Khrushchev's Cold War
Page 87
48. There is no memorandum of conversation in U.S. archives regarding the October 30 discussion, and none has yet been found in Russian archives. Regarding U.S. efforts to figure out what Dean might have said, because he was not under instructions to offer three inspections, see Editorial note, FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. 7, pp. 623–25.
49. Steno, April 25, 1963, AOK.
50. Norman Cousins, The Improbable Triumvirate: John F. Kennedy, Pope John, Nikita Khrushchev (New York: Norton, 1972), pp. 32–33.
51. Ibid., p. 46.
52. Ibid., p. 57.
53. This last series, which took place at the northern test site in Novaya Zemlya, lasted from December 18 to 25, 1962.
54. Steno, April 25, 1963, AOK.
55. Ibid.
56. John F. Kennedy, Third Annual Message, January 14, 1963, The State of the Union Messages of the Presidents, 1790–1966, vol. 111, 1905–1966, ed. Fred L. Israel (New York: Chelsea House, Robert Hector, 1966), pp. 3144–54.
57. Ibid.
58. Transcript, meeting, 4:05–4:55 P.M., November 16, 1962. The authors are grateful to David Coleman for sharing this draft transcript, which he worked on as primary transcriber. The transcript will appear in its final form in volume 4 of the Miller Center’s Presidential Recordings Series, John F. Kennedy. The “Munich” reference is to the 1938 Munich meeting at which the French and British acquiesced in allowing Nazi Germany to swallow the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia.
59. CIA, Current Intelligence Weekly Review, January 18, 1963, FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. 5, p. 609.
60. Telegram, Moscow to DOS, 6:00 P.M., January 26, 1963, ibid., vol. 5, pp. 480–81.
61. Protocol 80, January 29, 1963, AOK.
62. Ibid.
63. Editorial note, FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. 7, pp. 644–47.
64. Kennedy outlined his thinking in a conversation he taped with Norman Cousins on April 22, 1963. See Tape 82, Presidential Office Files, Presidential Recordings, JFK Library.
65. Naftali, telephone interview with James Critchfield, November 25, 2002. As chief of the CIA’s Near East desk between 1960 and 1968, Critchfield oversaw U.S. activities in Iraq.
66. Cited in Andrew Cockburn and Patrick Cockburn, Out of the Ashes: The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), p. 74.
67. Ibid.
68. Naftali interview with James Critchfield, August 18, 2001.
69. Meeting, Mikoyan and Qasim, April 14, 1960, APRF; aide-mémoire, Mikoyan for negotiations with Qasim, Protocol 274, April 7, 1960, APRF.
70. Tad Szulc, “U.S. and Britain Recognize Iraq; Soviet Also Acts; Speedy Decision Is Made by Washington, Which Finds New Regime Stable; Anti-Nasser Bloc in Middle East Moves to Counter Any Links to Cairo,” New York Times, February 12, 1963.
71. Batatu Hanna, The Old Social Classes and Revolutionary Developments in Iraq: A Study of Iraq’s Old Landed and Commercial Classes and Its Communists, Ba’athists, and Free Officers (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 985–89.
72. “Soviet Bloc Campaigns against Iraqi Regime,” Washington Post and Times Herald, February 20, 1963.
73. “Iraqi Accuses Red Bloc of Plotting Overthrow,” Washington Post and Times Herald, February 24, 1963.
74. “High Iraqi Red Killed, Others Arrested,” Washington Post and Times Herald, February 25, 1963. Ar-Radi was eventually killed by the new Iraqi regime. See Batatu Hanna, op. cit., p. 675.
75. Interview (with NSK) conducted Saturday afternoon, February 9, 1963, at the Kremlin, unpublished transcript, Roy H. Thomson Archive, Toronto. The authors are grateful to the current Lord Thomson for his permission to consult and quote from this document. They also appreciate the assistance of the archivist Robert Hamilton and David Thomson and Professor Wesley Wark.
76. Memcon, Khrushchev with Marshal Hakim Amer, June 9, 1963, 52-1-561, APRF. In this interesting conversation, Amer denied any Egyptian involvement in the Ba’athist coup of February 1963 and added that Nasser later warned Aref that any persecution of communists would complicate Iraq’s relations with the Socialist world. The Egyptians gave a higher number for the number arrested by the Iraqis (16,0000). Meanwhile Khrushchev reminisced about Soviet support for Qasim, mentioning that in July 1958 the Kremlin responded to fears of an imminent attack on Iraq by Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran by giving military assistance without the need for a formal agreement. When Qasim later revealed himself to have “dictatorial ways,” the Kremlin sent Anastas Mikoyan to urge him to alter his methods. Although Qasim refused to change, the Ba’athists, Khrushchev concluded, were even worse for Iraq.
77. “Sir H. Trevelyan’s interview with Khrushchev of March 6,” Prem 11/4498, National Archives—UK. Lincoln Broomfield, Walter C. Clemens, Jr., and Franklyn Griffiths, Khrushchev and the Arms Race: Soviet Interests in Arms Control and Disarmament 1954–1962 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 230–31.
78. Harry Schwartz, “Soviet Wipes Out Promise to Raise Meat Allowances,” New York Times, March 4, 1963.
79. Harrison E. Salisbury, “The Khrushchev Line; Premier Stiffens His Ideology at Home before Risking It in Conflict with China,” New York Times, March 12, 1963.
80. Interview, February 9, 1963, unpublished transcript, Roy H. Thomson Archive, Toronto, Canada.
81. Protocol 89, March 21, 1963, AOK.
82. Memcon, Alekseyev and Castro, February 6, 1963, MFA.
83. KGB, cable (New York) to Center, February 21, 1963, SVR; KGB, cable (Washington) to Center, March 1, 1963, SVR.
84. Report, KGB to MFA and GRU, February 19, 1963, APRF.
85. Fursenko interview with Ambassador N. S. Ryzhov, January 4, 1995.
86. Ibid.
87. Seymour Topping, “Chinese Suggest Khrushchev Visit and Party Truce; Willing to Receive Another Russian or Send Official of Their Own to Moscow; Neither Side Retreats; but Notes Are Conciliatory—Peking Insists on Rebuke to ‘Yugoslav Revisionism,’” New York Times, March 14, 1963.
88. Protocol 87, March 12, 1963, AOK.
89. Washington (Sir David Ormsby Gore) to FO March 28, 1963, Prem 11/4496, National Archives—UK. This was a priority, top secret cable that passed on the information received in Washington at 4:00 A.M. that day.
90. Harold Caccia to Philip de Zulueta, April 3, 1963, Prem 11/4496, National Archive—UK.
91. Ibid., for the view of CIA analysts, which was described by British Ambassador Ormsby Gore. Regarding the thinking at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, see Memo to Philip de Zulueta, March 29, 1963, Prem 11/4496, National Archives—UK. For evidence of the contrary indicators coming to the White House, see “Highlights from the Secretary of State’s Policy Planning Meeting,” March 26, 1963, FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. 5, p. 654.
92. Thompson to Rusk, April 3, 1963, ibid., p. 663.
93. RFK to JFK, April 3, 1963, vol. 6, p. 262.
94. Tape 79-2, Meeting, April 6, 1963, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings, JFK Library.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid. This behind-the-scenes activity is evident from the president’s and the attorney general’s statements in this meeting.
97. Ibid.
98. Cousins, op. cit., p. 79.
99. Tape 82, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings, JFK Library.
100. Meeting on Laos, April 19, 1963; NSC Meeting on Laos, April 20, 1963; NSC Meeting on Laos, April 22, 1963, Tape 82, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings, JFK Library.
101. Meeting with Norman Cousins, April 22, 1963, Tape 82, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings, JFK Library.
102. “K Back at Work Ignores Attack in Albania Press,” Washington Post and Times April 21, 1963.
103. Khrushchev described his April 23 meeting with the British and American ambassadors to the Presidium on April 25. See Steno, April 25, 1963, AOK.
104. Protocol 94, April 25, 1963, AOK.
105. NSK to JFK, September 28, 1962, FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. 6, pp. 152–61.
106.
Steno, April 25, 1963, AOK.
107. Memcon, Khrushchev and Harriman, April 26, 1963, FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. XXIV, pp. 1000–1005.
108. Memorandum for the Record, April 30, 1963, FRUS, 1961–1963, Op cit., p. 1006.
109. Smirnov to MFA, May [29?,] 1963, 0757 1963, 8/35/5, MFA.
110. Smirnov to MFA, April 6, 1963, and May 17, 1963, 0757 1963, 8/35/5, MFA
111. Smirnov to MFA, June 14, 1963, 0757 8/35/4-5, MFA. Kroll did come to the Soviet Union in the summer of 1963 and was given a personal letter from Khrushchev to deliver to Adenauer. But Adenauer never responded to the letter. On October 10, 1963, Adenauer told Soviet ambassador Smirnov that “he hadn’t the time [to respond].” Smirnov to MFA, October 10, 1963, 0757, 8/35/4-5, MFA.
112. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 900; Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 730.
113. Sorensen, op. cit., p. 730.
114. Naftali interview with McGeorge Bundy, November 15, 1995.
115. Sorensen, op. cit., p. 731.
116. Ibid.
117. Ibid., p. 732.
118. Ibid.
119. William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York: Norton, 2003), p. 602.
120. Protocol [102], June 13, 1963, AOK.
121. Protocol 80, January 29, 1963, AOK.
122. Steno, June 7, 1963, AOK.
123. Memcon, NSK and Castro, May 5, 1963, APRF.
124. Translated and cited in Odd Arne Westad, “The Sino-Soviet Alliance and the United States,” Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance 1945–1963 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), p. 180.
125. Records of Meetings of the CPSU and CCP Delegations, Moscow, July 5–20, 1963, Appendix 17, ibid., pp. 385–86.
126. Protocol 107, July 23, 1963, AOK.
CHAPTER 21: LEGACY
1. Sergei Khrushchev, Khrushchev on Khrushchev: An Inside Account of the Man and His Era, trans. William Taubman (Boston: Little, Brown, 1990), pp. 30–32.
2. Steno, December 16, 1959, AOK.
3. Ibid.
4. William Taubman, Khrushchev (New York: Norton, 2003), p. 613.
5. Protocol 145, May 26, 1964, AOK.
6. “Soviet School Retreat,” Editorial, New York Times, August 14, 1964.
7. Protocol 126, December 23, 1963, AOK.
8. Ibid.
9. Protocol 152, July 30, 1964, AOK.
10. “Soviet School Retreat,” Editorial, New York Times, August 14, 1964. At the special session of the Presidium where Khrushchev was dismissed, the other members severely criticized his unilateral education reform. Protocol (no number), October 13, 1964, AOK.
11. Sergei Khrushchev, op. cit., pp. 725–26.
12. Ibid.
13. The chronology of Khrushchev’s last days in office was compiled by the British Embassy in Moscow. Trevelyan to FO, October 16, 1964, FO 371/177665, National Archive—UK.
14. “How They Removed Khrushchev,” interview with Vladimir Semichastny, Argumenti i Facti, May 1989, p. 5.
15. Ibid.
16. Protocol 162, October 8, 1964, AOK.
17. Taubman, op. cit., p. 5.
18. “How They Removed Khrushchev,” interview with Vladimir Semichastny, Argumenty i fakty, May 1989, p. 5. Regarding the call to Palewski, see H. A. F. Hohler, British Embassy in Moscow, October 21, 1964, FO 371/177665, National Archives—UK. Hohler had a conversation with Palewski.
19. Cited in Trevelyan, “The Circumstances of Mr. Khrushchev’s Downfall,” paper to the British Foreign Office, November 2, 1964, FO 371/177666, National Archives—UK.
20. Baudet to Couve de Murville, October 16, 1964, Documents Diplomatiques Français (DDF), 1964, vol. 2, Record No. 136 (Brussels: P.E.I.—Peter Lang, 2002).
21. Cited in Trevelyan, “The Circumstances of Mr. Khrushchev’s Downfall,” paper to the British Foreign Office, November 2, 1964, FO 371/177666, National Archives—UK.
22. “How they removed Khrushchev,” interview with Vladimir Semichastny, Argumenty i fakty, May 1989, p. 5; Taubman, op. cit., p. 10.
23. Fursenko interviews with veterans of Kremlin guards, October 2005.
24. Protocol (no number), October 13, 1964, AOK.
25. Ibid.
26. Protocol (no number, continuation), October 14, 1962, AOK.
27. Ibid.
28. Fursenko interviews with veterans of the Kremlin guard, October 2005.
29. Telegram, Moscow to Washington, October 16, 1964, Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter FRUS], 1964–1968, vol. 14, pp. 122–23.
30. Trevelyan to FO, “The Circumstances of Mr. Khrushchev’s Downfall,” November 2, 1964, FO 371/177666, National Archive—UK.
31. Quoted in dispatch by Thomas Brimelow, British Embassy (Moscow), March 6, 1964, FO 371/177165, National Archive—UK.
32. Intelligence note, Bureau of Intelligence and Research to SecState, October 15, 1964, FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. 14, pp. 119–21. Memcon, meeting of executive group of NSC, October 16, 1964, ibid., pp. 124–25.
33. Memcon, Meeting of Executive Group of NSC, October 16, 1964, ibid.
34. Memcon, Dobrynin and LBJ, October 16, 1964, ibid., pp. 127–30.
35. H. A. F. Hohler, British Embassy in Paris, October 24, 1964, FO 371/177667, National Archive—UK.
36. Henry A. Kissinger, “Central Issues of American Foreign Policy” (1968), reproduced as Document 4 in FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 1, p. 26.
37. Protocol 73, February 6, 1957, AOK.
38. Timothy Naftali, ed., The Presidential Recordings: John F. Kennedy, vol. 1, The Great Crises (New York: Norton, 2001), p. 267.
39. Steno, May 26, 1961, AOK.
40. John F. Kennedy, July 26, 1963, quoted in editorial, Life (August 9, 1963).
AUTHORS’ NOTE
Authors routinely correct typographical and other minor errors in paperback editions. We are writing to point out two important corrections and to clarify how they happened.
In making notes on Anastas Mikoyan’s January 19, 1963, memorandum for the record outlining his recollections of the sessions of the Presidium on October 22 and 23, 1962, we inadvertently ascribed to Mikoyan a statement that Mikoyan had, in fact, attributed to Khrushchev in the 1963 document. We also understated Khrushchev’s passivity in determining the fate of the submarines. When Mikoyan single-handedly took on Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky, Khrushchev seemed to agree with Mikoyan but remained oddly silent. It also seems that it was Malinovsky and not Mikoyan who invited the commander in chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, to the Presidium’s evening session on October 23. We have corrected these details in this paperback edition.
The second correction involved our effort to determine the NATO identifications for the four Soviet diesel Foxtrot-class submarines in the Caribbean during the missile crisis. In working through the materials at the National Security Archive in Washington, D.C., we misidentified the Soviet submarine B-130, captained by Nikolai Shumkov, as C-19 when its NATO designation was actually C-18. For an excellent description of what is known about the maritime dimension of the Cuban missile crisis, we recommend Svetlana V. Savranskaya’s “New Sources on the Role of Soviet Submarines in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 28, no. 2, 233–59, April 2005.
The authors would also like to thank David Caplan for his assistance on the paperback edition.
St. Petersburg and Los Angeles
June 2007
ABBREVIATIONS
AOK Archivii Kremlya: Prezidium TsK KPSS, 1954–1964, Tom. 1, Chernovie protocolniye zapisi zasedanii; Stenogrammi [Archives of the Kremlin: Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1954–1965] vol. 1, Notes of State Meetings; Stenographic Accounts], editor in chief Aleksandr A. Fursenko, (Moscow: Rosspen, 2004)
APRF Archives of the President of the Russian Federation
AW
D Director of Central Intelligence Allen W. Dulles
CC Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CWIHP Cold War International History Project
DDE President Dwight D. Eisenhower
DDF Documents Diplomatiques Français
DOS U.S. Department of State
ERR Electronic Reading Room
FO British Foreign Office
FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States
FSB Archive of the (Russian) Federal Security Service
GRU Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie (Main Intelligence Administration of Russian General Staff)
JFD Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
Memcon memorandum of conversation
MFA Archives of the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation (AVPRF)
National Archives—UK British National Archives, Kew, UK
NARA-II National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland
NARA-LN National Archives and Records Administration, Laguna Niguel, California
NSK Nikita Sergeyvich Khrushchev
RGASPI Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History
RGANI Russian State Archive of Contemporary History
RMN Vice President Richard Milhous Nixon
SVR Archive of the (Russian) Foreign Intelligence Service
Telcon telephone conversation
*See authors’ note on backmatter.
*See authors’ note on backmatter.
*See authors’ note on backmatter.