Delphi Complete Works of Dio Chrysostom

by Dio Chrysostom

  Then the pupil raises the question as to whether any guiding spirit can be bad, since all are divine; and Dio admits that he has merely been accepting the popular belief, not following his own, in assuming that some guiding spirits are good and others bad. He really believes with the philosophers that all guiding spirits are good. If a man listens to his good and wise guiding spirit, he gets at one and the same time both happiness and wisdom; if he does not, he is both unhappy and a fool. Therefore, only the wise man is happy.

  [1] Δ. Πότερον δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἄνθρωπος εὐδαίμων, εἰ δὲ μή, γεγονέναι ἢ ἔσεσθαι, ἢ ἀδύνατον ἡγῇ τὸ τοιοῦτον περὶ ἀνθρώπου, ὥσπερ εἴ τις ἀθάνατον ἄνθρωπον λέγοι εἶναι; ἴσως γὰρ ἂν τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχοις δόξαν Ὁμήρῳ καὶ ἄλλοις συχνοῖς τῶν ποιητῶν. — Καὶ ποῦ ἀποφαίνεται περὶ τούτου Ὅμηρος; — Δ. Ὅπου πεποίηκε τὸν Δία λέγοντα αὐτόν, οὐκ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν θεῶν, ὡς οὐδέν φησιν ὀιζυρότερον εἶναι ἀνδρὸς ἁπάντων τῶν ζῴων, ὅσσα τε γαῖαν ἔπι πνείει τε καὶ ἕρπει. οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τὴν ὀϊζὺν ἄντικρυς κακοδαιμονίαν τινὰ λέγειν; —

  The Twenty-third Discourse: That the Wise Man is Fortunate and Happy

  Dio. Do you believe man is happy, and if not, that he has been or will be; or do you hold that such a thing as this is impossible to predicate of man, just as if a person were to say that man is immortal? For it is, perhaps, possible that you hold the same view as Homer and a good many others of our poets.

  Interlocutor. And where does Homer express this view on this question?

  Dio. Where he has represented Zeus himself, and not some other one of the gods, as saying that none of all living creatures is more miserable than man,

  Of all that breathe and move upon the earth.

  Do you not think that by misery he means expressly some great unhappiness?

  Int. I do.

  [2] Ἔμοιγε. — Δ. Έτερος δὲ ποιητὴς οὐκ ἰδίᾳ οὕτως, ἀλλὰ κοινῇ πρὸς θέατρον ἀγωνιζόμενος εἰσηγεῖται, τὸν φύντα θρηνεῖν εἰς ὅς᾿ ἔρχεται κακά, τὸν δ̓ αὖ θανόντα καὶ πόνων πεπαυμένον [p. 274] χαίροντας καὶ συνηδομένους οἴεται δεῖν ἐκπέμπειν. — Ἔστι ταῦτα. — Δ. Οὔκουν ὀρθῶς παρῄνεσεν. εἰ γὰρ ἅπαξ δεῖ κλαίειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους διὰ τὴν ἀτυχίαν, καὶ γενομένους προσήκει θρηνεῖν τῶν ἐσομένων αὐτοῖς κακῶν ἕνεκεν, καὶ τελευτήσαντας, ὅτι πολλὰ καὶ

  [2] Dio. And another poet, not speaking of any particular man, but expressing a general sentiment to the audience in a contest of tragedies, proposes that we should

  That man bewail who’s born and all life’s ills confronts,

  But him who’s dead and free from all his toils

  he thinks we should “with joy and gladness speed from out the house.”

  Int. That is so.

  Dio. Well, that was not sound advice he gave; for if we ought to weep once for mankind because of their misfortune, then it is fitting that we should both bewail their lot when they are born, because of all the evils that are in store for them, and when they die, because they have had experience of many terrible sufferings, and likewise while they live, because they are in the midst of evils.

  [3] δεινὰ πεπόνθασι, καὶ ζῶντας, ὅτι εἰσὶν ἐν κακοῖς. ὥστε ὥρα ἂν εἴη κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν μηδέποτε παύσασθαι ὀδυρομένους πολὺ μᾶλλον τῶν ἀηδόνων. ἐκεῖναι μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἦρος λέγονται θρηνεῖν τὸν Ἴτυν: τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους εἰκὸς ἦν θρηνεῖν καὶ θέρους καὶ χειμῶνος. πόσῳ δὲ βέλτιον τοὺς γενομένους ἐᾶν εὐθὺς ἀπολέσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλὰ μὴ σπαργάνοις ἐνειλοῦντας καὶ λούοντας καὶ τιθηνουμένους τοσαύτην ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι ὅπως ἄθλιοι ἔσονται: ἐχθρῶν γάρ, οὐ φίλων οὐδὲ κηδομένων τὸ τοιοῦτο: καὶ

  [3] Consequently there would never be a fitting time, according to the poet, for men to cease lamenting — much more truly than for the nightingales. For while those creatures are said to mourn for Itys in the springtime only — yet in the case of human beings it stands to reason that they should mourn both summer and winter. But how much better it would be to let them perish at once of their ills as soon as they are born, instead of wrapping them up in swaddling clothes and bathing them and nursing them and giving them so much care, simply in order that they may be wretched — for such solicitude would befit enemies, not friends or those who care for them — or, better still, to remove their own selves from life in the first place!

  [4] νὴ Δία αὑτοὺς πρώτους ἀπαλλάττειν τοῦ βίου; κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ κατὰ τὸν λόγον τοῦτον μόνοι φρόνιμοι γενέσθαι οἱ γενόμενοι ἐν Κόλχοις ἐκ τῶν τοῦ δράκοντος ὀδόντων, οὓς ἔσπειρεν Ἰάσων. οὗτοι γάρ, ὅτε πρῶτον ᾔσθοντο γεγονότες, εὐθὺς ἀλλήλους ἀνῄρουν, ἕως οὐδένα ἔλιπον, βοηθοῦντες ἀλλήλοις δῆλον ὅτι καὶ διὰ φιλίαν

  [4] For it is very likely, according to this line of reasoning, that the only sensible people to be born were those born in Colchis from the dragon’s teeth which Jason sowed. For these people, just as soon as they understood that they were born, forthwith proceeded to make away with one another until they left not one, helping one another, evidently, and doing this through friendship, not through hatred.

  [5] τοῦτο πράττοντες, οὐ δἰ ἔχθραν. — Ἀλλὰ οὗτός γε ὁ ποιητὴς ληρεῖν ἔμοιγε φαίνεται. τὸ δὲ τοῦ Ὁμήρου ταράττει με, ὅτι οὕτω σοφὸς ὢν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ταύτην ἀπεφήνατο τὴν γνώμην. — Δ. Καὶ τί ἄτοπον εἴρηκεν; οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἅπαντες οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἄθλιοί εἰσί φησιν, ἀλλ̓ ὅτι οὐθέν ἐστι ζῷον ἀνθρώπου ἀθλιώτερον τοῦ γε ἀθλίου, ὥσπερ ἀμέλει καὶ ἡμεῖς φαῖμεν ἄν. ἴσως γάρ τοι καὶ μόνος τῶν ἄλλων ὁ ἄνθρωπος κακοδαίμων ἐστίν, ὥσπερ καὶ εὐδαίμων: ἐπεί τοι καὶ μόνος ἄφρων, ὥσπερ καὶ φρόνιμος. οὔτε γὰρ ἄδικος οὔτε ἀκόλαστος εἴη ἂν ἵππος ἢ σῦς ἢ λέων, ὥσπερ

  [5] Int. Well, for my part, I think that what this poet says is nonsense. But Homer’s statement disturbs me because, wise though he was, he expressed that view about mankind.

  Dio. And what absurdity is there in it? He does not say that all men without exception are wretched, but that there is no creature more wretched than man when he is wretched, just as we too undoubtedly should say; for, mark you, man is perhaps the only unfortunate creature of them all, just as he is the only fortunate one; for, you see, man alone is said to be ‘senseless,’ just as man alone is said to be ‘sensible.’ It is clear that a horse cannot be either unjust or dissolute, nor can a pig or a lion, just as it cannot be uncultured or illiterate.

  [6] οὐδὲ ἄμουσος οὐδὲ ἀγράμματος. — Ἀλλὰ καλῶς μοι δοκεῖς διωρθῶσθαι τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου καὶ ἀποκρίνο
μαι ὅτι ἡγοῦμαι ἄνθρωπον εὐδαίμονα εἶναι. — Δ. Ἆῤ οὗ ὁ δαίμων ἀγαθός ἐστι, τοῦτον εὐδαίμονα [p. 275] εἶναι φῄς, οὗ δὲ μοχθηρός, κακοδαίμονα; — Ἔγωγε. — Δ. Δαίμονα δὲ ἄλλως ἀγαθὸν λέγεις; — Ἢ πῶς γε; — Δ. Ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπον, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον θεόν; ἢ τοὺς θεούς, εἴπερ νομίζεις ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι, οὐ δικαίους νομίζεις καὶ φρονίμους καὶ σώφρονας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς ἔχοντας, ἀλλὰ ἀδίκους καὶ ἀνοήτους καὶ ἀκολάστους; — Οὐδαμῶς ἔγωγε. — Δ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ δαίμονα, εἴπερ τινὰ ἀγαθὸν ἡγῇ, δῆλον ὡς δίκαιον ἡγῇ καὶ χρήσιμον καὶ φρόνιμον; — Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; — Δ. Ἦ γὰρ ὃν κακόν τινα νομίζεις, πονηρὸν οἴει τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι καὶ ἄδικον καὶ ἀνόητον; — Ἀνάγκη πάντως.

  [6] Int. Well, I think you have made an excellent correction of Homer’s statement, and I reply that I believe man is fortunate.

  Dio. Then when a man’s fortune or guardian spirit is good, you maintain that the man is fortunate, but when it is bad, that he is unfortunate, do you?

  Int. I do.

  Dio. And do you speak of a guardian spirit as good in a different sense?

  Int. What do you mean?

  Dio. In the sense in which a man is good and, still more, a god; or if you do think that the gods are good, do you think that they are not just and sensible and self-controlled and in possession of all the other virtues, but unjust and senseless and intemperate?

  Int. I certainly do not.

  Dio. Then in the case of a guardian spirit also, if you really consider any to be good, is it not clear that you consider it just and useful and sensible?

  Int. Why, of course.

  Dio. Pray, when you think that any person is bad, do you believe that he is at the same time evil and unjust and senseless?

  Int. Most assuredly so.

  [7] — Δ. Τί δαί; οὐ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστον κατὰ τὸν αὑτοῦ δαίμονα βιοῦν, ὁποῖος ἂν ᾖ ποτε, ἀλλὰ καθ̓ ἕτερον; — Οὐδαμῶς καθ̓ ἕτερον. — Δ. Οὐκοῦν τὸν τυχόντα ἀγαθοῦ δαίμονος ἡγῇ δικαίως ζῆν καὶ φρονίμως καὶ σωφρόνως; τοιοῦτον γὰρ ὁμολογεῖς εἶναι τὸν δαίμονα αὐτοῦ. — Πάνυ γε. — Δ. Τὸν δὲ μοχθηροῦ δαίμονος πονηρῶς καὶ ἀφρόνως καὶ ἀνοήτως καὶ ἀκολάστως; — Φαίνεται ταῦτα συμβαίνειν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων νῦν. — Δ. Ἆρα ὅστις ἄνθρωπος νοῦν ἔχων ἐστὶ καὶ δίκαιος καὶ σώφρων, οὗτος εὐδαίμων ἐστὶν ἀγαθῷ δαίμονι συνών: ὅστις δὲ ἀσελγὴς καὶ ἄφρων καὶ πανοῦργος, ἀνάγκη κακοδαίμονα φάσκειν ἐκεῖνον κακῷ δαίμονι

  [7] Dio. Well, then, do you not think that each man lives under the direction of his own guiding spirit, of whatever character it may be, and is not directed by a different one?

  Int. Certainly not directed by that of a different one.

  Dio. Then do you believe that the man to whom Fortune has given a good guardian spirit lives justly and prudently and temperately? For this is the character that you agree his spirit has.

  Int. Certainly.

  Dio. And that the man to whom Fortune has given the bad guardian spirit lives wickedly and senselessly and foolishly and intemperately?

  Int. That appears to follow from what we have just said.

  Dio. Then when a man is in possession of intelligence and is just and temper, is this man fortunate because he is attended by a good spirit; but when a man is dissolute and foolish and wicked, must we maintain that he is unfortunate because he is yoked to a bad spirit and serves it?

  Int. True.

  [8] συνεζευγμένον καὶ λατρεύοντα; — Ἀληθές. — Δ. Σοφὸν δὲ ἄλλον τινα καλεῖς ἢ τὸν φρόνιμον ἄνθρωπον καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον καὶ ἀνδρεῖον, φαῦλον δὲ τὸν ἄδικον καὶ ἀνόσιον καὶ δειλόν; — Φημί. — Δ. Μὴ τοίνυν ἔτι θαύμαζε τῶν λεγόντων, ὅτι μόνον καὶ πάντα φασὶ τὸν σοφὸν εὐδαίμονα εἶναι, τῶν δὲ φαύλων οὐδένα ὅντινα

  [8] Dio. And do you describe as wise anyone except the man who is sensible and just and holy and brave, and as a fool him who is unjust and unholy and cowardly?

  Int. I do.

  Dio. Then you should no longer be surprised when people say that they hold the wise man alone and without exception to be fortunate or happy, whereas of fools there is none that is not unfortunate or unhappy; you should agree to this inasmuch as you also seem to hold that view.

  [9] οὐ κακοδαίμονα: ἐπειδή γε καὶ σοὶ ταῦτα δοκεῖ. — Τὰ μὲν ἄλλα δοκεῖς μοι οὐ παρὰ δόξαν διειλέχθαι: ὅπως δὲ χρὴ δαιμόνιόν τι πονηρὸν ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ἄδικον καὶ ἀνόητον οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν. ἄλλως τε οὐ πρὸς ὑμῶν τῶν φιλοσόφων ἐστίν, εἴπερ θεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον ἡγεῖσθε, τοιοῦτον ὑπολαμβάνειν. — Δ. Ἀλλ̓ ἐγὼ νῦν οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ δόξαν διείλεγμαι τὰ πολλά, πλήν γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὅτι μοι δοκεῖ πᾶς καὶ μόνος εὐδαίμων ὁ σοφός: τὰ δὲ ἄλλα κατὰ τὴν τῶν

  [9] Int. What you have said so far I think has been quite reasonable; but how are we to consider any spirit to be wicked and unjust and senseless, I am unable to say; and besides, it is not like you philosophers, if you really hold that the guiding spirit is divine, to assume any such thing.

  Dio. Well, just now I have not been expressing my own view for the most part except in this one matter — that I believe every wise man is fortunate and happy and he alone; but in everything else I have accepted the views of the majority of men, that I may not seem to be forcing my own views on them.

  [10] πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅπως μὴ δοκῶ βιάζεσθαι αὐτούς. ἐπεὶ φέρε, [p. 276] εἰ οὐχ ἡγεῖσθε τὸ δαιμόνιον θεῖον καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ μηδενὶ κακοῦ μηδενὸς αἴτιον, πῶς φατε γίγνεσθαι κακοδαίμονα ἄνθρωπον; ἢ ὅταν μὴ προσέχωσι μηδὲ πείθωνται τῷ δαιμονίῳ ἀγαθῷ ὄντι; ὥσπερ εἰ νομίζοιμεν τοὺς ἰατροὺς ἅπαντας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι τὰ τῆς τέχνης καὶ μηδένα αὐτῶν πονηρὸν ἰατρὸν μηδὲ βλαβερόν, τῶν δὲ καμνόντων κακῶς τινας πράττοντας βλέποιμεν καὶ βλαπτομένους ἐν ταῖς νόσοις, δῆλον ὅτι τούτους ἂν φαῖμεν μὴ ἐθέλειν τὰ προσταττόμενα ποιεῖν, τοὺς δὲ πειθομένους ἀνάγκη καλῶς ἀπαλλάττειν: καὶ τί ἂν γίγνεσθαι οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμεν. — Οὕτως ἔχει. —

  [10] For just consider: If you really believe that the guiding spirit is divine and good and the author of no evil to anyone, how do you explain a man’s becoming unfortunate, that is, unhappy? Or does that happen when he does not heed or obey his guiding spirit, this being good? It is just as if we should think that all physicians are good in the matters of their profession and that none of them is a bad physician or harmful, but yet should see some of their pati
ents doing poorly and suffering harm in their illnesses; evidently we should say that they refuse to obey orders and that such patients as do obey cannot but come through well; and nothing that should happen to them would surprise anyone.

  Int. That is right.

  [11] Δ. Πότερον οὖν δοκοῦσί σοι οἱ ἐγκρατεῖς εἶναι καὶ σώφρονες καὶ νοῦν ἔχοντες, οὗτοι ἀπειθεῖν ἂν τοῖς ἰατροῖς τοῖς ἐμπείροις καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα προστάττουσιν, ἢ τοὐναντίον οἱ ἀνόητοι καὶ ἀκόλαστοι; — Δῆλον ὅτι οἱ ἀκόλαστοι. — Δ. Τί δέ; τῷ δαίμονι χρηστῷ ὄντι πείθεσθαι καὶ ζῆν κατ̓ ἐκεῖνον πότερον ἡγῇ τῶν σωφρόνων εἶναι καὶ νοῦν ἐχόντων ἢ τῶν πονηρῶν καὶ ἀνοήτων; —

  [11] Dio. Do you think, therefore, that the really self-controlled and sober and sensible patients are those who would disobey their physicians when these are skilled and prescribe the treatment that is good for them, or, on the contrary, the senseless and uncontrolled?

  Int. Evidently the uncontrolled.

  Dio. Then again, do you hold that to obey the guardian spirit when it is good, and to live in conformity with its direction, is a mark of those who are temperate and sensible or of those who are wicked and senseless?

  Int. Of those who are temperate.

  [12] Τῶν σωφρόνων. — Δ. Τὸ δέ γε μὴ πείθεσθαι μηδὲ προσέχειν ἀλλ̓ ἐναντίως τῷ θείῳ τε καὶ δαιμονίῳ πράττειν, τῶν κακῶν καὶ ἀγνωμόνων; — Πῶς δ̓ ἂν ἄλλως λέγοιμεν; — Δ. Εἶναι δὲ τοὺς πειθομένους τῷ δαιμονίῳ τοιούτῳ ὄντι εὐδαίμονας, τοὺς δὲ ἀπειθοῦντας κακοδαίμονας; — Ἀνάγκη. — Δ. Οὐκοῦν κἀνταῦθα συμβαίνει τὸν μὲν σοφὸν καὶ φρόνιμον εὐδαίμονα εἶναι πάντα, τὸν δὲ φαῦλον κακοδαίμονα, οὐχ ὡς τοῦ δαιμονίου κακοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλ̓ ὡς αὐτὸν οὐ προσέχοντα ἐκείνῳ χρηστῷ ὄντι.