Stalin's Nemesis

by Michael James Melnyk

  b) It is vital that we maintain and keep together the remaining valuable blood that has been brought together by its hatred of Bolshevism.

  c) The Division, in its composition and in particular in the working relationship between the Germans and the Ukrainians, forms a firm blood-bonded basis for the future co-operation of both peoples.

  d) For the Germans to remain in the Ukrainian Division, they must show chivalry towards the Ukrainians who are in the main respectable, and who despite severe setbacks have stood with greatest loyalty by the side of the German Reich right into the very last phase of the battle.

  e) Following the philosophy of the Wehrwolf remains foolish, as no military or other conditions prevail that would justify this kind of freedom movement. External support for this movement is not present. A Wehrwolf movement under the given assumptions can only result in a cost to the civilian population, that will lead those in question into the fold of the partisans. He who wishes to leave the Division excludes himself from the community. There can however only be a communal fate from which no one is able to exclude themselves.

  f) It should also be noted that 1 million Ukrainians currently reside in America and 600,000 in Canada.

  g) The German personal would keep, as would the whole Div., the same uniforms until further notice, should the Div. be transferred to the anti- Bolshevik battle front.

  2.) The German personnel leaves prior to a transfer of the Div.

  This measure should also be prepared for. Most importantly officers must, as of now, be considered to replace the Germans immediately should they leave. The personnel thus released must immediately be placed under the command of the commander of the nearest German combat unit, if possible an SS unit.

  3.) In the case of an official capitulation by the German Reich, which can hardly be expected, the Division is to withdraw towards the Anglo-Americans. Thus all units would be ordered to go to assembly areas as far back as possible. Command would then only be conducted by radio and messengers.

  V. Immediate-measures

  1.) Philosophical instruction

  The concepts presented above must immediately be presented to the officer and NCO corps (German and Ukrainian), by the commanders. This is currently the most urgent measure and the highest priority task for the commanders. Nothing is to be kept secret, instead all possibilities and facts are to be clearly presented.

  It should be emphasised as forcefully as possible that the Germans of the Division are in no way deserting the Ukrainians, but intend to continue to stand by them in a joint future. The principle that should be expressed in all theoretical and practical measures, is that the unity of, and the links within the Division, will remain regardless of what the future may bring. The better the relationship between the Germans and the Ukrainians, the better and happier the future. The officer corps can be clearly informed of the fact that negotiations with the allied camp have commenced. It may be hinted at to the NCO corps in order to maintain combat morale. The requirement for the success of all measures that are currently in progress, is that the front be held. The men must also be made aware of the future in a suitable form.

  2.) How long the Division’s current battle is likely to last is impossible to predict; it may be short. All the more important then that we use the remaining days to reward the deserving officers, NCOs , and men. The Div. will therefore be very charitably disposed to nominations for promotion or decorations and will pass these on immediately. They will make an effort to consider all nominations as fully as possible. It is to made particular note of, that as of 8 days from now every type of nomination can, in view of the prevailing circumstances, be dealt with internally.

  3.) Special emphasis must be given to keeping order and discipline in the unit. The unit must remain firmly in the hands of its leaders.

  4.) The unit must quickly receive everything it can transport by itself, by depleting the stores of the quartermasters department. Firstly the Div. should immediately be equipped with as much transportable food as possible. Additionally the troops must be equipped with enough ammunition to be able to engage the enemy at any time. Additional supplies of ammunition and food can NOT BE EXPECTED. Emergency rations are to be issued to the troops immediately. If a man eats his rations immediately, then only he will suffer. Replacements cannot be issued. This must be made clear to the troops.

  Remaining bedding, clothing, and equipment are to be issued to the troops immediately. It is mindless, possibly even sabotage, to continue to horde valuable clothing and equipment in stores. Any officer who fails to put all his effort into equipping his troops as well as possible by emptying the stores, shall suffer summary justice. The troops must however only receive those things which they can genuinely take with them. Poor clothing is to be replaced immediately with the best available. The administrative officers must work with great flexibility and speed. The troop officers must, as appropriate, put the necessary pressure on their administrative officers. It must be particularly stressed that the transport of stores will no longer be possible. Seizure of goods or plundering by other parts of the Div. must be relied upon.

  5.) Future command will depend mainly on the use of radio for information. Radio communication readiness is to be checked from Div. level right down to company level. The mobility of the communication centres is of particular importance. In addition communications duties are to be assigned to the best NCOs and men. They are to be mounted to a large extent, to increase mobility. Bulk loads of fuel for loading onto transporters, are to be requested from the appropriate departments and stored.

  6.) All vehicles must be loaded and ready. This also applies to the convoy section of the Division supply section (Nachschub). The process of clearing out is to continue with renewed emphasis. Any nonessential equipment must be handed over to make room for food and ammunition. Div. Abt. Ib must put itself in a position where it is able to receive the equipment from all over the unit at short notice.

  7.) Div. Abt. V must immediately test the remaining bulk supplies of fuel for range (i.e. miles per gallon/fuel value). For all still authorised vehicles, 3 V.S. must be with the unit.

  8.) Files, are as far as is possible to be cleared out and destroyed. War diaries are to no longer to be kept and are to be cancelled. [ NOTE: legibility of original document in this section is very poor] … Divisional staff papers are to be destroyed.

  9.) A.u.E.Rgt. must quickly take over the Division’s supplies in the Unterdrauburg and Mahrenburg region, and hide them for the Div. Apart from this all stores of the quartermasters department that lie well in the rear are to be dissolved and transferred to the A.u.E.Rgt in the vicinity of the fighting troops. Maximum haste and speed is demanded of all section heads of the quartermasters department.

  10.) The Commanders are to transfer, via lists, those German soldiers, who for special reasons are strongly opposed to the Ukrainians, to the Feld Ers. Btl. Soldiers who hate or are hated by the Ukrainians can not be kept. The Feld.Ers.Btl as a pure German unit is not envisaged to take part in the actions of the battalion, but will have a different mission. Individual members of the Stab F.E.B. may yet be included in the Division.

  11.) Emphasis should be placed on the establishment of full mobility for all sections of the Division.

  († note: part of this figure quoted on the original document is illegible, however the figure of 3,600 is known to be correct.)

  Subsequent to the issuing of the order, the commanders of all sub-units were gathered together and given a resumé of its contents and the possibilities outlined therein. At the end of the meeting Oberst Bisanz spoke calling upon all commanders to conscientiously fulfil their duties as soldiers at this difficult time.65

  General Shandruk, Wächter and Arlt returned to Völkermarkt, on 29 April while Dr Wächter and Dr Arlt left to contact General Shkuro with the intention of discussing the prospect of amalgamating the Cossacks under his command with the 1 Ukrainian Division for joint action.66 The next day General Shandruk oversaw t
he swearing in of the Reserve Regiment and on 1 May undertook an inspection of the Division’s hospital.67

  The first days of May 1945, were quiet in the Feldbach/Gleichenberg sector, except for local actions by enemy patrols and an intensification of artillery fire. As commander of 6 Army General Balck summoned SS-Brigadeführer Freitag and Major Heike, along with all the other commanders, higher adjutants and Chiefs of Staff, to his HQ where he expressed his conviction in a positive outcome of the approaching events. During the conference he gave a very confident but somewhat unrealistic evaluation of potential future developments and stressed that available supplies of munitions and fuel in the depots near the front would be adequate to repel the enemy advance. He also gave orders for all units to increase the use of reconnaissance groups that were to conduct raids deep behind the enemy lines, collect intelligence and destroy military installations. In his memoirs, Heike states General Balck’s optimistic assessment was for some ‘difficult to believe and received with considerable scepticism’.68

  Activity in the frontal sectors was limited allowing rotation between units in the front and the rear to continue as Waffen-Grenadier Volodymyr Keczun 4./I./WGR 29 wrote:

  […] The main Red Army headquarters in our sector was in a village in a valley which was out of reach for our mortars. Even our howitzers could not reach it. Sometimes we could hear a shell from our artillery flying over but because of the shortage of ammunition they had to restrain themselves. At the end of April 1945, we received orders, that on the morrow at noon, we must report at headquarters, leave our mortars with transport and in the evening of that day march to relieve Kozak’s 3 company entrenched to the left of Schloss Gleichenberg. They had not had any respite from fighting since we arrived on the front.

  Two soldiers from WGR 29 in bunker positions Austria April 1945. On the right is Stephan Mayer.

  Gleichenberg April 1945. From left Roman Hankevych, Smuk, Jaroslav Rudy, not known, Stefan Mayer, Solodky, not known, Waffen-Untersturmführer Wolodymyr Motyka.

  A post war picture of Schloss Gleichenberg scene of heavy fighting involving WGR 29.

  Lischynsky and the other ‘heroes’, decided that, just because we hadn’t spent our ammunition because of restrictions, it didn’t mean that we had to carry it back to headquarters. Why not use it on the Red Army and leave them a farewell present? Ziemba had found where our frontline curved nearest to the village where the enemy were and estimated that we just might reach it.[…] We dismantled the mortar. Each of us knew which part to carry. I carried the Enfernung Messer (measuring device).

  We set off in the morning while it was still dark and when we reached the ridge that protruded towards the village, we went right to the tip. We set up our mortar and waited for it to get lighter. Our frontline was behind us and in front of us were just a few night outposts that in the morning usually moved back to the frontline. As soon as we could see the village fairly clearly I measured the distance. Once the mortar was targeted myself and Ziemba held the mortar’s legs to steady it. Dacko put asbestos gloves on and fired several shells one after another. While we were dismantling the mortar post haste, Lischynsky observed the village through binoculars and told us that all the shells exploded on target. The mortar barrel was very hot so I could not carry it. We put it in its cradle and pulled it until we got to relative safety behind our lines.

  The Soviets soon fired a few shells but hardly any fell on the ridge that we used. They probably did not believe that we were so daft as to sneak so near to their positions. When we arrived back to our post we decided that as we had used all the shells that we had with us, there was no point in waiting till noon. We dismantled our tents and walked down the mountain to rejoin our company. We loaded our mortar onto a truck for safekeeping, took more ammunition for our rifles and MGs, took our daily ration and set off up the mountain again by a different path. Once we got to the front our field kitchen would be moved near our positions.

  Just before dusk we arrived behind the positions of Kozak’s company. They explained to us the set up—where the main front was and where the outposts were situated. When we looked from the top of the hill we noticed that it was sloping gently towards a valley, which we were told was no-man’s-land. Beyond the valley was a belt of forest and beyond that more hills. The enemy positions were along the verge of the forest. In the centre of no-man’s-land stood a lonely dilapidated house. We were warned to beware because there were snipers there. About 100 metres down the hill were the positions that we were going to take up from Kozak’s company. That was going to be our front line. Further down the slope, about 100 metres before valley started, were our outpost positions. On top of the hill to our left, were ruins of some houses and some trees and to the right of us there was a slightly elevated point. That was the observation nest for our artillery observer.

  In this sector of the front, once you had taken up your position you had to stay in it through the day. In some places you could move aside if there were some trenches, but not up or down the hill because of snipers. We had to go in turns for our meals and rations only during the night. The main front line was static. The MGs had two nests positioned about 20 metres apart, connected by shallow trenches so that after firing it could be moved to another position to confuse the Soviets.

  The worst duty was to be sent to an outpost. When it got dark and you got your ration you had to go carefully to your assigned foxhole which was a deep round hole in the ground in which you could stand, cover yourself with a camouflaged rain cape and observe. If somebody fired a flare, you had to drop to the ground and wait until it went out. The hole I was sent to had some ‘mod-cons’. Somebody had widened it at the back to make a shelf so you could sit down, which was dangerous, because you could easily fall asleep. If you wanted to smoke, you had to stoop down so nobody could see the light. We were on that frontline from 1 to 8 of May 1945.

  During that time I spent only two nights on outpost duty and I hated every second of it. Just imagine yourself being alone in a hole during a dark night. Your friends are over 200 metres behind you, other outposts are about 100 metres on either side of you and ruthless enemy in front of you. You strain your eyes and see nothing, but you can hear suspicious noises in front of you. Is it a Red Army man sneaking up on you? You recall that on that ridge near Gleichenberg castle two soldiers vanished from their outposts during one night. Were they taken by the enemy or did they desert? Then a flare goes up and you relax for a while, because all seems to be clear, but when the flare goes out you are even blinder than before. Sentry duty in the outpost only lasted about 4 hours each night and then you rejoined your friends while it was still dark.[…]69

  At this time rumours abounded and the prospects of an uncertain future were very much in evidence. Waffen-Oberscharführer Myron Pasij later commented: ‘The mood of the soldiers during the first week of May 1945, is hard to describe. There was nothing to look forward to except self-preservation and not to be captured by the Red Army’.70

  Aware of this, General Shandruk gave orders for the solemn observance of Easter 1945, which by the Julian calendar, began on Thursday 3 May.71 For the next four days the deeply religious Ukrainian soldiers held impromptu celebrations to commemorate the occasion, (as did the Ukrainians in the enemy positions), with both sides occasionally firing flares at night and singing the traditional Easter songs.72

  According to traditional Ukrainian custom, some units in reserve were able to prepare special meals served with Schnapps and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic chaplains said Holy Mass and provided spiritual guidance and support.73 Waffen-Untersturmführer Andrij Komorowsky later wrote:

  The soldiers tried to do what ever they could to arrange for the celebration of our holiday. For example they were able to hunt down a wild boar for the meal. The mood in the battalion (II./WGR 30) was one of excitement and anticipation of our festivities. Also the men were visited by General P. Shandruk who just by his very presence raised the soldiers’ sprits. And to further lighten the mo
od, the weather had been sunny for many days and there was an unusual calm at the front. The Easter celebration was a time of spiritual renewal for all of us permeating all our actives and relationships. Our celebrations as expressed in our Easter traditions were a dear reminder of our homes our families and our country.74

  Those in the front line however did not have this luxury as Waffen-Oberscharführer Myron Paslij remembered:

  On Saturday before Easter I went for the first time to the company command post to clarify a few things. Unshaven and dirty, I stepped in and there they were sitting and talking. What I saw angered me; a long table with a roasted piglet, bread and other things. Everything ready for the Easter celebration but not enough for the soldiers in the trenches. I did not say why I had come, the meat on the table was my focus. I stepped to the table cut a chunk of meat and left. Nobody said a word and nobody asked me what I came for.75

  Waffen-Obersturmführer Stefan Hulak commander of the 3 company Fusilier Battalion also recalled his Easter in the front line:

  The Fusilier Battalion was in position north of Schloss Gleichenberg. The 2 and 3 companies manned the line whilst the other two were in reserve. On the right was the 3 company that abutted the 29 Regiment. On the left was the 30 Regiment. The field before us was mined. The 3 platoon was nearest the Soviet line which was 150–200 m from us, and they talked to each other. The Soviets drew a large map and showed where the front lines in the east and west were running. Of course they tried to persuade us to desert.

  On Easter Thursday there was a general confession behind the lines conducted by Chaplain Korduba. The Greek-Catholics went to confession by platoon. There was no Orthodox Chaplain. There were preparations for the blessing of ‘paska’ bread, painted eggs, sausage and meat in baskets one per platoon. At midnight I ordered three minutes of fire mostly with signal cartridges, then silence and the song ‘Christ is Risen’. The blessing of ‘paska’ was held at the Battalion command post early in the morning.