One Hundred Days

by Sandy Woodward

  8 May

  Weather improved around us but still low cloud over FI so, while we bombed around overhead, we couldn’t actually do much! Continued vertrepping HDSing [Helo Delivery Service] as always. Flew CAP. Observed Arg raid turn back, either for lack of fuel or nerve because CAP was up. Maybe they thought we had the inshore squadron operating and they were hoping to ruin our day. Late on, finally decided to get on with my war, as aviation just wasn’t achieving anything. BRILLIANT sent to terrorise Falkland Sound North. ALACRITY to NGS Port Stanley. YARMOUTH to pull out SHEFFIELD. BROADSWORD/COVENTRY to missile [anti-aircraft missile cover] Port Stanley all tomorrow. Wait and see. Much depends.

  This I believe was another turning point for me personally. SHEFFIELD undoubtedly had been a shock for all, including me though I hadn’t realised it until now. Perhaps I was lucky that the weather had allowed me this recovery period – perhaps, on the other hand, I’d have got on with it earlier if the weather had allowed.

  9 May

  BROADSWORD and COVENTRY well on their way in by 0700. NO sign of ALACRITY coming out, or BRILLIANT. YARMOUTH has her tow. Today could be critical: if the BROADSWORD/COVENTRY combination doesn’t work then we’re out of business anyway. Canning and H-D [Hart-Dyke] must get a medal for this day I’d think.

  0830: ALACRITY and BRILLIANT still adrift from their expected itinerary – bit worrying. And obviously worried for the T22/T42 combo (BROADSWORD/COVENTRY). But this ‘trial’ is essential (in my book). If it fails, we shall all know the landing is off in sufficient time to stop it happening, at great saving of life. (Later) and a long day groans on. COVENTRY frightened off the first Arg sortie with CAP – the ass. Then he fired three Sea Darts at extreme range with them too high – he said they were ‘feasible’ but I doubt it: feasibility is only a machine language definition and may well prove over-optimistic in reality. Anyway, all missed so another shower turned away over the Falkland Sound for a cost of £750,000 to us. Then a Puma helo took off and got shot down.

  We show a profit but the Arg Press will no doubt make much of it as an SAR [Sea Air Rescue] for the wretched NARWAL [Argentinian trawler], which had previously turned up fifty miles off Port Stanley for all the world as though there was no war at all and we hadn’t warned her off the week before. A SHAR CAP dropped two 1000 lb bombs (which missed/didn’t go off – which was as well as they weren’t delayed action bombs and would have blown both trawler and a/c to perdition) and then strafed, stopping her in the water and injuring several of the crew.

  Then the saga began. If you try to do anything unplanned in aviation or with the Army, it all takes sixty-two times as long. Ships improvise, everyone rehearses, checks and delays. Result is hours of bogging about, the near loss (for lack of fuel) of an SK4 and much confusion. No doubt, it will sort out by breakfast tomorrow. Looks as though YARMOUTH will make it to Tug SALVAGEMAN out to the east with the not so shiny SHEFF.

  The BROADSWORD/COVENTRY combination had the desired effect: the Args got nothing into Port Stanley today. I think I’ll have to replace them for tomorrow; twenty-four hours inshore must be very tiring.

  After a good few worries about the NARWAL, when we talk to the crew, we find one is a young Arg Lt Cdr seconded to the ship. If that doesn’t make NARWAL some kind of warship/auxiliary, what does?

  The CO of COVENTRY was no ‘ass’ – just a bit too keen on his first day right up front; and who is to blame him?

  The ‘saga’ concerned the boarding of NARWAL by SK4 after she had surrendered to the SHARs. It was eventually done some four hours later and the NARWAL finally left to sink – which she did, after another four hours. I was personally very relieved to find the Arg Lieutenant Commander on board, together with his code books: the political consequences of shooting up an innocent trawler would have been awkward. While the SHARs had not attacked before I had given my personal permission to do so, albeit with some misgivings, it was a clear breaking of my ROE. What decided me, of course, was that we had warned her off on 30th April.

  Basic events of the day/night included:

  a. BRILLIANT night patrol to north entrance to Falkland Sound.

  b. ALACRITY to NGS Port Stanley area.

  c. YARMOUTH to take SHEFFIELD in tow.

  d. BROADSWORD/COVENTRY off Port Stanley all day: various engagements.

  e. Attempts to bomb PSA (Port Stanley airfield) medium level with SHARs.

  f. Two PAN [panic] calls, one for fuel and one for smoke in his cockpit – both recovered safely.

  g. The NARWAL action over a total of nine hours.

  h. Another SK, short of fuel, landed on GLASGOW (not strictly allowed!).

  10 May

  First good night’s sleep in quite a while. The weather has clagged in just after sunset and, barring the inshore squadron, there’s little to do. Sending the T21s ahead to sus out the Falkland Sound. This involves their going inside the narrows, this time to find out (the hard way) whether they have been mined. But I can’t risk the Amphib force being totally stalled at one end of the Sound on the day we go in. Better to lose a T21 and send the Amphibs elsewhere on the day. SHEFFIELD has apparently sunk at last, perhaps saving us a lot of bother. YARMOUTH who was still towing reported her as ‘Sunk. Am searching to confirm.’ This is not a very confidence inspiring statement. Like he’s not sure whether she has, in fact, sunk! Oh dear, the battle for information is never ending and often largely fruitless.

  PM. Still thick fog and the inshore group getting no action as far as I can make out. Arg air quiet.

  11 May

  Nearly got ourselves into a parlous muddle overnight. Signals are clogging a bit but the existence of alternative orders for BROADSWORD/COVENTRY coupled with BROADSWORD’s choice of the wrong one because of the order in which they were received, coincidentally coupled with the failure of BROADSWORD’s Flash [urgency indicator] signal (saying what he intended) to get into the GWO’s hand for two hours after receipt, nearly had ARROW, ALACRITY, BROADSWORD and COVENTRY into an 0300 mix-up in fog in the middle of the San Luis SPA [Submarine Patrol Area] there and should have emerged via the N Channel by now (0900). Am expecting them back into screen any minute, while BROADSWORD and COVENTRY go inshore again. ALACRITY and ARROW returned safely. BROADSWORD’s GWS 25 [Sea Wolf Point Defence AA Missile System] looking sick, which is a worry. But weather is very poor so it probably won’t matter today – take another risk anyway. I’m getting a bit fed up with this sort of thing.

  INVINCIBLE put out a bleat by TACSIG [special type of tactical signalling procedure) this morning – I’m beginning to worry about him now. He is complaining that he has been put on the up threat side of the force without a T22 as goal keeper [close in anti-Exocet escort for CVs], forgetting that we in HERMES have been in this position on and off for three days and we don’t have a GWS 30. So we’re all nervous and some more than others but one does not admit it in this way. Meanwhile quite a few individuals have cracked up including sadly the RAF pilot who did so well on 1 May, a young doctor and possibly an old one too. Symptoms vary greatly and I have to examine mine. One symptom, which sometimes occurs, is a tendency to want to nod off the whole time – and I have found myself spending more time lying on my back than usual! Don’t think I’m cracking though! But then no more do those that have actually cracked. So I’m no further on. What one does about such people I’m not sure – the real cases it’s easy to say, must be sent home; it is after all a mental breakdown and its effect on others is not negligible. Some, of course, will be tempted to feign breakdowns in order to get off the hook. And I’m getting a bit concerned over Lin’s state of mind – his decisions under stress are mercurial.

  Getting nothing done slowly today. Visibility poor in F9 from NW. Finalising the landing plan which seems to be going remarkably smoothly after expectations of problems. Keynotes are:

  AOA [Amphibious Objective Area] in weatherproof waters.

  CVBG off-shore with waiters [ships waiting to go into AOA].

  COMAW inshore with
escort force incl. 1 x T42, 2 x T22, ANTRIM, 2 x T12, ARGONAUT? ARDENT?

  [Type 12 frigates, e.g. YARMOUTH], ARGONAUT? ARDENT?

  Send ships in and out at night as required.

  Priorities for landing force are:

  a. Secure beachhead.

  b. Establish local air defence.

  c. Build up for land advance.

  This was particularly brave work by ALACRITY, who made a point of going in and out of the north entrance to the Falkland Sound to check for mines the hard way. It had to be done though, since to wait for the arrival of the entire amphibious force to find out would have been less than clever. If they had found mines by hitting one – the only likely way of finding them – she would have earned a VC. As it turned out, COMAW wasn’t even grateful.

  12 May

  Weather still terrible – damned glad I’m not in a T21. I can’t help thinking that maybe the Args’ heart is not in this war. Certainly, determination and demonstration of it must count for a lot – particularly early on. So far, barring the SHEFFIELD disaster, the signs are that they are very keen to wrap hand in as early as possible. Caused major furore in Northwood with rude signal about Searchwater radar and Nimrod force to effect that they have got it wrong too often now and must start getting more collateral than just length e.g. ESM [Electronic Support Measures], vis [visual features] etc., i.e. take a risk or two. Quoted their two biggest errors so far, namely: BRILLIANT Group identified as six M/Vs [merchant vessels] close together back in mid-April and recent CVA shouts when undoubtedly looking at a M/V. The phrase in HERMES Ops Rm was ‘Which Kung Fu dat Nimrod?’

  1600: weather finally cleared so started high bombing Port Stanley airfield. Probably very inaccurate. By late pm the Args (midday their time) had obviously decided to ‘do‘ BRILLIANT and GLASGOW with three lots of four A4s [ground and ship attack aircraft]. First lot: two taken by Sea Wolf, one spun in, one escaped. Second lot: Sea Wolf went to reset just before moment to open fire and so all four came through unharmed and one bomb went right through GLASGOW’s AER [After Engine Room]. Third lot were probably deterred by high CAP up threat by then (previous policy had been to hold them back) or possibly by news of the mauling the first four got.

  2100: GLASGOW has got it under control apparently but I expect she’ll have to go home. Fleet Trial has made progress but still needs its final test. Meanwhile Sea Dart, as an anti-low level system, is looking to be useless.

  13 May

  GLASGOW seems to have it under control but the thread has to be thin. Bloody lucky the bomb didn’t go off or we’d be another T42 down. The essential question is whether to keep her here or send her home. Sent for SALVAGEMAN [Tug] anyway. Meanwhile thick fog brings entire war (I hope) to a standstill again. Final analysis of the second raid – really we were both very unlucky and very lucky. GLASGOW’s Sea Dart went defective right from the start; and her gun jammed on the sixth round. BRILLIANT’s Sea Wolf switched off completely so defensive fire was 2 x 20 mm and 2 x 40 mm only. To receive just one non-exploding bomb out of some eight or twelve is just bloody lucky. And another inactive day drew to a close with a cancelled DA [Direct Action – by Special Forces] operation and patchy fog. Just the weather we want for the landing.

  In fact, the Pebble Island raid was delayed twenty-four hours for lack of recce reports from the small team sent ahead three nights before by helo.

  14 May

  Then it started a gale from west and I spoke too soon. Spent evening speeding into the teeth of it for a DA job on what looks like a very ripe plum – eleven a/c plus all the stores for a major nasty on us on D-Day. And most of the spare time organising a ‘blind eye’ operation on the mainland. Probably come to nothing but if it goes wrong, will have me court martialled; if it goes right, no one is going to know.

  Very quiet in filthy weather until Pebble Island raid late [in fact early on 15th]. Absolute cliff-hanger and delays due F9 gale and minor incompetence lost us fifty-five minutes in a tight programme. We were within five minutes of cancelling whole thing. Eleven Arg a/c destroyed on ground, no casualties, back out of main Arg air threat area by midday [15th]. Continuing saga over Rio Grande looking a bit more settled now. I can do as I please!

  15 May

  Fairly busy air day for us. Args not in evidence at all. It is w/e [weekend], of course, and they’re either saving up for the ‘big push’ or just wrapping hand in. Rio Grande saga reopened with further illogical and incompletely thought through plan from Northwood. Not doing so well and making it very difficult for me to do what is actually needed. If only they’d just leave it alone. By very late it began to transpire that the Brigadier of SAS [in London] had interpreted ‘Ditching SK4’ as dropping whole lot into water off the target and expecting everyone to swim ashore. What an utter twit the man must be! Hope it’s sorted out now, anyway. Still getting half-assed suggestions from people at home – more now what with this SAS bit. FOSM [Flag Officer Submarines] inventing new capabilities but refusing to change his stereotyped operating patterns and even CinC starting to make suggestions as to how to do my business none of which we hadn’t already considered and discarded.

  16 May

  After much toing and froing, finally got SAS management to accept (much reluctance I suspect – one Col RM even wanted to use a naval SK5 [Sea King Mark 5 helicopter] rather than one of our valuable SK4s for the job and tried such comments as ‘have you considered working from a landing site in W Falkland’ – I could have strangled him!) Anyway, that got underway and the only feasible plan (Lin Middleton’s idea) is accepted. The Elms/Talking Trees [Special Forces] fell out of the sky after 28 hours from UK into the water beside FORT AUSTIN on the one perfect day we have had this month – blue sky, westerly zephyrs, no swell. A good augury for a difficult task. After a long day’s flying over FI to little effect (Args stayed at home) – including two attempts on Arg M/Vs amongst islands which seem to have missed – HERMES set off for launch area. But operation cancelled – the Trees are wilting after their journey and all their kit got soaked in the water! So we turned back. INVINCIBLE will have to try tomorrow as we must go and meet COMAW and get on with cross-decking and planning for landing. Many indications that Args getting restive on shore in FI.

  17 May

  The weather is better than I expected so we may have a busy flying day. Basically, all the plans for the landing, the days before and the first few days after, are complete to the extent at least that they can be. They are, of course, reasonably flexible, as they must be, and in essence give a simple layout of:

  a. A long supply line which does not appear to be under threat for lack of air range, SM scale [numbers] and range, and surface fear of SSNs.

  b. An offshore (to east of FI) assembly and operations area outside unrefuelled Mirage, A4 and Etendard range (thereby doubling Arg problems). From whence CAP, CAS [Close Air Support for ground forces] missions will be mounted and convoys despatched inshore.

  c. The AOA, where the land battle will start from. It only lacks good air defence in the very early stage.

  I believe we should win this battle but with no guarantees just because so much can turn on chance – as the BRILLIANT/GLASGOW action so starkly reveals – and we have little reserve.

  18 May

  That day ended with our departure for the FEARLESS Group. On the way, an SK5 fell in the water – Rad Alt [Radio Altimeter] failure. It sounds as though the pilot got it wrong, i.e. too low to correct and could have got off the water as well afterwards. Then the Captain gets it wrong too and I mistakenly support him. Very odd. On another matter – the protection of the amphibious force – I am a bit torn between the John Coward type idea of T42s right forward with CAP forward of them, then the AW [Amphibious Warfare] Group and T22s and then only fifty miles behind, the carriers – virtually undefended in terms of point defence … and my own plan which has the AW Group and CAP and the T42s with the RRs [aircraft carriers].

  My problem is really that, if the weather is good for the opposi
tion, i.e. good for low ship attack, then Coward could be right because I’m into a high risk operation anyway and a bold move (which effectively assumes the enemy will concentrate to the exclusion of all else on the AW Group) might be the only thing to carry the day. But if I get the weather right, then the safer course will be best. Hence, of course, we are trying to judge the weather right and must at least trust their [meteorologist’s] judgement since, unlike the enemy, the weather isn’t malevolent though it may be no more predictable. Jeremy Black obviously feels the same way about the T42s forward, but he wants the RRs well up too. This also smacks of all or nothing and I like it even less, yet can’t help feeling I ought to do it – and just might if it weren’t that the SM area is exactly where we would need to be to do the job; the other thought, that I oughtn’t to make it too easy for the Args to remove half our AD [Air Defence] force at a stroke convinces against. Hope I’m right.

  The Captain and I misjudged the SK ditching (at about 1400) in that we agreed to try to crane it out. The SK was floating the right way up in calm water – a nice, shiny new aircraft worth millions of pounds, just yards away, as we nosed HERMES up to it. Then we thought, ‘I wonder if the depth charges are primed, and could drop off if we don’t get it all exactly right, with unpleasant consequences for HERMES bow.’ So we backed off, gently, and sent for BRILLIANT to sink the SK. As it sank, the depth charges went off.

  The day itself was largely taken up with meeting the AW Group, talking to the COMAW staffs, receiving aircraft reinforcements including Harrier GR3s and the inevitable replenishments now further complicated by ‘cross-decking’ – another word for ‘cross-making’ – before it was over.

  19 May

  Further massive cross-decking CANBERRA/FEARLESS/INTREPID/HERMES. Shifting over 1500 blokes around (out of CANBERRA) and 100s of helo loads. At same time keeping six SHAR/GR3s at a time airborne for CAP and familiarisation. While the decision to remove 1500 soldiers from CANBERRA is, I’m sure, right, the time at which it was taken could have been a lot more ‘felicitous’. CANBERRA with her totally inadequate DC [Damage Control] and F/F [Fire Fighting] arrangements is a floating bonfire awaiting a light. Decision to go ahead still not received – if Cabinet stall tomorrow, landing area could well be compromised and ships lost/hazarded unnecessarily.