Khrushchev's Cold War
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53. Memo, from the vice president’s military aide (Burris) to LBJ, “Khrushchev Moves toward Berlin Showdown,” September 18, 1962, FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. 15, p. 119. In late August Khrushchev told UN Secretary-General U Thant that he intended to involve the UN in his effort to get the United States to withdraw its forces from West Berlin. U Thant advised him to use the existing four-power framework, not the UN, to settle this issue.
54. Fursenko and Naftali, op. cit., p. 211; F. D. Reeve, Robert Frost in Russia (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964).
55. Stewart Udall, report on trip to Pitsunda (undated) Cuban Missile Crisis Collection, National Security Archive.
56. Memcon, NSK and Kroll, September 11, 1962, 0757, 7/33/2, MFA.
57. Memcon, NSK and Kroll, January 8, 1960, 0757, 7/33/2, MFA.
58. Cited in CIA memorandum, September 12, 1962, FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. 10, pp. 1055–56.
59. Memcon, NSK and Kroll, September 11, 1962, 0757, 7/33/2, MFA.
60. Memo from the vice president’s military aide (Burris) to LBJ, “Khrushchev Moves toward Berlin Showdown,” September 18, 1962, FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. 15, pp. 324–25.
61. CIA, Special National Intelligence Estimate, “Current Soviet Tactics on Berlin,” September 13, 1962, NSF Box 100, LBJ Library, Austin, Texas.
62. “Endkampf um Berlin in 4 Wochen,” Deutsche Soldaten Zeitung und National-Zeitung, September 28, 1962. The authors are grateful to David Coleman for finding this evidence of Kroll’s public campaign.
63. Protocol, October 14, 1962, AOK.
64. Memcon, Kosygin and Souphanouvong, September 28, 1962, 0570, 8/7/3, MFA.
65. Zakharov and Fokin to Defense Council, “(to show to NSK, only),” September 18, 1962, Volkogonov Collection, Library of Congress.
66. To the commander of the Soviet Forces in Cuba, September 8, 1962, ibid.
67. Zakharov to Kosygin, September 16, 1962, APRF.
68. Zakharov and Fokin to NSK, September 25, 1962, Volkogonov Collection, Library of Congress.
69. NSK to JFK, September 28, 1962, FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. 6, pp. 151–62.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. Dobrynin to NSK, October 9, 1962, Volkogonov Collection, Library of Congress.
73. Memcon, MFK and Couve de Murville, October 9, 1962, FRUS, vol. 15, pp. 351–55. The French record is in Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1962 (DDF) (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1999), vol. 2, pp. 283–86.
74. Khrushchev revealed the relationship between the test ban treaty and Berlin in a top secret Presidium discussion in 1963. See steno, April 17, 1963, AOK. On October 14, 1962, Khrushchev raised the need to prepare new language for a test ban treaty. Protocol 59, October 14, 1962, AOK.
CHAPTER 19: CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
1. Timothy Naftali and Philip Zelikow, eds., Presidential Recordings: John F. Kennedy, The Great Crises (New York: Norton, 2001), vol. 2, p. 413.
2. Ibid., pp. 512–72.
3. Ibid., pp. 464–66.
4. Chizhov to Center, October 22, 1962, GRU.
5. Summary (prepared 1994), GRU reports through October 22, 1962.
6. Chizhov to Center, October 22, 1962, GRU.
7. Notes, A. K. Serov, October 22, 1962, RGANI.
8. This reconstruction of the meetings of October 22 and October 23 is much fuller than that which we could present in 1997. Supplementing Malin’s notes are sections from Mikoyan’s unpublished memoirs. In 1999 a portion of Mikoyan’s memoirs was published in Russia as Tak Bylo (As It Was). The section of the memoir dealing with the Cuban missile crisis, however, was not published. It consists of a dictation made by Mikoyan on January 19, 1963, in the A. I. Mikoyan Archive of the State Archive of Social-Political History [hereafter RGASPI]. The other new source is the memorandum of record prepared by A. K. Serov, a Central Committee staffer who attended the meeting. His notes are on deposit at RGANI. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to protocol minutes refer to Malin’s notes.
9. Protocol 60, October 22, 1962, AOK.
10. Notes, A. K. Serov, October 22, 1962, RGANI.
11. Protocol 60, October 22, 1962, AOK.
12. Havana to Center, October 23, 1962, GRU.
13. The rules of engagement for the Lunas are listed in Ivanov’s military plans. See Dmitri Volkogonov Collection, Library of Congress.
14. Protocol 60, October 22, 1962, AOK.
15. Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali interview with Vladimir Semichastny, June 1994.
16. Protocol 60, October 22, 1962, AOK.
17. Notes A. K. Serov, October 22, 1962, RGANI.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Protocol 60, October 22, 1962, AOK.
21. Ibid. Notes, A. K. Serov, October 22, 1962, RGANI.
22. Protocol 60, October 22, 1962, AOK.
23. Ibid.
24. Notes, A. K. Serov, October 22, 1962, RGANI.
25. Protocol 60, October 22, 1962, AOK.
26. Mikoyan’s unpublished memoir, RGASPI.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Notes, A. K. Serov, October 22, 1962, RGANI.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Na Krayu Propasti [On the Brink] (Moscow: 1994), pp. 58, 73; Dmitri Volkogonov, Sem Vozhdei [Seven Leaders] (Moscow: Novosti, 1998), p. 423.
33. The cable was sent by KGB channels to Cuba, Folio 16, Inventory 3753, File 1, Box 3573, Historical Archive and Military Memorial Center of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AGSRF).
34. Protocol 60, October 22, 1962, AOK.
35. Notes, A. K. Serov, October 22, 1962, RGANI.
36. “Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba,” October 22, 1962, Public Papers of the Presidents: John F. Kennedy, 1962; Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President, January 1–December 31, 1962 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 807.
37. For convenience we are using the U.S. designations for the four Foxtrots as they were detected by the U.S. Navy. Shumkov’s C-18 was the first detected. C-19 was next, then C-20 (later renumbered as C-26), then C-23. The Soviet designation for C-18 was B-130. The other designations were B-4, B-36, and B-59, but the authors were unable to establish the correlation between these designations and the NATO designations. For documents on the U.S. antisubmarine warfare operations in the Cuban missile crisis, see the National Security Archives Submarine file.
38. The authors are grateful to William Burr and Thomas Blanton of the National Security Archives for sharing information on the locations of the Soviet submarines during the crisis.
39. Ernest May and Philip Zelikow, The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis, concise ed. (New York: Norton, 2001, 2002), p. 173.
40. Ibid.
41. “Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba,” October 22, 1962,” Public Papers of the Presidents: John F. Kennedy, 1962, loc. cit., p. 809.
42. Information to Timothy Naftali from the National Security Agency.
43. Interrogations of Oleg Penkovsky, Central Archive FSB.
44. Protocol 60 (continuation), October 23, 1962, AOK.
45. NSK to JFK, October 23, 1962, Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter FRUS], 1961–1963, vol. 6, p. 166.
46. Protocol 60 (continuation), October 23, 1962, AOK.
47. These ships were not ordered to turn around until October 25. See Protocol 61, October 25, 1962, AOK.
48. Protocol 60, October 22, 1962, AOK. This note begins on October 22, but internal evidence suggests that it includes the deliberations at the two meetings on October 23.
49. Serov treats the October 23 discussions as a continuation of Protocol 60 (the meeting of October 22).
50. Naftali interview with Second Captain (ret.) Vadim P. Orlov, Havana, Cuba, October 2002. During the crisis Orlov was an intelligence officer on Submarine B-59.
52. Ibid.
53. Transcript, interview with Nikolai Shumkov, BBC Scotland. The authors are grateful to Jacqui Hayeth and Ross Wilson for sharing to BBC Scotland Cuba Missile crisis interviews with them.
54. Transcript, interview with “Albert” Chebrasov, BBC Scotland.
55. Mikoyan was sure that the order had been sent. Not only in his memoir but later, in the contemporaneous account of the October 1964 meeting at which Khrushchev was dismissed, Mikoyan noted the importance of ending the submarine mission during the crisis. (Protocol 162, October 8, 1964, AOK.) However, U.S. records of the positions of the submarines and the recollections of the surviving Soviet commanders all dispute Mikoyan’s belief that this order was sent. Instead of a general order, the submarine captains were ordered one by one to return as they were surfaced by the U.S. Navy or as their batteries died. But these orders were sent after October 27, the climax of the crisis.
56. Deputy Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson discussed this message at a meeting of the Excomm on October 24. See Philip Zelikow and Ernest May, ed., Presidential Recordings: John F. Kennedy, The Great Crises (New York: Norton, 2001), vol. 3, p. 192.
57. Ibid., p. 184.
58. Ibid., p. 191.
59. Ibid., p. 193. For Robert Kennedy’s notes on the meeting, see Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Robert Kennedy and His Times (New York: Random House, 1978), p. 514.
60. Zelikow and May, eds., op. cit., vol. 3, p. 194.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid., p. 195.
63. Ibid., pp. 196–97.
64. Quoted in Robert Dallek, An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, 1917–1963 (Boston: Little, Brown, 2003), pp. 564–65.
65. NSK to JFK, October 24, 1962, FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. 6, p. 170.
66. Protocol 61, October 25, 1962, AOK.
67. Memcon, A. K. Serov, October 25, 1962, RGANI.
68. That quotation does not appear in the Serov memcon. It comes from Malin’s record of the meeting. See Protocol 61, October 25, 1962, AOK.
69. The Serov note was not available to us when we wrote “One Hell of a Gamble.” It shows that the decision to end the crisis through diplomatic means was made on the night of Wednesday, October 25. This suggests that the Scali and Feklisov discussion of the next day may well have been a peace feeler initiated by Khrushchev or someone close to him once the Presidium had set the new line. The similarity of the language of this decision and Feklisov’s language on October 26 seems too strong to be merely a matter of coincidence.
70. Indeed the KGB chief was not invited to any of the Presidium meetings during the crisis. Fursenko and Naftali interview with Semichastny, 1994.
71. Fursenko and Naftali interview with Aleksandr Feklisov, September 1994.
72. Naftali interview with John Scali, July 1994.
73. Kallistrat (Feklisov) to Center, October 26, 1962, File 116, vol. 1, pp. 1062–64, SVR.
74. “John Scali’s notes of first meeting with Soviet Embassy counselor and KGB officer Aleksandr Fomin, October 26, 1962,” Document 43, in Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh, eds., The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 (New York: New Press, 1992).
75. Markov to Serov, October 26, 1962, GRU; Kallistrat (Feklisov) to Center, October 25, 1962, File 116, vol. 1, p. 1034, SVR. Heffernan spoke to representatives of both the KGB and the GRU. Gam was a KGB source.
76. Murov (from Havana) to Serov, October 24, 1962, GRU.
77. NSK to JFK, October 26, 1962, FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. 6, pp. 176–77.
78. Ibid., p. 176.
79. Transcript, interview with Nikolai Shumkov, BBC Scotland.
80. Memcon, June 3, 1961, 3:00 P.M., FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. 5, p. 182.
81. Mikoyan told the Cubans that Lippmann’s column had been Khrushchev’s inspiration. Memcon, Mikoyan, November 4, 1962, APRF.
82. Protocol 63, October 27, 1962.
83. Dobrynin to MFA, October 27, 1962, MFA, p. 171. This document is the source of all the quotations from this meeting.
84. On October 26, the Soviet commander in Cuba had received permission to use force against an aerial attack but not against an isolated U-2 flight. See Fursenko and Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble”: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964 (New York: Norton, 1997), pp. 277–78.
85. Ibid., p. 272.
86. Protocol 64, October 28, 1962, AOK.
87. Protocol 60 (continuation), October 23, 1962, AOK.
88. Ulbricht to NSK, October 1962, APRF.
89. For the chronology of this day in Washington, see Fursenko and Naftali, op. cit., pp. 287–89; Zelikow and May, op. cit., vol. 3, pp. 512–25.
90. Steno, January 8, 1962, AOK.
CHAPTER 20: “LEAVING FEAR ASTERN”
1. JFK to NSK, October 27, 1962, Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter FRUS], 1961–1963, vol. 6, p. 182.
2. NSK to JFK, October 28, 1962, ibid., p. 184.
3. Alekseyev to Moscow, October 29, 1962, APRF.
4. Alekseyev to Moscow, October 31, 1962, APRF.
5. KGB (Havana) to Center, October 29, 1962, SVR. The KGB reported on Castro’s discussion with Cuban military leaders and the comments of the head of Cuban intelligence, Manuel Piñero. KGB (Havana) to Center, November 1, 1962, SVR. The KGB here reported on dissatisfaction with the Soviets in Cuba’s ministry of the interior and other ministries, and the Cuban armed forces.
6. NSK to JFK, October 27, 1962, FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. 6, p. 179.
7. NSK to JFK (undated), ibid., p. 200.
8. JFK to NSK, November 6, 1962, ibid., p. 201.
9. “China Press Sees K as Weak Man,” Washington Post and Times Herald, October 31, 1962.
10. Robert Trumbull, “Peking Criticizes Russians on Cuba; Party Warns Soviet Must Back It in India Dispute,” New York Times, November 1, 1962.
11. “Castro Defended in Crisis,” New York Times, November 3, 1962. Seymour Topping, “Red-Bloc Conflict Seen on Cuba and War in India,” New York Times, November 2, 1962.
12. The demonstrations were large, though it is difficult to determine how large. The British news agency Reuters reported tens of thousands marching on November 3, whereas the official Chinese count was three hundred thousand. “Chou Reaffirms Support of Cuba; Gives Impetus to Anti-US Drive in Peking Speech,” New York Times, November 4, 1962. “Chinese Marchers Back Cuba” (Reuters), New York Times, November 4, 1962. “Peking Condemns ‘Appeasing’ of US; Red Paper Pledges Support of Castro’s Defiant Stand,” New York Times, November 6, 1962; John Roderick, “Chinese Liken Soviet Action on Cuba to Munich Appeasement,” Washington Post, November 6, 1962.
13. Roderick, “Chinese Liken Soviet Action on Cuba to Munich Appeasement,” loc. cit.
14. Adam Kellet-Long, “Soviet Envoy’s Praise of Khrushchev Meets Silence at Peking Celebration,” Washington Post and Times Herald, November 7, 1962.
15. “Soviet Policy on Cuba Is Attacked by Albania,” Washington Post and Times Herald, November 8, 1962.
16. Memcon, November 4, 1962, Cold War International History Project [hereafter CWIHP] Bulletin, no. 5 (Spring 1995).
17. Mikoyan to NSK, November 6, 1962, Folio 3, List 65, File 908, p. 184, APRF.
18. Protocol 65, Presidium Meeting of November 15, 1962, Folio 3, List 65, File 911, APRF.
19. Ibid.
20. Protocol 58, October 11, 1962, AOK, Protocol 59, October 14, 1962, AOK.
21. Ibid.
22. “MiG Deal with India Appears Off; Russian Official Supports Peking in Border Clash,” Washington Post and Times Herald, October 30, 1962.
23. A. M. Rosenthal, “India’s Hope for Support by Soviet All but Ended; Khrushchev Letter to Nehru Speaks of Friendship, but Says Moscow Will Continue Backing Red China,” New York Times, November 4, 1962.
24. Seymour Topping, “Soviet Indicates a Return to Neutrality on India,” New York Times, November 6, 1962.
25. “Nehru Says Soviet Jets Will Arriv
e; MiGs are expected Next Month Despite Conflict with China,” Washington Post and Times Herald, November 1, 1962; “India Says Soviet Union Will Honor Oil Commitment,” New York Times, November 14, 1962; “Soviet Again Promises MiGs,” New York Times, November 19, 1962.
26. Moscow to secretary of state, November 13, 1962, 9:00 P.M. (Section 1 of 2), NSF, JFK Library.
27. Sir Frank Roberts to Lord Home, November 19, 1962, Prem 11/3996, 83827, National Archive—UK.
28. Cable, Dobrynin to Moscow, November 1, 1962, APRF.
29. Cable, KGB (Washington) to the Center, October 31, 1962, Delo 90238, vol. 1, SVR. The KGB quoted three congressional staffers.
30. Thomas J. Hamilton, “Cuba Bars Return of Soviet Planes,” New York Times, November 9, 1962.
31. Excomm meeting, November 14, 1962, 5:45 to 6:02 P.M., unpublished draft transcript by David G. Coleman, The authors are grateful to David Coleman for the use of this transcript.
32. NSK to Mikoyan, extract from Protocol 65, November 10, 1962, 3-65-909, 44–45, APRF.
33. NSK to JFK (undated), FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. 6, p. 207.
34. NSK to Mikoyan, extract from Protocol 65, November 10, 1962, 3-65-909, pp. 44–45, APRF.
35. Editorial note, FRUS, vol. 6, p. 209.
36. NSK to JFK, November 14, 1962, ibid., p. 211.
37. NSK to Mikoyan extract from Protocol 65, November 13, 1962, 3-65-909, APRF.
38. KGB (New York) to the Center, December 15, 1962, Delo 90238, SVR, “Copies to Khrushchev, Kozlov, Gromyko, Malinovsky.”
39. President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings, tape 60, JFK Library.
40. Protocol 66, November 16, 1962, AOK.
41. David Coleman, “The Missiles of November, December, January, February: The Tactical Missiles in Cuba,” unpublished manuscript.
42. Roberts to London, November 12, 1962, National Archive—UK.
43. Protocol 68, November 21, 1962, AOK.
44. Memcon (by Edward S. Glenn), Kennedy and Mikoyan, November 29, 1962, FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. 11, pp. 545–62.
45. Memcon (by Y. Vinogradov and I. Bubnov), Mikoyan and Kennedy, November 29, 1962, APRF.
46. Ibid. Memcon (by Edward S. Glenn), Kennedy and Mikoyan, November 29, 1962, FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. 11, pp. 545–62.
47. Protocol 71, December 3, 1962, AOK.