One Hundred Days

by Sandy Woodward

  Intention for tomorrow is basically to press on unless told to stop and try to maintain a low profile. The AW Group might just get in unnoticed. I am fairly confident that we should bring it off but zero can come up twice running and that would break this bank.

  This was the sad day that we lost so many Special Forces men in a SK4 crash. Strange that the log didn’t mention it but I was deeply involved in the final preparations for landing and perhaps the twenty men killed seemed less significant in the face of the risks to 4000 or 5000 over the next few days. Later that evening CinC told me to proceed with the landing using my own local judgement as to the day chosen. The weather couldn’t have suited better at that very moment – we predicted poor visibility during daylight on the 20th. With an indefinite clearance thereafter, this could have been our only opportunity for some time, so I decided to go.

  20 May

  Moving towards the AOA. Fingers crossed and hoping not to be noticed. Deliberately not flying any more than usual. GLAMORGAN doing her usual deception thing.

  Three sentences say it all – and unconsciously reflect the instinctive wish of us all to do the absolute minimum to attract attention to ourselves.

  21 May

  0400: first news that AW Group is in and proceeding – smoothly so far, twenty minutes behind but hoping to catch up in calm clear weather.

  0740: still a deathly hush – extraordinary.

  0930: dawn still an hour away and still little sign of Arg activity from any source. The weather is fine and clear – not what I wanted for Day 1 at all but at least it’s fairly calm for the soldiers and the transfers. Today should not only be critical for the land forces but also for the air forces. If the Args are going to fight, today is their best opportunity for their Air Force. We shall see. Meanwhile we are ready to put up as much Sea Harrier air defence as we can throughout daylight hours clear of the AOA itself so that ground missile defence has a free hand vs fixed wing. I am already finding that no longer being the core of activity and the reversion to ‘Support Force Commander’ is a bit irksome this morning. No doubt I’ll be too busy to think about this later.

  1115: first indication that Args know we’re in: some local disturbances in AOA. Can’t be long now.

  1300: they’re beginning to come, so it wasn’t ‘long now’. Fairly continuous air attacks in near perfect weather have given us the punishment we were bound to have. ARDENT sinking, ARGONAUT stopped, ANTRIM with no effective weapons. At least the two T22s and the two T12s are fit so the Args have hit the wrong ships. Unfortunately the weather tomorrow will be no better for at least until the evening – if then; so until the Army have their own AD set up, I can’t leave them to their own devices, not least because there are all the LSLs [Landing Ship Logistic] to unload yet.

  Later: it turns out that the T22s are by no means fit, indeed BRILLIANT has one end [of her Sea Wolf system] only and radar and propulsion. By 2300 it seems that ARDENT is sinking, ARGONAUT is stopped but has her weapons systems working, ANTRIM is floating and moving but has no weapons and an unexploded bomb in her backside. BRILLIANT as stated, BROADSWORD minor damage, PLYMOUTH and YARMOUTH unscathed. All the AW ships untouched as yet. Decided to reinforce AD rather than diminish where the choices are to move everyone into San Carlos Bay and virtually give the Args a free hand (though not easy for them) or to move everyone out and away (too soon for the landing) or as I have done to try a little harder. Accordingly, COVENTRY sent up front to form T42/T22 missile trap on north coast of WFI [West Falklands]; carriers plus ‘Chaff Sierra’ [Fleet auxiliaries] and M/Vs in the BG will edge forward a bit more; remainder of inshore squadron will concentrate in Carlos Water.

  22 May

  Dispositions made and another critical day lies ahead. The Args lost fifteen or so a/c yesterday by having no escort a/c for their attacks. That policy could change today. Bearing in mind that this max effort seems to be in the order of twenty a/c, this may have set them back a bit at least for a day or so. Equally, it may cause them to escort against our CAP, which scored most of the successes. BRILLIANT and BROADSWORD accounting for two possibly three only, despite being frequently ‘surrounded’ by circling attackers. Meanwhile EXETER will be with us before dawn. At about 0700, a shadower came within eight miles of COVENTRY, who failed to shoot! I despair. The GWS 30 appears to be totally unreliable. Altogether, we’re in a fairly desperate situation until Rapier comes good. After yesterday’s dusting, we have the capability and the will to continue. No vital part of our capability has been lost (yet) but we still have a very long way to go before we can be sure the back of the Arg Air Force is broken. They normally start stirring at about 1300 and now it’s nearly 1500 with nothing. Weather inshore is not good; this and the undoubted confusion their losses must have caused should at least reduce the likelihood of their coming today. Just hope so anyway as we are in a poor way at the moment. BRILLIANT will have to come out tonight for extensive repairs.

  By 1930 it became clear that they were not going to come but between 1755 and 1840 there were six of them orbiting out to the west, while a couple of other a/c, thought to have been A4s, sneaked in and out again. It looked more like a stores drop than an attack to me. It wasn’t our CAP that frightened them off; they had their own CAP to cover the droppers I guess. Do we ever need a radar over there! COVENTRY has been useful today in telling us something about their activities. GR3 sent to look; didn’t make it.

  23 May

  Feeling a bit hassled. Support of AOA requires me well forward: long-term maintenance of carriers requires me well back: provision of in/out convoys requires me somewhere in the middle. This week I guess I have to be up front and hope to get away with it but I must get clear at the first opportunity. The only solution I can see is to get the A0A’s missile defences on top line and then run SHARs from a forward base in the AOA as best we can. Aviators won’t like it.

  Meanwhile (1030) another day of split aims faces me. Had to withdraw the missile trap. Let COMAW keep BROADSWORD for another day but don’t know what to do for forward radar tomorrow, since I don’t feel I can send a DDG [T42 destroyer] up there with any real hope of avoiding a very big bang. The T22s are much more valuable as goal keepers/ASW escorts out here.

  By 1630, I’m beginning to feel they are not coming. We have removed another two or three of their Pumas.

  At 1700, the BG ESM Lynx comes up with an Etendard radar in the middle of the force – almost instantly up come about four fast, low [surface radar] contacts every which way.

  By 1720 and £2000 worth of chaff and chatter later, it is clear that it was all spurious. Main contributors Lynx and ANTRIM, AMBUSCADE, ATLANTIC CONVEYOR. The Lynx had only just got airborne: ATLANTIC CONVEYOR reported the surface search helo but ANTRIM and AMBUSCADE had little excuse. New boys!

  By 1800, the Argentinians are obviously having a go at the AW Group in Carlos Water. Difficult to tell yet, but Rapier is beginning to work. ANTELOPE has one possibly two unexploded bombs in her but dropped a Mirage which hit her main mast. With one dead, two wounded they reported ‘proceeding down Carlos Water for peaceful defuse/repair‘. Very good. Meanwhile his weapons are in local control and probably the better for it.

  During the day, I have had a continuing saga with the GR3 tasker inshore who treats his air assets as expendables on anything that moves, apparently regardless of target feasibility, importance, position or whatever. I let him use them for Goose Green yesterday on the assumption he knew what he was doing but with private reservations of my own. We’ve done the place often enough and kept an eye on it, hence knew it was likely to look tempting but unlikely to yield anything. Sure enough, they (fortunately) all get back and say – ‘Nothing there.’ Today the twit says ‘Try Pebble Island’ and then ‘Do the troop positions at Port Howard’ in total ignorance of either but giving the reason for the latter as ‘My patrols are being held down.’ Refused and have taken over the tasking XMT [except] around edge of landers’ positions. Really can’t abide such unprofessional con
duct – real, criminal waste. Very angry.

  By 2300, things are a good deal less happy. One SHAR blew up about three miles out from us – no idea why but was on his way with three others to toss bomb Port Stanley. And ANTELOPE’s bomb went off – unknown casualties and the ship abandoned. The SHAR (Lt Cdr Batt), low over water, burned bright orange for three secs then snuffed out.

  The GR3 tasker ashore was not a ‘twit’ nor was he unprofessional, I’m sure – just that his and my information did not coincide and perhaps also that he was more prepared to lose aircraft (from my very limited supply) than I was. His job was to help land the forces by whatever means he could from minute to minute: mine was to help the landing forces as necessary over a long period, balancing the losses so that they all lasted about the same time.

  24 May

  0120: day’s work just about done! SALTA [Arg SM] going to Georgia – so move ships out and leave him to stew. Argentinian Air Force has to be in a bad way. They put up forty-six odd a/c on Sat. Virtually nothing Sun and some twenty-three or so (only seventeen came into AOA) today. They lost fifteen or so Sat and nine today. I find it hard to believe they have many a/c or pilots left. COMAW reported today’s a/c as real kamikazes – so probably young braves who don’t know any better. Truly a terrible business, and I can only hope the Args stop soon for they have to be in a bad way.

  It is increasingly apparent how easy it is to lose control. I was fairly desperate on the 21st but yesterday’s events were not quite so bad. ANTRIM (Brian Young) wrote a blistering letter to the GWOs complaining about the management – actually not on anything all that important – and quite helpful too though not quite written in their style! Can’t blame him – the inshore battle can easily look to be a bloody mistake if you’re in the thick of it – but the basic facts are that the Arg Air Force has to be depleted by attrition and the only force we have that can afford that is the DD/FF [frigate] force. The Args have got it wrong with their anti-escort (if that is what it is, as opposed to a hit-what-you-see policy). By 1530, it begins to emerge that Args have noticed they’ve got it wrong and are now concentrating on the AW ships. Somehow they got a dozen a/c together and sent them in. One empty LSL badly hit. The other LSL has an UXB [unexploded bomb] on her stern; three Mirages, four A4s splashed in the process. Where are they getting the volunteers? What on earth do we do with this UXB after ANTELOPE’s one that finally went off, killing the defuser?

  Late pm: have a feeling Arg Navy may fancy celebrating 25 May and surge forth. Most likely ploy is their RR sneaking right down south to act as recovery platform for the Etendards in SW TEZ. Moving SSNs in their direction. It has to be a five per cent chance; very risky for Args but clever and bold enough to succeed. Reaction by FOSM to proposed SSN shift was ‘Pooh, pooh’, which further reduces confidence in their ability to do what is required. There’s just f-all flexibility there.

  I still believe it would probably have been better if the SSNs had been controlled by the CTG in the south. But the arguments are only 50/50-ish. Since the Arg surface forces never came out again, the system was never put to the test but I continually felt that the SSNs were being operated as a strategic and separate force rather than as ‘Fleet submarines’ in the proper sense – as the advance guard of the BG. I probably would have done no better even though it was one of the few things I was reasonably well qualified to have a view on – no doubt my CinC and FOSM felt the same way being both of them submariners too.

  25 May

  Another long day of good weather ahead I’m afraid. This all seems most unfair – it’s supposed to be bad around here but what have we had but near continuously clear days, e.g.:

  D-2

  clear

  D-1

  clagged

  D

  clear

  D+1

  clagged over Argentina a bit

  D+2

  clear

  D+3

  clear

  and now D+4 clear inshore but fog where CVBG is. The worst combination and the islands were said to have been unusually dry until the week we arrived in area.

  However, the bad vis around us should clear at about midday we reckon and the Args seldom arrive before 1300 so all may yet be well. Again though, the question arises of whether to take the carriers west into non-AAR range and, again, reinforced by lack of escorts, the answer is no. I have with us only two T 21s, one T 42, one DLG (useless really) and BRILLIANT (not very fit). COVENTRY is up front in the missile trap with BROADSWORD. GLASGOW is destoring to the rear. BRISTOL won’t be here till midnight and CARDIFF is even further behind. COMAW is still unprepared to rely on Rapier and I can’t say I blame him. Missile trap needed for better CAP direction meanwhile.

  1200: this has all the signs of a disastrous day. COMAW has packed the stage with ships he can’t possibly unload today. The ‘missile trap’ is in clear sky. And the carriers in thick fog. CAP cannot be provided. The only thing to be thankful for is that this didn’t happen on Day 1 and the only hope is that the Args have had enough for the moment or perhaps their minds are on other things.

  1300: it cleared and the CAP is up. Thank Heavens.

  1600: the reports from the AOA and the missile trap are various but it sounds as though the Args have been into Carlos Water with A4s and Pucaras, and lost several.

  At about 1900 yet another bloody disaster. Three A4s apparently trundling in towards AOA over Pebble Island swerve north and bomb COVENTRY and BROADSWORD. COVENTRY badly hit and sinking. BROADSWORD probably not too badly, picking up survivors. NO missiles fired – which is quite extraordinary and saps any faith we may have had in our modern systems even against these previous generation a/c.

  Lessons:

  The T42/T22 combination does not work.

  Sea Dart virtually useless vs low fliers.

  Sea Wolf unreliable.

  Surface ships have to have AEW [Airborne Early Warning] and CAP up threat for survival in open water.

  We must do much more rigorous multi-target trials of AAW [Anti-Air Warfare] systems.

  Stick to night operations and/or bad weather.

  They really must try to come for the carriers now!

  But this wasn’t all because half an hour later the two Etendards got in amongst the CVBG – actually detected on radar in good time, at twenty-four miles from T21 (AMBUSCADE) on UAA1, twenty-eight miles by BRILLIANT and even in HERMES, visually by all. Seduced by AMBUSCADE’s chaff and went for ATLANTIC CONVEYOR – both hit well aft. CONVEYOR total loss but eighty per cent crew saved and one Chinook and one Wessex 5. Down go another £100 million worth? The Etendards got away having fired at the first thing they saw.

  All in all the prediction at 1200, which looked to be wrong at 1800, was all too true by 2000 albeit for rather different reasons.

  Lessons:

  Radar will detect and track a/c and missiles at reasonable range.

  Chaff can seduce, off small ships anyway.

  Using M/Vs as spare targets probably not such a good idea unless they have chaff.

  Remember UAA1 distribution for the screen. OK this time but more by accident.

  Keep escorts fairly well forward for early warning.

  Don’t have too many ships in depth down AAW axis otherwise missile has too many chances to get it right.

  Stay outside 460-mile circles; we’d had to creep inside for CAP.

  Turn towards, fire chaff to right. At least you present the strongest part of the ship that way.

  Cross fingers.

  Fire CAP straight out along the initial bearing. Opposition will be scampering low out along it.

  And so the war will go on. Setbacks yes, defeat no, but we are very much in need of a decent airfield ashore.

  26 May

  It is very easy to get depressed. The land force will probably bog down; if I’m wrong on the Etendard range and the Args get their hands on more AM39s [air-launched Exocet missiles], the CVBG is due for a hammering if not while chaff stocks last, certainly thereafter.
The attrition process on ships in the AOA must eventually go sour on us unless the Arg Air Force cracks but I can’t plan on that. Conclusion: the battle is high risk at sea and in the air; it now must go high risk on land.

  1800: little action either from enemy or us. Army probably still digging holes. Thick low cloud over AOA. Minor twitch on Etendard which came to nothing.

  The war is in a bit of a mess. I suppose it’s post COVENTRY blues but the continued strain and worry isn’t entirely easy to live with. As much as anything it’s the waiting that grinds – once it all starts happening there’s almost a sense of release of hoping it can all be decided soon. Not that it will, of course, unless we have a frightful disaster.

  Several new bits and pieces ‘coming’ which will greatly help us. The laser guided bomb, the eyesight crippler and the Exocet jammer which makes it HOJ [Home on Jamming] should all help. Trouble is to get these things fitted in time, for time is what we don’t have any more. Quite a lot of the ships have now been at sea for two months continuously and just can’t go on indefinitely. So, roulement will be the next big headache but there seems no obvious way out for HERMES.

  The eye damage laser looks a winner if it works – and if the politicians don’t take fright at being accused of mediaeval atrocities. There’s little doubt that the Argentinians would accuse us of ‘ungentlemanly conduct’ – I’d do the same if I thought it’d do any good.