One Hundred Days

by Sandy Woodward

  Meanwhile today has max potential for a disaster again. Fog over CVBG and clear inshore and on mainland.

  The history of amphibious landings is studded with examples of the Navy and the Army falling out, often because the Army seems to act so slowly compared to the rather more mobile Navy concerned. The essential view to arrive at was my conclusion for this day: to balance the risks. Equally, however, I was determined not to try to run the Land Force Commander’s battle for him and hence confined myself to trying to keep him informed of the BG’s general capability to go on giving him the support he needed. I sent a signal with this precise purpose. Thus only he could balance the risks: failure to win the land battle by mid/late June would be because the BG would lose it for him. Not comfortable for either of us – but well enough understood by those who wished to.

  27 May

  What have I got wrong? Just about everything?

  The SHEFFIELD incident – questionable.

  D-Day dispositions in Sound (COMAW) but Args got it wrong too and AW ships got clear.

  The GLASGOW (T42/T22) incident. But needed NGS in daylight.

  The COVENTRY (T42/T22) incident – shouldn’t have tried again? But needed up threat AD ship clear of land. BROADSWORD keen.

  The ATLANTIC CONVEYOR – ‘Chaff Sierra’? Wrong ship to have there?

  If none there, would HERMES have survived being next in line after CONVEYOR?

  What did we get right?

  May 1 – OK. Lucky perhaps, particularly the NGS team.

  Port Stanley policy.

  Insertions [of Special Forces recce].

  Pebble.

  NARWAL.

  BELGRANO.

  Falkland Sound and Fox Bay ops.

  The landing, approach and insertion.

  Support thereafter?

  As a matter of stocktaking.

  Our losses to date:

  4 SHARs

  1 GR3

  2 SK4s

  Several SK5/6s.

  3 Chinooks, 13? Wessex 5s in ATLANTIC CONVEYOR, ARDEN.

  ANTELOPE

  SHEFFIELD

  COVENTRY

  ATLANTIC CONVEYOR

  Damaged Badly:

  ARGONAUT

  ANTRIM

  GLASGOW

  1, possibly 2, LSLs

  Defective:

  ARROW

  While the enemy has lost:

  1 cruiser

  The odd patrol craft, M/V, F/V [fishing vessel]

  The AOA

  Mirages

  A4s

  Pucaras

  Chinooks

  Pumas

  Bell [Helo]

  The Argentinian Air Force has taken a hammering as we have in our DD/FF force, and the weather has not been good to us. However, the beach head is firmly established,.

  Against us, however, is time. We can probably extend the carriers for another month but by then, we must have a well-defined and survivable base ashore for the SHARs and ideas for this phase may include:

  AD ship in Falkland Sound, Rapiers behind, fitted lasers (which have to be proven by then), and ASW FFs also fitted.

  Shore radars.

  Carriers well offshore.

  SSNs.

  Port Stanley airfield extended, repaired and preferably capable of operating fast jets. Arrester gear?

  2 separate runways NW/SW. Boost gear?

  Hardened shelters.

  A10s [US ground attack aircraft]?

  What is the threat?

  Arg Paras to grab a LZ [Landing Zone] for more to pour in. Main limitation has to be aircraft for transport because sea transport not possible vs SSN threat.

  Coup de main on our main airfield.

  So main defensive position much as for Argentinian defence but with the advantage for us that Stanley is furthest point away from mainland and much more supportable from sea.

  Outposts in far west with radar/radio/Rapier.

  The stocktaking process is essential to the management of an attritive war. You rob Peter to pay Paul – ships for aircraft, aircraft for soldiers, soldiers for time and time for ships. The campaign is full of examples. Once the elements of surprise and manoeuvre have been lost, as they largely were by now, the profit and loss account becomes critically important to sensible continued conduct of the battle.

  28 May

  Apart from time being against us – the AM39 threat is getting worse I fear. It can’t be long before they find a way to double refuel it [the Etendard] and extend range further. So how to catch him? Forward picket line? Back CAP? Hope to goodness? No very satisfactory answers. Evidence if threat is reduced to minimum is:

  a. SHEFFIELD – tacdi [recce aircraft for tactical direction] gave us south of Port Stanley. Clear vis enabled him to see funnel smoke. Hung about a bit but fired at main body – SHEFFIELD pulled first missile off. Second chaffed by YARMOUTH. M ax range on that occasion about 400 miles with a bit possibly in hand (4/5/82).

  b. Over the next sixteen days, we never spent more than short periods within 460 miles of Rio Grande (or anywhere else) during daylight. Occasional night rushes forward (e.g. Pebble Island and night insertions). They certainly knew we were about but never came to us. Didn’t go within 460/440 miles of Gallegos/St Julian/Deseado either. No air attacks on us from start to finish. Inevitable conclusion is that they can’t reach us yet, even with AAR (which we know they now have).

  c. However, from D-Day, we started ‘bulging‘ forward in order to provide adequate CAP over the AOA. After two days in one spot, I moved south fifty miles. Still no attacks on us although most of day spent between 420/440 miles from Rio Grande and first two days within 420 of Deseado. D+4 saw us back in the northern bulge some 440 miles from Rio Grande and some 400 from Deseado. The Etendard attacked from 310 (the direction of Deseado) and disappeared without anyone seeing where he went. CAP was placed over Stanley but not a sniff. I am tempted to conclude that Etendard range is 400 odd miles and that they will send him off from the closer base. It is the simpler interpretation of the known facts though there are many not quite so simple, e.g. they only got their new supply of missiles on 25th May.

  Nevertheless, the absence of any attack on the force while we have kept beyond 460 miles does suggest fairly strongly that they have no capability to do so – at least from low level.

  The 28th has been a dull day with poor weather predominating. Argentinians quite active but not aggressive. Army went to Goose Green and Darwin. Apparently successful so far. No doubt worrying about heli-borne counter-attacks. Pucaras also being troublesome, but I don’t really know how to get at them. Low CAP suggested by 317.1.1 [COMAW] but lack of stay-time makes this less sensible than interdiction of his various possible bases. By 1515 the clues are assembling themselves for an Etendard attack – two fast ones ex-RG [Rio Grande], others from Gallegos point the way, and conditions are right. Would have expected a dusk event really but this fits a possible tacdi run by Brazilian Bandeirante [recce aircraft] as well.

  In the out-turn. Goose Green Arg forces surrendered and numbers of Arg aircraft started flying into Stanley – presumably for lack of anywhere else to go with fuel. Should be able to catch the lot tomorrow – those that NGS doesn’t tonight.

  We never did sort out the Etendard/Exocet radius of action, largely because the Args were on the AAR learning curve too it transpires. It was, nevertheless, a very important judgement to get right if the Etendards were not to present an impossible-to-manage all round threat to the BG. We did, in fact, get it right for each occasion but I suspect it was more a matter of luck than judgement.

  29 May

  Meanwhile we get through a good flying day with ships toing and froing all over the place. BRISTOL (the spare flagship) sent off to look after ships in the LOLA [Loitering and Logistics Area – an area, well east of BG, for non-combatant ships to sort themselves out]. BRITISH WYE [commercial tanker – empty] attacked with four bombs way out to the east which fortunately missed but a nasty fright for all – the Args used a Herc
ules. Now we must arm all our ships everywhere I fear. A new phase? Also marked by a Canberra night bombing raid – an obvious thing to do once we settle into formal position.

  30 May

  Nearly a month in the front line and not far off our last. Two Etendard and two other a/c came in from SSW at 1730-ish. Exocet and Etendard radar, three radar contacts. Sea Dart engagement (three weapons) by EXETER (with not a word on AAWC UHF! [Anti-Air Warfare Co-ordination: Ultra High Frequency radio circuit]), gun engagement by AVENGER. One a/c claimed to have been splashed. Indications of raid obtained in good time but I allowed warning to be rescinded too soon by a good half-hour. They must have been tanking.

  Timings were:

  1545

  Left Base

  1730

  Attacking

  1835

  RTB [Return to Base]

  So the tanking process can take up to forty-five minutes.

  This lot came in from SSW – and the feeling I get is that they are trying to get round the edges but having difficulty. Once again they tried to fire past the picket, this time AVENGER who was sculling about down there mending something and narrowly avoided a. an Exocet and b. bombs (which were seen). Thus, it seems we need:

  RRs plus goalies.

  Chaff Sierra.

  Pickets, DDGs or whatever a good twenty miles out with DDGs interspersed.

  Locap (Low CAP) during threat period suitably placed fifty nm out.

  And incidentally, Chandos [Radio intercept] heard a little Spanish chatter, v little, during main event.

  So we avoided an Exocet attack for the first time or they got it wrong, or the missile was duff despite the ESM detection of its [homing] head. I must find more ways of helping the opposition to make mistakes. What about Chaff Charlie [chaff fired by guns], for instance, every ten to fifteen minutes of the alertment period? Aimed to give an additional picket layer outside the real one. But this ‘purely defensive’ situation is unsatisfactory. I think we will have to go for Rio Grande with a Harrier strike or something.

  There is one other odd feature. On the three occasions he has attacked us in open water, all have been in the very best visibility. It could be coincidental, but he does seem to come only on those days when the air is crystal clear – and there have been many days when it was less than perfect that I had thought good enough but he hasn’t come.

  Another awkward feature is that we’re really not sure how many Exocets have been fired. The SHEFFIELD occasion called for two, one at SHEFFIELD, a second half an hour later into the main body – very odd and fairly unlikely as a tactic. CONVEYOR had, observed by BRILLIANT GWS 25 TV [television guidance], two very close together but only one hole in CONVEYOR. The people in San Carlos Water are sure they have seen one go whizzing by and now another singleton. And there just could have been another one on 1st May. So we are left with two each on two occasions, and perhaps three other singletons.

  31 May

  And today’s extra problem is the Arg ‘hospital ship’ BAHIA PARAISO. Previously used as a transport, now stated to be a hospital ship, reported to be approaching FI to arrive at 1400, i.e. three hours after dawn. We have to board – but this is best done by ship. If done by ship, it has to be done at night if ship is not to be at severe risk of air attack. Therefore do by aircraft – helos from CARLOS – not easy because getting the necessary co-ord together. Helo surface search, helo boarding after calling to stop, waiting during internal search then extraction of party which has to include hard men, doctor and OIC [Officer-in-Charge]. Cor! But must try.

  By 1800 the PARAISO bit seems to have gone quite well. Stopped obediently, permitted search, nothing found, told to go join CANBERRA. What an odd war!

  Panic in the afternoon. INVINCIBLE CAP reported four possible swept wing a/c parked along edge of Port Stanley runway. So laid on an instant two [bomb] tossers, two racketeers strike and four CAP overhead. Found four Pucaras, probably old kit anyway. Damaged both GR3s board – lucky to get them back. Very angry with INVINCIBLE. Actually we knew all along, it turned out from examination of the Photographic Interpreters records (in HERMES). So INVINCIBLE didn’t do it all on her own; HERMES got it wrong as well. It was the old business of intelligence going to ground in time and not ensuring the necessary turnover/continuity.

  Weather has been OK for Exocet today though rather a tot of heavy snow flurries. Nothing yet I’m glad to say. Args vehemently claiming hits on INVINCIBLE: Beeb denying. Suspect my team, after this afternoon’s fiasco, don’t care much either way! The usual scurry of night NGS ships, convoys, stragglers, RASers board – the daily business plus a rumour of Peruvian SMs joining in and the Args to make a last desperate bid to come at us from the mainland. Meanwhile it blows Force8 from the SW: not a day for a swim.

  Thinking about the final Task Group, it’s beginning to look like:

  INVINCIBLE and ANDROMEDA as her goalie

  BRISTOL as flagship

  EXETER

  FORT GRANGE CARDIFF

  TIDESPRING

  AVENGER

  OLNA

  ACTIVE*

  RESOURCE

  AMBUSCADE*

  STENA SEASPREAD or relief

  MINERVA

  MCMV squadron

  PENELOPE

  With *s to be relieved first.

  At least at that stage there should be no further need to run convoys all the way to Carlos and the BG can probably lie well back and clear of all but Canberras. Without the high pressure on convoys and night support operations and little need for an inshore squadron, the number of escorts should prove adequate too.

  Now what to do about an Arg final fling? If it be to the W side of W Falkland, I don’t think I care – we can do it over once we have Port Stanley.

  Counting chickens again but the signal arrived today nominating FOF3 [Flag Officer 3rd Flotilla] (Derek Reffell) to relieve on station ‘about the end of June’ which will suit me well enough. If all goes smoothly, should be back in Ascension by mid-July, fly home and make it for Cowes week. All seems a bit unlikely really – and there are plenty of hurdles to clear. I find myself wishing for the peace of the IOW on a summer evening. I wonder how much leave they’d allow me. With ships only getting six weeks to turn round, it all looks fairly cheerless.

  While it can seem that I was over-concerned with roulement problems and should have been more prepared to leave it all to the management, inputs from the front line Commanders are an essential part of the process leading to the final decision from home.

  1 June

  The ‘Glorious First of June’ is celebrated at 0750 by Action Stations instigated by the Captain who is playing things very safe, too safe perhaps when he flies CAP at shadows. At one stage or another though everyone gets a bit persecuted. And it is anyway difficult/undesirable to reverse the Captain’s orders! Hope he’s not cracking up permanently.

  I have a worry that the signal situation is on the verge of falling over. The quantity is horrendous, yet the organisation (perhaps because so far from home) seems to demand it. I feel that a major operational problem on top might crack it totally. And it has to be possible that the Args will make a final effort air and sea. Indeed their recent inactivity can be interpreted as opportunity for major regrouping or as acceptance of defeat.

  We finally splashed a Hercules near the AOA with a CAP a/c so we’re a bit pleased with ourselves. Hope the warm feeling is not marred by a return disaster. It is perfect Etendard weather, the main body is in a bit of a muddle and my frigates are all over the place.

  By 1920 they haven’t come so they’re probably not going to. Meanwhile we have whispers of Peruvian assistance to the Argentinians and fear that they may help out with the AM 39 SKs – these being a worst case for us. Args would be in a tearing hurry for them, so bearing in mind the limited range, they’d have to use Pebble Island now (less likely Fox Bay) for staging unless they went to Stanley direct which their range makes less likely too. Plan, therefore, to run extra CAP.

  Wha
t to do in the morning? I wonder. Aggressive CAP/recce along N coast? First light armed recce is fairly obvious. Whether to retire even further to E and use Carlos airstrip as FOB [Forward Operating Base]. Meanwhile what about surface search? What about [Argentinian] Sea Kings being used as a ruse de guerre with a bloody great bomb? Or hard men? So we must institute a special recovery routine for SKs which must be rigidly adhered to in future. Anyone not observing it gets a bullet in his guts.

  Of course, it is important not to go overboard in doing ‘worst case’ assessments. The threat reduction simply says he needs more helos for troop movements; here are a couple of stripped out Navy ones the Navy won’t need any more because it isn’t going to sea.

  However, it adds more pressure to the urge to get offshore, use the FOB at Carlos and Goose Green, ferrying GR3s and SHARs all the way in; fuel; do job; ferry back. Start convoys from further out; use T22s and provide them with CAP, and so on.

  2 June

  And sure enough, BRISTOL and INVINCIBLE get a valid 909 contact with all the right noises/indications board – eventually sorted out as weather (Course speed generally downwind – towards us – at 16,000 feet). Not helped because we had about three SAR helos up looking for a SHAR pilot (SARBE ISAR beacon] and voice heard on Guard channel occasionally since he went off air some eight or nine hours ago on a singleton jaunt – his oppo had gone u/s on deck). Pilot finally picked up about 0330 in his dinghy fifty miles offshore in the middle of nowhere. Lucky. And his own fault for: