Park Chung Hee Era
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74. Interview, Francisco S. Tatad, former Information Minister (under President Marcos), August 22, 1989. In Weber’s words, “the ruler’s personal discretion delimits the jurisdiction of his officials.” Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 1029.
75. Raul V. Fabella, “Trade and Industry Reforms in the Philippines: Process and Performance,” in Philippine Macroeconomic Perspective: Developments and Policies, ed. Manuel F. Montes and Hideyoshi Sakai (Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 1989), 197; Weber, Economy and Society, 1098 (see also p. 1028).
76. Marcos’s modest land reform was similarly counteracted by the regime’s rampant land grabbing, and modest bank reforms were counteracted by the bank grabbing of Marcos and his cronies. See Hutchcroft, Booty Capitalism, 140–
142.
77. Davide Commission Report, 52; McCoy, Closer than Brothers, quote at 207.
Notes to Pages 565–568
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78. Wurfel, Filipino Politics, 159, 266. Wurfel writes that unofficial estimates of the size of the Moro National Liberation Front reached as high as 60,000
fighters.
79. Byeongil Rho, “State Capability and Third World Politics: A Comparative Analysis of South Korean and Philippine Cases” (Ph.D. diss., State University of New York at Albany, 1992), 331. I am grateful to Rigoberto Tiglao for pointing me to this analysis.
80. McCoy, Closer than Brothers, 193, 205–206 (quote at 205). Rho reports that in 1976 there were roughly 120 political prisoners in Korea, while in 1977
there were some 4,700 political prisoners in the Philippines. Between 1972
and 1977, there were 10 deaths from domestic political conflict in Korea and 3,588 deaths in the Philippines. Rho, “State Capability and Third World Politics,” 332–333, quote at 333.
81. Tiglao, “The Consolidation of the Dictatorship,” 53.
82. See Chapters 4, 7, 9, 10, and 11, above; Tiglao, “The Consolidation of the Dictatorship,” 49, citing economist Bernardo Villegas of the Center for Research and Communications. The term “debt-driven growth” comes from Manuel F. Montes, “Financing Development: The ‘Democratic’ versus the
‘Corporatist’ Approach in the Philippines,” in The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy, ed. Miguel Urrutia, Shinichi Ichimura, and Setsuko Yukawa (Tokyo: United Nations University, 1990), 90.
83. See Chapter 7.
84. Ferdinand E. Marcos, The Democratic Revolution in the Philippines (Engle-wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall International, 1979 [1974]), 6.
85. De Dios, “Philippine Policy-Making,” 114. “Crony” is used to describe those whose positions are particularly favored by the current regime, regardless of their origins. An “oligarch” may not be a current crony but in either case has already established his or her fortune in earlier dispensations. Under the Marcos regime, both “old oligarchs” and “new men” gained “crony” status, and they were referred to collectively as the “new oligarchy.” According to the regime’s chief ideologue, the impulse for crony capitalism was present from the start, but Marcos knew he had to take “measured steps” and wait for further opportunities to present themselves. Interview, Adrian Cristobal, June 19, 1989.
86. Manuel F. Montes, “Philippine Structural Adjustments, 1970–1987,” in Philippine Macroeconomic Perspective: Developments and Policies, ed. Montes and Sakai, 45–90, at 71–73; World Bank, “Philippines Staff Appraisal Report on the Industrial Finance Project,” Report no. 3331-PH (Washington, DC, 1981), 1; Emmanuel S. de Dios, “The Erosion of the Dictatorship,” in Javate-de Dios et al., Dictatorship and Revolution, 119–120; and de Dios, “Philippine Policy-Making,” quote at 116.
87. Hutchcroft, “Oligarchs and Cronies,” 429–430; Wurfel, Filipino Politics, 200; Woo, Race to the Swift, 88, 133–170, quotes at 163, 169; Joel Rocamora,
“Japanese Capital in the Philippines: Exploiting to Develop,” Southeast Asia Chronicle, no. 88 (1983): 10–13, at 11–12; Mamoru Tsuda, A Preliminary
Notes to Pages 568–572
725
Study of Japanese-Filipino Joint Ventures (Quezon City: Foundation for Nationalist Studies, 1978), 34–35 (see also p. ii of Renato Constantino’s fore-word to the book); and Hutchcroft, Booty Capitalism, 188. On the origins of the term “crony capitalism,” see Benjamin Trinidad Tolosa, Jr., “Calling to Account: Good Governance, Global Financial Regularization and the Symbolic Labor of Securities Research” (Ph.D. diss., University of Minnesota, 2001), 6.
88. In-Sub Mah, “Emergency Powers,” 2.
89. Sunhyuk Kim, The Politics of Democratization in Korea, 51–55.
90. Sunhyuk Kim, The Politics of Democratization in Korea, 61–62; Chang Hun Oh, “Dynamics of an Authoritarian Regime,” 78, 298, 302.
91. Thompson, Anti-Marcos Struggle, 61. Throughout this study, Thompson provides a fascinating account of the complex linkages among the various oppositions to martial law: traditional politicians, communists, and Muslims.
92. De Dios, “Erosion,” 70–71, 74 (quotes at 71, 74); Thompson, Anti-Marcos Struggle, 74–80.
93. See Kathleen Weekley, The Communist Party of the Philippines: 1968–1993: A Story of Its Theory and Practice (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 2001), 111–114.
94. On the adjustment of the CPP to new conditions, see Rocamora , Breaking Through, 15–18, and Tiglao, “The Consolidation of the Dictatorship,” 63–
66. On relations between the CPP and the “caciques,” see Patricio N.
Abinales, Images of State Power: Essays on Philippine Politics from the Margins (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1998), 137–165.
95. De Dios, “Erosion,” 128–130; Rocamora, Breaking Through, 21–27; Tiglao,
“The Consolidation of the Dictatorship,” 58–66.
96. Mark R. Thompson, “Off the Endangered List: Philippine Democratization in Comparative Perspective,” Comparative Politics 28, no. 2 (1996): 179–205
(quote at 180).
97. Interview, Aniceto Sobrapeña, Cabinet Secretary in the administration of Corazon Aquino, 1987–1992, July 24, 2000.
98. This counterfactual fantasy sets aside, for the sake of simplicity, questions about whether a fierce nationalist like Park would likely have emerged from a Philippine military that had little concern about external threats and competition, and little if any animosity toward the former colonial power, or whether someone like Marcos would rise to the top of the Korean political system. It is perhaps somewhat easier to imagine a self-aggrandizing politico like Marcos arising from the ranks of Korean congresspersons, but by the end the 1950s—
after Rhee’s success at centralizing the political system—it seems unlikely that such a politician could have had the same sort of independence and strong local base that Marcos enjoyed as he ascended to higher office.
99. The complementary nature of structure and agency in the two cases could at least in part be attributed to the way in which Park and Marcos were shaped by the contexts from which they emerged. It must quickly be emphasized, however, that a range of different individuals can arise from precisely the same
Notes to Pages 573–581
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context. One can imagine highly divergent outcomes, for example, if Fidel Ramos rather than his second cousin Ferdinand Marcos wielded the powers of martial law in the Philippines after 1972.
20. The Perfect Dictatorship? South Korea versus Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico
This chapter is part of a project focused on the Park Chung Hee regime in South Korea led by Professors Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra Vogel. It draws on the works of South Korean authors for this project as the basic source of information about the Park regime. Thus I am greatly in debt to all colleagues in this project for their research, insights, and generosity. Earlier versions were presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, held in Boston, Mass., in 2001, and at the Harvard Government Department Comparative Politics Works
hop on 5 October 2005. I am especially grateful to Hillel Soifer for his comments. All mistakes are mine alone.
1. The classic theoretical and comparative analysis is Juan J. Linz, “Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes,” in Handbook of Political Science: Macropoliti-cal Theory (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975).
2. See David Mares, Violent Peace: Militarized Interstate Bargaining in Latin America (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).
3. Jorge I. Domínguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba’s Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), chap. 5.
4. See Meredith Woo-Cumings, ed., The Developmental State (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999) and Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
5. My task is to assess how authoritarian regimes can be politically effective. I do not endorse such regimes and hope none reappears.
6. S. N. Eisenstadt, The Political Systems of Empires (New York: Free Press, 1963).
7. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 244–245.
8. See Chapter 1 above. On the relatively low level of resistance, see also Chapter 13 above. On organized labor, see Ho Keun Song, “State and Labor under the Park Chung Hee Regime.” This paper was prepared for the project that gave rise to this book.
9. See Chapter 6 above.
10. Guillermo O’Donnell, Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Argentina, 1966–1973, in Comparative Perspective (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 39–40.
11. William C. Smith, Authoritarianism and the Crisis of the Argentine Political Economy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 230–231.
12. David Pion-Berlin, The Ideology of State Terror: Economic Doctrine and Political Repression in Argentina and Peru (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989), and Smith, Authoritarianism, 231.
Notes to Pages 582–589
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13. Thomas Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930–1964: An Experiment in Democracy (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 294–313.
14. Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela, Chile under Pinochet: A Nation of Enemies (New York: Norton, 1991), chaps. 1–4, and pp. 297, 310–11; Arturo Valenzuela, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 55 and passim.
15. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Michael Oakeshott (New York: Collier, 1962), 100, 132.
16. Robert E. Scott, Mexican Government in Transition, rev. ed. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), 115–125; Enrique Krauze, Mexico: Biography of Power, trans. Hank Heifetz (New York: Harper Collins, 1997), 426–435.
17. See Chapter 7 above.
18. O’Donnell, Bureaucratic Authoritarianism, 104, 108, 113.
19. Guillermo A. Calvo, “Fractured Liberalism: Argentina under Martínez de Hoz,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 34, no. 3 (April 1986): 511–529.
20. Edmar L. Bacha, “Issues and Evidence on Recent Brazilian Economic Growth,” World Development 5, nos. 1–2 (1977): 47–64; Albert Fishlow,
“Some Reflections on Post-1964 Brazilian Economic Policy,” in Authoritarian Brazil, ed. Alfred Stepan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973).
21. Sebastian Edwards, “Stabilization with Liberalization: An Evaluation of Ten Years of Chile’s Experiment with Free-Market Policies, 1973–1983,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 33 (1985): 223–254.
22. Regarding the successful growth model, see Daniel Levy and Gabriel Székely, Mexico: Paradoxes of Stability and Change, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview, 1987), chap. 5.
23. For a comparison between the Argentina 1966 and Brazil cases with the Chile and Argentina 1976 cases, see Hector Schamis, “Reconceptualizing Latin American Authoritarianism in the 1970s: From Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism to Neoconservatism,” Comparative Politics 23 (1991): 201–220. See also David Collier, ed., The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979) for discussion of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. On Mexico, see Roderic Ai Camp, Entrepreneurs and the State in Twentieth Century México (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) and Dale Story, Industry, the State, and Public Policy in Mexico (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986). For state protection for national manufacturers in Brazil and Mexico to the end of the 1970s, with weaker instances in Argentina and Chile, see Jorge I. Domínguez, “Business Nationalism,” in Economic Issues and Political Conflict: U.S. –Latin American Relations (London: Butter-worth, 1982).
24. Frances Hagopian, Traditional Politics and Regime Change in Brazil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 184–185.
25. Scott Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 94–
98.
26. See Hoon Jaung, “The Abortive Experiment of Party Politics: The Failure of
Notes to Pages 589–595
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the Democratic Republican Party.” This paper was prepared for the project that gave rise to this book.
27. See Kim Soo Jin, “A Study of Opposition Parties in the Park Chung Hee Era.”
This paper was prepared for the project that gave rise to this book.
28. Luciano Martins, “The ‘Liberalization’ of Authoritarian Rule in Brazil,” in Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America, ed. Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 83–86.
29. Bolívar Lamounier, “Authoritarian Brazil Revisited: The Impact of Elections on the Abertura, ” in Democratizing Brazil, ed. Alfred Stepan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 70.
30. See Chapters 5, 6, 8, and 13 above.
31. Huntington’s Political Order, published in 1968, scored Mexico and South Korea as comparably successful authoritarian regimes (see p. 261), which at the time they indeed were.
32. For comparative data on torture and political imprisonment, see Jorge I.
Domínguez, Nigel Rodley, Bryce Wood, and Richard Falk, Enhancing Global Human Rights (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 93–102.
33. Kevin J. Middlebrook, The Paradox of Revolution: Labor, the State, and Authoritarianism in Mexico (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 29–30.
34. On Brazilian state corporatism, see Philippe Schmitter, Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971).
35. Margaret Keck, “The New Unionism in the Brazilian Transition,” in Democratizing Brazil, ed. Alfred Stepan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
36. Smith, Authoritarianism and the Crisis of the Argentine Political Economy, 231, 263–265, and chap. 6.
37. Manuel Barrera and J. Samuel Valenzuela, “The Development of Labor Movement Opposition to the Military Regime,” in Military Rule in Chile: Dictatorship and Oppositions, ed. J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).
38. See Ho Keun Song, “State and Labor under the Park Chung Hee Regime.”
This paper was prepared for the project that gave rise to this book.
39. Wayne A. Cornelius, Mexican Politics in Transition: The Breakdown of a One-Party-Dominant Regime, Monograph Series no. 41 (La Jolla: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California-San Diego, 1996), 89–98; Roderic Ai Camp, Politics in Mexico: The Decline of Authoritarianism, 3d ed.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), chaps. 3 and 8.
40. Camp, Politics in Mexico, chap. 6; Cornelius, Mexican Politics in Transition, 51–56.
41. Ian Roxborough, “Inflation and Social Pacts in Brazil and Mexico,” Journal of Latin American Studies 24 (October 1992): 639–664.
42. O’Donnell, Bureaucratic Authoritarianism, 51–61; Pion-Berlin, The Ideology of State Terror, 97–101; Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 304, 314; Constable and Valenzuela, Chile under Pinochet, 62–63.
; 43. Linz, “Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes,” 267.
44. Constable and Valenzuela, Chile under Pinochet, 161–162.
Notes to Pages 596–604
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45. Carlos Acuña, “Business Interests, Dictatorship, and Democracy in Argentina,” and Blanca Heredia, “Mexican Business and the State,” both in Business and Democracy in Latin America, ed. Ernest Bartell and Leigh Payne (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995).
46. Leigh A. Payne, Brazilian Industrialists and Democratic Change (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).
47. See Chapters 4, 12, and 13 above. Also see Seung-mi Han, “The New Community Movement (Sama¤l Undong) and the Formation of State Populism: An Analysis of the Ethos of Development Project in Korea.” This paper was prepared for the project that gave rise to this book.
48. See Chapters 7, 9, 10, and 11 above. See also Mah In-Sub, “Rule by Emergency Powers.” This paper was prepared for the project that gave rise to this book.
49. Naciones Unidas, Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe, Balance preliminar de las economías de América Latina y el Caribe (Santiago, Chile: Naciones Unidas, 2001), 86.
50. Quotation from Jorge Chabat, “Mexico’s Foreign Policy in 1990: Electoral Sovereignty and Integration with the United States,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 33, no. 4 (Winter 1991): 12.
21. Industrial Policy in Key Developmental Sectors: South Korea versus Japan and Taiwan
1. Hyug Baeg Im, “The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in South Korea,”
World Politics 39, no. 2 (January 1987), 231–257; see also Chapter 8 above.
2. Chalmers Johnson, “Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Government-Business Relationship in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan,” and Bruce Cumings, “The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy: Industrial Sectors, Product Cycles, and Political Consequences,”