴρηκεν,

  ἀρετῶσι δὲ λαοὶ ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ.

  ὁ γὰρ τοιοῦτος βασιλεὺς τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις καλὸν κτῆμα τὴν ἀρετὴν νενόμικ
εν, αὑτῷ δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον.

  [9] This, it seems to me, is exactly Homer’s view as well; for, after speaking of the ideal king, he concludes by saying,

  “And virtuous the people beneath him.”

  Such a king considers virtue a fair possession for others but an absolute necessity for himself.

  [10] τίνι μὲν γὰρ δεῖ πλείονος φρονήσεως ἢ τῷ βουλευομένῳ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων; τίνι δὲ ἀκριβεστέρας δικαιοσύνης ἢ τῷ μείζονι τῶν νόμων; τίνι δὲ σωφροσύνης ἐγκρατεστέρας ἢ ὅτῳ πάντα ἔξεστι; τίνι δὲ ἀνδρείας ἰσχυροτέρας ἢ ὑφ᾽ [p. 36]

  [10] Who, in fact, must exercise greater wisdom than he who is concerned with the weightiest matters; who, a keener sense of justice than he who is above the law; who, a more rigorous self-control than he to whom all things are permissible; who, a stouter courage than he upon the safety of everything depends?

  [11] οὗ πάντα σῴζεται; τίνα δὲ μᾶλλον εὐφραίνει τὰ ἔργα τῆς ἀρετῆς ἢ τὸν σύμπαντας ἀνθρώπους θεατὰς καὶ μάρτυρας ἔχοντα τῆς αὑτοῦ ψυχῆς; ὥστε μήποτε πράξαντι μηδὲν οἷόν τε λαθεῖν, οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ ἡλίῳ πορεύεσθαι διὰ σκότους: πάντα γὰρ τἄλλα ἀναφαίνων πρῶτον ἑαυτὸν ἐπιδείκνυσι.

  [11] And who takes greater delight in the works of virtue than he who has all men as spectators and witnesses of his own soul? — so that nothing he may do can ever be hidden any more than the sun can run its course in darkness; for, in bringing all other things to light, it reveals itself first.

  [12] λέγω δὲ ταῦτα οὐκ ἀγνοῶν ὅτι τὰ ῥηθέντα νῦν ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ ἐν πλείονι χρόνῳ ἀνάγκη λέγεσθαι: ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι δέος μήποτε ἐγὼ φανῶ τι κολακείᾳ λέγων. οὐ

  [12] These things I say in the full knowledge that my present statements will have to be repeated at greater length; and yet there is no danger of my appearing to speak aught in flattery, since I have given no slight nor fleeting evidence of my sincerity.

  [13] γὰρ ὀλίγην οὐδὲ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ δέδωκα βάσανον τῆς ἐλευθερίας. εἰ δὲ ἐγὼ πρότερον μέν, ὅτε πᾶσιν ἀναγκαῖον ἐδόκει ψεύδεσθαι διὰφόβον, μόνος ἀληθεύειν ἐτόλμων, καὶ ταῦτα κινδυνεύων ὑπὲρ τῆς ψυχῆς, νῦν δέ, ὅτε πᾶσιν ἔξεστι τἀληθῆ λέγειν, ψεύδομαι, μηδενὸς κινδύνου παρεστῶτος, οὐκ ἂν εἰδείην οὔτε παρρησίας οὔτε κολακείας καιρόν.

  [13] If, in bygone days when fear made everyone think falsehood a necessity, I was the only one bold enough to tell the truth even at the peril of my life, and yet am lying now when all may speak the truth without incurring danger — then I could not possibly know the time for either frankness or flattery.

  [14] καίτοι σύμπαντες οἱ πράττοντες ὁτιοῦν ἑκόντες ἢ χρημάτων ἕνεκα πράττουσιν ἢ δόξης ἢ δι᾽ ἡδονήν τινα ἄλλην ἢ

  [14] Again, all who act deliberately do so either for money, for reputation, or for some pleasurable end, or else, I suppose, for virtue’s sake and because they honour goodness itself.

  [15] λοιπὸν οἶμαι δι᾽ ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ καλὸν αὐτὸ τιμῶντες. ἐγὼ δὲ χρήματα μὲν λαβεῖν παρ᾽ οὐδενὸς πώποτε ἠξίωσα, πολλῶν δοῦναι βουλομένων, τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ δὲ ὀλίγων ὑπαρχόντων οὐ μόνον μεταδιδοὺς ἑτέροις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ῥίπτων φανήσομαι πολλάκις.

  [15] But I could never bring myself to accept money from anyone, although many are willing to give it. Nay, little as I had, you will find that I not only shared it with others, but actually squandered it many a time.

  [16] ἡδονὴν δὲ ποίαν ἐθηρώμην, ὁπότε καὶ τῶν κολάκων οἱ φανερῶς πεποιημένοιτέχνην ταύτην ὁμολογοῦσιν ἁπάντων ἀηδέστερον τὸ κολακεύειν; πῶς γὰρ ἡδύ, ἵν᾽ ἄλλον ἀδίκως ἐπαινῇ τις, αὐτὸν δικαίως ψέγεσθαι;

  [16] And what sort of pleasure was I seeking, when even those flatterers who openly follow the business acknowledge that to play the flatterer is of all things most distasteful? For what pleasure is there in praising someone else undeservedly merely to be deservedly blamed one’s self?

  [17] καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἔνδοξον οὐδὲ καλὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ κολακεύειν, ἵνα τιμῆς ἕνεκεν ἢ δι᾽ ἀρετήν τις τοῦτο ἐπιτηδεύῃ. πασῶν γάρ, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τῶν κακιῶν αἰσχίστην τις ἂν εὕροι τὴν κολακείαν.

  [17] Furthermore, flattery seems neither reputable nor honourable even when practised to gain distinction, or from some other worthy motive. Nay, of all vices, I may say, flattery will be found to be the meanest.

  [18] πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ δικαιότατον διαφθείρει, τὸν ἔπαινον, ὥστε μηκέτι δοκεῖν πιστὸν μηδὲ ἀληθῶς γιγνόμενον, καὶ τό γε πάντων δεινότατον, τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἔπαθλα τῇ κακίᾳ δίδωσιν. ὥστε πολὺ χεῖρον δρῶσι τῶν διαφθειρόντων τὸ νόμισμα: οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὕποπτον ποιοῦσι τὸ νόμισμα, οἱ δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἄπιστον.[p. 37]

  [18] In the first place, it debases a thing most beautiful and just, even praise, so that it no longer appears honest or sincere, and — what is most outrageous — it gives to vice the prizes of virtue. Flatterers, therefore, do much more harm than those who debase the coinage: for whereas the latter cause us to suspect the coinage, the former destroy our belief in virtue.

  [19] ἔπειτα δὲ οἶμαι ἀεί ποτε μὲν ὁ πονηρὸς ἀνόητος λέγεται καὶ ἔστιν ὄντως, τῷ δὲ ἄφρονι πάντας ὑπερβέβληκεν ὁ κόλαξ. μόνος γὰρ τῶν ἀφανιζόντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν πρὸς ἐκείνους θαρρεῖ τὰ ψευδῆ λέγειν τοὺς μάλιστα εἰδότας ὅτι ψεύδεται. τίς γὰρ ἄπειρός ἐστι τῶν ἑαυτοῦ πραγμάτων; ἢ τίς ἠλίθιος οὕτως ὅστις οὐκ οἶδεν πότερον πόνοις ἢ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ χαίρει καὶ πότερον ἥδεται πλέον ἔχων ἢ τὰ δίκαια πράττων καὶ πότερον ἡδονῶν ἥττων ἐστὶν ἢ τῶν καλῶν πράξεων ἐραστής;

  [19] Then again, as I see the matter, we always call the bad man a fool, and so he really is; but for downright folly the flatterer outdoes all, since he is the only perverter of the truth who had the hardihood to tell his lies to the very persons who know best that he is lying. For who does not know his own business? or who is so stupid as not to know whether work or idleness brings him joy, whether he finds pleasure in over-reaching another or in acting justly, and whether he is the slave of pleasure or a lover of noble deeds?

  [20] καὶ τοίνυν ὃ μάλιστα οἴεται, χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς ἐπαινουμένοις, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ τούτου καὶ μάλιστα ἀποτυγχάνειν: τοὐναντίον γὰρ ἀπεχθάνεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς μὴ τελέως κούφοις.

  [20] And, further, it seems to me that the flatter
er fails worst just where he is most confident that he is succeeding — namely, in pleasing those whom he praises. Nay, he is odious rather than pleasing to them unless they be utter fools.

  [21] αὐτίκα ὁ τὸν πένητα μακαρίζων ὡς πλούσιον αὐτὸς μὲν ψεύδεται, τῷ δὲ μακαριζομένῳ τὴν πενίαν ὀνειδίζει. πάλιν ὁ τὸν αἴσχιστον ὡς καλὸν ἐπαινῶν ἄλλο τι ἢ προφέρει τὸ αἶσχος αὐτῷ; ἢ ὁ τὸν ἀνάπηρον ὁλόκληρον εἶναι λέγων πῶς ἂν χαρίζοιτο ὑπομιμνήσκων τῆς ἀτυχίας; ὁ δὲ αὖ τὸν ἀνόητον ὡς φρόνιμον ὑμνῶν, οὗτος ἂν τυχὸν ἁπάντων εἴη πιθανώτερος διὰ τὴν ἄνοιαν τοῦ ἀκούοντος καὶ τοσούτῳ γε μείζονα ἐργάζεται βλάβην: ἀναπείθει γὰρ ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ μὴ τοῖς φρονίμοις ἐπιτρέπειν.

  [21] For example, he who congratulates a poor man on his wealth not only lies himself, but holds up to scorn the poverty of the man he congratulates. Again, does not he who praises a most ugly person for his beauty simply cast his ugliness in his teeth? Or how could he who calls a cripple able-bodied please him by reminding him of his misfortune? — The man, however, who lauds the fool for his wisdom is perhaps the most convincing of all on account of the stupidity of his hearer and thus does all the greater harm, since he induces the fellow to take his own counsel and not trust to intelligent men.

  [22] ὁ μὲν γὰρ τὸν δειλὸν ὡς ἀνδρεῖον θαυμάζων, οὗτος δικαιότατα χρῆται τῇ ἀνοίᾳ τοῦ κολακευομένου: τάχιστα γὰρ ὂν οἶμαι ἀπόλοιτο πειθόμενος αὐτῷ καὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας τὰ ἔργα ἐπιχειρῶν.